Graham v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA
Filing
80
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 73 MOTION by Robert E. Graham to Reconsider 68 Memorandum Opinion and Order, and/or MOTION by Robert E. Graham to Certify Questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals filed by Robert E. Graham. Signed by Judge David A. Faber on 4/19/2013. (cc: counsel of record) (mjp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
IN BLUEFIELD
ROBERT E. GRAHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:10-00453
NATIONAL UNION INSURANCE CO.
OF PITTSBURGH, PA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On March 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider,
or in the alternative, to certify questions to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.
Doc. No. 73.
For the following
reasons, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
Discussion
As an initial matter, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not recognize a "motion to reconsider" per se.
Nevertheless,
Plaintiff cites both Rule 59 and Rule 60 as the bases for its
filing styled "motion to reconsider."
I. Rule 59(e) “Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment”
Regarding Rule 59's relevance to this case, Plaintiff may
at a maximum avail himself of Rule 59(e), a Motion to Alter or
Amend a Judgment.
However, it is well recognized that Rule
59(e) may not be used to re-litigate old matters or raise
arguments or present evidence that could have been raised before
judgment.
(2008).
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486, n. 5
Rather, the Fourth Circuit has clearly identified three
circumstances under which a district court may alter or amend a
judgment under Rule 59(e): (1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice.
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins.
Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998).
Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit has allowed some flexibility to district courts
within the parameters of the three circumstances for granting a
Rule 59(e) motion.
Namely, Rule 59(e) allows a district court
"to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and the
appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate
proceedings."
Woltz v. Scarantino, 5:10-CV-00095 (S.D.W. Va.
Mar. 13, 2012)(citing Pacific Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403).
The only circumstance from Pacific Ins. Co. that could
fairly apply to Plaintiff's prayer for relief under Rule 59(e)
is the third, namely altering or amending the judgment to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.
After considering the instant motion, it is clear Plaintiff
simply disagrees with the court's ruling.
Plaintiff makes this
clear by excerpting arguments from his briefs regarding summary
judgment.
See generally Doc. No. 74, at 6, 8, 10-11.
The court
simply cannot find that failing to grant the Rule 59(e) motion
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would result in manifest injustice to the Plaintiff.
As a
reminder of the Fourth Circuit's pronouncement of the policy
behind Rule 59(e), it should be noted that granting such motion
“is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”
Bailes v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 3:09-CV-00146 (S.D.W. Va.
Feb. 9, 2010)(citing Pacific Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403).
Plaintiff presents no extraordinary need or circumstance to
justify such an extraordinary remedy.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion is DENIED.
II. Rule 60 Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order
Plaintiff does not specify whether he seeks relief under
Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b).
Nevertheless, as with relief under
Rule 59(e), relief under Rule 60 is not available for mere
disagreement with the court’s decision.
See Shelton v. Hayes,
197 F. App'x 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2006); cf. Broadway v. Norris,
193 F.3d 987, 989-90 (8th Cir. 1999)(“In their ‘motion for
reconsideration,’ defendants did nothing more than re-argue,
somewhat more fully, the merits of their claim [. . .] This is
not the purpose of Rule 60(b). It authorizes relief based on
certain enumerated circumstances (for example, fraud, changed
conditions, and the like). It is not a vehicle for simple reargument on the merits.”).
When “a motion is for reconsideration of legal issues
already addressed in an earlier ruling, the motion is not
3
authorized by Rule 60(b).”
CNF Constructors, Inc. v. Donohoe
Const. Co., 57 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 1995)(internal quotations
omitted).
Plaintiff’s motion clearly falls within this
category, thus making unwarranted the relief contemplated by
Rule 60.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Rule 60 motion is DENIED.
III. Plaintiff’s Suggestion to Certify the Question to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
Ordinarily, a court will order certification of a state
law question on its own motion because the court is “in the best
position to determine whether it feels confident in its own
reading of the state law.”
17A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4248
(3d ed.); cf. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391
(1974)(holding that the decision whether to certify a state law
issue to a state’s highest court is within “the sound discretion
of the federal court.”).
However, nothing absolutely bars a
party from suggesting certification, although suggesting
certification late in a proceeding weakens such a suggestion.
Id.; see also Boyd Rosene & Associates v. Kansas Mun. Gas
Agency, 178 F.3d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir. 1999)(noting that, with
only a few exceptions from the Fifth Circuit, parties request
certification before a court issues an opinion); Perkins v.
Clark Equipment Co., 823 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1987)(noting
that once a question is submitted for decision in a federal
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district court, only limited circumstances justify certification
after a case has been decided).
Because of the court’s confidence in its reading of West
Virginia law as it applies to this case and because Plaintiff
waited until after the court disposed of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment to request certification, the court accordingly
declines to submit any of Plaintiff’s proposed state law
questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
Conclusion
Construing Plaintiff’s “motion to reconsider” under either
Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
yields the same result—relief is not warranted.
Plaintiff’s instant motion is DENIED.
Accordingly,
Doc. No. 73.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of April, 2013.
ENTER:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
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