Ramadan v. F.B.O.P. et al
Filing
83
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court ADOPTS 81 PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort; GRANTS Defendants' 69 Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment; DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint; and DISMISSES this matter from the docket. Signed by Senior Judge David A. Faber on 9/28/2015. (cc: counsel of record and plaintiff, pro se) (mk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
SAIED MOUSA RAMADAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No: 1:14-25757
FBOP, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
By Standing Order, this matter was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort for submission of proposed
findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
The magistrate judge submitted his
proposed findings and recommendations (“PF&R”) on August 27,
2015.
(Doc. No. 81).
In his PF&R, Magistrate Judge VanDervort
recommended that the court grant defendants’ motion to dismiss or
in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint, and remove the matter from the court’s
docket.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the
parties were allotted fourteen days, plus three mailing days, in
which to file any objections to the PF&R.
Plaintifff timely
filed objections to the PF&R on September 16, 2015.
1
(Doc. No.
82).
With respect to those objections, the court has conducted a
de novo review.
However, because plaintiff’s objections are
without merit, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss
and/or for summary judgment and dismisses plaintiff’s complaint.
I.
Background
Plaintiff, Saied Mousa Ramadan, is a federal inmate formerly
incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution located at
McDowell, West Virginia (“FCI McDowell”).
On October 3, 2013,
plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint alleging violations
of his constitutional and civil rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
In his complaint, plaintiff, a practicing Muslim,
alleges that defendants, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
and employees thereof, violated his constitutional rights by
denying him the opportunity to participate in congregational
prayer five times a day and by implementing a ban on Noble
Qurans.
In his disposition of plaintiff’s complaint, Magistrate
Judge VanDervort made the following specific recommendations: 1)
that the court dismiss defendants Samuels, Eichenlaub, and
Atkinson for lack of personal jurisdiction; 2) that plaintiff’s
claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”) be dismissed because the RLUIPA provides a cause
of action only against state actors, not federal actors; 3) that
2
plaintiff’s Bivens claim against all defendants in their
individual capacity be dismissed; 4) that all claims save for the
alleged bans on congregational prayer five times daily and the
Noble Quran be dismissed for failure to exhaust; 5) that
plaintiff’s claim for money damages for emotional and
psychological harm be dismissed; 6) that plaintiff’s claim for
money damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) be dismissed as there is no right to relief of that type
under RFRA; 7) that plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief be
dismissed on mootness grounds given that plaintiff is no longer
incarcerated at FCI McDowell; and 8) that any claim for money
damages under Bivens be dismissed because there is no right to
money damages for First Amendment claims.
Having so recommended,
Magistrate Judge VanDervort determined that he need not consider
the other grounds for dismissal advanced by defendants.
Nevertheless, in a footnote, he did briefly consider the merits
of plaintiff’s exhausted claims concerning congregational prayer
and the Noble Quran and found both to be without merit.
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge VanDervort’s recommendation
regarding these claims.
II.
Analysis
“Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”
3
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
As one
court explained:
With respect to the free exercise of religion, prison
inmates retain a right to reasonable opportunities for
free exercise of religious beliefs without concern for
the possibility of punishment. See Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 39, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972).
That retained right is not unfettered. Prison
restrictions that impact the free exercise of religion
but are related to legitimate penological objectives do
not run afoul of the constitution. See Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed.
2d 64 (1987).
Rodgers v. Sheardin, Civil Action Nos. CCB-09-1962, CCB-103110,
2011 WL 4459092, *7 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2011).
A.
Congregational Prayer
Plaintiff disagrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion
that FCI McDowell’s refusal to allow congregational prayer five
times a day violates his equal protection and/or First Amendment
rights.
Specifically, he contends that defendants “have failed
to put forth even one feasable [sic] and actual example of their
reasons” for doing so.
incorrect.
Objections at p.2.
Ramadan is simply
Defendants cited several reasons for its policy
surrounding congregational prayer.
Plaintiff just doesn’t agree
with them.
Gilbert Nash, the Chaplain at FCI McDowell, testified as
follows:
4.
FCI McDowell’s policy on group prayer is as
follows:
4
COMMUNITY/GROUP PRAYER: Inmates are
only allowed to pray as a group
within the Chapel (FCI) or
Multipurpose Room (Camp) or outdoor
worship areas during times
scheduled by the Religious Services
Department. Community/group prayer
is not permitted in areas other
than those designated by Religious
Services.
5.
This policy is an all-inclusive policy and there
are no exceptions for any religious group.
6.
FCI McDowell’s group prayer policy prohibits
inmates from gathering together in groups outside
of those areas designated by Religious Services
because of the security concerns that exist when
inmates are unsupervised in groups.
7.
When inmates group up throughout different areas
of the institution, whether for prayer or other
reasons, the potential for violence escalates.
Grouping of inmates can be an actual or perceived
sign of a show of force against other inmates
and/or staff, and also creates security concerns
for the inmates involved. For example, Muslim
inmates performing salat prayers must lie in a
prone position during some of the prayer. This
could put those inmates at an increased risk for
assault because they are not attentive to their
surroundings and are in a vulnerable position.
Other inmates may also perceive these group
prayers, in areas not designed or designated for
such, as a way of proselytizing other inmates to
join the group and could create additional tension
between groups because of the location of the
meetings.
8.
The policy prohibiting group gatherings for prayer
at locations other than those areas designated and
equipped for the group helps maintain the security
of the institution.
9.
[The] FCI McDowell policy on group prayer does
allow religious group prayer at the designated
area where it may be more closely monitored by
5
Religious Services staff. The designated area is
appropriate and designed for group meetings and
prayer. To allow all religious groups to gather
in groups at other locations, not specifically
designed for groups, in the institution without
supervision is not in the best interest of the
security and good order of the institution.
Furthermore, allowing group prayer by inmates at
any location they choose would be disruptive to
the normal operation of the facility including
work assignments, housing units, and recreation.
10.
Additionally, allowing group prayer at other
locations would require additional staff
supervision and impact the budget of the
institution. Religious Services does not have
enough staff to supervise all of the group prayers
from all faith groups throughout multiple
locations of the facility. It also could affect
other inmates who would be required to move out of
common areas when the inmates were involved in
group prayers. Additionally, a chain reaction is
likely to occur where other faith groups would
demand additional time and places to meet for
group prayer throughout the day, creating
additional staffing and security concerns.
11.
Muslim inmates at FCI McDowell are provided
numerous opportunities to practice their faith,
including weekly Jumu’ah study and prayer every
Friday in the Chapel; an additional weekly study
time in the chapel; the 29-30 day yearly
observance of Ramadan where Muslim inmates gather
daily for group prayer time and study, and
depending upon the time of sun set are allowed to
go to the dining hall for a late dinner; a
separate yearly ceremonial meal; ability to
purchase and use prayer rugs in their cells or in
the Chapel; use of prayer oils; ability to wear
religious clothing such as the Kufi; and
individual prayer opportunities in their cells or
work areas. In addition to the above, inmates can
approach their workplace supervisors to see if it
is feasible to be allowed prayer time at work. If
not, they can choose to go back to their cells on
the move prior to prayer time and pray at that
time. They may also request to be moved to
6
another job, if they believe their job could
interfere with prayer time.
12.
In late February 2012, Plaintiff filed an Informal
Resolution Form (“BP-8") indicating that he was a
Muslim and was not being allowed to pray in
congregational prayer five times per day. He
stated that BOP guidelines allowed the
congregational prayers.
13.
I responded to the BP-8. In the response, I noted
that there were BOP guidelines on Islam that
indicated the following:
•
•
Other than Jumu’ah, it is recommended that
prayers be made individually or in very small
groups (2 or 3 inmates) throughout the day
•
Prayers can be made at work detail sites,
school or units during break times
•
14.
Inmates should have the opportunity to pray
five times daily
This requires a clean area, prayer rug or
clean towel to cover the floor
It was explained that while the guidelines allowed
plaintiff to pray five times per day, that the
guidance provided several options for an
institution to adopt to allow an inmate to carry
out the prayers. It did not mandate all of the
options be allowed. It was explained that FCI
McDowell chose the individual prayer option and
only allowed group prayer in the chapel. However,
it was explained that individual prayer was always
permitted in his cell and on worksites at the
discretion of his worksite supervisor.
Declaration of Gilbert Nash, January 21, 2015 ¶¶ 4-14 (Exhibit 2
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment).
Gerald Connors, another of the chaplains
at FCI McDowell during the relevant time period, testified
7
similarly.
See Declaration of Gerald Connors, January 16, 2015,
¶¶ 4-12 (Exhibit 3 to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment)
(Doc. No. 69-3).1
Notwithstanding plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary, the
foregoing demonstrates that defendants have explained the reasons
for FCI McDowell’s policy with respect to congregational prayer.
Furthermore, those reasons are legitimate.
“The interest in
preserving order and authority in the prisons is self-evident.
Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and
between the inmates and prison officials or staff, contain the
ever-present potential for violent confrontation and
conflagration.”
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977); see also Muhammad v. Arizona
Dept. of Corr., No. CV-11-1890-PHX-SMM(LOA), 2013 WL 3864253, *4
(D. Ariz. July 25, 2013) (dismissing prisoner’s claim under First
Amendment and RLUIPA based upon denial of congregational prayer
five times daily because “[a]llowing any group of inmates to
congregate five times every day, even for prayer, creates
potential security risks”); Parker v. Trent, Civil Action No.
1:10CV120, 2012 WL 71695, *1 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding
jail did not violate prisoner’s “First Amendment rights by
1
Indeed,
Chaplain Connors, now the Supervisory Chaplain at FCI
Berlin, testified that FCI McDowell’s policy regarding group
prayer was consistent with the policy at FCI Berlin. Connors
Decl. at ¶ 6.
8
refusing to allow him to pray with other Muslims because the
restriction was rationally related to a legitimate penological
interest in security”); Rodgers v. Sheardin, Civil Action Nos.
CCB-09-1962, CCB-103110, 2011 WL 4459092, *7 (D. Md. Sept. 22,
2011) (no First Amendment or RLUIPA violation where prisoner was
not allowed to attend communal worship while on administrative
segregation because “[r]estricting group meetings may be
necessary to prevent the possibility of riots or gang meetings”);
Lee v. Gurney, Civil Action No. 3:08cv99, 2010 WL 5113782, *5
(E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2010) (granting judgment in defendants’ favor
on prisoner’s equal protection claim where he had “not submitted
evidence that other religious groups besides Sunni Muslims were
permitted to conduct religious services on the recreation yard”);
Jackson v. McBride, Civil Action No. 5:06-cv-00518, 2007 WL
2815447, *8 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 24, 2007) (finding no RLUIPA or
First Amendment violation because the prison’s policy restricting
Muslim inmates from gathering on the outdoor recreation yard for
group prayer was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental
policy that order and safety be maintained”); Bryan v. Capers,
C/A No. 8:06-cv-255-GRA-BHH, 2007 WL 2116452, *5 (D.S.C. July 19,
2007) (holding that, in context of evaluating inmate’s First
Amendment and RLUIPA claims, denial of plaintiff’s request for
daily group pray was rationally related to the legitimate
penological interest of security where prison did not have a
9
secure place for daily group prayer and individual prayer was
permitted)
Furthermore, Ramadan’s equal protection claim regarding the
policy on group prayer fails because it is undisputed that the
policy is applied uniformly.
See Nash Decl. at ¶ 5, 26; Connors
Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 18 (“[The] FCI McDowell policy is universal to all
religious groups.
Group prayer is not allowed by any group
except in the prescribed areas.”).
According to Nash, he has
“stopped both Muslim and Christian groups from engaging in group
study and prayer in the recreation yard in the institution.”
Nash Decl. at ¶ 26.
Plaintiff does not point to another group
that is allowed to practice congregational prayer in violation of
the policy.
Almost any prison rule is likely to affect some
religions more than others, but so long as the
justification for the rule is reasonable and is not
intended to target a particular religious group, it
does not violate the Constitution, under either the
free exercise clause or the equal protection clause.
Turner v. Hamblin, 995 F. Supp. 2d 859, 862 (W.D. Wisc. 2014).
To the extent plaintiff argues that the BOP’s guidance with
respect to Muslim daily prayer creates a mandatory obligation on
the part of the BOP to allow inmates to pray “in very small
groups (2 or 3 inmates)” he is mistaken.
The document relied
upon is merely a set of guidelines to aid the BOP in their effort
to accommodate inmate religious beliefs and practices - - and it
10
merely makes a “recommend[ation] that prayers be made
individually or in very small groups.”
(emphasis added).
The
guideline at issue is written in the disjunctive, i.e., prison
officials have a choice to offer either individual prayer or
prayer in small groups.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s
objections concerning congregational prayer are OVERRULED.
B.
Alleged Ban on Noble Quran
In his objections, plaintiff alleges that Magistrate Judge
VanDervort “misconstrued” his claim regarding Noble Qurans.
Objections at p.2.
Specifically, he contends that his “Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection under the law was violated in
that Muslim inmates were banned from bringing their personally
owned Qurans into the chapel – Qurans that the Muslim inmates
were permitted to purchase and therefore own while no other
similarly situated religious group ever faced such a ban.”
Id.
He further accuses the BOP of fabricating a ban and lying.
See
id. at p.3.
The BOP candidly admits that, for a short time,
there was some confusion over allowing the Noble Quran in the
chapel.
However, a review of the record makes clear that
plaintiff’s rights, constitutional or otherwise, were not
violated by the brief restriction.
According to Gerald Connors,
13.
I do understand that Plaintiff alleges he was not
allowed to bring the version of the Quran, called
11
the Nobel Quran or Hilali-Khan translation, into
the chapel for a brief period.
14.
This version of the Quran, called the Nobel Quran
or Hilali-Khan translation, is a controversial
translation of the Quran that many believe
contains radical notes and parentheticals
associated with Jihad.
15.
Because of the controversy regarding this
particular translation of the Quran, it is not
purchased for the chapel, nor is it stocked in the
chapel library. Admittedly, there was some
confusion for a few weeks as to whether this
translation was allowed in the chapel. Based on
the verbal guidance Chaplains Nash and I had
received earlier from the BOP’s Central Office, we
believed this translation was not allowed in the
chapel, but that inmates could purchase and
possess this particular translation. I do not
believe that I had told any of the inmates this
yet.
16.
It was because of this confusion that Chaplain
Nash called the BOP Central Office prior to
responding to Plaintiff’s May 31, 2012 BP-8. The
guidance he received from the Central Office
Religious Services was that any material that
could be purchased was allowed in the chapel, but
that only approved material could be used for
teaching in the chapel.
17.
Qurans were never banned from FCI McDowell.
Copies of the Quran were available in the chapel
and inmates could purchase other translations.
Though there were a few weeks of confusion with
regard to the Nobel Quran translation, it was
determined that inmates could continue to purchase
and possess the translation and bring it to chapel
at FCI McDowell. Nonetheless, like any other
study, materials used in teaching needed prior
approval by the Chaplains.
12
Connors Decl. at ¶¶ 13-17.
Chaplain Nash’s declaration was
substantially similar to that of Chaplain Connors.
See Nash
Decl. at ¶¶ 16-25.
The foregoing makes clear that there was never a “ban” on
the Noble Quran.
There is no allegation, much less evidence,
that plaintiff’s copy of the Noble Quran was ever confiscated or
taken from him.
Furthermore, FCI McDowell was under no
obligation to make that specific translation available in the
chapel.
See, e.g., Earl v. Gould, No. 1:03CV109-1-MU, 2006 WL
983887, *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2006) (“[N]ot being provided with a
specific translation of a religious text does not substantially
burden Plaintiff when Plaintiff was provided several common
versions of the religious text.”).
Therefore, distilled to its
essence, plaintiff’s complaint is that for a few weeks he was not
allowed to bring his copy of the Nobel Quran into the chapel.
However, an inmate has no right under the First Amendment or RFRA
to a preferred translation of the Quran.
Nor is there any
indication that Ramadan’s inability to bring his copy of the
Nobel Quran into the chapel for a few weeks prohibited him from
practicing his religion, especially given that copies of other
translations of the Quran are available in the chapel.
Even if plaintiff were to somehow establish that he has a
constitutional right to have his copy of the Nobel Quran in the
chapel (and the court concludes he has not), the brief
13
interruption of the practice does not rise to a First Amendment
or RFRA violation.
See, e.g., Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d
1525, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1987) (prison regulation banning wearing
of headgear, including religious headbands, in inmate dining hall
did not violate Native American inmates’ constitutional right to
free exercise of religion where headgear ban was logically
connected to legitimate penological interest); Williams v. Bragg,
No. 12-50965, 537 F. App’x 468, 468 (5th Cir. July 29, 2013) (“A
prisoner’s constitutional right to freedom of religion is not
violated by the occasional inability to attend services.”);
Thompson v. Holm, No. 13-CV-930, 2015 WL 1478523, *6 (E.D. Wisc.
Mar. 30, 2015) (removal of prisoner from Ramadan participation
list, which resulted in him missing two Ramadan meal bags, did
not constitute a substantial burden of prisoner’s free exercise
of religion because there was “no evidence that the brief
interruption forced him to abandon one of the precepts of his
religion or that he felt a substantial pressure to modify his
beliefs.”); Vann v. Fischer, No. 11 Civ.1958(KPF), 2014 WL
4188077, *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2014)(finding that prison’s
requirement that religious beads be confiscated, examined, and
approved before their introduction into the corrections system
(the “Approval Process”) passes muster under the First Amendment
even when Approval Process took approximately two weeks); Halloum
v. Ryan, No. CV 11-0097 (PHX-RCB), 2014 WL 1047144, *17 (D. Ariz.
14
Mar. 18, 2014) (preventing Muslim inmates from bringing their
prayer rugs into the dining room on two occasions during Ramadan,
thereby prohibiting them from praying, did not constitute a
substantial burden on prisoners’ free exercise rights); Coleman
v. Allen, Civil Action No. 2:09-CV-311-TMH, 2012 WL 4378086, *9
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 7, 2012) (finding that prisoner had “failed to
demonstrate that the occasional interruption of religious
ceremonies unduly burdened his ability to engage in the free
exercise of his religion.”).
Finally, plaintiff’s attempt to resurrect his unexhausted
retaliation claim2 regarding the restriction on the Nobel Quran
under the guise of an equal protection claim likewise fails.
Ramadan has failed to offer any evidence that defendants acted
with a discriminatory purpose.
See Patel v. United States Bureau
of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, (8th Cir. 2008) (“Even assuming that
Patel has been treated differently from similarly-situated
inmates, Patel has not presented any evidence suggesting that the
Bureau Defendants acted with a discriminatory purpose.”).
The
evidence shows that, for a short period of time, there was some
confusion regarding whether the Nobel Quran was allowed in the
chapel but that, after seeking guidance from the Central Office,
plaintiff was allowed to bring his Nobel Quran into the chapel.
2
Plaintiff argued that the restriction placed on the Nobel
Quran was in retaliation for his complaints regarding
congregational prayer.
15
For all these reasons, plaintiff’s objections regarding the Nobel
Quran are OVERRULED.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES petitioner’s objections to
Magistrate Judge VanDervort’s PF&R.
The court adopts the factual
and legal analysis contained within the PF&R, GRANTS defendants’
motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary
judgment, DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint, and DISMISSES this
matter from the court’s active docket.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to plaintiff, pro se.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 28th day of September, 2015.
ENTER:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
16
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