Harris v. Holder

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court finds that plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the 9 PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge VanDervort; DENIES plaintiff's 1 PETITION for Writ of Mandamus, DE NIES 3 MOTION for Perpetual and Mandatory Injunction filed by Christopher L. Harris, DENIES 7 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Christopher L. Harris, and directs the Clerk to remove these matters from the court's docket. The court DENIES a certificate of appealability. Signed by Judge David A. Faber on 9/3/2014. (cc: Plaintiff, pro se and counsel of record) (mjp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
CHRISTOPHER L. HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-0584

ERIC HOLDER,
United States Attorney General,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
By Standing Order, the action was referred to United
States Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort for submission of
findings of fact and recommendations regarding disposition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Magistrate Judge

VanDervort submitted his Findings and Recommendation (“PF&R”) to
the court on August 21, 2014, in which he recommended that the
court deny plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus; deny
petitioner’s “Motion for Perpetual and Mandatory Injunction;”
deny petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; and
remove this matter from the court’s docket.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b),
the parties were allotted fourteen days plus three mailing days
in which to file any objections to Magistrate Judge VanDervort’s
Findings and Recommendations.
filed timely objections.

On August 28, 2014, plaintiff

With respect to those objections, the

court has conducted a de novo review.

Harris is a prolific filer.

Rather than recount his

extensive litigation history herein, the court relies upon
Magistrate Judge VanDervort’s thorough account in the PF&R.
Suffice it to say that Harris’ creative attempts to obtain
release through such channels as civil commercial law and the
like have resulted in his being cautioned by more than one court
that it would “not tolerate the type of frivolous behavior Mr.
Harris has thus far demonstrated in his filings.”
Wands, 410 F. App’x 145, 147 (10th Cir. 2011).

Harris v.

Plaintiff’s

objection to the PF&R represents yet another equally frivolous
attempt.
Specifically, Harris objects to Magistrate Judge
VanDervort’s recommended disposition because, according to him,
he has invoked this court’s jurisdiction over admiralty and
maritime claims.

Having done so, Harris argues that he is

entitled to a hearing pursuant to Supplemental Rule E(4)(f) of
the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims.

Harris’

argument is without merit as his claims herein are not within the
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of this court.

Labels

assigned to pleadings filed by pro se litigants are not
determinative.

Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
similar to the instant one,

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As one court noted in a case

Given plaintiff's unsuccessful attempts to obtain
release through habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241
and 2255), he now brings suit “In Admiralty”
applying extreme artistic license to the law of
contracts, secured transactions and admiralty.
Plaintiff's legal theories, although creative,
are patently frivolous. Not only do his fanciful
assertions regarding his legal status and that of
the defendants lack an arguable basis in the law,
his legal contentions offered in support of
release have virtually no support in existing
law. Moreover, despite plaintiff labeling this
suit as one arising in admiralty, neither his
factual assertions nor his legal claims remotely
relate to that subject. See Black's Law
Dictionary 969 (6th ed. 1990) (defining Maritime
Law as “[t]hat system of law which particularly
relates to marine commerce and navigation, to
business transacted at sea or relating to
navigation, to ships and shipping, to seamen, to
the transportation of persons and property by
sea, and to marine affairs generally.”); Id., at
47 (stating that the terms “admiralty” and
“maritime” law are “virtually synonymous.”).
Talley v. U.S., No. 3:08cv278/RV/MD, 2008 WL 4164151, *3 (N.D.
Fla. Sept. 5, 2008); see also Crawford v. Michigan, No. 2:13-CV10466, 2013 WL 1189994, *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013) (“Although
Plaintiff uses contract language and cites Admiralty and Maritime
Law, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 9(h), Article I, Section
10 of the United States Constitution, and several provisions of
Michigan law in his pleadings, it is clear that he is contesting
his state criminal proceedings.”); Robinson v. McKee, No. 1:10cv-979, 2010 WL 4924737, *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2010) (“The
Court cannot discern any possible claim against Defendant McKee
over which this Court could exercise its admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.

Thus, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed as
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frivolous.

If Plaintiff wishes to challenge the fact or duration

of his confinement, he must file a habeas corpus action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”); Demos v. United States, No. Civ. 10-6299TC, 2010 WL 4007527, *1 (D. Or. Oct. 8, 2010) (“Although
plaintiff alleges that his `issues involve’ Maritime law,
commercial law, `merchant law’ and Admiralty law, the complaint
is a not-so-thinly veiled challenge to his confinement.”).

The

court likewise finds that plaintiff’s claims do not relate to
admiralty or maritime law and, accordingly, plaintiff’s
objections are OVERRULED.
For the foregoing reasons, the court adopts the Findings
and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge VanDervort, DENIES
plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus, DENIES petitioner’s
“Motion for Perpetual and Mandatory Injunction,” DENIES
petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and directs
the Clerk to remove these matters from the court’s docket.
Additionally, the court has considered whether to grant a
certificate of appealability.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

A

certificate will not be granted unless there is “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
2253(c)(2).

28 U.S.C. §

The standard is satisfied only upon a showing that

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the
constitutional claims by this court is debatable or wrong and
that any dispositive procedural ruling is likewise debatable.
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Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,
683-84 (4th Cir. 2001).

The court concludes that the governing

standard is not satisfied in this instance.

Accordingly, the

court DENIES a certificate of appealability.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to plaintiff, pro se.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of September, 2014.
ENTER:

David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge

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