Gilley v. CH Robinson Worldwide, Inc. et al
Filing
82
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying defendant C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.'s 13 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge David A. Faber on 3/28/2019. (cc: counsel of record) (arb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
CLINTON EUGENE GILLEY, as
Administrator of the Estate of
CARL DAVID GILLEY, Nicole Leigh Lee,
As Administrator of the Estate of
CHRISTINE TARA WARDEN GILLEY, and
Clinton Eugene Gilley and Nicole Leigh
Lee as Co-Administrators of the Estates
Of J.G. and G.G., minor children.
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-00536
C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC.,
J&TS TRANSPORT EXPRESS, INC., and
BERTRAM COPELAND
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is the defendant, C.H. Robinson
Worldwide, Inc.’s (hereinafter “CHR”) Motion to Dismiss.
No. 13.
ECF
Specifically, CHR moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims
against it because CHR contends that the claims are preempted by
the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994
and otherwise fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Id.
For the reasons that follow, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.’s
motion (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.
I.
Background
This case arises out of a motor vehicle wreck in which a
tractor-trailer driven by defendant Bertram Copeland collided
into a vehicle driven by Christine Gilley, resulting in the
death of Christine Gilley, and her family, Carl David Gilley,
J.G., and G.G.
See ECF NO. 1.
Prior to the incident, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 1
(hereinafter “CHR”) engaged J&TS Transport Express, Inc. 2
(hereinafter “J&TS”) to transport goods from Bay Valley Foods,
LLC in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to Aldi, Inc. in Salisbury,
North Carolina.
Id.
J&TS hired Copeland to transport the
shipment via a tractor-trailer, which was leased to J&TS.
On April 13, 2017, Copeland picked up a load for transport.
Id.
Id.
Plaintiffs’ allege that the brakes on the tractor-trailer were
not properly maintained.
Id.
While traveling on I-77 in Mercer
County, West Virginia, Copeland allegedly “burned up” the brakes
on the tractor-trailer, failed to maintain control of the
tractor-trailer, crossed over the median into oncoming traffic,
and collided with the Gilley family’s vehicle.
Id.
CHR is a federally-licensed property freight broker.
J&TS is a motor carrier that hired and employed Copeland. At
the time of the incident, Copeland was transporting goods in
Mercer County, West Virginia.
1
2
2
Plaintiffs assert wrongful death claims against CHR for
negligently selecting J&TS to transport the CHR Load and
vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of defendants
J&TS and Copeland.
ECF No. 1.
Defendant CHR has moved to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against it.
ECF Nos. 13, 14.
First,
CHR argues that the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 (hereinafter “FAAAA”) preempts
plaintiffs’ negligent selection claim.
See id. at p. 2.
CHR
contends that the FAAAA preempts state laws, including common
law tort claims, that have any relation to or connection with a
broker’s prices, routes or services.
Id.
CHR argues that the
plaintiffs’ claim goes to the heart of CHR’s services and would
have a significant economic impact on those services, and thus
are preempted by the FAAAA.
Id.
Second, CHR argues that the
court should dismiss the plaintiffs’ common law claim of
vicarious liability because J&TS was an independent contractor,
and CHR had no relationship, contractual or otherwise, with J&TS
driver, Copeland.
Id.
In Count V against CHR 3, the plaintiffs allege that CHR
negligently selected J&TS to carry the load; specifically,
because J&TS was a “new entrant” that had been operating for a
The court will review the defendant CHR’s objections in the
order presented in its motion. Thus, Count V will be reviewed
before Count IV is reviewed.
3
3
month and had not yet been rated by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, when selected by CHR.
ECF Nos. 1, 33.
Because the plaintiffs’ specific complaint is pertinent to the
motion to dismiss analysis, the complaint is as follows:
At all relevant times, Defendant CH Robinson owed the
Gilley family, and the public at large, a duty to
exercise ordinary care and act reasonably in arranging
transportation on public roadways, in investigating
the fitness of J&TS prior to hiring the company to
carry the Load on public highways and not to hire or
retain a trucking company that CH Robinson knew or
should have known posed a risk of harm to others and
which was otherwise not competent or fit to operate
CMVs on public roadways.
J&TS was a brand new, inexperienced and incompetent
truck company that hired an incompetent driver,
Defendant Copeland.
J&TS inexperience and incompetence, and hiring and
retention of an incompetent and unfit driver, were
direct and proximate causes of this fatal collision.
Defendant CH Robinson, a sophisticated transportation
services provider that is regularly engaged in the
business of shipping, knew or should have known that
J&TS was a new entrant, that J&TS did not have a
“satisfactory” safety rating, that J&TS was an unrated
motor carrier and as such, the reasonably safe course
of action for CH Robinson would have been to conduct
further investigation and otherwise exercise due
caution with respect to J&TS, which was unfit to
operate safely and provide competent transportation.
Defendant CH Robinson negligently and recklessly
breached each of these duties, which it owed to the
motoring public, including the Gilley family, by
failing to exercise due care in arranging the
transportation for the Load, by hiring and/or
retaining J&TS when CH Robinson either knew or should
have known that J&TS posed a risk of harm to others
and was otherwise incompetent and unfit to perform the
4
duties of an interstate motor carrier, or
intentionally chose not to know.
As a foreseeable and proximate result of Defendant CH
Robinson’s negligent and reckless or intentional
actions and omissions, in breach of its duties, the
Gilley family and/or their heirs and survivors
suffered and/ or will continue to suffer damages for
which their estates and survivors are entitled to
recover, as set forth above.
Defendant CH Robinson’s [sic] acted willfully,
wantonly and recklessly—a willful blindness to the
well-known dangers with respect to inexperienced new
entrant and unrated trucking companies—and their
actions and omission demonstrate a conscious disregard
for the safety of others.
Defendant CH Robinson is liable for the abovedescribed actions and omissions, the damages
proximately caused, and any punitive or exemplary
damages.
ECF No. 1, p. 9-10.
Plaintiffs allege in Count IV against CHR that CHR “had the
right to control the manner of work performed, the right to
discharge, the method of payment, and/or the level of skill
involved, among other things, with respect to defendant J&TS and
the transportation of this Load.”
ECF No. 1, p. 8.
Plaintiffs
contend that the acts or omissions of defendant Copeland were
committed within the course or scope of his employment and/or
agency with CHR.
See id.
Plaintiffs argue that as a principal
or employer of defendant Copeland, CHR is vicariously liable for
the negligence and reckless conduct of defendant Copeland, the
damages proximately caused, and any punitive or exemplary
5
damages.
Id.
Plaintiffs state that the actions and omissions
of defendant J&TS were committed within the course and scope of
J&TS’ employment and/or agency with CHR.
Id.
Additionally,
plaintiffs argue that “as principal or employer of Defendant
J&TS, Defendant CH Robinson is vicariously liable for the
negligence and reckless conduct of Defendant J&TS, the damages
proximately caused thereby, and any punitive or exemplary
damages.
Id.
II.
Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss
Defendant CHR moves to dismiss the claims against it
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
“[A]
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief
should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that
the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state
of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.”
Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325
(4th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), and Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354,
355 (4th Cir. 1969)).
“In considering a motion to dismiss,
the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations
and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff.”
Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130,
1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Ibarra v. United States, 120
F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997).
6
In evaluating the sufficiency of a pleading, the cases of
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), provide guidance.
When
reviewing a motion to dismiss, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, a court must determine whether the
factual allegations contained in the complaint “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests,” and, when accepted as true,
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957); 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).
“[O]nce
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. As the Fourth Circuit has
explained, “to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”
Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown,
716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
III. Discussion
a. Preemption Argument
CHR contends that the FAAAA preempts plaintiffs’ negligent
selection claim against CHR.
ECF No. 14.
7
Specifically, CHR
argues that the FAAAA preclusion of states from enacting or
enforcing laws that relate to a motor carrier’s or broker’s
prices routes, or services is applicable to the issues at hand,
and thus, precludes the plaintiffs’ state law tort claims
against it.
Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)).
“Preemption may be either express or implied, and is
compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the
statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose.”
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
383 (1992) (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-67
(1990).
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained the question of
whether federal law preempts state laws in an area is one of
statutory intent, and courts should begin with language employed
by congress and with the assumption that ordinary meaning of
that language accurately expresses legislative purpose.
Id.
The FAAAA, which sought to preempt state trucking regulation, 4
provides that no state may:
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price,
The FAAAA replaced the then-existing patchwork of intrastate
trucking laws with a uniform federal standard. The statutory
language was borrowed from the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”)
and has been interpreted consistently by the Supreme Court in
both settings. See generally Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2018). Congress intended for the
preemption provision of the FAAAA to be applied in an identical
manner as the preemption provision of the ADA. See Deerskin
Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.,
972 F.Supp. 665, 668 (N.D.Ga. 1997).
4
8
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . broker, or
freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of
property.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
In line with this statute, the Supreme Court has held that
state enforcement actions having “a connection with or reference
to” carrier rates, routes or services are preempted.
U.S. at 368.
Rowe, 552
Such preemption may occur even if a state law’s
effect on rates, routes or services is only indirect.
Id.
Nonetheless, federal law may not preempt state laws that affect
rates in only a tenuous, remote or peripheral manner.
(citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390). 5
Id.
Courts have found that
Congress’ “related to” language has a broad scope.
Federal
Express Corp. v. United states Postal Service, 55 F.Supp.2d 813,
816 (W.D. Tenn. 1992).
Section 14501(c)(1) requires the Court
to determine whether the provision, directly or indirectly,
binds the carrier to a particular price, route or service and
thereby interferes with competitive market forces within the
industry.
Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 643
(9th Cir. 2014).
In Rowe, 552 U.S. 364, the court found that the Maine Laws at
issue, which regulated the delivery of tobacco to customers
within the state, were preempted by federal law. Rowe was not a
personal injury case. In Morales, 504 U.S. 374, the court found
that a claim of deceptive airline-fare advertising under a state
consumer fraud case was preempted by federal law. Morales was
not a personal injury case.
5
9
Although Congress generally preempted state regulation of
motor carries, it simultaneously carved out an exception to the
rule with regard to the states’ safety regulatory authority by
expressly stating that the provisions of § 14501(c)(1) “shall
not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with
respect to motor vehicles.”
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
To
determine whether this exception applies, courts must decide
whether the provision at issue is intended to be, and is,
genuinely responsive to motor vehicle safety.
See Dilts, 769
F.3d at 644.
Turning to the issue at hand, the court must determine
whether plaintiffs’ common law negligent selection claim is
“related to” a price, route or service of CHR with respect to
the CHR’s selection of the transportation business.
Even if the
plaintiffs’ claim has such a connection, the court must further
determine whether such claims are “saved” under the safety
regulatory exception.
In other words, the court must decide
whether personal injury negligence claims are preempted by the
FAAAA under these circumstances.
CHR argues that the plaintiffs’ negligent selection claim
against it expressly takes issue with how CHR performed its
primary service—selecting motor carriers to transport freight.
ECF No. 34, p.2.
In other words, “[b]y alleging that CHR failed
to further or sufficiently investigate J&TS before selecting it
10
to transport the at-issue load, [p]laintiffs’ allegations relate
to and complain specifically about the manner in which CHR
performed its core service.”
Id. at p.6.
Thus, CHR contends
that the plaintiffs’ negligence selection claims are preempted
by the FAAAA.
In response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs cite to numerous district and trial court decisions
from various jurisdictions that stand for the proposition that
the FAAAA does not preempt state personal injury tort claims
against freight brokers.
ECF No. 33, p. 5.
Furthermore, the
plaintiffs contend that even if the court found that plaintiffs’
claims against CHR satisfy paragraph (1) of the FAAAA preemption
provision regarding “services,” the claims would not be
preempted because they fall within the “safety regulatory
authority concerning motor vehicles” exception in paragraph
(2)(A) of the statute.
ECF No. 33, p. 13.
In support of their
argument, plaintiffs cite to City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and
Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 429-441 (2002), where the
U.S. Supreme Court states that, with respect to the FAAAA,
Congress’ clear purpose was “state economic regulation” and not
to restrict the preexisting and traditional state police power
over “safety regulations,” including ones that govern motor
carriers of property.
Id.
11
Although the Supreme Court has address FAAAA preemption,
neither it nor any federal district court of appeals has
addressed whether a personal injury claim against a broker based
on negligent hiring is preempted.
However, many lower courts
have, and this court agrees with the numerous courts which have
found that personal injury negligence claims are not preempted
by the FAAAA.
For example, in Mann v. C. H. Robinson Worldwide,
Inc., No. 7:16-cv-00104, 2017 WL 3191516 (W.D. Va. July 27,
2017), the plaintiffs filed a negligent hiring action against
the defendant, C. H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., claiming that the
defendant was negligent in its decision to hire the
transportation business and drivers to haul a load of laundry
detergent and that a reasonably prudent broker would not have
done so.
Id. At *1.
This case also arose out of a collision
with a tracker-trailer and drivers.
Id.
The defendant argued
that “plaintiffs’ negligence claims are completely preempted by
federal law under the preemption provisions set forth in the
FAAAA.
Id. at *5.
The Mann court concluded that:
plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claims are not preempted.
First of all, as several other courts have noted, a
negligent hiring claim as an avenue for imposing
liability for an accident does not have anything more
than a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” connection to
the “price, route, or service” or a broker. Rowe, 552
U.S. at 371. Instead, the court agrees with the Montes
court that a personal injury suit for negligent hiring
is not an attempt to regulate the “services” of a freight
broker. No. 14-cv-9230, 2015 WL 1250139, at *1-2.
12
Id. at *7.
Similarly, in Owens v. Anthony, the defendant, C. H
Robinson Worldwide, Inc., moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’
common law negligence claims against it by arguing that the
claims were preempted by the FAAAA.
No. 2:11-cv-33, 2011 WL
6056409, at *1 (M.D. TN. Dec. 3, 2011).
In this case, the
defendant selected the transportation company whose driver of a
tractor-trailer crashed into a vehicle resulting in severe
personal injuries.
Id.
The plaintiffs brought a negligence
selection claim against the defendant.
See id.
The Owens court
held that “personal injury negligence claims are not preempted
by the FAAAA” and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on
this basis.
Id at *3; Morales v. Redco Transport Ltd., No.
5:14-cv-129, 2015 WL 9274068 (S.D. Tex. Dec 21, 2015) (denying
broker’s motion to dismiss state law tort claims based on FAAAA
preemptions); Jimenez-Ruiz v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 794 F.
Supp. 2d. 344, 2011 WL 2460873 (D. Puerto Rico, June 16, 2011)
(holding that personal injury claims based on a state’s general
negligence law are not preempted by the ADA).
The court finds the holdings in various jurisdictions
persuasive and concludes that the FAAAA does not preempt the
plaintiffs’ state law vicarious liability claim based upon the
particular facts before the court.
In the present case,
plaintiffs’ negligent selection claim stems from a personal13
injury, wrongful-death action, and the court finds that this
claim does not “relate to” CHR’s broker services.
It affects
broker services in “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner,”
to fall within the purview of the statutory preemption
provision.
The court finds that allowing a state law remedy in
the present case will not create an irreconcilable conflict
between federal and state regulation.
Accordingly, CHR’s motion
to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claim as preempted by the FAAAA
is denied.
The court further concludes that, even if that state’s
negligent hiring claims had a sufficient impact on the price,
route, or service of a broker to satisfy Paragraph (1), it would
not be preempted because it would fall within the general
“safety regulatory exception of paragraph (2)(A) of the
preemption provision.
For these reasons, defendant CHR’s Motion to Dismiss the fifth
cause of action is denied.
b. Failure to
Argument
State
a
Claim
for
Vicarious
Liability
CHR contends that plaintiffs’ claim of vicarious liability
under the theory of common law agency 6 fails because J&TS was an
independent contractor, and CHR had no relationship, contractual
Plaintiffs dismissed their claim of vicarious liability under
the theory of statutory employment. See ECF No. 33, footnote
12.
6
14
or otherwise with J&TS’s driver, Copeland.
CHR cites to
Robertson v. Morris, 209 W. Va. 288, 291 (2001), for the general
proposition that “one who hires an independent contractor is
generally not responsible for injury resulting from an act or
omission of the contractor or the contractor’s servant.”
CHR’s
also cites to Paxton v. Crabtree, Syl. Pt. 5, 184 W. Va. 237,
240, 400 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1990) in their brief, where the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia established four
factors to consider when determining the question of whether an
employer-employee or independent contractor relationship exists
for vicarious liability purposes.
These four factors are as
follows: “(1) Selection and engagement of the servant; (2)
Payment of compensation; (3) Power of dismissal; and (4) Power
of control.”
Id.
The court does not find it appropriate at this juncture to
delve into the question of what the nature of the relationship
between CHR, J&TS, and Copeland was at the time of the accident
giving rise to the case.
Rather, the question immediately
before the court is whether the plaintiffs’ complaint “alleges
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,’”
Painter's Mill Grille, LLC, 716 F.3d at 350
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
This determination is made
by viewing the facts and circumstances in the light most
15
favorable to the plaintiffs.
See Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 7
F.3d at 1134; see also Ibarra, 120 F.3d at 474.
The court finds that the plaintiffs’ complaint pled
sufficient facts to support the contention that a claim for
relief is plausible beyond mere speculation.
The plaintiffs’
complaint detailed that some form of a business relationship
between the parties did in fact exist and provided notice to CHR
of the allegations brought against it.
ECF No. 1.
The question
of the exact nature of the relationship between the parties for
purposes of imposing potential liability remains to be answered
by the fact finder.
See Rawls v. Associated Materials, LLC, No.
1:10-cv-01272, 2012 WL 3852875, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 5, 2012)
("Whether an agency relationship exists is a factual
question.”).
Therefore, CHR’s motion to dismiss claim four is
denied.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order to all
counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of March, 2019.
ENTER:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?