Young et al v. Cook et al
Filing
115
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing that the 107 Order entered 6/15/2011 is affirmed. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 8/2/2011. (cc: attys) (cbo)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
LARRY YOUNG and MELISSA YOUNG,
his wife,
Plaintiffs
v.
Civil Action No. 2:10-0013
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
an Illinois corporation,
Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is defendant’s appeal of a June 15, 2011, order
entered by the United States Magistrate Judge, filed June 29,
2011.1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) governs appeals
from rulings of a magistrate judge on nondispositive matters:
When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a
party's claim or defense is referred to a magistrate
judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must
promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when
appropriate, issue a written order stating the
decision. A party may serve and file objections to the
order within 14 days after being served with a copy. A
party may not assign as error a defect in the order not
timely objected to. The district judge in the case must
Also pending is plaintiffs’ motion to extend their time to
respond to defendant’s appeal, filed June 30, 2011. It is
ORDERED that the motion to extend be, and it hereby is, granted.
Plaintiffs’ response to the appeal, received July 13, 2011, is
deemed timely.
1
consider timely objections and modify or set aside any
part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is
contrary to law.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(a) (emphasis added).
The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has observed as follows:
Rule 72(a), and its statutory companion, see 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), place limits on a party's ability
to seek review of a magistrate judge's non-dispositive
order. . . .
In [sum] . . . , the district court was required
to “defer to the magistrate judge's ruling unless it
[was] clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
Allen v. Sybase, Inc., 468 F.3d 642, 658 (10th Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added)(quoted authority omitted).
A decision is clearly erroneous when, following a
review of the entire record, a court “is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
A
decision is “contrary to law” when it “fails to apply or
misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.”
Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 592 F.
Supp.2d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
The magistrate judge granted plaintiffs’ motion to
compel defendant to fully respond to plaintiffs’ second set of
interrogatories and request for production of documents.
2
The
magistrate judge found that “Allstate’s objections to
Interrogatories 1 and 2, and Request Nos. 3 and 5 . . .
[constituted] inappropriate boilerplate,” and she granted the
motion to compel as to those items and, additionally, Request No.
1.
(Ord. at 3).
Defendant “primar[il]y” objects to the magistrate
judge’s direction that it “produce documents it does not possess
[and] which [it] said it did not possess in response to the
requests.”
(Appeal at 2).
In particular, defendant asserts that
discovery related to something known as “Tech-Core” is
inappropriate on the following grounds:
Magistrate Stanley’s Order does not address the fact
that there is no such thing as Tech-Cor[e] training.
Magistrate Stanley has ordered Allstate to identify
individuals responsible for designing and implementing
. . . [that] program identified by a term that is
essentially corporate slang for internal training and
manuals. . . . When the term is corporate slang, and
the party has no idea what is meant by it, and explains
why, such an objection ceases to be boilerplate. . . .
Allstate’s employees’ testimony, attached as exhibits
to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, show how differently
those employees use the term Tech-Cor[e]. For example,
one adjuster stated she received claims handling
policies and procedures previously produced in this
case as part of Tech-Cor[e]. Another adjuster could
not recall receiving any written materials at all, but
testified elsewhere that he had received the same
policy manuals discussed by the other adjuster.
(Appeal at 4-5 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
3
Testimony by at least two of defendant’s adjusters,
along with that of its Rule 30(b)(6) designee, appear to refer to
“Tech-Core.”
(See Dep. of Shelly Fariss at 54 (“That information
would have been received from Tech-Cor[e], which I’m not sure who
the trainers were.”); Dep. of John Roberts at 10, 13; Dep. of
Suzanne Lamphier at 7-9 (“We had two weeks training in our home
office facility called Tech-Core.”)).
The magistrate judge
specifically referenced testimony by Ms. Lamphier, the Rule
30(b)(6) designee, in reaching her decision concerning
disclosure.
Inasmuch as defendant’s employees testified to the
existence of “Tech Core,” this portion of the order appealed from
is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.2
Defendant further challenges that portion of the order
appealed from that requires it to respond to a request for
production of “‘all training programs, papers, class room
Both parties seem to exalt form over substance at times in
their filed materials. The crux of plaintiffs’ request is for
information relating to the training of defendant’s adjusters
concerning uninsured motorist and unfair trade practice claims.
Irrespective of nomenclature differences, defendant should
respond in substance to the request made, something plaintiffs
contend it has not done. (See, e.g., Resp. to Objecs. at 6
(“Allstate has not provided the Plaintiff with any adjuster
training information . . . .”)).
2
4
handouts, and/or presentations that were prepared by Suzanne
Lamphier relating to unfair trade practices, bad faith risk
avoidance, file quality documentation, and good faith claim
handling in the last five years.’”
No. 5).
(Appeal at 6 (quoting Request
Defendant advised the magistrate judge that it possessed
no such documents.
It additionally notes that Ms. Lamphier
advised counsel during her deposition that she prepared no
“programs, papers, handouts, or presentations.” (Id.)
Defendant has stated in its appeal that it intends to
“supplement its discovery responses with any documents used by
Suzanne Lamphier, not previously produced, despite the fact that
those documents were not requested by Plaintiffs’ request.”
at 7).
(Id.
Plaintiffs appear satisfied with this voluntary
disclosure on the point.
(See, e.g., Pls.’ Resp. to Appeal at 7
(“It appears that Allstate has waived this objection as it has
agreed that it ‘will supplement its discovery responses with any
documents used by Suzanne Lamphier, not previously produced . . .
. ’”)).
Defendant has not replied.
Based upon defendant’s promised production, and
plaintiffs’ apparent satisfaction therewith, the court deems this
portion of defendant’s appeal to be moot.
5
Should further
controversy develop on the point, the parties may present the
matter to the magistrate judge for disposition.
Defendant also challenges that portion of the
magistrate judge’s order directing it to produce certain employee
“performance related records contained in . . . personnel files .
. . including completion of training, commendations, reprimands,
recommendations for advancement or demotion, etc.”
(Ord at 5).
Defendant has agreed to “produce the test results for compliance
training for the adjuster employees [about whom plaintiffs
inquired] and reserves their right to challenge the admissibility
of the same at trial.”
(Objecs. at 6).
Plaintiffs appear
satisfied with this voluntary disclosure on the point.
(Pls.’
Resp. to Objecs. at 7 (“It appears that Allstate is waiving this
objection as it has agreed it “‘will produce the test results for
compliance training for the adjuster employees.”)).
Defendant
has not replied.
Based upon defendant’s promised production, and
plaintiffs’ apparent satisfaction therewith, the court deems this
portion of defendant’s appeal to be moot.
Should further
controversy develop on the point, the parties may present the
matter to the magistrate judge for disposition.
6
Inasmuch as defendant has not demonstrated that the
order appealed from is either clearly erroneous or contrary to
law, it is ORDERED that the June 15, 2011, order be, and it
hereby is, affirmed.
The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this written
opinion and order to all counsel of record.
DATED: August 2, 2011
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
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