McBrayer et al v. Johnson & Johnson et al

Filing 181

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (Daubert Motion re: Vladimir Iakovlev, M.D.) The court DENIES in part, GRANTS in part, and RESERVES in part the Motion filed in MDL 2327 by Ethicon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Dr. Vladirmir Iakovlev, as more fully set forth herein. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 9/1/2016. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (REF: MDL 2327; Cases Listed on Exhibit) (kll)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
IN RE:

ETHICON INC.
PELVIC REPAIR SYSTEMS
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
MDL No. 2327
______________________________________________________________________________
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
Cases Identified in the Exhibit
Attached Hereto
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
(Daubert Motion re: Vladimir Iakovlev, M.D.)
Pending before the court is the Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony
of Dr. Vladirmir1 Iakovlev [ECF No. 2066] filed by Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon,
Inc. (collectively “Ethicon”). The Motion is now ripe for consideration because briefing
is complete.
I.

Background

This case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat
pelvic organ prolapse (“POP”) and stress urinary incontinence (“SUI”). In the seven
MDLs, there are more than 75,000 cases currently pending, approximately 30,000 of
which are in this MDL.
In this MDL, the court’s tasks include “resolv[ing] pretrial issues in a timely

1

The proper spelling of Dr. Iakovlev’s first name is Vladimir.

and expeditious manner” and “resolv[ing] important evidentiary disputes.” Barbara
J. Rothstein & Catherine R. Borden, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Managing Multidistrict

Litigation in Products Liability Cases 3 (2011). To handle motions to exclude or to
limit expert testimony pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993), the court developed a specific procedure. In Pretrial Order
(“PTO”) No. 217, the court instructed the parties to file only one Daubert motion per
challenged expert, to file each motion in the main MDL—as opposed to the individual
member cases—and to identify which cases would be affected by the motion. PTO No.
217, at 4.2
II.

Preliminary Matters

Before plunging into the heart of the Motion, a few preliminary matters need
to be addressed.
I am compelled to comment on the parties’ misuse of my previous Daubert
rulings on several of the experts offered in this case. See generally Sanchez v. Bos.

Sci. Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 29, 2014); Tyree
v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 501 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); Eghnayem v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 3d 658 (S.D. W. Va. 2014). The parties have, for the most part, structured
their Daubert arguments as a response to these prior rulings, rather than an
autonomous challenge to or defense of expert testimony based on its reliability and
relevance. In other words, the parties have comparatively examined expert testimony
2 Ethicon

identified the Wave 1 cases affected by this Motion in its attached Exhibit A [ECF No. 20661], which the court has attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order. At the time of transfer or
remand, the parties will be required to designate relevant pleadings from MDL 2327, including the
motion, supporting memorandum, response, reply, and exhibits referenced herein.

2

and have largely overlooked Daubert’s core considerations for assessing expert
testimony. Although I recognize the tendency of my prior evidentiary determinations
to influence subsequent motions practice, counsels’ expectations that I align with
these previous rulings when faced with a different record are misplaced, especially
when an expert has issued new reports and given additional deposition testimony.
Mindful of my role as gatekeeper for the admission of expert testimony, as well
as my duty to “respect[ ] the individuality” of each MDL case, see In re

Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006), I refuse
to credit Daubert arguments that simply react to the court’s rulings in Sanchez and
its progeny. Indeed, I feel bound by these earlier cases only to the extent that the
expert testimony and Daubert objections presented to the court then are identical to
those presented now. Otherwise, I assess the parties’ Daubert arguments anew. That
is, in light of the particular expert testimony and objections currently before me, I
assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid” and “whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. Any departure from

Sanchez, Eghnayem, or Tyree does not constitute a “reversal” of these decisions and
is instead the expected result of the parties’ submission of updated expert reports and
new objections to the expert testimony contained therein.
Finally, I have attempted to resolve all possible disputes before transfer or
remand, including those related to the admissibility of expert testimony pursuant to

Daubert. Nevertheless, in some instances I face Daubert challenges where my

3

interest in accuracy counsels reserving ruling until the reliability of the expert
testimony may be evaluated at trial. At trial, the expert testimony will be tested by
precise questions asked and answered. The alternative of live Daubert hearings is
impossible before transfer or remand because of the numerosity of such motions in
these seven related MDLs. As these MDLs have grown and the expert testimony has
multiplied, I have become convinced that the critical gatekeeping function permitting
or denying expert testimony on decisive issues in these cases is best made with a live
expert on the witness stand subject to vigorous examination.
In the course of examining a multitude of these very similar cases involving
the same fields of expertise, I have faced irreconcilably divergent expert testimony
offered by witnesses with impeccable credentials, suggesting, to me, an unreasonable
risk of unreliability. The danger—and to my jaded eye, the near certainty—of the
admission of “junk science” looms large in this mass litigation.
The parties regularly present out-of-context statements, after-the-fact
rationalizations of expert testimony, and incomplete deposition transcripts. This,
combined with the above-described practice of recycling expert testimony, objections,
and the court’s prior rulings, creates the perfect storm of obfuscation. Where further
clarity is necessary, I believe it can only be achieved through live witness testimony—
not briefing—I will therefore reserve ruling until expert testimony can be evaluated
firsthand.
III.

Legal Standard

By now, the parties should be intimately familiar with Rule 702 of the Federal

4

Rules of Evidence and Daubert, so the court will not linger for long on these
standards.
Expert testimony is admissible if the expert is qualified and if his or her expert
testimony is reliable and relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at
597. An expert may be qualified to offer expert testimony based on his or her
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Reliability
may turn on the consideration of several factors:
(1) whether a theory or technique can be or has been tested;
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) whether a technique has a high known or
potential rate of error and whether there are standards
controlling its operation; and (4) whether the theory or
technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant
scientific community.

Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 592–94). But these factors are neither necessary to nor determinative of
reliability in all cases; the inquiry is flexible and puts “principles and methodology”
above conclusions and outcomes. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also Kumho Tire Co.

v. Carmichael, 525 U.S. 137, 141, 150 (1999). Finally, and simply, relevance turns on
whether the expert testimony relates to any issues in the case. See, e.g., Daubert, 509
U.S. at 591–92 (discussing relevance and helpfulness).
At bottom, the court has broad discretion to determine whether expert
testimony should be admitted or excluded. Cooper, 259 F.3d at 200.
IV.

Discussion

Dr. Vladimir Iakovlev is a clinical pathologist at St. Michael’s Hospital in

5

Toronto, Canada. Each year, he conducts approximately 5,000 pathological
examinations in his practice.
a. Properties
i. Degradation
Ethicon seeks exclusion of Dr. Iakovlev’s degradation opinions, which it claims
are unreliable. As an initial matter, Ethicon seeks to exclude all of Dr. Iakovlev’s
degradation-related testimony when in fact, Ethicon disputes the reliability of a
specific opinion about degradation bark. Ethicon argues that the “central theory
underlying all of Dr. Iakovlev’s degradation opinions is that the Prolene in Ethicon
mesh products degrades in vivo creating cracks in the degraded Prolene that trap
histological stains, which Dr. Iakovlev can detect via light microscopy.” Mem. 4 [ECF
No. 2070]. A review of Dr. Iakovlev’s report shows this is a mischaracterization of his
proposed testimony. Dr. Iakovlev’s testimony on degradation generally is extensively
supported with specific references to the scientific literature and several internal
Ethicon documents. His manner of corroborating the scientific literature by
performing his own tests to detect degradation is only one facet of his testimony. I
will not order a blanket exclusion of Dr. Iakovlev’s degradation testimony based on
Ethicon’s misleading representations.
I will, however, address Ethicon’s specific challenge. Ethicon disputes the
reliability of Dr. Iakovlev’s opinion that he can detect degradation bark because it
traps histological dyes. Ethicon claims this opinion rests on an implicit untested
hypothesis, which is inconsistent with the scientific method. Ethicon is basically

6

demanding that Dr. Iakovlev artificially try to replicate degradation with oxidation
outside of the body in his lab before he can testify about degradation that allegedly
occurred inside the body. The plaintiffs dispute the existence of any untested
hypothesis and argue that additional laboratory testing is not necessary to support
what Dr. Iakovlev sees from “actual explanted mesh from human beings.” Resp. 8–9
[ECF No. 2185].
While the parties have discussed at length the merits of conducting in vivo
testing to artificially replicate degradation in a laboratory setting, the court has
insufficient evidence to evaluate the methodology Dr. Iakovlev actually employed to
examine mesh samples that allegedly degraded in vivo. Accordingly, I RESERVE
ruling until Dr. Iakovlev’s methodology of examining mesh explant samples can be
evaluated firsthand at trial.
ii. Linking Degradation to Complications
Ethicon objects to Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions that “degradation needs to be
considered as a factor of additional stiffening and late deformations of the mesh” and
that “if chemical and physical properties of a material change while it is in the body
it should not be used for permanent applications and for anatomical sites from which
the devices cannot be safety removed.” Mem. 9–10 [ECF No. 2070] (citing Iakovlev
Report 8–9 [ECF No. 2066-4]). Ethicon argues that this is unreliable because Dr.
Iakovlev’s writings “tell a far different story.” Mem. 10. I disagree. A review of the
citations provided—most of which simply acknowledge the incomplete state of
scientific knowledge on this subject and the need for additional study—does not

7

demonstrate any irreconcilable differences. Even if it did, such contradictions would
be better suited for cross-examination than as a basis for exclusion. Accordingly,
Ethicon’s Motion is DENIED on this issue.
iii. Mesh Folding and Deformation
Ethicon also seeks to exclude Dr. Iakovlev’s testimony that mesh can fold or
curl in vivo and that such deformations can cause compartments, which in turn cause
pain. Ethicon disputes that Dr. Iakovlev can merely look at a pathology slide and
infer that mesh curled or deformed in the body. In response, the plaintiffs do not
address the reliability of Dr. Iakovlev’s method for determining whether mesh was
folded in vivo. Accordingly, Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions on folding and curling are
EXCLUDED to the extent they rely solely on his personal analysis of pathology slides,
and Ethicon’s Motion is GRANTED on this point.
b. Complications
Ethicon argues that Dr. Iakovlev failed to use a control in his examination of
explanted mesh, thus he is unable to properly correlate specific complications with
the samples examined. Ethicon relies on other expert opinions criticizing Dr.
Iakovlev’s approach to demonstrate that Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions are unreliable. The
essence of the argument is that Dr. Iakovlev did not compare examined tissue slides
of patients complaining of pain to slides of tissue from patients who did not complain
of pain yet nonetheless had their mesh devices removed. The plaintiffs argue that Dr.
Iakovlev compared his samples to “normal tissue” present within the same slides.
Ethicon argues that “Dr. Iakovlev’s comparison of his pathological findings to normal

8

tissue within the same slide does not constitute a control, since he cannot rule out the
fact that patients not suffering from pain may have the same pathological
presentation based on this comparison.” Reply 11 [ECF No. 2251]. I agree. Without a
proper control, Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions correlating specific complications with
samples of explanted mesh products do not provide a sufficiently reliable
methodology. See Sanchez v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989, at
*28 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 29, 2014) (“Vigorous adherence to protocols and controls are
the hallmarks of ‘good science.’” (citing to Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp.
2d 592, 603 (S.D. W. Va. 1998))). To the extent that Dr. Iakovlev offers complications
opinions based on his examination of explanted mesh samples without the use of a
control sample, his complications opinions are EXCLUDED.
Ethicon next argues that Dr. Iakovlev ignored relevant scientific literature,
specifically, Dr. Hill’s study entitled Histopathology of Excised Midurethral Sling

Mesh. Dr. Iakovlev’s alleged failure to review a particular study in forming his
opinion is better suited for cross-examination, particularly when Dr. Iakovlev has
supported his opinions with numerous other studies. Ethicon’s Motion is DENIED on
this point.
Ethicon next argues that a certain paper that Dr. Iakovlev co-authored reveals
that his methodology is not scientifically legitimate. Ethicon points to the following
quote from the paper as evidence that Dr. Iakovlev is unable to form opinions
regarding complications: “At present, general human tissue interactions with the
mesh are known, but we have an incomplete understanding of interactions specific to

9

a mesh material and design as well as the pathophysiology of any complications.”
Mot. re: Dr. Iakovlev, Ex. O at 15 [ECF No. 2066-17]. The standards elucidated in

Daubert certainly do not require an expert to have a “complete understanding” of an
issue in a particular field, and the reality is that a complete understanding of
anything in science is virtually unattainable. Dr. Iakovlev has supported his opinions
with his own experience and citation to scientific literature. To the extent that
Ethicon believes that Dr. Iakovlev has made inconsistent statements regarding his
opinions, Ethicon is free to cross-examine him on those points. Ethicon’s Motion on
this point is DENIED.
Ethicon next challenges Dr. Iakovlev’s qualifications to offer opinions
regarding certain alleged complications, such as thromboses, occlusions of capillaries,
and arterioles. Additionally, Ethicon challenges Dr. Iakovlev’s opinion that “the
presence of smooth muscle in mesh pores reveals that the mesh has migrated because
smooth muscle has a restricted ability to regenerate.” Mem. Supp. Mot. re: Dr.
Iakovlev 16 [ECF No. 2070]. The basis of Ethicon’s arguments is centered on Ethicon’s
own experts’ criticisms of Dr. Iakovlev’s conclusions. The simple fact that Ethicon’s
experts disagree with Dr. Iakovlev does not mean Dr. Iakovlev is rendered
unqualified under Daubert. Dr. Iakovlev is a highly experienced clinical pathologist,
and he is qualified to render his complications opinions based on his knowledge, skill,
education, and experience. Ethicon’s Motion on this point is DENIED.
Next, Ethicon argues that Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions regarding the presence and
clinical significance of “nerve twigs” or “nerve branches” are inconsistent with the

10

scientific method and medical facts. Again, the basis for Ethicon’s challenge is that
Ethicon’s own experts disagree with the ultimate opinions Dr. Iakovlev offers.
Differing opinions reached by opposing experts is not an appropriate challenge under

Daubert. Dr. Iakovlev has sufficiently explained his opinions regarding nerve branch
entrapment and distortion, and such opinions are within his specialty as a clinical
pathologist. Ethicon’s Motion on this point is DENIED.
Ethicon next challenges as unreliable Dr. Iakovlev’s opinion that the presence
of an erosion necessarily implies that a patient has a wound infection. Ethicon points
to deposition testimony where Dr. Iakovlev testified that “erosion is always associated
with localized infection.” Iakovlev Dep. 14:2–6, March 13, 2016 [ECF No. 2066-29].
Dr. Iakovlev does not provide any support for his opinion that erosion is always
associated with localized infection other than stating his own experience. Even his
report, which states that “[m]ucosal erosion of the transvaginal Ethicon mesh
becomes a chronic open wound and an entry for infectious organisms,” provides no
citation to scientific literature. Report 18 [ECF No. 2066-4]. Dr. Iakovlev’s opinion,
which would universally apply to all Ethicon mesh, is simply not supported with cited
scientific literature. Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions on this point are unreliable, and they are
EXCLUDED.
c. Mesh Explants
Ethicon argues that Dr. Iakovlev should not be permitted to testify on the basis
of mesh explants that are not the subject of this litigation because he “previously
testified that he could not determine the origins of many of the slides used in his

11

reports.” Mem. 22. Such indeterminacy raises concerns about the integrity of Dr.
Iakovlev’s data pool, as the selection and origin of samples may necessarily affect the
conclusions that may reliably be drawn from them. To the extent that Dr. Iakovlev
cannot determine the origin of the slides on which his opinions are based, such
opinions are EXCLUDED as unreliable.
V.

Recurring Issues

Many of the Daubert motions filed in this MDL raise the same or similar
objections.
One particular issue has been a staple in this litigation, so I find it best to
discuss it in connection with every expert. A number of the Daubert motions seek to
exclude FDA testimony and other regulatory or industry standards testimony. To the
extent this Motion raises these issues it is GRANTED in part and RESERVED in
part as described below.
I have repeatedly excluded evidence regarding the FDA’s section 510(k)
clearance process in these MDLs, and will continue to do so in these cases, a position
that has been affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. In re C. R. Bard, Inc., 81 F.3d 913,
921–23 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding the determination that the probative value of
evidence related to section 510(k) was substantially outweighed by its possible
prejudicial impact under Rule 403). Because the section 510(k) clearance process does
not speak directly to safety and efficacy, it is of negligible probative value. See In re

C. R. Bard, 81 F.3d at 920 (“[T]he clear weight of persuasive and controlling authority
favors a finding that the 510(k) procedure is of little or no evidentiary value.”).

12

Delving into complex and lengthy testimony about regulatory compliance could
inflate the perceived importance of compliance and lead jurors “to erroneously
conclude that regulatory compliance proved safety.” Id. at 922. Accordingly, expert
testimony related to the section 510(k) process, including subsequent enforcement
actions and discussion of the information Ethicon did or did not submit in its section
510(k) application, is EXCLUDED. For the same reasons, opinions about Ethicon’s
compliance with or violation of the FDA’s labeling and adverse event reporting
regulations are EXCLUDED. In addition to representing inappropriate legal
conclusions, such testimony is not helpful to the jury in determining the facts at issue
in these cases and runs the risk of misleading the jury and confusing the issues.
Insofar as this Motion challenges the FDA-related testimony discussed here, the
Motion is GRANTED.
A number of experts also seek to opine on Ethicon’s compliance with design
control and risk management standards. Some of this testimony involves the FDA’s
quality systems regulations, and some—likely in an attempt to sidestep my
anticipated prohibition on FDA testimony—involve foreign regulations and
international standards. I find all of this proposed testimony of dubious relevance.
Although these standards relate to how a manufacturer should structure and
document risk assessment, the standards do not appear to mandate any particular
design feature or prescribe the actual balance that must be struck in weighing a
product’s risk and utility. Nor is it clear that the European and other international
standards discussed had any bearing on the U.S. medical device industry when the

13

device in question was being designed.
Nevertheless, because the nuances of products liability law vary by state, I will
refrain from issuing a blanket exclusion on design process and control standards
testimony, whether rooted in the FDA or otherwise. Each standard must be assessed
for its applicability to the safety questions at issue in this litigation, consistent with
state law. I am without sufficient information to make these findings at this time.
Accordingly, I RESERVE ruling on such matters until a hearing, where the trial
judge will have additional context to carefully evaluate the relevance and potential
prejudicial impact of specific testimony.
Similarly, I doubt the relevance of testimony on the adequacy of Ethicon’s
clinical testing and research, physician outreach, or particular product development
procedures and assessments otherwise not encompassed by the above discussion.
Again, such matters seem to say very little about the state of the product itself (i.e.,
whether or not it was defective) when it went on the market. But because the scope
of relevant testimony may vary according to differences in state products liability law,
I RESERVE ruling on such matters until they may be evaluated in proper context at
a hearing before the trial court before or at trial.
Additional—and more broad—matters also warrant mention. While some of
these concerns may not apply to this particular expert, these concerns are raised so
frequently that they are worth discussing here.

First, many of the motions seek to exclude state-of-mind and legal-conclusion
expert testimony. Throughout these MDLs, the court has prohibited the parties from

14

using experts to usurp the jury’s fact-finding function by allowing testimony of this
type, and I do the same here. E.g., In re C. R. Bard, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 589, 611
(S.D. W. Va. 2013); see also, e.g., United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir.
2006) (“[O]pinion testimony that states a legal standard or draws a legal conclusion
by applying law to the facts is generally inadmissible.”); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab.

Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Inferences about the intent and
motive of parties or others lie outside the bounds of expert testimony.”). Additionally,
an expert may not offer expert testimony using “legal terms of art,” such as
“defective,” “unreasonably dangerous,” or “proximate cause.” See Perez v. Townsend

Eng’g Co., 562 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
Second, and on a related note, many of the motions seek to prohibit an expert
from parroting facts found in corporate documents and the like. I caution the parties
against introducing corporate evidence through expert witnesses. Although an expert
may testify about his review of internal corporate documents solely for the purpose
of explaining the basis for his or her expert opinions—assuming the expert opinions
are otherwise admissible—he or she may not offer testimony that is solely a conduit
for corporate information.

Third, many of the motions also ask the court to require an expert to offer
testimony consistent with that expert’s deposition or report or the like. The court will
not force an expert to testify one way or another. To the extent an expert offers
inconsistent testimony, the matter is more appropriately handled via crossexamination or impeachment as appropriate and as provided by the Federal Rules of

15

Evidence.

Fourth, in these Daubert motions, the parties have addressed tertiary
evidentiary matters like whether certain statements should be excluded as hearsay.
The court will not exclude an expert simply because a statement he or she discussed
may constitute hearsay. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Hearsay objections are more
appropriately raised at trial.

Finally, in some of the Daubert motions, without identifying the specific expert
testimony to be exclude, the parties ask the court to prevent experts from offering
other expert testimony that the moving party claims the expert is not qualified to
offer. I will not make speculative or advisory rulings. I decline to exclude testimony
where the party seeking exclusion does not provide specific content or context.
VI.

Conclusion

The court DENIES in part, GRANTS in part, and RESERVES in part the
Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Dr. Vladimir Iakovlev [ECF No.
2066].
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to file a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order in 2:12-md-2327 and in the Ethicon Wave 1 cases identified in the Exhibit
attached hereto.
ENTER:

16

September 1, 2016

EXHIBIT A

Case Name
Adams, Joan
Amsden, Donna
Babcock, Marty
Baugher, Dorothy
Beach, Harriet
Bennett, Dina Sanders
Blake, Bonnie & Larry Miketey
Boggs, Sharon & Michael
Bollinger, Karen
Bridges, Robin
Clayton, Melissa & Charles
Cole, Carey Beth & David
Conti, Patricia
Daino, Constance & Anthony
Destefano-Raston, Dina & Terry
Dimock, Carol Jean
Drake, Karyn E. & Douglas E.
Durham, Lois & Gerald
Fox, Sherry & Roy, Jr.
Free, Pamela
Freeman, Shirley & William
Freitas, Monica & Kenneth
Frye, Jackie
Funderburke, Betty
Georgilakis, Teresa & Angelo
Hagans, Wendy
Hankins, Donna & Roger
Hendrix, Mary & Thomas

Holmes, Jeanie
Hooper, Nancy & Daniel
Hoy, Lois & Robert
Jones, Holly & Jason
Joplin, Deborah Lynn
Justus, Joyce

Kaiser, Barbara
Kriz, Paula & James
Lankston, Cheryl
Loustaunau, Donna
Lozano, Deborah & Felipe
Massey, Donna & Charles
McBrayer, Dee & Timothy
Morrison, Angela & Bradley
Nix, Cynthia
Phelps, Patti Ann & James
Reyes, Jennifer & Jerry
Ruebel, Ana

Case Number
2:12cv01203
2:12cv00960
2:12cv01052
2:12cv01053

2:12cv00476
2:12cv00497

2:12cv00995
2:12cv00368
2:12cv01215
2:12cv00651

2:12cv00489
2:12cv00483
2:12cv00516
2:12cv01145
2:12cv01299
2:12cv00401
2:12cv00747
2:12cv00760
2:12cv00878
2:12cv00423
2:12cv00490
2:12cv01146
2:12cv01004
2:12cv00957
2:12cv00829
2:12cv00783
2:12cv01011
2:12cv00595
2:12cv01206
2:12cv00493
2:12cv00876
2:12cv00443
2:12cv00787
2:12cv00956
2:12cv00887
2:12cv00938
2:12cv00755
2:12cv00666
2:12cv00347
2:12cv00347
2:12cv00779
2:12cv00800
2:12cv01278

2:12cv01171
2:12cv00939
2:12cv00663

Ruiz, Patricia
Schnering, Debra A. & Donald, Sr.
Sikes, Jennifer
Smith, Cindy
Stone, Maria C. & Mark A.
Stubblefield, Margaret
Swint, Isabel
Taylor, Charlene Logan
Teasley, Krystal
Thaman, Susan
Thomas, Kimberly
Vignos-Ware, Barbara J. & Gary L.
Warmack, Roberta & Thomas
Waynick, Laura & David
Wheeler, Rebecca & David
White, Virginia & Edward
Wilson, Blynn
Wolfe, Kathleen
Wright, Thelma
Wroble, Julie & Jerry

2:12cv01021
2:12cv01071
2:12cv00501
2:12cv01149

2:12cv00652
2:12cv00842
2:12cv00786
2:12cv00376
2:12cv00500
2:12cv00279

2:12cv00499
2:12cv00761
2:12cv01150
2:12cv01151
2:12cv01088

2:12cv00958
2:12cv01286

2:12cv00337
2:12cv01090
2:12cv01090