Gilley v. CH Robinson Worldwide, Inc. et al
Filing
148
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The court DENIES AS MOOT defendant M & K Truck Leasing, LLC's 105 Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order and Other Orders; DENIES plaintiffs' request to conduct jurisdictional discovery; and GRANTS defendant River Valley Capital Insurance, Inc.'s 98 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Defendant River Valley is further DISMISSED from this case with prejudice. Signed by Senior Judge David A. Faber on 3/16/2020. (cc: counsel of record) (arb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
Clinton Eugene Gilley, as Administrator
of the Estate of CARL DAVID GILLEY,
Nicole Leigh Le, as Administrator of the
Estate of CHRISTINE TARA WARDEN GILLEY,
and Clinton Eugene Gilley and Nicole
Leigh Le as Co-Administrators of the
Estates of J.G. and G.G., minor children,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-00536
C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC.,
J&TS TRANSPORT EXPRESS, INC.,
BERTRAM COPELAND, M&K TRUCK LEASING, LLC,
and RIVER VALLEY CAPITAL INSURANCE, INC.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court 1 is defendant River Valley Capital
Insurance, Inc.’s (“River Valley”) motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
(ECF No. 98).
For the reasons that
follow, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Also pending before the court is defendant M & K Truck Leasing,
LLC’s motion to vacate Scheduling Order and Other Orders. (ECF
No. 105.) That motion was filed on May 22, 2019. (See id.) On
July 3, 2019, the court entered a Stipulated Amended Scheduling
Order, (ECF No. 115), based on a joint proposed amended
scheduling order submitted by all parties, including defendant
M&K Truck Leasing. (See ECF No. 113.) Because the court
entered the Stipulated Amended Scheduling Order, (ECF No. 115),
the court DENIES AS MOOT defendant M&K Truck Leasing, LLC’s
motion to vacate Scheduling Order and Other Orders. (ECF No.
105.)
1
I.
Procedural and Factual Background
A. The 2017 accident and plaintiffs’ claims against nonmoving defendants
This lawsuit stems from an April 13, 2017 trucking accident
that occurred in Mercer County, West Virginia.
¶ 18.)
(See ECF No. 85
Plaintiffs allege that due to inexperience, poor
training, and insufficient vehicle maintenance, defendant
Bertram Copeland burned up the brakes on the tractor-trailer and
failed to maintain control of the tractor-trailer.
The tractor-
trailer driven by defendant Copeland then crossed the median
into oncoming traffic and struck the vehicle containing Carl
David Gilley, Christine Gilley, and their children J.G. and G.G.
(collectively referred to as the “Gilley family”).
(Id.)
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Copeland was employed by J&TS
Transport Express, Inc. (“J&TS”) and that C.H. Robinson
Worldwide, Inc. (“C.H. Robinson”) hired J&TS to transport goods
in a tractor-trailer. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.)
Plaintiffs also allege
that the trailer involved in the accident was owned by M&K
Leasing.
(Id. ¶ 62.)
B. Plaintiffs’ claims against River Valley
Plaintiffs assert a negligence claim against River Valley
(Count VII), averring that River Valley performed “services,
including evaluating and screening new-hire drivers for J&TS,
2
that River Valley knew, or should have known, were necessary for
the protection of the motoring public, including plaintiffs” and
that it “(a) failed to exercise reasonable care in performing
those services; (b) Defendant River Valley’s performance
increased the risk of harm to the Plaintiff; (c) One of the
causes of the harm suffered is J&TS reliance on Defendant River
Valley’s performance; and, (d) Defendant River Valley’s
performance was the duty of the other to the Plaintiffs.”
¶ 67(a-d).)
(Id.
Plaintiffs also allege that River Valley was
involved in a joint venture with some or all of the other named
defendants.
(Id. ¶ 68.)
C. River Valley’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction
On May 8, 2019, defendant River Valley filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
(ECF No. 98.)
River Valley
argues that plaintiffs have not set forth allegations that would
subject it to personal jurisdiction in West Virginia under the
state’s long arm statute.
(See ECF No. 99 (citing W. Va. Code
§§ 56-3-33, 31D-15-1501(d)(1)).)
It points out that plaintiffs’
claims against River Valley do not arise out of any activity
that occurred within the State of West Virginia, nor do the
claims arise out of activities River Valley directed at the
3
residents of West Virginia.
River Valley also submits an
affidavit by its President, Tom Friedel, which avers the
following:
3.
River Valley is a corporation which is
incorporated in Iowa and has its principal place
of business at 14868 West Ridge Lane, Suite 200,
Dubuque, Iowa.
5.
River Valley is an insurance agency that is
domiciled in Iowa.
6.
River Valley is the insurance agency for one of
the defendants, in this lawsuit, J&TS, an Illinois
corporation with its principal place of business
in Chicago, Illinois.
7.
River Valley is not registered or otherwise
authorized by the Department of State of the State
of West Virginia to do business in West Virginia.
8.
River Valley does not maintain an agent for
service of process in West Virginia.
9.
River Valley does not direct any advertisements
specifically to the citizens, residents, or
businesses of West Virginia.
10. River Valley does not own or lease any real or
personal property in West Virginia.
11. River Valley does not maintain any bank accounts
in West Virginia.
12. River Valley does not have a mailing address in
West Virginia.
13. River Valley does not maintain any telephone
numbers in West Virginia.
14. River Valley does not contract with any third
party in West Virginia for business purposes
related to sale of insurance, nor has River Valley
4
engaged in any joint venture with any third party
located in West Virginia.
15. River Valley does not exert control over any West
Virginia insurance agencies, nor does River Valley
hold out any West Virginia individuals or entities
as being agents or representatives of River
Valley.
16. None of River Valley’s 19 employees, officers, or
directors is located in West Virginia.
17. River Valley has never filed taxes or
administrative reports in West Virginia.
18. River Valley’s revenue obtained through sales to
businesses or individuals located in West Virginia
constitutes 0.000006% of its income.
19. Information about River Valley may be accessed on
the internet from anywhere in the world, including
West Virginia, at
http://rivervalleycapital.com/insurance/, but that
website is not directed specifically at West
Virginia, nor can any product sold by River Valley
be purchased through the website.
20. In order to purchase insurance through River
Valley, a customer must first call the River
Valley telephone number, which is an Iowa
telephone number, or come to the office in
Dubuque, Iowa, to meet with an agent.
22. River Valley was asked by J&TS to add Bertram
Copeland to J&TS’s commercial trucking policy.
River Valley conducted a DMV background check on
Bertram Copeland and provided the results to the
company that underwrote the commercial trucking
policy, National Liability & Fire Insurance Co.,
who then added Bertram Copeland as an approved
driver on J&TS’s commercial trucking policy. River
Valley did not make any recommendations as to
whether or not Bertram Copeland should or should
not be employed by J&TS or whether Bertram
Copeland was fit or unfit to operate a motor
vehicle or commercial truck.
5
23. The commercial trucking policy to which Bertram
Copeland was added as an approved driver was
written in the State of Illinois.
24. All of the activities that River Valley undertook
as it relates to the requested services from J&TS
took place in Iowa.
(ECF No. 98, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3, 5-20, 22-24.)
River Valley argues that
for these reasons it is not subject to general personal
jurisdiction because it is not “at home” in West Virginia, nor
have plaintiffs alleged sufficient minimum contacts to subject
it to specific personal jurisdiction in West Virginia.
(See ECF
No. 99.)
Plaintiffs respond that there are sufficient contacts
between River Valley and West Virginia for this court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over River Valley.
116.)
(See ECF No.
Specifically, plaintiffs point to several facts that they
allege create jurisdiction:
River Valley’s website 2 notes that
River Valley has “the capability of serving Nationwide”; “River
Valley added defendant truck driver Copeland to an interstate
commercial motor vehicle policy”; “an agent of River Valley
Capital Insurance stated Copeland ‘was eligible to be added to
the [insurance] policy’”; and River Valley’s admission that West
Virginia constitutes 0.000006% of its income shows that River
2
https://rivervalleycapitalinsurance.com/
6
Valley does in fact conduct some business in West Virginia.
(Id.)
Plaintiffs also argue that if the court finds plaintiffs
have not yet alleged facts creating personal jurisdiction, the
court should grant plaintiffs the opportunity to conduct
reasonable, limited discovery to learn the full nature and
extent of River Valley’s commercial contacts with this forum.
(Id.)
River Valley filed a Reply, countering that its website
being available in West Virginia does not constitute the kind of
purposeful availment to establish sufficient minimum contacts;
the fact that it performs work outside of West Virginia for an
interstate trucking company which might hypothetically do
business in or through West Virginia also does not show
purposeful, intentional contact with West Virginia; its
determination of defendant Copeland’s eligibility occurred
entirely outside West Virginia; and the fact that River Valley
draws a miniscule percentage of its income from business in West
Virginia does not create general personal jurisdiction because
it does not make River Valley “at home” in West Virginia, and
does not create specific personal jurisdiction because such a
miniscule percentage is insufficient to demonstrate purposeful
availment.
(ECF No. 117.)
River Valley also argues that
jurisdictional discovery should not be permitted because
7
plaintiffs have not set forth a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction and merely want to conduct a fishing expedition to
hope to find some basis of asserting personal jurisdiction.
(Id.)
II.
Standard of Review for Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a court may
dismiss claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
P. 12(b)(2).
Fed. R. Civ.
“When a non-resident defendant files a motion
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure challenging the court's power to exercise personal
jurisdiction, ‘the jurisdictional question thus raised is one
for the judge, with the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to
prove the existence of a ground for jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.’”
Felman Prod. v. Bannai, 517 F.
Supp. 2d 824, 827–28 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) (quoting Combs v. Bakker,
886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)).
“Where, as here, the
district court addresses the question of personal jurisdiction
on the basis of motion papers, supporting legal memoranda, and
the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff bears the burden
of making a prima facie showing of a sufficient jurisdictional
basis to survive the jurisdictional challenge.”
Consulting
Eng'rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 276 (4th Cir.
8
2009).
“In considering whether the plaintiff has met this
burden, the district court must construe all relevant pleading
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume
credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the
existence of jurisdiction.”
Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR,
S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
III.
Discussion
A federal court sitting in diversity, “has personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if (1) an applicable
state long-arm statute confers jurisdiction and (2) the
assertion of that jurisdiction is consistent with constitutional
due process.”
Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A., 814 F.3d 185, 188
(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d
1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Here, because the West Virginia
long-arm statute “‘is coextensive with the full reach of due
process,’ the court need not conduct ‘the normal two-step
formula.’”
Knisely v. Nat'l Better Living Ass'n, 2015 WL
1868819, at *8 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 23, 2015) (quoting In re Celotex
Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Thus, the court's
statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry and the
court need only consider whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would be consistent with the Due Process Clause.
See id.
“A court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
9
defendant comports with due process if the defendant has
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum, such that to require the
defendant to defend its interests in that state ‘does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334
F.3d at 397 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
A. General Personal Jurisdiction
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and
specific.
A court may exercise general personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident, corporate defendant if the defendant's
contacts with the forum state are so “continuous and systemic”
as to render the defendant “at home” in the forum state.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014).
See
Generally, a
corporation is at home only where it has its place of
incorporation and its principal place of business.
See id. at
137.
It is abundantly clear that River Valley is not “at home”
in West Virginia.
River Valley’s contacts with West Virginia
are nowhere near being continuous and systematic.
River Valley
is incorporated in Iowa and has its principal place of business
in Iowa.
(ECF No. 98, Ex. 1 ¶ 3.)
Plaintiffs have made no
assertions and or shown any facts challenging these statements
10
and demonstrating that River Valley is incorporated in or has
its principal place of business in West Virginia.
On the
contrary, River Valley is not registered to do business in West
Virginia, has no officers located in or employees stationed in
West Virginia, and seems to scarcely do any business in West
Virginia at all.
(Id. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3-24.)
As such, River Valley is
not subject to general personal jurisdiction in the state of
West Virginia.
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
the corporate defendant if the defendant has “‘purposefully
established minimum contacts in the forum State’ such ‘that [it]
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’”
Perdue Foods, 814 F.3d at 189 (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
The Fourth Circuit has
directed courts to use the following three-pronged test to
determine whether specific personal jurisdiction exists: (1) the
extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state; (2)
whether the plaintiff's claims arose out of those activities;
and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
constitutionally reasonable.
Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR,
S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2014).
11
i.
No purposeful availment
When determining whether a plaintiff has met the first
prong of this analysis, the Fourth Circuit directs courts to
consider the following (nonexclusive) factors:
(1) whether the defendant maintains offices or agents
in the forum state; (2) whether the defendant owns
property in the forum state; (3) “whether the
defendant reached into the forum state to solicit or
initiate business; (4) whether the defendant
deliberately engaged in significant or long-term
business activities in the forum state; (5) “whether
the parties contractually agreed that the law of the
forum state would govern disputes; (6) whether the
defendant made in-person contact with the resident of
the forum in the forum state regarding the business
relationship; (7) the nature, quality and extent of
the parties' communications about the business being
transacted; and (8) whether the performance of
contractual duties was to occur within the forum.
Consulting Eng'rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278
(4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted and formatting modified).
If, and only if, a plaintiff can satisfy the first prong should
a court move to consider the second and third prongs.
Id.
None of these factors are met in the instant case. 3
Factors
(1), (2), (5), (6), and (7) can be dealt with summarily, as they
have been established by a sworn affidavit and plaintiffs have
not established any facts which could result in a different
But even if one of these factors were met and prong (1)
satisfied, prong (2) would not be satisfied because plaintiffs'
claims do not arise or relate to River Valley’s minimum,
purposeful contacts with West Virginia.
3
12
conclusion.
River Valley (1) does not maintain offices or
agents in West Virginia; (2) does not own property in West
Virginia; (5) has not contractually agreed that the law of West
Virginia would govern any of its disputes or potential disputes;
(6) did not have contact with any resident in West Virginia
regarding its insurance services; and (7) conducted all relevant
services – communicating with and providing services to
defendant J&TS, conducting the DMV background check on defendant
Copeland, and providing the results to National Liability & Fire
Insurance Co. – in Iowa and not in West Virginia.
98, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3-24.)
(See ECF No.
Factors (3), (4), and (8) require greater
attention, though, as these factors were the ones plaintiffs
appeared to challenge in their Response.
(See ECF No. 116.)
Plaintiffs assert that River Valley’s website shows River
Valley’s solicitation of West Virginia business, as the website
is accessible by consumers in West Virginia and states that
River Valley has “the capability of serving Nationwide”.
id.)
(See
This argument is not supported by law for two reasons.
First, plaintiffs state no facts showing that the website
is specifically targeted towards persons in West Virginia, and
thus River Valley cannot be considered to be reaching into or
soliciting business in West Virginia on this basis.
See Fidrych
v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 2020 WL 986674, at *12 (4th Cir. Mar.
13
2, 2020) (“[T]he mere fact that the website is accessible in a
given state does not mean that [a defendant] is targeting its
activities at that state.”).
The website’s statement that River
Valley has “the capability of serving Nationwide” is not
evidence that the website specifically targets West Virginia
consumers.
Second, the website appears to be a passive rather than
interactive website, as the website conveys information but
consumers cannot purchase any River Valley products or services
through that website.
(ECF No. 98, Ex. 1 ¶ 19.)
This kind of
passive website is insufficient to grant specific personal
jurisdiction over the website operator.
HSBC Bank USA, Nat.
Ass'n v. Resh, 2015 WL 4772524, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 12, 2015)
(“[I]f the defendant runs a passive site that ‘merely makes
information available,’ the fact that the website can be
accessed by residents in a different state is insufficient to
give courts in that state personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.” (quoting Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst
Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 399 (4th Cir. 2003))). 4
Additionally, even if the website was targeted towards West
Virginia such that it is sufficient to satisfy factor (3) of
prong (1), the website would fail prong (2). See Universal
Leather, 773 F.3d at 559. This is because plaintiffs do not
allege that River Valley’s website is related in any way to the
actions at issue in this case. Accordingly, the court cannot
4
14
While plaintiffs point to the fact that West Virginia
constitutes 0.000006% of River Valley’s income, this is
insufficient to demonstrate the “significant or long-term
business activities in the forum state” that factor (4)
requires.
A miniscule percentage of income such as 0.000006%
cannot be considered significant.
Furthermore, plaintiffs have
not put forth a single example of other business River Valley
has done in West Virginia, much less demonstrated a long-term
pattern of West Virginia business activities.
Nor have
plaintiffs demonstrated how the transactions that served as the
basis for River Valley’s 0.000006% of income in West Virginia
have any connection to plaintiffs’ current cause of action
against River Valley.
And as the Supreme Court has expressed,
minimal business activity is “not enough to warrant a State's
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation in a cause of action not related to those . . .
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over River Valley in
this case based upon its website. See Pomeroy, Inc. v. GHL
Int'l, Inc., 2009 WL 10688836, at *8 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 18, 2009)
(“Unique Balance does not allege GHL International's website
served any function in the formation or performance of the
contracts at issue in this litigation. Accordingly, “the cause
of action does not ‘arise out of’ [GHL International's] website
and the court cannot properly exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over [GHL International] on this basis” (quoting
Reynolds & Reynolds Holdings, Inc. v. Data Supplies, Inc., 301
F. Supp. 2d 545, 553 (E.D. Va. 2004))).
15
transactions.”
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984).
The core of factor (8) is about foreseeability:
whether a
defendant should find it foreseeable that, based on its
contracted responsibilities, it is likely to be required to
perform its duties in the forum state.
Here, River Valley
performed all its contractual duties in Iowa, as requested by
defendant J&TS, an Illinois entity, for an insurance policy that
was written in Illinois.
(See ECF No. 99, at p.12.)
Thus,
River Valley did not perform any actions relevant to this case
in West Virginia, nor does it appear remotely foreseeable that
River Valley would perform any actions in or affecting West
Virginia.
River Valley added persons to an interstate
commercial motor vehicle policy.
Plaintiffs appear to make the
argument that this makes it sufficiently foreseeable that River
Valley’s performance of its duties would affect West Virginia.
This argument, relying on the stream of commerce theory,
likewise fails to create specific personal jurisdiction over
River Valley.
Even if River Valley performed an act and it was aware that
the effects of that action could touch West Virginia – such as
its act here in certifying a truck driver for an interstate
commercial insurance policy, which could then result in the
16
driver driving in West Virginia - this awareness is itself
insufficient to find the kind of purposeful availment of the
forum state required before specific personal jurisdiction is
properly found.
As the Supreme Court explained in Asahi,
The placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
State, for example, designing the product for the
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum
State, establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing
the product through a distributor who has agreed to
serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But a
defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may
or will sweep the product into the forum State does
not convert the mere act of placing the product into
the stream into an act purposefully directed toward
the forum State.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
Here, plaintiffs have not
demonstrated the presence of any of this additional conduct.
See supra.
Thus, while River Valley stated that defendant
Copeland was eligible to be added to an interstate commercial
motor vehicle policy, this is (at most) equivalent to merely
placing a product into the stream of commerce without any
purposeful direction of that product towards the forum state.
The action of a third party, defendant J&TS, directed defendant
Copeland to enter and drive in West Virginia, and does not
17
subject River Valley to specific personal jurisdiction in West
Virginia.
See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (“[T]he
relationship [between the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation] must arise out of contacts that the “defendant
himself” creates with the forum State.” (citations omitted)).
Therefore, plaintiffs have not met their burden of making a
prima facie case that River Valley purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of conducting activities in West Virginia.
See
Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 559 (4th
Cir. 2014).
As plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this first
prong of the Universal Leather test, this court need not analyze
the second and third prongs of the specific personal
jurisdiction analysis before concluding that River Valley is not
subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court.
See
Consulting Eng'rs Corp., 561 F.3d at 278 (“If, and only if, we
find that the plaintiff has satisfied this first prong of the
test for specific jurisdiction need we move on to a
consideration of prongs two and three.”).
IV.
Jurisdictional Discovery
Plaintiffs request that, if this court concludes that
plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction over River Valley, plaintiffs be afforded the
opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery “to learn the
18
full nature and extent of River Valley’s commercial contacts”
with West Virginia.
(ECF No. 116, at p.2.)
The court DENIES
that request for the following reasons.
A. Standard for Granting Jurisdiction Discovery
“A federal district court uncertain about its personal
jurisdiction over a defendant may, in its discretion, grant
discovery for the limited purpose of determining whether
exercising personal jurisdiction is proper.”
Estate of Alford
v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 2016 WL 756489, at *1 (S.D.W. Va.
Feb. 25, 2018) (citing Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst
Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003)).
“‘If
a plaintiff presents factual allegations that suggest with
reasonable particularity the possible existence of the requisite
contacts between the party and the forum state, the plaintiff's
right to conduct jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.’”
Estate of Alford v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd, 2016 WL 756489, at
*1 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 25, 2016) (quoting ; Toys “R” Us, Inc. v.
Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)).
However,
“the decision of whether or not to permit jurisdictional
discovery is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the
district court,” and “where . . . the plaintiff simply wants to
conduct a fishing expedition in the hopes of discovering some
basis of jurisdiction,” the district court is well within its
19
discretion to deny jurisdictional discovery.
Base Metal Trading
v. Ojsc Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 216 n.3
(4th Cir. 2002).
Thus, “[w]hen a plaintiff offers only
speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum
state, a court is within its discretion in denying
jurisdictional discovery.”
Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 402.
B. Analysis
Even after construing all inferences in plaintiffs' favor,
plaintiffs have offered merely speculative and/or conclusory
assertions that River Valley has sufficient contacts with West
Virginia for this court to assert personal jurisdiction over
River Valley.
Plaintiffs have done no more than simply state
that River Valley has contacts with West Virginia, and have
offered no concrete examples of River Valley’s contacts with the
forum state. 5
Compare Brighter Sky Prods., LLC v. Marriott
Int'l, Inc., 2018 WL 2248601, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. May 16, 2018)
(finding that the plaintiff's claims regarding personal
jurisdiction were merely conclusory where the plaintiff offered
no concrete, meaningful contacts with the forum outside of the
defendant's website, and that plaintiffs’ claims do not arise
Other than the website and the 0.000006% of revenue, which this
court addressed earlier, see supra Part III.B, and were also
first mentioned not by plaintiffs, but by River Valley itself.
See supra Part I.C.
5
20
out of any asserted contacts in any event), with Farrar v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 2018 WL 5891751, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 9,
2018) (granting jurisdictional discovery where plaintiffs
offered “concrete examples” of contacts with the forum state,
such as defendants making “millions of dollars in revenue in
West Virginia . . . [being] registered with the State of West
Virginia for the purpose of conducting business . . . and
advertis[ing] in and solicit[ing] business from West Virginia”). 6
Moreover, allowing jurisdictional discovery would largely amount
to a wasteful fishing expedition, as plaintiffs do not
articulate any specific facts they anticipate to uncover; in
fact, plaintiffs do not even suggest any general lines of
inquiry they might pursue beyond getting to “jurisdictional
issues” and questioning Mr. Friedel about his affidavit.
No. 116, at p.3.)
(ECF
Plaintiffs merely hope to uncover some
information that would aid them in asserting jurisdiction.
In
such a case, the court declines to authorize such a fishing
It also appears that in other cases where courts have granted
jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs have met prong (1) of the
Universal Leather test by showing some sufficient minimum
contacts between defendant and the forum state, but are
struggling to meet prongs (2) and (3) by showing how the
particular cause of action in the case is connected to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state. The decisions cited
here, Farrar and Brighter Sky, demonstrate this distinction.
6
21
expedition, and so DENIES plaintiffs’ request to conduct
jurisdictional discovery.
V.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds that
plaintiffs have not met their burden of making a prima facie
showing that River Valley purposefully directed activities at
West Virginia or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
doing business here such that the exercise of jurisdiction would
be reasonable.
Nor have plaintiffs shown that granting
jurisdictional discovery is appropriate here.
It is therefore
necessary to dismiss River Valley from this action for want of
personal jurisdiction.
As such, and for the reasons expressed
above, defendant River Valley’s motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 98),
is GRANTED.
Defendant River Valley is further DISMISSED from
this case with prejudice.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to all counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of March, 2020.
Enter:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
22
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?