Skinner v. Maruka
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying petitioner's 14 MOTION for Reconsideration. Signed by Senior Judge David A. Faber on 1/27/2021. (cc: Petitioner; counsel of record) (arb)
Case 1:19-cv-00528 Document 15 Filed 01/27/21 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 240
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT BLUEFIELD
JESSE MANUEL SKINNER,
Petitioner,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-00528
WARDEN C. MARUKA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 14) of the court’s order of September
25, 2020 (ECF No. 11), (1) denying petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241
petition; (2) denying petitioner’s “Petition for Emergency Writ
of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum Pursuant to § Title 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1657, 2241, 2255(f)”; (3) denying petitioner’s petition
for “Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum Seeking Order from
this Court to Conduct Hearing and/or Forthwith Grant Writ of
Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum and Order Petitioner released from
Unlawful Custody As Law and Justice Requires and/or Release
Petitioner on Bail Pending Adjudication of Instant Habeas
Proceeding”; and (4) dismissing this action.
For the reasons
discussed below, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
On the propriety of granting a motion to alter or amend a
judgment under Rule 59(e), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has stated that “ a district court has
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the discretion to grant a Rule 59(e) motion only in very narrow
circumstances:
‘(1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available
at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or to prevent
manifest injustice.’”
Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Collison v. Int’l Chemical Workers Union, 34
F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir.1994)); see also United States ex rel.
Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290
(4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1012 (2003).
The
circumstances under which this type of motion may be granted are
so limited that “[c]ommentators observe ‘because of the narrow
purposes for which they are intended, Rule 59(e) motions
typically are denied.’”
Woodrum v. Thomas Mem’l. Hosp. Found.,
Inc., 186 F.R.D. 350, 351 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (citation omitted).
Rule 59(e) motions may not be used, however, to raise
arguments which could have been raised prior to the
issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a
case under a novel legal theory that the party had the
ability to address in the first instance.
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998).
“[M]ere disagreement” with a court’s legal analysis
“does not support a Rule 59(e) motion.”
Hutchinson v. Staton,
994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's motion does not fall within the limited
circumstances under which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted as
enunciated by the Fourth Circuit.
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Although petitioner refers to
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the Fourth Circuit’s savings clause jurisprudence (namely, In re
Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000) and United States v.
Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 1318 (2019)), he makes no attempt to show that his case
passes either of the tests set forth in that jurisprudence.
Rather, he continues to press his meritless argument that
because he attacks the sentencing court’s jurisdiction, he is
exempt from those tests.
This court is not the first to tell petitioner that his
argument fails.
At least two other courts have already done so.
Analyzing a similar § 2241 challenge by petitioner (one claiming
that the federal government “lacked jurisdiction to prosecute,
convict, and sentence [him]”), Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D.
Austin in the District of South Carolina stated,
Here, Petitioner appears to claim he is entitled to
immediate release from BOP custody because the Federal
Government is not authorized to prosecute drug crimes.
This type of claim, to the extent it presents any arguable
basis in law, should usually be brought under § 2255 in the
sentencing court. Rice, 617 F.3d at 807. The Petition is
devoid of allegations suggesting that § 2255 is inadequate
or ineffective such that the savings clause would apply to
permit Petitioner to raise his claims under a § 2241
petition.
Skinner v. Mosley, No. CV 8:18-1908-JFA-JDA, 2018 WL 8497900, at
*3 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,
No. CV 8:18-1908-JFA-JDA, 2019 WL 2394147 (D.S.C. June 6, 2019).
The district court reiterated this in response to petitioner’s
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objections to Magistrate Judge Austin’s report and
recommendation. 1
Skinner v. Mosley, No. CV 8:18-1908-JFA-JDA,
2019 WL 2394147, at *5 (D.S.C. June 6, 2019) (rejecting
petitioner’s claim there that “since his conviction was illegal
it ‘negates any further consideration of the [savings clause]
test.’”).
In dismissing another § 2241 petition by petitioner,
Magistrate Judge Autumn D. Spaeth in the Central District of
California noted petitioner’s failure to explain why his
jurisdictional argument was not the proper subject of a direct
appeal or § 2255 application.
Skinner v. United States Dep’t of
Justice, No. 518CV00627DMGADS, 2018 WL 7893014, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 26, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No.
518CV00627DMGADS, 2019 WL 1437588 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019).
The court there stated,
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that he has not
had any unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his
claim in the trial court and has therefore failed to
establish that Section 2255 is either inadequate or
ineffective for invoking the savings clause. The fact that
he may now be procedurally barred from obtaining relief
does not alter that conclusion.
Id.
Petitioner’s objections in that case described Magistrate Judge
Austin’s proposed findings as containing “the most absurd, most
ridiculous and ignorant statement [he] ha[d] ever heard in
almost twenty (20) years of litigating.” Skinner v. Mosley, No.
CV 8:18-1908-JFA-JDA, 2019 WL 2394147, at *3 (D.S.C. June 6,
2019).
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This court joins the chorus and reiterates that because
petitioner seeks immediate release from imprisonment and because
he is imprisoned pursuant to a sentence imposed by a district
court, his challenge is to the legality of his conviction or
sentence; as such, no district court has jurisdiction to
entertain his petition under § 2241 unless petitioner can show
that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.”
See § 2255; Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802,
807 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194
(4th Cir.1997) (en banc)) (“It is only when ‘§ 2255 proves
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention,’
that a federal prisoner may pursue habeas relief under
§ 2241.”).
Instead, petitioner advances his own interpretation of
§ 2241, which would allow him to seek immediate release from
prison without challenging his conviction or sentence, thereby
evading the savings clause.
In support of his interpretation,
he invokes Chief Justice John Marshall.
Specifically, he relies
upon the following quote from the Chief Justice’s opinion for
the Court in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 117 (1807):
“The
question whether the individual shall be imprisoned is always
distinct from the question whether he shall be convicted or
acquitted of the charge on which he is to be tried, and
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therefore these questions are separated, and may be decided in
different courts.”
8 U.S. at 101.
The facts in Bollman formed the basis for the famous
treason case against Aaron Burr.
Paul D. Halliday, G. Edward
White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts,
and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 683-84 (2008).
Two alleged Burr co-conspirators—Dr. Justus Erich Bollman and
Samuel Swartwout—were arrested after Burr had entrusted them
with duplicates of a letter to General James Wilkinson and
Wilkinson, in turn, alerted President Jefferson to the allegedly
treasonous enterprise.
Id.
While in custody, “Bollman was
denied access to counsel and the courts and placed on a U.S.
warship for transportation to Baltimore, the seaport closest to
Washington.
After his arrival, he and Swartwout were taken
under guard to Washington and imprisoned.”
Id. at 84.
An initial question was whether the court had the power to
issue a writ of habeas corpus:
Chief Justice Marshall held that the Supreme Court had the
statutory power to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the
release of two prisoners held for trial under warrant of
the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, but the
Court rejected the argument that the Court had inherent
power to issue the common law writs, other than habeas
corpus ad prosequendum and habeas corpus ad testificundum.
Brown v. Taylor, No. CIV. 11-4709 NLH, 2011 WL 3957533, at *2
(D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2011).
The Court went on to grant habeas
relief to Bollman and Swartwout.
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Unfortunately for petitioner here, Bollman does not support
his argument.
In contrast to Skinner, Bollman and Swartwout
were in custody on pending charges, not serving sentences of
imprisonment imposed after a jury verdict of guilty.
Bollman
states, “As preliminary to any investigation of the merits of
this motion, this court deems it proper to declare that it
disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by
the laws of the United States.”
8 U.S. at 93.
So too here.
Because petitioner has not shown how § 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective,” as defined by binding case law in this circuit,
this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Because the motion for reconsideration does not even attempt to
rectify this fatal flaw in his motion for reconsideration, and
for the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of January, 2021.
ENTER:
David A. Faber
Senior United States District Judge
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