Satcher v. United States of America

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: the Court OVERRULES plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge VanDervort's PF&R; ADOPTS the factual and legal analysis contained within the PF&R; DENIES plaintiff's 1 APPLICATION to Proceed without Pre payment of Fees and Costs; DISMISSES plaintiff's 2 COMPLAINT; and DIRECTS the Clerk to remove this matter from the court's active docket. The court further DENIES a certificate of appealability. Signed by Senior Judge David A. Faber on 10/7/2015. (cc: counsel of record and plaintiff, pro se) (mk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
STEPHEN D. SATCHER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No: 1:12-07674

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Background

By Standing Order, this matter was referred to United
States Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort for submission of
proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

(Doc. No. 3).

The magistrate

judge submitted his proposed findings and recommendation
(“PF&R”) and recommended that the court deny plaintiff’s
application to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs,
(Doc. No. 1), and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. No. 2).
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b),
petitioner was allotted fourteen days, plus three mailing days,
in which to file any objections to the PF&R.

Plaintiff timely

filed objections, (Doc. No. 5), and, as a result, the court has
conducted a de novo review of the record as to those objections.
See 28 U.S.C. § 646(b)(1).

Because plaintiff’s objections are

without merit, the court adopts the PF&R and dismisses
petitioner’s petition.
II.

Analysis

On November 11, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).1

Plaintiff’s

first claim is one for false imprisonment in which he contends
that “[t]he United States, through the USMS and the FBOP, has
unlawfully imprisoned plaintiff in violation of the Due Process
Clause, federal statutes and the law of West Virginia.”
No. 2 at 3).
process.

(Doc.

Plaintiff’s second claim is one for abuse of

In support of this claim, plaintiff states that the

“United States, through the USMS and the FBOP has abused the
[j]udicial and [e]xecutive process for committing the plaintiff
to federal prison for detention and execution of his federal
sentence, in that the said federal agencies has [sic] willfully
misused the imprisonment process to decrease economic cost of
the same and to make it more convenient for both federal
agencies to carry out the imprisonment process.”

Id. at 5.

Plaintiff’s allegations stem from the failure of the United
States Marshals Service to endorse the “Return” portion of

1 Plaintiff’s complaint is, almost verbatim, a copy of another
complaint filed in this district. See Ephraim v. United States,
Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-0785. Neither plaintiff’s complaint
nor his objections to the PF&R persuade the court that the
ultimate disposition of plaintiff’s case should vary from
Ephraim.
2

plaintiff’s Judgment and Commitment Order when it delivered him
to Federal Correctional Institute (“FCI”) Beckley to begin
serving his federal sentence.2

Instead, a FBOP official signed

plaintiff’s Commitment Order.
Magistrate Judge VanDervort recommended the dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that his claims herein are
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In Heck, the

Supreme Court held that:
in
order
to
recover
damages
for
allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or a sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
28 U.S.C. § 2254.
A claim for damages bearing the
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87.3

Noting that plaintiff had not demonstrated that

his criminal conviction has been invalidated, Magistrate Judge
VanDervort concluded that plaintiff’s claims herein are subject
to the Heck bar.

See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 847 (4th

Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff’s illegal search and

2 The form has a signature line for a Deputy Marshal to sign on
behalf of the United States Marshal.
3 While Heck was a § 1983 case, numerous courts have applied it
to FTCA actions. Matthews v. United States, No. 1:12cv1473
(LO/TCB), 2015 WL 164805, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2015)
(and authorities cited therein).
3

seizure claim against state trooper under § 1983 was not
cognizable because judgment in plaintiff’s favor would have
implied the invalidity of conviction).
Plaintiff’s sole objection to the PF&R is to Magistrate
Judge VanDervort’s determination that Heck’s rule bars his
complaint.

According to plaintiff, his complaint challenges the

“lawfulness of the ‘process’ used by the US Marshals to commit
him to federal prison.”

(Doc. No. 5 at 3).

As a result,

plaintiff objects to the conclusion that Heck bars his FTCA
claim, as “the unlawfulness of his commitment in no way implies
that his conviction and sentence is unlawful.”

Id.

While plaintiff is correct, as a general matter, that false
imprisonment claims do not always necessarily implicate the
validity of a conviction or sentence, in this case, a judgment
in his favor would do so.

In West Virginia, a plaintiff

alleging false imprisonment must prove “(1) the detention of the
person, and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention and
restraint.”

Riffer v. Armstrong, 477 S.E.2d 535, 555 (W. Va.

1996) (quoting Williams v. Glen Alum Coal Co., 78 S.E. 94 (W.
Va. 1913)) (emphasis added).

Therefore, the only way plaintiff

can prevail on his false imprisonment claim is to show that his
conviction and/or sentence are illegal.

And, of course, to do

so under the facts and circumstances of this case would
necessarily imply that his conviction and/or sentence are
4

invalid.

Therefore, Magistrate Judge VanDervort was correct

that plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is barred by Heck and
his objection is overruled.
Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim is subject to dismissal
for failure to state a claim.

In West Virginia, “abuse of

process consists of the willful or malicious misuse or
misapplication of lawfully issued process to accomplish some
purpose not intended or warranted by that process.”

Williamson

v. Harden, 585 S.E.2d 369, 372 (W. Va. 2003) (quoting Preiser v.
MacQueen, 352 S.E.2d 22, 28 (W. Va. 1985)).

As the court

explained in Preiser:
Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in
that the gist of the tort is not commencing an action or
causing process to issue without justification, but
misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for
an end other than that which it was designed to
accomplish. The purpose for which the process is used,
once it is issued, is the only thing of importance
. . . . The essential elements of abuse of process, as
the tort has developed, have been stated to be: first,
an ulterior purpose, and second, a willful act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of
the proceeding.
Some definite act or threat not
authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not
legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and
there is no liability where the defendant has done
nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized
conclusion, even though with bad intentions.
Preiser, 352 S.E.2d at 28 n.8 (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of
the Law of Torts § 121 (1971)); see also Deel v. W. Va. EMS
Tech. Support Network, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:06-1064, 2009 WL
2366524, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. July 24, 2009).
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Even accepting as true the factual allegation of
plaintiff’s complaint, his allegations fall woefully short of
stating an abuse of process claim.

Plaintiff has not alleged a

“willful or malicious misuse” of process, nor has he alleged the
requisite improper purpose.

For these reasons, his abuse of

process claim was properly dismissed and his objection is
overruled.4

4 Like Mr. Ephraim, plaintiff previously contended in a § 2241
habeas case that his judgment and commitment order was invalid
because it was not properly executed and returned by the United
States Marshals Service and that his detention was unlawful.
Satcher v. Hogsten, Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00466 (S.D.W. Va.
Oct. 17, 2013). The court disagreed and dismissed Satcher’s
petition. See id. (and the authorities cited therein); aff’d
Satcher v. Hogsten, 576 F. App’x 221 (4th Cir. 2014).
Although under a different guise, it is clear that
plaintiff believes that he is entitled to relief for the failure
of the United States Marshals Service to execute the return on
his Judgment and Commitment Order. However, no authority for
this proposition exists. See Hall v. Loretto, 556 F. App’x 72,
73 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Hall has not cited, nor have we located, any
authority for the proposition that, where the United States
Marshal (or his or her deputy) does not complete the ‘return’
section of a defendant’s judgment and commitment order, the
defendant’s confinement is unlawful and he must be released.”).
18 U.S.C. § 3621(c) provides that “[w]hen a prisoner, pursuant
to a court order, is placed in the custody of a person in charge
of a penal or correctional facility, a copy of the order shall
be delivered to such person as evidence of this authority to
hold the prisoner, and the original order with the return
endorsed thereon, shall be returned to the court that issued
it.” (emphasis added). The statute requires only that the
return be endorsed, not that the United States Marshal Service
be the one to do it.
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III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES plaintiff’s objections to
Magistrate Judge VanDervort’s PF&R.

The court ADOPTS the

factual and legal analysis contained within the PF&R, DENIES
plaintiff’s application to proceed without prepayment of fees
and costs, (Doc. No. 1), DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc.
No. 2), and DIRECTS the Clerk to remove this matter from the
court’s active docket.
Additionally, the court has considered whether to grant a
certificate of appealability.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

A

certificate will not be granted unless there is “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
2253(c)(2).

Id. §

The standard is satisfied only upon a showing that

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the
constitutional claims by this court is debatable or wrong and
that any dispositive procedural ruling is likewise debatable.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38 (2003); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,
683–84 (4th Cir. 2001).

The court concludes that the governing

standard is not satisfied in this instance.

Accordingly the

court DENIES a certificate of appealability.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to plaintiff, pro se.

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IT IS SO ORDERED on this 7th day of October, 2015.
ENTER:

David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge

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