Metcalf v. Masters
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court OVERRULES Petitioner's 11 Objections to Magistrate Judge Tinsley's Proposed Findings and Recommendation; ADOPTS the 10 Proposed Findings and Recommendation; DISMISSES Petitioner's 1 Section 2241 Petition; DENIES Petitioner's 5 MOTION to Unseal Transcripts; DENIES Petitioner's 8 MOTION to Dismiss Criminal Case for Lack of Jurisdiction and DISMISSES this matter from the Court's docket. The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. Signed by Senior Judge David A. Faber on 8/25/2015. (cc: Petitioner, Pro Se and counsel of record) (arb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
BRADFORD METCALF,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No: 1:14-27185
BART MASTERS,
Warden
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court are petitioner’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (Doc. No.
1), motion to unseal transcripts, (Doc. No. 5), and motion to
dismiss criminal case for lack of jurisdiction.
(Doc. No. 8).
By Standing Order, this matter was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley for submission of proposed
findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
(Doc. No. 7).
The magistrate judge
submitted his proposed findings and recommendation (“PF&R”) on
August 6, 2015.
(Doc. No. 10).
In the PF&R, Magistrate Judge
Tinsley recommended that the court deny petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as his motion to unseal
transcripts and motion to dismiss criminal case for lack of
jurisdiction, and dismiss this matter from the court’s docket.
(Doc. No. 10 at 6).
1
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b),
petitioner was allotted fourteen days, plus three mailing days,
in which to file any objections to the PF&R.
filed an objection on August 19, 2015.
Petitioner timely
(Doc. No. 11).
Because
petitioner’s objection is without merit, the court adopts the
PF&R and dismisses petitioner’s petition.
I.
Background
After a jury trial in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan, petitioner was found guilty of
one count of conspiracy to possess machineguns to threaten to
assault and murder federal employees, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371; four counts of unlawful possession of machineguns, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1); two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm silencer and a destructive device, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 5861(d); and using and carrying a
semiautomatic assault weapon during and in relation to a crime
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
On May 26,
1999, the court imposed a sentence of 480 months.
United States
v. Metcalf, 221 F.3d 1336, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000).
The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
petitioner’s convictions and sentence, Id. at *5, and the United
States Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Metcalf v. United States, 531 U.S. 1053 (2000);
reh’g denied, 531 U.S. 1133 (Jan. 22, 2001).
2
On July 2, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
No. 1:98-cr-00054-PLM-2, Doc. No. 280).
(Case
Petitioner thereafter
retained counsel, who filed an amended § 2255 motion
approximately six months later.
(Id., Doc. No. 295).
denied petitioner’s § 2255 petition on June 19, 2002.
Doc. No. 312, 313).
The court
(Id.,
Petitioner subsequently filed several
motions for reconsideration which have been construed as second
or successive § 2255 motions.
Notably, the Sixth Circuit has
not authorized petitioner to file a successive § 2255 petition.
II.
Petitioner’s Objection to the PF&R
In his PF&R, Magistrate Judge Tinsley found that
petitioner’s instant petition challenges the validity of his
convictions and sentence, rather than the manner of its
execution.
Magistrate Judge Tinsley further found that the
“savings clause” of § 2255 did not permit review of petitioner’s
claims under § 2241.
As petitioner’s petition seeks relief
afforded under § 2255 but petitioner has not received
authorization to file a successive § 2255 petition, the PF&R
recommended denial of the instant petition.
In his objection, petitioner reiterates the main claims of
his § 2241 petition, namely, that he is actually innocent of the
crimes of which he was found guilty and that the trial judge
displayed impermissible bias against him.
3
Petitioner argues
that Judge Richard Enslen, who presided over his trial and
sentencing, was biased against him and this bias constituted a
fundamental defect in the criminal proceedings, one that may be
addressed through the “savings clause” of § 2255.
Petitioner relies solely on Poole v. Dotson, 469 F. Supp.
2d 329 (D.Md. 2007), in which a court found that the savings
clause of § 2255 authorized a prisoner to seek relief under §
2241 after he had already filed an unsuccessful § 2255 petition.1
After denial of his original § 2255 petition, Poole received
notice that one of his prior state convictions was reclassified
from a felony to a misdemeanor.
Id. at 331.
At his sentencing
years earlier, the district court sentenced Poole as a career
offender for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, based in
part upon this later-reclassified felony conviction.
Id.
After
the Fourth Circuit prohibited Poole from filing a successive §
1 Notably, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision and remanded the case, finding that the district court
did not have jurisdiction over Poole’s § 2241 petition. United
States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 275 (4th Cir. 2008). While Poole
was convicted in the District of Maryland, he was sent to
federal prison in Cumberland, Kentucky to serve his sentence.
Id. at 264. After appearing before his original sentencing
judge in Maryland on an outstanding post-conviction motion, the
district court allowed Poole to remain in custody in Maryland
for several months, “short-circuiting [his] return to his
Kentucky cell, in an express attempt to create the requisite
confinement for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction over the [§
2241 petition].” Id. at 264–65. The Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus, finding
that the district court “sequester[ed] Poole in Maryland for the
sole purpose of solidifying its own jurisdiction.” Id. at 274.
4
2255 petition, Poole filed a § 2241 petition and argued that his
sentence was enhanced illegally.
Id.
The court found that
“Poole’s situation present[ed] another unique and very limited
circumstance where Section 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to
test the legality of his sentence.”
Id. at 336.
As a result,
the court permitted Poole’s petition to proceed as a § 2241 and
ultimately granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 336, 339.
While petitioner contends that his case “is on ‘all fours’
with Poole,” (Doc. No. 11 at 3), the court disagrees.
The
factual background was critically important to the district
court’s reasoning in Poole.
The district court reasoned that
Poole was not aware that his felony conviction had been
reclassified as a misdemeanor at the time of his original §
2255, and, therefore, he could not have challenged his status as
a career offender in that petition.
As a result, the court
concluded that the savings clause permitted him to employ this
new information to attack the validity of his sentence through §
2241.
Petitioner has not demonstrated any change in
circumstance similar to that in Poole.
Petitioner raised these
same arguments in his original § 2255 and was unsuccessful.
He
has presented no information that was unavailable to him at the
time of his original § 2255, nor has he received permission to
file a successive § 2255 petition.
5
Petitioner’s circumstances,
unlike Poole’s, are neither unique nor very limited.
Accordingly, the court overrules petitioner’s objection to
Magistrate Judge Tinsley’s conclusion that the savings clause of
§ 2255 does not apply to his case.
While petitioner does not contest the PF&R’s conclusion
that denial of his remaining motions is appropriate, the court
considered these motions as well and concurs with Magistrate
Judge Tinsley’s recommendation.
In his motion to unseal
transcripts, (Doc. No. 5), petitioner argues that certain
transcripts contain concealed information which is pertinent to
his § 2241 petition.
(Doc. No. 5 at 1).
As the court has
concluded that petitioner’s § 2241 petition is actually a
successive § 2255 and, accordingly, the court must deny as moot
this motion related to his successive § 2255.
The court
furthermore concludes that it must also deny petitioner’s motion
to dismiss his criminal case.
(Doc. No. 8).
This court never
possessed jurisdiction over petitioner’s criminal case, and, as
a result, cannot dismiss that criminal case.
Therefore, denial
of both of petitioner’s motions is appropriate.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES petitioner’s objection to
Magistrate Judge Tinsley’s PF&R.
The court ADOPTS the factual
and legal analysis contained within the PF&R, DISMISSES
petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
6
U.S.C. § 2241, (Doc. No. 1), DENIES petitioner’s motion to
unseal transcripts, (Doc. No. 5), DENIES petitioner’s motion to
dismiss criminal case for lack of jurisdiction, (Doc. No. 8),
and DISMISSES this matter from the court’s active docket.
Additionally, the court has considered whether to grant a
certificate of appealability.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
A
certificate will not be granted unless there is “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
2253(c)(2).
Id. §
The standard is satisfied only upon a showing that
reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the
constitutional claims by this court is debatable or wrong and
that any dispositive procedural ruling is likewise debatable.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38 (2003); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,
683–84 (4th Cir. 2001).
The court concludes that the governing
standard is not satisfied in this instance.
Accordingly the
court DENIES a certificate of appealability.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to petitioner, pro
se.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 25th day of August, 2015.
ENTER:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
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