Anger Hart v. Commissioner of Social Security et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING AND AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S 16 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 13 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 11 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S 17 OBJECTIONS. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment on this matter. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 11/7/16. (copy to counsel via CM/ECF) (lmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
KELLY ANN ANGER HART,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:16CV32
(STAMP)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING AND AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION,
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
I.
Procedural History
The plaintiff, Kelly Ann Anger Hart (“Anger Hart”), filed an
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title
II of the Social Security Act.
In the application, Anger Hart
alleged disability since December 4, 2011 due to lumbar spinal
stenosis,
high
blood
pressure,
abnormal
cell
growth,
thyroid
disorder, and diabetes mellitus.
The
Social
Security
Administration
denied
application initially and on reconsideration.
Anger
Hart’s
Anger Hart then
appeared with counsel at a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”).
At the hearing, Anger Hart testified on her own
behalf, as did a vocational expert.
The ALJ issued a decision
finding that Anger Hart suffered from a severe impairment of
“degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status post L4-L5
laminectomy.”
ECF No. 9-2 at 15.
However, the ALJ found that
Anger Hart was not disabled under the Social Security Act but
instead found that Anger Hart had a residual functional capacity to
perform her past relevant work, at a light exertional level with
certain non-exertional restrictions.
were denied.
Thus, Anger Hart’s benefits
Anger Hart then timely filed an appeal of the
decision to the Appeals Council.
The Appeals Council denied Anger
Hart’s request for review.
Anger Hart then filed a request for judicial review of the
ALJ’s decision in this Court.
The case was referred to United
States Magistrate Judge James E. Seibert for submission of proposed
findings of fact and recommendation for disposition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B).
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
After consideration of those motions, the magistrate judge entered
a report recommending that Anger Hart’s motion for summary judgment
be denied and that the defendant’s motion for summary judgement be
granted.
Anger Hart filed timely objections to the report and
recommendation.
Hart’s
objections
The defendant then filed a response to Anger
stating
that
the
defendant
relies
on
the
magistrate judge’s reasoning and the defendant’s prior briefs.
II.
Applicable Law
Because the plaintiff timely filed objections to the report
and recommendation, the magistrate judge’s recommendation will be
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reviewed de novo as to those findings to which objections were
made.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
As to those findings to which
objections were not made, the findings and recommendations will be
upheld unless they are “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
III.
Discussion
Anger Hart argues that the ALJ made four errors: (1) that she
failed to address contradictory evidence; (2) that she improperly
evaluated treating physicians’ opinions; (3) that she overly-relied
on state-agency consulting physicians’ opinions; and (4) that she
made
various
errors
in
her
residual
functional
capacity
determination. Magistrate Judge Seibert concluded that the ALJ did
not err in any of those respects.
Anger Hart has objected as to
each.
A.
Failure to Address Evidence
Anger Hart argues that the ALJ failed to address evidence that
she claims contradicts the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Anger Hart’s
ability to ambulate effectively. Specifically, she argues that the
ALJ failed to consider treatment notes from Catherine Chua, D.O.,
regarding her ability to ambulate and that the ALJ ignored portions
of Anger Hart’s testimony regarding whether she could ambulate
effectively.
The
magistrate
judge
concluded
that
the
ALJ
considered all of Dr. Chua’s opinions and treatment notes, and
properly considered Anger Hart’s testimony.
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In her objections,
Anger Hart argues that the ALJ made her own medical opinion based
on the “raw medical data” and ignored Dr. Chua’s opinions, that the
ALJ’s conclusion that she is able to ambulate effectively is
contradicted by her finding that Anger Hart’s degenerative disc
disease status post L4-L5 laminectomy was a severe impairment, and
that she otherwise ignored portions of Anger Hart’s testimony.
“In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court
does not re-weigh conflicting evidence . . . or substitute its own
judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
The ALJ must “always consider the
medical opinions in . . . [the] record together with the rest of
the relevant evidence . . . receive[d].”
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b).
In evaluating these opinions, the ALJ should consider: (1) “[h]ow
long the source has known and how frequently the source has seen
the individual;” (2) “[h]ow consistent the opinion is with other
evidence;” (3) “[t]he degree to which the source presents relevant
evidence to support an opinion;” (4) “[h]ow well the source
explains the opinion;” (5) “[w]hether the source has a specialty or
area of expertise related to the individual’s impairment(s);” and
(6) “[a]ny other factors that tend to support or refute the
opinion.”
Id. at 4-5.
Further, because the ALJ directly observed
the plaintiff’s live testimony, her credibility determinations are
“to be given great weight.” Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 98990 (4th Cir. 1984).
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First, the ALJ properly considered all of Dr. Chua’s opinions
and treatment notes. While the ALJ did not comment on the specific
treatment notes identified by Anger Hart, the ALJ rejected Dr.
Chua’s conclusions regarding Anger Hart’s ability to ambulate
effectively
after
extensively
considering
Dr.
Chua’s
medical
opinions, treatment history, and other relevant material.
The ALJ
concluded that Dr. Chua’s opinion was not supported by objective
medical evidence, was internally inconsistent, and that there was
a significant gap in treatment.
Anger
Hart’s
degenerative
Second, the ALJ’s conclusion that
disc
disease
status
post
L4-L5
laminectomy was a severe impairment is not inconsistent with her
finding that Anger Hart could ambulate effectively, as those issues
are
legally
distinct.
Third,
the
ALJ
extensively
discussed
conflicting portions of Anger Hart’s testimony, allowing this Court
to track the ALJ’s reasoning for crediting some portions and
discrediting other portions.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not ignore
any relevant evidence.
B.
Medical Opinions
Second, Anger Hart argues that the ALJ did not give proper
weight to the medical opinions of Dr. Chua and Richard Douglas,
M.D.
Specifically, she argues that the ALJ erred in disregarding
Dr. Chua’s conclusion that met Anger Heart Listing 1.04C, and that
the ALJ did not afford Dr. Chua and Dr. Douglas’s opinions proper
weight.
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First, the ALJ correctly disregarded Dr. Chua’s conclusion
that Anger Hart met Listing 1.04C, as that was a legal conclusion
for the ALJ to make.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
Second, the
ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Chua and Dr. Douglas’s opinions
regarding the amount of weight Anger Hart could lift because those
conclusions were based on Anger Hart’s subjective statements and
because they were contradicted by the state-agency consulting
physician’s RFC assessment.
Further, the ALJ concluded that Anger
Hart’s subjective statements and complaints to the doctors were
inconsistent, that Dr. Chua’s opinion was inconsistent with her
treatment
notes,
and
that
Dr.
Chua’s
diagnosis
of
myotonic
dystrophy was contradicted by a consulting neurologist’s conclusion
that there was no evidence of a myotonic disorder.
Accordingly,
the ALJ properly considered all of the medical evidence.
C.
State-Agency Consulting Physicians’ Opinions
Anger Hart argues that the ALJ unreasonably relied on state-
agency consulting physicians’ opinions because the ALJ provided
“boilerplate reasons” for doing so, the ALJ failed to resolve
conflicts between the consulting physicians’ opinions and Anger
Hart’s treatment history, the ALJ ignored unidentified treating
physicians’ opinions, the ALJ unreasonably relied on the consulting
physicians’ RFC recommendations, and the ALJ reviewed evidence
favorable to Anger Hart “under a much stricter microscope.”
The
magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ provided a sufficient
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explanation
opinions.
for
her
reliance
on
the
consulting
physicians’
Anger Hart objects to this conclusion.
While “the opinion of a doctor who never examined or treated
the patient cannot serve to refute the conclusions of the patient’s
treating
physician,”
Sheppard
&
Enoch
Pratt
Hosp.,
Inc.
v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 1994), the ALJ may
make credibility determinations and give whatever weight she deems
appropriate to the medical opinions in the record.
§ 404.1527(c)(2).
20 C.F.R.
The ALJ gave great weight to the consulting
physicians’ opinions because they were the most consistent with the
rest of the medical evidence.
As discussed above, the ALJ fully
explained why she discredited Dr. Chua’s opinions and why they were
given
less
weight
than
the
consulting
physicians’
opinions.
Further, the ALJ correctly considered Dr. Chua and the consulting
physicians’ RFC opinions as evidence while making the ultimate RFC
determination herself. Finally, Anger Hart provides no examples of
the ALJ not treating all evidence with the same level of scrutiny.
D.
Residual Functional Capacity
Anger Hart argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she
performed light-level work in the past and that she could perform
her past relevant work as she actually performed it.
In determining whether an applicant can perform her past
relevant
work,
an
ALJ
must
compare
her
“residual
functional
capacity assessment . . . with the physical and mental demands of
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[the claimant’s] past relevant work,” and the claimant is not
disabled if the claimant “can still do this kind of work.”
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
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An ALJ may consider evidence regarding
whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to meet
the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant
work as the claimant “actually performed it or as generally
performed in the national economy.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b).
Thus, a claimant is not disabled if she has the residual functional
capacity
to
perform
her
past
relevant
work
as
she
actually
performed it or as it is generally performed in the national
economy.
The ALJ applied the appropriate standard in concluding that
Anger Hart had the residual functional capacity to perform her past
relevant work as a fast-food worker as that work is generally
performed in the national economy. The ALJ based her findings upon
the vocational expert’s testimony that Anger Hart’s past work as a
fast-food worker is classified as light-level work and that, based
on hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ, Anger Hart was capable
of performing light-level work.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the magistrate judge’s report
and
recommendation
(ECF
No.
16)
is
AFFIRMED
and
ADOPTED.
Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
13) is GRANTED, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
8
No. 11) is DENIED, and the plaintiff’s objections to the report and
recommendation (ECF No. 17) are OVERRULED.
It is further ORDERED
that this civil action be STRICKEN from the active docket of this
Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
on this matter.
DATED:
November 7, 2016
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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