Menei v. Rubenstein et al
Filing
83
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part the 75 MOTION for Summary Judgment; granting said motion with regard to Defendants Parry, Collins, and Rubenstein and denying said motion with regard to Defendant Ballard. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 8/6/2014. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (taq)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
THOMAS RAYMOND MENEI,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-cv-00967
JIM RUBENSTEIN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Defendant Jim
Rubenstein, Defendant David Ballard, Defendant Paul Parry, and Defendant Jason Collins in their
individual capacities [Docket 75]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED with
regard to Defendants Parry, Collins, and Rubenstein and DENIED with regard to Defendant
Ballard.
I.
Background
A. Procedural History
The plaintiff, Thomas Raymond Menei, is in the custody of the West Virginia Division of
Corrections and filed this action regarding events that took place while he was incarcerated at
Mount Olive Correctional Complex (“Mount Olive”). In the Complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant prison officials violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and
his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff
also alleged that the defendants’ decisions to deny him protective custody disregarded a significant
risk of harm to his safety and resulted in an assault. The plaintiff further alleged that he was denied
appropriate medical treatment for the injuries sustained during the assault and that he was charged
with and found guilty of escape without due process of law. The plaintiff requested damages as
well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
The defendants named in the complaint included: Jim Rubenstein, Commissioner of the
West Virginia Division of Corrections, in his official and individual capacities; David Ballard,
Warden of Mount Olive, in his official and individual capacities; Paul Parry, Assistant Warden of
Security at Mount Olive, in his official and individual capacities; Jason Collins, Assistant Warden
of Programs at Mount Olive, in his official and individual capacities; John Frame, Institutional
Investigator at Mount Olive, in his official and individual capacities; Brian Greenwood,
Institutional Magistrate Hearing Officer at Mount Olive, in his official and individual capacities;
Humayan Rashid, a doctor at Mount Olive employed by Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
(“Wexford”); and Anna Kinkaid, Health Service Administrator at Mount Olive, employed by
Wexford.
Several motions to dismiss were filed. Because the plaintiff was proceeding pro se at that
time, the motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Stanley. On June 20, 2012, Judge Stanley
recommended I dismiss: (1) the claims against Defendants Rubenstein, Ballard, Parry, Collins,
Frame, and Greenwood in their official capacities; (2) all of the allegations against Defendant
Frame; (4) the due process allegations; and (5) the allegations against Defendant Kincaid. (See
Proposed Findings & Recommendation (“PF&R I”) [Docket 32]). I adopted PF&R I on October
11, 2012. (See Order [Docket 45]).
2
On March 25, 2013, Judge Stanley recommended I grant Defendant Rashid’s Motion to
Dismiss and dismiss Defendant Rashid from this action. (See PF&R II [Docket 54]). That same
day, Judge Stanley also recommended I dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief because they became moot after the plaintiff was transferred to another prison. (See PF&R
III [Docket 55]). I adopted PF&R II and PF&R III. (See Order [Docket 66]; Order [Docket 67]).
Thereafter, the plaintiff obtained counsel.
Presently before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Rubenstein, Ballard, Parry, and Collins in their individual capacities. The defendants argue that
there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims and
also that each defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants additionally argue that
the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot and should be dismissed. This issue was already
addressed in PF&R III and my order adopting it (see Order [Docket 66]), and therefore the section
of the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment relating to injunctive relief is DENIED as
moot. The remaining claims in this case are that Defendants Ballard, Rubenstein, Parry, and
Collins violated the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.
B. Factual History
This case stems from threats the plaintiff allegedly received from members of the Aryan
Brotherhood gang while incarcerated at Mount Olive and a subsequent physical assault on the
plaintiff. Between November and December 2010, the plaintiff spoke with Defendant Parry and
two other Mount Olive staff members regarding threats he was receiving from the Aryan
Brotherhood and Inmate Cockerham, who was referred to as “Joker.” Joker had allegedly told the
3
plaintiff to stab another inmate and warned the plaintiff that if he did not stab the other inmate
before Thanksgiving, that he would be stabbed instead. At the same time, Joker purportedly
showed the plaintiff autopsy pictures of an inmate at Mount Olive he had previously killed.
The plaintiff informed a Mount Olive sergeant about this alleged conversation and was
escorted to a meeting with Defendant Parry and other Mount Olive officials. (See Menei Dep.
[Docket 76-1], at 26). At the meeting, the plaintiff gave a taped statement regarding the Aryan
Brotherhood’s illegal activities at Mount Olive. (See id.). He also provided information regarding
the Aryan Brotherhood’s inner workings and a list of its members. (See id.). The plaintiff also told
Defendant Parry about Joker’s demand and threats, and expressed that he feared for his life and
safety. (See id.). After this meeting, Joker was removed from the general prison population and
placed in lockdown. (See id. at 34).
Following this meeting, the plaintiff states that he purposefully started a fight in violation
of a prison rule so he would be placed in segregation. (See Menei Dep. [Docket 75-1], at 25:6-11).
He testifies that did this because he feared for his safety. (See id.). On January 15, 2011, while still
in segregation, the plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendant Parry asking for protection from the Aryan
Brotherhood and requesting that that he not be returned to the general prison population because
he was not safe there. (See Jan. 15, 2011 Letter [Docket 81-1]).
Five days later, on January 20, 2011, the plaintiff was released from segregation. On
January 20 and January 22, 2011, he had conversations with Defendant Collins regarding his
request to be placed in protective custody. (See Menei Dep. [Docket 75-1], at 17-24). He told
Defendant Collins the specifics of the threats he said he had received that he believed were a result
of the information he had given to Defendant Parry regarding the Aryan Brotherhood. According
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to the plaintiff, Defendant Collins told the plaintiff would not be placed in protective custody
because he was serving a life sentence, and he would “just . . . have to deal with it.” (Menei Dep.
[Docket 75-1], at 30:17-24).
The plaintiff filed a grievance and special management request form asking to be
transferred out of Mount Olive on February 13, 2011. While he was waiting for the Special
Management Committee to review his request, another inmate, Glen Meadows, was attacked and
physically assaulted by a member of the Aryan Brotherhood. (See id. at 33). After Meadows was
assaulted, the plaintiff was allegedly told by another inmate that he was also “on that list.” (Compl.
[Docket 2], at 14; Menei Dep. [Docket 75-1], at 32:18-23).
On February 18, 2011, the plaintiff met with the Special Management Committee and told
them he believed his life was in danger. He provided the committee with the details of the alleged
threats made against him and additional information regarding the activities of the Aryan
Brotherhood. The committee found that there was “sufficient verifiable information” indicating
that the plaintiff’s “safety may be threatened.” (Special Management Review Form [Docket 2-5],
at 2).1 The committee also found there was “sufficient verifiable information” indicating that the
plaintiff’s “safety ha[d] been threatened” and he “need[ed] to be transferred to another facility.”
(Id.). The committee therefore recommended the plaintiff be transferred to Northern Regional Jail
and Correctional Facility (“Northern Regional Jail”). (See id.).
Defendant Ballard, who had the ultimate decision-making authority regarding the transfer,
denied the committee’s recommendation. Defendant Ballard argues that he denied the transfer
because of confidential information presented to him that the plaintiff was planning to escape.
1
Each exhibit to the Complaint contained several different documents. The page numbers listed for the exhibits to
the Complaint reflect the ECF pagination and do not reflect the page numbers on each separate document.
5
Defendant Ballard denied the transfer on the same day the committee issued the recommendation,
without being present at the hearing or meeting with the plaintiff. (See id.; Menei Dep. [Docket
75-1], at 19-20; Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Behalf of Def. Jim Rubenstein, Def. David
Ballard, Def. Paul Parry, and Def. Jason Collins (“Defs.’ Mem.”) [Docket 76], at 5). Defendant
Ballard overruled all of the committee’s findings and determined the plaintiff should remain in his
“present status” (in the general prison population at Mount Olive). (Special Management Review
Form [Docket 2-5], at 2).
As a result of the information the plaintiff gave the committee, actions were allegedly taken
against the Aryan Brotherhood at Mount Olive. (See Compl. [Docket 2], at 16-17). On February
22, 2011, another inmate purportedly told the plaintiff that he should be careful because everyone
knew he had provided information about the Aryan Brotherhood. The plaintiff told Mount Olive
officials about what he alleged were continued threats.
On February 23, 2011, while walking near his housing unit with headphones on, the
plaintiff was attacked. He was struck in the back of the head and knocked out. The plaintiff did
not see the identity of his attacker. When the plaintiff woke up, he was disoriented, could not see,
and his whole body hurt. Since the assault, the plaintiff has suffered from seizures and a loss of
vision in one eye.
On March 8, 2011, the plaintiff was found guilty of an escape charge and was placed in
sixty days of punitive segregation. While serving his punitive segregation, the Administrative
Segregation Committee determined that the plaintiff should remain in administrative segregation
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following his release from punitive segregation because of his alleged escape plan. (See Menei
Dep. [Docket 75-1], at 66).2
On March 11, 2011, while in administrative segregation, the plaintiff appealed Defendant
Ballard’s reversal of the Special Management Committee’s decision to Defendant Rubenstein.
(See Appeal [Docket 2-5], at 3-12). Defendant Rubenstein upheld Defendant Ballard’s decision.
(See Grievance 11-Moc-Q2-429 Review [Docket 2-6], at 7). Defendant Rubenstein concluded that
the plaintiff’s appeals regarding special management and transfer were moot since the plaintiff
was being housed in administrative segregation and not the general prison population at the time
of the appeal. (See id.). The plaintiff remained in administrative segregation for at least two years.
(See Menei Dep. [Docket 75-1], at 66).
In 2013, the plaintiff was released from administrative segregation and placed back in the
general prison population at Mount Olive. After he was returned to the general population,
someone slid a threatening note under the plaintiff’s door after finding his court filings.
Subsequently, the plaintiff was transferred to Northern Regional Jail. The plaintiff states that
Defendant Ballard approved his transfer because of the threatening note. The plaintiff is currently
being housed at Northern Regional Jail.
II.
Standard of Review
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
2
The parties do not present evidence regarding the details of the plaintiff’s alleged escape attempt or what it
entailed. The relevance of the alleged attempt on the plaintiffs’ claims will be determined at trial.
7
249 (1986). Instead, the court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some “concrete evidence
from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on
an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a
showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of
evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory
allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of
a summary judgment motion. See Felty v. Graves Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.
1987); Ross v. Comm’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other
grounds, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
III.
Discussion
A. Eighth Amendment: Deliberate Indifference
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). The requirements of
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the Eighth Amendment were incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. These
amendments place some requirements on prison officials to keep prisoners safe from harm.
In particular, . . . prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at
the hands of other prisoners. Having incarcerated persons with demonstrated
proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having stripped them
of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside
aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its
course. Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, but gratuitously
allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate
penological objective, any more than it squares with evolving standards of decency.
Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.
It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that
translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s
safety. Our cases have held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be,
objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or omission must result in
the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. For a
claim . . . based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.
The second requirement follows from the principle that only the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment. To violate the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety.
Id. at 833-34 (internal quotations and references omitted). An official is deliberately indifferent if
he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation
because he does not know precisely who struck him in the head. This argument is without merit.
The Supreme Court has stated that
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a prison official [may not] escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing
that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not
know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific
prisoner who eventually committed the assault. The question under the Eighth
Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference,
exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to his future
health, and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or
multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive
risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation
face such a risk.
Id. at 843 (internal quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 84
F.3d 614, 621 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding summary judgment inappropriate where the defendants
argued that the plaintiff did not identify his “enemies” to prison officials and stating “the issue is
not whether [the plaintiff] identified his enemies by name to prison officials, but whether they
were aware of a substantial risk of harm to [the plaintiff]. Although a prisoner’s identification of
his enemies is certainly relevant to the question of knowledge, it is not, necessarily, outcome
determinative.”).
Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant Ballard violated the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by his deliberate indifference
to the plaintiff’s safety. The plaintiff has demonstrated that he suffered an “objectively, sufficiently
serious” harm when he was assaulted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also id. at 852 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (“[V]iolence among prison inmates serves absolutely no penological purpose. Such
brutality is the equivalent of torture, and is offensive to any modern standard of human dignity.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Knowledge can be inferred. See Parrish ex rel.
Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Although the deliberate indifference
standard requires a showing of actual knowledge as to both elements, it ‘is a question of fact subject
to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.’ Thus, ‘a
10
factfinder may conclude that an officer knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk
was obvious.’”) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). However, in the case of Defendant Ballard,
the plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate actual knowledge of the serious
threat he faced.
Defendant Ballard overruled the finding of the Special Management Committee that there
was “sufficient verifiable information” that the plaintiff’s safety was threatened. (See Special
Management Review Form [Docket 2-5], at 2). There is no dispute that, as the Warden and person
in charge of making the ultimate determination regarding the plaintiff’s transfer, Defendant Ballard
was aware of the “sufficient and verifiable” dangers posed to the plaintiff. Defendant Ballard had
the authority to uphold or deny the Special Management Committee’s decision. He also had the
authority to determine what action, if any, to take regarding the “sufficient verifiable information”
indicating that the plaintiff’s “safety [had] been threatened and [he] need[ed] to be transferred to
another facility.” (Id.). Rather than determine that any type of action should be taken, Defendant
Ballard found that the plaintiff should “remain in [his] present status[,]” despite the committee’s
findings (Id.). Five days after Defendant Ballard returned the plaintiff to the general prison
population, he was assaulted.
Defendant Ballard contends that in light of the facts presented, his actions were reasonable.
Reasonableness is a defense to an Eighth Amendment action. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 845
(stating that “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted” and “[w]hether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference,
prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual
11
Punishments Clause”). However, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that a jury could
find Defendant Ballard acted unreasonably. Whether Defendant Ballard acted reasonably is a
factual issue for the jury, not the court, to determine. See id. at 842-43 (stating that “if an Eighth
Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was
longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and
the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information
concerning the risk and thus must have known about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to
permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk”) (internal
quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Conkel v. Van Pelt, 854 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1988) (“The
determination of reasonableness under the circumstances of a particular case is a classic question
of fact within the province of the jury.”) (unpublished table decision).
The plaintiff argues that Defendants Parry and Collins knew he was in danger but failed to
take any action to protect him. The plaintiff has testified that he told Defendant Parry his life was
threatened by Joker, and that he repeatedly followed up with Defendant Parry regarding the danger
he was in, but Defendant Parry told the plaintiff he could not help him. (See Menei Dep. [Docket
75-1], at 24-28. 35-36; Jan. 15, 2011 Letter to Def. Parry [Docket 81-1]). The plaintiff also testified
that he told Defendant Collins about the threats against him and requested to be placed in special
management. In response, the plaintiff states that Defendant Collins told him “you’re just going to
have to deal with it.” (See Menei Dep. [Docket 75-1], at 30-31). The plaintiff argues that he was
assaulted as a result of Defendant Parry’s and Defendant Collins’s failure to take action.
Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, these facts demonstrate, at most,
negligence on the parts of Defendants Parry and Collins. “Deliberate indifference is a very high
12
standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695
(4th Cir. 1999).
[T]wo slightly different aspects of an official’s state of mind . . . must be shown in
order to satisfy the subjective component in this context. First, actual knowledge of
the risk of harm to the inmate is required. Beyond such knowledge, however, the
officer must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the
risk of harm to the inmate.
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Actual
knowledge may be inferred by the circumstances, however, the circumstances must be evidence
that there was an obvious risk to which the official must have been aware. See Parrish ex rel. Lee
v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Although the deliberate indifference standard
requires a showing of actual knowledge as to both elements, it ‘is a question of fact subject to
demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.’ Thus, ‘a
factfinder may conclude that an officer knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk
was obvious.’”) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). The plaintiff has not presented any such
evidence with regard to Defendants Parry and Collins. Unlike Defendant Ballard, who reviewed
the committee’s order stating that there was sufficient verifiable information that the plaintiff was
in danger and needed to be transferred, the only evidence against Defendants Parry and Collins is
that the plaintiff told them he felt unsafe. This is not sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants
Parry and Collins had actual knowledge of the risk of the harm to the plaintiff, or that they
recognized their actions were insufficient. I therefore FIND that summary judgment is appropriate
for Defendants Parry and Collins and summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants
Parry and Collins.
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With regard to Defendant Rubenstein, the only action that the plaintiff alleges Defendant
Rubenstein took was the denial of his appeal from Defendant Ballard’s overruling of the Special
Management Committee. (See Pl.’s Am. Resp. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Resp.”)
[Docket 82], at 5, 16-17). However, Defendant Rubenstein’s decision occurred on April 21,
2011—well after the plaintiff was assaulted. (See Grievance 11-Moc-Q2-429 Review [Docket 26], at 7). The plaintiff does not allege that any harm came to him after, much less because of,
Defendant Rubenstein’s decision. (See Pl.’s Resp. [Docket 82], at 16-17). The plaintiff also does
not present any evidence that Defendant Rubenstein was aware of the threats before the attack. I
therefore FIND that the plaintiff has not presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Defendant Rubenstein was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
rights and summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Rubenstein.
B. Qualified Immunity
Having determined that the plaintiff presented a genuine issue of fact regarding his Eighth
Amendment claim Defendant Ballard, I must now decide whether Defendant Ballard is
nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. “Government officials performing discretionary
functions are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages to the extent that ‘their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The Fourth Circuit has established a two-part test for
determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity.
The threshold question in the qualified immunity analysis on summary judgment is
whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts
alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. If no
constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there
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is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. If, however, the
facts alleged show a constitutional violation, then the next step is to ask whether
the constitutional right was clearly established in the specific context of the case.
Odom v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 769-70 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
omitted); see also, e.g., Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011). Therefore, I must
determine first whether each individual defendant’s conduct could be found to have violated a
constitutional right, and second whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
violation.
The plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ballard, the Warden of Mount Olive, violated his
constitutional rights by overruling the Special Management Committee’s recommendation to
transfer the plaintiff to Northern Regional Jail. On February 18, 2011, the Special Management
Committee recommended that the plaintiff be transferred to Northern Regional Jail because
“[s]ufficient verifiable information exists which indicates that [the plaintiff’s] safety may be
threatened[.]” (Special Management Review Form [Docket 2-5], at 2). Nonetheless, Defendant
Ballard exercised his discretionary authority to overrule the recommendation and have the plaintiff
“remain in [his] present status.” (Id.). After Defendant Ballard overruled the Special Management
Committee’s decision to transfer the plaintiff, the plaintiff was assaulted. As discussed above, there
is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant Ballard violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
Because I have determined that there is an issue of fact regarding whether Defendant
Ballard violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, I must now determine whether that right was
clearly established at the time of the violation. “It is well established that the Eighth Amendment
obligates prison officials to take reasonable precautions to ‘protect prisoners from violence at the
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hands of other prisoners.’” Wilson v. Wright, 998 F. Supp. 650, 654 (E.D. Va. 1998) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). “[T]he exact conduct at issue need not have been held unlawful for the
law governing an officer’s actions to be clearly established . . . . Rather, the particularity principle
mandates that courts refer to concrete applications of abstract concepts to determine whether the
right is clearly established.” Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations
omitted). “Thus, ‘clearly established’ in this context includes not only already specifically
adjudicated rights, but those manifestly included within more general applications of the core
constitutional principle invoked.” Id. at 362-63 (internal quotation omitted).
“[A] right is clearly established if it has been authoritatively decided by the United States
Supreme Court, the appropriate circuit court of appeals, or the highest state court where the
challenged official act occurred.” Wilson, 998 F. Supp. at 656. Clearly established rights may also
“be found in statutes or manifestly included within more general applications of the core
constitutional principle invoked.” Id. At the time the alleged events occurred, “it was clear that as
a component of their duty to provide inmates with humane conditions of confinement, prison
officials were required to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831). Additionally, at the time of Defendant Ballard’s denial of the
plaintiff’s claim, the Fourth Circuit “had made clear that under some circumstances officials may
be liable for completely failing to take any action to avert an attack by one prisoner on another
when they knew that a substantial risk of harm existed.” Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 532 (4th
Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Odom v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 773-74 (4th Cir. 2003)
(stating that in 2003, “the state of pre-existing law was such that reasonable prison guards in the
defendants’ position would have understood that doing nothing in response to [the plaintiff’s]
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requests [to be moved to a different cell] in light of the circumstances of this case violated [the
plaintiff’s] rights”); Wilson, 998 F. Supp. at 657 (“Today, a prison official incurs Eighth
Amendment liability if he or she in making a cell assignment knows of, and is deliberately
indifferent to, a substantial risk of serious harm one inmate generally poses to any assigned
cellmate.”).
The plaintiff presents evidence that Defendant Ballard was aware of a significant risk to
the plaintiff’s safety and did nothing to alleviate that risk. Defendant Ballard does not deny the
facts asserted by the plaintiff. As discussed above, an officer may be liable when he knows of a
risk to an inmate yet does nothing to alleviate that risk. See Winfield, 106 F.3d at 532; Odom, 349
F.3d at 773. This right was clearly established at the time the plaintiff was assaulted. See Odom,
349 F.3d at 773-74. Because I have determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant Ballard violated the plaintiff’s clearly established Eighth Amendment rights, I FIND
that Defendant Ballard is not entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Docket 75]
is GRANTED with regard to Defendants Parry, Collins, and Rubenstein and DENIED with regard
to Defendant Ballard. The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of
record and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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August 6, 2014
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