Gresham v. Norfolk Southern, et al
Filing
172
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 159 MOTION to Reopen Case and denying as moot all other motions filed: Norfolk Southern Corporation's 162 MOTION to Strike and for Sanctions; Plaintiff's 163 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction; Norfolk Southern Corporation's 165 MOTION for Order Prohibiting Further Filings; Plaintiff's 166 MOTION for Extension of Time to File; Plaintiff's 167 MOTION to Vacate; Plaintiff's 167 MOTION for Joinder; Plai ntiff's 167 MOTION to Amend; Plaintiff's 167 MOTION for Default Judgment Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), FRCivP; Plaintiff's 167 MOTION to Intervene and Plaintiff's 169 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages. In addition, Plaintiff is hereby warned that any further filing of frivolous motions will result in a pre-filing review order. Signed by Senior Judge David A. Faber on 7/28/2015. (cc: Plaintiff, Pro Se and counsel of record) (arb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BLUEFIELD
LATHRONEA P. GRESHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:92-01003
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION
a.d.b.a Norfolk & Western
Railway Company, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In 1992, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendants, her
employer, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and sex in
violation of both Title VII and the West Virginia Human Rights
Act.
On July 21, 1994, after a multi-day bench trial, the court
entered judgment in favor of defendants and ordered the case
removed from the court’s docket.
On September 8, 1995, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s judgment.
On April 2, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to reopen this
case which she titled “Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion to
Re-open Legal Actions for Relief from Judgments Pursuant to FRCP
60(4), (6)(d)(3) - Fraud Upon the Court by Officers of the Court,
et al to Conceal Violations of Various Laws by Defendants
Including Those Defined in 18 U.S. Code Section 1961(1)(A)(B),
Etc.”
(Doc. No. 159).
Defendants have filed a response to
plaintiff’s motion indicating their opposition to reopening the
case, as well as a motion to strike and for sanctions.
After a review of plaintiff’s filings, it is clear that she
is not entitled to relief under either Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4) or 60(d)(3).
“Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in
the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a
certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due
process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be
heard.”
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S.
260, 271 (2010).
Plaintiff does not point to any jurisdictional
error or due process violation such that Rule 60(b)(4) is
implicated.
court.
Likewise, she has failed to show fraud upon the
Of the high bar a litigant faces in proving fraud upon
the court, our appeals court recently explained:
We have likewise underscored the constricted scope
of the fraud on the court doctrine. In Great Coastal,
we held that fraud on the court is a “nebulous concept”
that “should be construed very narrowly” lest it
entirely swallow up Rule 60(b)(3). 675 F.2d at 1356.
We stressed that this doctrine should be invoked only
when parties attempt “the more egregious forms of
subversion of the legal process . . ., those that we
cannot necessarily expect to be exposed by the normal
adversary process.” Id. at 1357. Even the “perjury
and fabricated evidence” present in Great Coastal,
which were “reprehensible” and unquestionable “evils,”
were not adequate to permit relief as fraud on the
court because “the legal system encourages and expects
litigants to root them out as early as possible.” Id.
Instead, the doctrine is limited to situations such as
“bribery of a judge or juror, or improper influence
exerted on the court by an attorney, in which the
integrity of the court and its ability to function
impartially is directly impinged.” Id. at 1356.
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In succeeding cases we have emphasized this
circumscribed understanding of fraud on the court. In
Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., we held
that fraud on the court involves “corruption of the
judicial process itself” and thus the doctrine cannot
support allegations involving a “routine evidentiary
conflict.” 827 F.2d 984, 986 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To hold otherwise, we found,
would “seriously undermine[ ] the principle of
finality” by permitting “parties to circumvent the Rule
60(b)(3) one-year time limitation.” Id. at 987.
Later, in In re Genesys Data Technologies, Inc., we
recognized that “[c]ourts and authorities agree that
fraud on the court must be narrowly construed” or it
would “subvert the balance of equities” contained
within Rule 60(b)(3). 204 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Because the
power to vacate a judgment for fraud upon the court is
so free from procedural limitations, it is limited to
fraud that seriously affects the integrity of the
normal process of adjudication.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). We therefore held that
“[f]raud between parties” would not be fraud on the
court, “even if it involves [p]erjury by a party or
witness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fox ex rel. Fox v. Elk Run Coal Co., 739 F.3d 131, 135–36 (4th
Cir. 2014).
As to defendants’ motion for sanctions, “[t]he court has the
power to impose filing restrictions and sanctions on plaintiffs
who repeatedly file frivolous motions and complaints.”
Karangiannopoulos v. City of Lowell, No. 3:14-CV-728, 2015 WL
4389522, *2 (W.D.N.C. Jul. 17, 2015).
This case has been closed
for over 20 years and plaintiff is now aware of the extremely
high bar she faces in reopening this matter.
Furthermore,
defendants have incurred needless expense in defending
defendant’s various filings.
For these reasons, plaintiff’s
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motion to reopen is hereby DENIED and the other motions filed are
DENIED as moot.
In addition,
PLAINTIFF IS HEREBY WARNED THAT ANY FURTHER FILING OF
FRIVOLOUS MOTIONS WILL RESULT IN A PRE-FILING REVIEW
ORDER.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to plaintiff, pro se.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2015.
ENTER:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
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