Harris v. Hogsten

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The court OVERRULES petitioner's objections to Magistrate Judge Eifert's PF&R. The Court ADOPTS the 14 Proposed Findings and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Eifert; DENIES 1 and 6 PETITION and AMEND ED PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus; 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Christopher L. Harris is DENIED as MOOT, 3 MOTION to Compel production of documents filed by Christopher L. Harris is DENIED as MOOT, DENIES 9 and 10 no tice of appeal and MOTION to Alter or Amend Judgment filed by Christopher L. Harris, DENIES 5 Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees or Costs filed by Christopher L. Harris, and DISMISSES this matter from the court's active docket. Signed by Judge David A. Faber on 11/13/2013. (cc: petitioner, pro se) (mjp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
CHRISTOPHER L. HARRIS,
Petitioner,
v.

Civil Action No: 1:13-11595

KAREN HOGSTEN,
Warden
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court are petitioner’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 1),
motion to compel production of documents (Doc. No. 3),
application to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs
(Doc. No. 5), amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 6), motion for leave to
file a supplemental brief (Doc. No. 7), notice of appeal (Doc.
No. 9), motion to alter or amend judgment (Doc. No. 10), and
motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 11).

By Standing

Order, this matter was referred to United States Magistrate
Judge Cheryl A. Eifert for submission of proposed findings and
recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B).

(Doc. No. 2).

The magistrate judge submitted her

proposed findings and recommendation (“PF&R”) on October 29,
2013.

(Doc. No. 14).

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b),
petitioner was allotted fourteen days, plus three mailing days,
in which to file any objections to the PF&R.
objections to the PF&R on November 5, 2013.

Petitioner filed
(Doc. No. 15).

Petitioner’s objections are without merit for the reasons that
follow.
I.

Background
Petitioner was convicted in the Southern District of

Indiana in 1999 for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.
(Doc. No. 6 at 1).

Petitioner is currently serving a sentence

of 300 months imprisonment for the conviction.

In this

petition, like in previous petitions brought in the sentencing
court, petitioner claims the sentencing court lacked
jurisdiction over the parcels of property where the criminal
activity occurred; consequently, petitioner alleges the district
court in Indiana violated its “jurisdictional limitations.”
(Doc. Nos. 6 at 6, 7 at 2-3, 8, 11 at 1-2).
II.

Petitioner’s Objections to the PF&R

The magistrate judge concluded that the claims raised by
petitioner in his § 2241 petition are ones properly considered
under § 2255.

Because petitioner was sentenced in the Southern

District of Indiana, and relief under § 2255 is not “inadequate
or ineffective,” the magistrate judge concluded that this court
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is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

The

magistrate judge further determined that the petition should not
be transferred to the Southern District of Indiana because
petitioner has sought relief under § 2255 in the sentencing
court on multiple occasions, and he has not obtained a
certification to file a second or successive motion from any
circuit court.
Petitioner purports to object to the PF&R, but he obviously
does not understand the objection process.

In his objections,

petitioner pleads “affirmative defenses” such as estoppel,
fraud, and illegality.

(Doc. No. 15).

All the while, the

actual findings of the PF&R go unaddressed.

The objections “do

not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s
[PF&R]” because they are “general and conclusory.”
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

Orpiano v.

Such non-specific and

patently frivolous objections waive the right to a de novo
review.1

That said, the court has reviewed the PF&R, the record,

and the objections.

After this review, the court determines

that petitioner’s objections are wholly meritless.

The court

1

The court recognizes that petitioner is proceeding pro se and
therefore his filings are held to a less stringent standard than
if they were prepared by a lawyer. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972).
Nonetheless, even under this liberal
standard, petitioner’s supposed objections fail to warrant a de
novo review.
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adopts the magistrate judge’s succinct factual and legal
analysis in its entirety.
Petitioner is quite obviously challenging the validity of
his conviction and not matters pertaining to his “commitment or
sentence” as required to file a petition under § 2241.
U.S.C. § 2242.

See 28

Petitioner presents no dispute as to the date of

his commitment or calculation of his sentence.

He simply

complains of the alleged lack of federal enclave jurisdiction.
As pointed out by the magistrate judge, petitioner has raised
these same jurisdictional issues in multiple meritless Rule
60(b) motions.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals aptly

called defendant’s actions a “campaign of frivolous motions and
appeals.”

United States v. Christopher L. Harris, Case No.

1:98-cr-00121-SEB-DKL (S.D. Ind.), Doc. No. 143 at 4.
Consequently, as determined by the magistrate judge,
petitioner’s claims are ones properly considered under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, rather than § 2241.

Because motions under § 2255 must

be filed in the sentencing court, jurisdiction is proper in the
Southern District of Indiana.

And because petitioner has

proceeded on several occasions under § 2255 in the sentencing
court and has not obtained certification to file a successive
motion, the court will dismiss the petition rather than transfer
it to the sentencing court.

4 

Even if petitioner were properly challenging matters
pertaining to his “commitment or detention” as required under §
2241, the court would still dismiss the petition.

The explicit

terms of § 2255 state that a petition under § 2241 cannot be
entertained unless a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
2255(e).

28 U.S.C. §

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that

relief is inadequate or ineffective when:

“(1) at the time of

conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court
established the legality of his conviction; (2) subsequent to
the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the
substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the
prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the
prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255
because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.”
Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000).

In re

The petitioner

bears the burden of showing that relief under § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective.

Hood v. United States, 13 F. App’x

72 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished decision); Jeffers v. Chandler,
253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001).

As stated by the magistrate

judge, the petitioner “states no recognized basis to find that a
motion under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective.”
at 4).

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(Doc. No. 14

III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES petitioner’s objections to
Magistrate Judge Eifert’s PF&R.

The court adopts the factual

and legal analysis contained within the PF&R; DENIES
petitioner’s petition and amended petition for writ of habeas
corpus (Doc. Nos. 1, 6); DENIES petitioner’s motion to compel
production of documents (Doc. No. 3) as MOOT; DENIES
petitioner’s application to proceed without prepayment of fees
and costs (Doc. No. 5); DENIES petitioner’s notice of appeal and
motion to alter or amend judgment (Doc. Nos. 9, 10) as no
judgment existed that could have been appealed, altered, or
amended at the time of those filings; DENIES petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 11) as MOOT;

and DISMISSES

this matter from the court’s active docket.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to petitioner, pro se.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 13th day of November, 2013.
ENTER:

David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge

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