Chafin v. Hunter et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying as moot defendant John Reed's 67 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages; denying defendant John Reed's 54 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law; denying defendant John Reed's 54 MOTION f or New Trial; granting Logan County's 56 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law; directing that the liability and damage portions of the jury's verdict rendered in favor of Ms. Chafin and against Logan County are set aside. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 1/16/2013. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (tmh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
APRIL TOMBLIN CHAFIN,
Civil Action No. 2:11-0034
LOGAN COUNTY COMMISSION,
LOGAN COUNTY HOME CONFINEMENT DEPARTMENT, and
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are the motions (1) by defendant John Reed for
judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, filed November
1, 2012, (2) by Logan County Commission and Logan County Home
Confinement Department (collectively as "Logan County") for
judgment as a matter of law, filed November 1, 2012, and (3) by
John Reed for leave to file a reply memorandum in excess of 10
pages ("motion for leave"), filed November 26, 2012.1
Plaintiff April Tomblin Chafin alleged in this action
that she was sexually assaulted by Mr. Reed, an officer with the
Logan County Home Confinement Department.
The case was tried to
There is not a 10-page limitation on reply briefs. The rule to
the contrary cited by Mr. Reed does not apply. It is ORDERED
that the motion for leave be, and hereby is, denied as moot.
a jury beginning on October 10, 2012.
On October 12, 2012, the
jury returned a verdict in Ms. Chafin's favor as follows:
We the members of the jury, by a preponderance of the
evidence, unanimously find as follows:
Has plaintiff proven her Section 1983 claim
against defendant John Reed?
Has plaintiff proven her intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim against defendant
If you answered "NO" to Questions 1 and 2 above,
please proceed no further and inform the
Court Security Officer that you have
reached a verdict. If you answered "YES"
to either Questions 1 or 2 above, please
proceed to Question 3 below.
Has plaintiff proven her negligent training claim
against the Logan County Commission and the Logan
County Home Confinement Department?
If you answered " YES" to either of Questions 1
or 2 above, please enter the amount of damages,
if any, that plaintiff has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence was proximately
caused by defendant Reed alone:
(a) If you answered " YES " to Question 3 above ,
please enter the amount of damages, if any, that
plaintiff has proven were proximately caused
by defendants Logan County Commission and Logan
County Home Confinement Department:
(b) To what extent, if any, do the damages
awarded against defendants Logan County
Commission and Logan County Home Confinement
Department duplicate the damages awarded, if any,
against defendant Reed:
Did defendant Reed act with evil motive or intent, or
with reckless or callous indifference to the
plaintiff's federally protected rights?
If you answered "NO" to Question 6, proceed no further
and inform the Court Security Officer you have reached
a verdict. If you answered "YES," please proceed to
Question 7 below.
What is the total amount of punitive damages you award
against defendant Reed?
(Verd. Form at 1-2).
In his motion for judgment as a matter of law, Mr.
Reed asserts that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the
In his motion for new trial, he contends that
improper evidence was introduced and resulted in a manifest
Specifically, he challenges the testimony of trial
witnesses Jeaneanne Gilco and Sherry Frye-Cochran, which he
claims "served no purpose other than to establish that . . .
[he] had a bad character [and] that he acted in conformity
therewith in relation to plaintiff."
(Mot. at 2).
asserts that the brief testimony by Ms. Chafin regarding Rachel
Scott prejudiced him inasmuch as the parties were prohibited by
the court from calling Ms. Scott at trial.2
In its motion for judgment as a matter of law, Logan
County contends that "no reasonable jury would have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the Plaintiff on her
claim of negligent training" against Logan County
Mot. at 1).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) provides as
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is
considered to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to the court's later deciding the legal
questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days
after the entry of judgment--or if the motion
addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no
later than 28 days after the jury was discharged--the
movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law and may include an alternative or joint
Mr. Reed also challenges the punitive damages award. He
asserts that evidence of his ability to pay should have been
presented to the jury. While evidence of this type is
permissibly considered by a jury in arriving at a just award, it
was not incumbent upon Ms. Chafin's counsel to develop the
matter when her adversary chose not to do so.
request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on
the renewed motion, the court may:
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the
jury returned a verdict;
(2) order a new trial; or
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)).
The applicable federal standard governing a Rule 50(b)
motion is summarized as follows:
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), the question is whether a
jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to [the nonmovant], “could have properly reached the
conclusion reached by this jury.” If reasonable minds
could differ about the result in this case, we must
affirm the jury's verdict. . . .
Bryant v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543
(4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); International Ground
Transp. v. Mayor And City Council Of Ocean City, 475 F.3d 214,
218-19 (4th Cir. 2007)(“When a jury verdict has been returned,
judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if, viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (and
in support of the jury's verdict) and drawing every legitimate
inference in that party's favor, the only conclusion a
reasonable jury could have reached is one in favor of the moving
party.”); Tools USA and Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame
Straightening Eqpt. Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 656-57 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted) (“Champ argues that the district judge erred
in denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law with
respect to both liability and damages.
A court may only grant a
motion for judgment as a matter of law (formerly j.n.o.v.) if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing every legitimate inference in that
party's favor, the court “determine[s] that the only conclusion
a reasonable trier of fact could draw from the evidence is in
favor of the moving party.”); Hetzel v. County of Prince
William, 89 F.3d 169, 171 (4th Cir.
Respecting the request for new trial, Rule 59(a)
provides that "[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on
all or some of the issues . . . for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(a).
For example, a trial judge
may grant a new trial if he is of the opinion that the verdict
is against the clear weight of the evidence or is based upon
evidence which is false or will result in a miscarriage of
Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktienge-
sellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1043 (4th Cir. 1987); Wyatt v.
Interstate & Ocean Transport Co., 623 F.2d 888, 892 (4th Cir.
1980); Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 392 (4th Cir. 1959).
Mr. Reed's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a
Respecting the motion for judgment as a matter of law,
the governing standard necessarily focuses the inquiry on Ms.
In summary, she stated that on April 7,
2009, she was placed on home confinement for approximately two
months while awaiting sentencing.
She believed that a violation
of her home confinement terms would result in revocation and
She met Mr. Reed when he summoned her to his
office the day after she violated her supervision conditions.
He explained that if she wished to avoid jail she would have to
provide him oral sex.
She described the event in significant
At an unspecified later time while still under
supervision, Ms. Chafin obtained an interview at Valley Market
with Mr. Reed's assistance.
She reported to him following the
interview, informing him she had gotten the job.
smiled and stated that she "owed him one."
(Trans. at 198).
requested oral sex, which Ms. Chafin provided.
that she was under a continuing fear that the circuit court
would revoke her supervision at Mr. Reed's urging.
reminded her of that very potentiality.
On a third occasion, Ms. Chafin was informed during a
private conversation with Mr. Reed prior to her sentencing that
he could "give me a bad report or a good report, and if I wanted
a good one, I had to do what he wanted me to do."
Similar to the two earlier events recounted, Ms. Chafin
then offered significant detail respecting how and why she
performed oral sex on Mr. Reed this third time.
In proving her claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ms.
Chafin was required to demonstrate several elements by a
preponderance of the evidence.
First, she was required to show
that Mr. Reed committed a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
violation against her.
Second, she was required to demonstrate
that Mr. Reed acted under color of state law in doing so, a
matter to which the parties stipulated.
Third, Ms. Chafin was
required to demonstrate that Mr. Reed's actions were the
proximate cause of the damages she sustained.
As a part of proving the first element, namely, the
Due Process violation, she was required to demonstrate that Mr.
Reed inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering upon
In cases of sexual abuse or rape, as the court instructed
the jury, the conduct itself constitutes sufficient evidence of
the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering.
Reduced to its essence, Ms. Chafin was required to
prove that Mr. Reed, while acting in his capacity as a home
confinement officer, sexually abused her.
Viewing the evidence
in the light most advantageous to Ms. Chafin, and drawing every
legitimate inference in her favor, a reasonable jury could have
permissibly returned the verdict rendered.
accordingly, ORDERS that Mr. Reed's motion for judgment as a
matter of law be, and it hereby is, denied.3
Mr. Reed next contends that he should be awarded a new
trial based on the asserted error of permitting the testimony of
Ms. Gilco and Ms. Frye-Cochran.
He asserts the witnesses'
testimony amounted to prohibited character evidence.
parties present the issue pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), which provides materially as follows:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act is not admissible to
prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; . . . This evidence may
be admissible for another purpose, such as
proving motive, opportunity, intent,
To the extent that Mr. Reed additionally asserts under Rule
59(a) that the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence, the same analysis applies. There was abundant
evidence to support the verdict reached.
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident. . .
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
As noted by our court of appeals in
United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2012), a fourfactor test governs the admissibility determination:
(1) The evidence must be relevant to an issue, such as
an element of an offense, and must not be offered to
establish the general character of the defendant. In
this regard, the more similar the prior act is (in
terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the
act being proved, the more relevant it becomes. (2)
The act must be necessary in the sense that it is
probative of an essential claim or an element of the
offense. (3) The evidence must be reliable. And (4)
the evidence's probative value must not be
substantially outweighed by confusion or unfair
prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate
reason to emotion in the factfinding process.
Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 29697 (4th Cir. 2010))(quoting United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d
991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997)); see United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d
1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1988).
At the time of her testimony, Ms. Gilco was
incarcerated at the Lakin Correctional Complex after pleading
guilty to first degree robbery.
She testified to serving a
five-month period of home confinement, from April to October
2009, under Mr. Reed's supervision.
She stated in stark terms
what Mr. Reed did to her during the supervision term: "He made
me give him oral sex two times to stay out of jail.
He raped me
(Trans. at 273).
On the first occasion, Mr. Reed
caught Ms. Gilco driving without a license.
He entered her
vehicle and directed her to park in the basement of the county
On the second occasion, Mr. Reed promised to
"fix" a violation of her home confinement terms.
He also told
her to park alone in the basement of the parking garage when she
next returned to the home confinement office.
When she arrived
there on a return trip, Mr. Reed directed her back to her
vehicle in the garage.
He entered the vehicle later and told
her she "knew what . . . [she] had to do."
(Trans. at 292).
She again performed oral sex upon him.
Ms. Frye-Cochran testified that she served two terms
of home confinement beginning respectively in February and
She first met Mr. Reed in February 2007.
testified that Mr. Reed ordered her to provide him oral sex on
two occasions during her second, six-month term in October 2007.
Both episodes occurred in the parking lot at a local grocery
While few details were provided on direct examination
respecting the second incident, Ms. Frye-Cochran testified that
the first occurred during evening hours at a local grocery store
parking lot "out back toward the dumpsters."
(Trans. at 348).
In assessing this evidence, the first and second
prongs of the applicable test may be considered in tandem.
Rule 404(b) evidence offered by Ms. Gilco and Ms. Frye-Cochran
was both relevant and probative on an issue in the case, namely,
Mr. Reed's alleged use of his position of authority to extract
sexual favors from females under his supervision.
was not offered to establish his character.
It was offered in
support of a pattern and practice engaged in by him and in
service of the preparation and planning undertaken by him as he
carried out the abuse.
The analysis of the first element also reflects that
the greater the similarity between the bad acts alleged by Ms.
Gilco and Ms. Frye-Cochran, and those perpetrated on Ms. Chafin,
the more relevant the challenged testimony becomes.
similarities are evident here.
Ms. Chafin, Ms. Gilco, and Ms.
Frye-Cochran were all under home confinement supervision.
each violated the terms of their supervision and confronted
revocation and incarceration.
In that crucible, Mr. Reed used
his position of power to (1) locate a secluded place, (2) offer
the supervisees his help in maintaining their continued freedom,
and (3) received in exchange a very specific physical favor,
namely, oral sex.
It is true, as Mr. Reed emphasizes in his briefing,
that the specific details of each event differ a bit, such as
the location of the abuse and Mr. Reed's mannerisms and speech
A complete identity of circumstances, however, is
The modus operandi is materially identical in each
Respecting the third factor, the challenged witness
testimony bore significant indicia of reliability.
witnesses provided quite a bit of detail concerning three of the
four episodes about which they testified.
Gilco had something to lose by testifying and Ms. Frye-Cochran
had nothing to gain.
Ms. Gilco testified that (1) she was "born
and raised" in the Logan County area, (2) she would eventually
return to it, and (3) she is "fearful of repercussions" as a
result of her testimony.
(Trans. at 293).
In contrast, Ms. Frye-Cochran let the statute of
limitations lapse for her claim against Mr. Reed.
to muster a reasonable explanation for her decision to come
forward and publicly testify about an intensely personal, and
painful, chapter of her life, recounting not only the abuse she
suffered at Mr. Reeds' hands but also her longstanding substance
abuse problem and the tragic life decisions to which it led.
The final factor requires the court to assess whether
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense that it tends to
subordinate reason to emotion in the fact finding process.
Confusion does not appear to be a concern.
however, is a matter that the court considered in depth.
prejudice was one of the reasons why the court disallowed other
Rule 404(b) evidence proffered by Ms. Chafin.
For example, she
sought to introduce an alleged inculpatory tape recorded
telephone conversation between another home confinement
supervisee, namely, Rebecca Whitt, and Mr. Reed.
circumstances sufficiently dissimilar, and considering the
diminished probative value of the evidence, the proof was
The testimony of Ms. Gilco and Ms. Frye-Cochran is
different from that proffered from Ms. Whitt.
The evidence was
certainly prejudicial to Mr. Reed's interests but not unfairly
Further, the probative value of the evidence, as earlier
summarized, was substantial given the similarity of the events
The court discerns no error in admitting the
testimony of Ms. Gilco and Ms. Frye-Cochran.4
As noted, the court has analyzed the matter within the Rule
404(b) parameters discussed by the parties. They do not mention
Rule 415(a), which provides as follows:
In a civil case involving a claim for relief based on
a party's alleged sexual assault . . . the court may
admit evidence that the party committed any other
Mr. Reed's final claim of error relates to Ms.
Chafin's mention of Rachel Scott during her testimony.
contends that the court should not have permitted utterance of
the name inasmuch as Ms. Scott was barred from testifying for
failure to appear at her discovery deposition.5
concedes, however, that "Plaintiff and Defendant Reed agreed
that neither would call Ms. Scott at trial, due to the inability
[to] depose her."
(Memo. in Supp. at 4).
The court has reviewed the relevant portion of the
During her testimony, Ms. Chafin mentioned that
she witnessed Mr. Reed pick up prostitutes.
"Speaking of that, do you know Rachel Scott?"
Her counsel stated
(Trans. at 213).
Mr. Reed's counsel objected, stating "Your Honor.
has been excluded."
(Trans at 213).
That objection was
withdrawn, however, based upon Ms. Chafin's counsel's promise
sexual assault . . . . The evidence may be considered
as provided in Rules 413 and 414.
F.R.E. 415(a). Rules 413 and 414 permit the evidence to "be
considered on any matter to which it is relevant." F.R.E. 413,
Mr. Reed asserts that he was prohibited from calling Ms. Scott
in rebuttal. He fails to identify that portion of the record,
however, where he made such a request, much less where the court
denied the relief sought. Mr. Reed also does not direct the
court to that portion of the record where he requested a
limiting instruction respecting the testimony concerning Ms.
Scott or that offered by Ms. Gilco and Ms. Frye-Cochran.
that he was attempting to adduce only what Ms. Chafin witnessed
and not anything that Ms. Scott may have said.
(defense counsel stating in response to whether she would
withdraw the objection "Yes, if that's all you are going
Ms. Chafin then testified she saw Ms. Scott get into
Mr. Reed's car on one occasion without any money and return with
$40, which was used to buy food for both Ms. Scott and Ms.
No objection was made, Mr. Reed's counsel cross
examined Ms. Chafin on the matter, and she later questioned Mr.
Reed about it as well during his direct testimony.
deems no error to have occurred.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it is ORDERED
that Mr. Reed's motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a
new trial be, and it hereby is, denied.
Logan County's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Logan County asserts that no reasonable jury would
have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to return a verdict
for Ms. Chafin on the negligent training claim.
There are three
matters of record that guide the court's analysis of the
First, Ms. Chafin admitted that she lacked any
information respecting Mr. Reed's training.
Second, Mr. Reed admitted, and Ms. Chafin appears to
concede, that he received on-the-job training as a home
Mr. Reed testified that Director Gower
"lined me out of my duties as an officer, what she expected out
(Trans. at 111).
He offered what appeared to be a
nonexclusive listing of those expectations as follows: "learn to
monitor my clients, hook up the equipment, take care of the
equipment, do drug tests."
(Id. at 111).
For example, he noted
that the procedure followed for urinalysis screening required
that a female member of the office staff, not Mr. Reed, enter
the restroom with the supervisee when the sample is obtained.
(Id. at 113 (Mr. Reed noting "They are required to go with
Additionally, the Logan County Home Confinement
Director, Patricia Gower, testified that on-the-job training
included (1) use of the home confinement monitoring equipment,
and (2) procedures for office and home visits.
Prior to being
authorized to make home visits alone, Mr. Reed was first
required to accompany Director Gower during her home visits for
a one to two-month period.
Director Gower additionally observed
that (1) a home confinement officer was prohibited from closing
his or her office door when a client was reporting, and (2) home
visits to a supervisee of the opposite sex could only be
performed by two home confinement officers in tandem.
Reed admitted he had made home visits without another officer
accompanying him, he knew he was not to be in his office alone
with female supervisees.
(Id. at 158, 159 ("I mean, you know,
you never put a man and a woman who work together like that in
the same room alone.")).
It thus seems undisputed that Mr. Reed
at least understood certain gender-appropriate policies
governing his supervision activities.
Third, as a matter of commonsense and perhaps based
upon the foregoing on-the-job policies, Mr. Reed reiterated time
and again that he did not require training to understand that he
was prohibited from having intimate relations with those under
For example, he testified that a home
confinement officer should be charged criminally if he admits to
having a supervisee perform oral sex on him.
He also noted as
follows with respect to improperly touching a supervisee: "I
understood that there was no way you could do stuff like that.
Anybody with common sense understands that. . . . I was never
told that, but I didn't have to be told that."
(Id. at 145).
This type of common-sense understanding has often
exonerated institutional defendants in the failure-to-train
For example, in federal civil rights cases it has been
observed that if the impropriety of an action “is obvious to all
without training,” a failure to train a police officer to
refrain from taking that action will usually not show deliberate
Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488,
490 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that officer's
sexual molestation of arrestee resulted from deliberate
indifference in training and supervision); Parrish v. Ball, 594
F.3d 993, 999 (8th Cir. 2010) (no patently obvious need to train
an officer not to sexually assault women); Kitzman-Kelley, on
behalf of Kitzman-Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 459 (7th Cir.
2000); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 1998)
("Even if the courses concerning gender issues and inmates'
rights were less than adequate, we are not persuaded that a
plainly obvious consequence of a deficient training program
would be the sexual assault of inmates. Specific or extensive
training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that
sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.");
Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1077, 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 711
(8th Cir. 1996) ("In light of the regular law enforcement duties
of a police officer, we cannot conclude that there was a
patently obvious need for the city to specifically train
officers not to rape young women."); see Michael Avery et al.,
Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation § 4:21 (Elec. ed. 2012)
("There may be no liability for a failure to train officers with
respect to matters which should be obvious even in the absence
In assessing the proof at trial, the court once again
turns to the elements of the claim.
The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has consistently observed that, in
order “[t]o be actionable, negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury complained of and must be such as might have
been reasonably expected to produce an injury.”S yl. pt. 11,
Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W. Va. 77, 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990); syl.
pt. 4, Haddox v. Suburban Lanes, Inc., 176 W. Va. 744, 349
S.E.2d 910 (1986); Syl. pt. 3, Hartley v. Crede, 140 W. Va. 133,
82 S.E.2d 672 (1954).
It has been further stated that
“‘Proximate cause is a vital and an essential element of
actionable negligence and must be proved to warrant a recovery
in an action based on negligence.’" Syl. pt. 7, Judy v. Grant
County Health Dept., 210 W. Va. 286, 557 S.E.2d 340 (2001)
(quoting syl. pt. 3, McCoy v. Cohen, 149 W. Va. 197, 140 S.E.2d
The supreme court of appeals has additionally observed
that the "concept of proximate cause . . . [is] 'that cause
which in actual sequence, unbroken by any independent cause,
produced the wrong complained of, without which the wrong would
not have occurred.'”
White v. Wyeth,
227 W. Va. 131, 139, 705
S.E.2d 828, 836 (2010) (quoting syl. pt. 3, in part, Webb v.
Sessler, 135 W. Va. 341, 63 S.E.2d 65 (1950)).
Mindful of the fact that a proximate cause finding is
committed to the jury, the court is obligated under Rule 50(b)
to assure that sufficient evidence supports the finding
Inasmuch as the jury found Mr. Reed to have
perpetrated the sexual assaults at issue in this action, there
is no legally sufficient basis upon which to base a finding that
more or better training to the contrary would have dissuaded
Mr. Reed testified to his understanding that he was
prohibited from engaging in the sexual abuse of supervisees that
the jury found to have occurred.
If common sense did not inform
him of that boundary line, the Logan County training process did
so as a matter of law.
That training was designed to mitigate
the possibility that inappropriate officer-supervisee contacts
It was simply ignored by Mr. Reed, without any
actionable negligence by Logan County that proximately caused
the resulting harm to Ms. Chafin.
The court is, accordingly,
unable to sustain that portion of the verdict against Logan
County as a matter of law.
Consequently, it is ORDERED that Logan County's motion
for judgment as a matter of law be, and it hereby is, granted.
It is further ORDERED that the liability and damage portions of
the jury's verdict rendered in favor of Ms. Chafin and against
Logan County be, and hereby are, set aside.
The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this
written opinion and order to all counsel of record and any
January 16, 2013
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
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