Runyon v. Hannah et al

Filing 117

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying plaintiff Arvil Runyon's 112 MOTION for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 11/25/2013. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (taq)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
ARVIL RUNYON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:12-1394

LONNIE HANNAH, in his individual
capacity and official capacity as
Sheriff of the Mingo County Sheriff’s Dept.,
JOE SMITH, in his individual capacity and
official capacity as Sergeant of the Mingo
County Sheriff’s Dept.,
MICHAEL MILLER, in his individual capacity
and official capacity as a Deputy of the Mingo
County Sheriff’s Dept., and the
MINGO COUNTY COMMISSION, a political
subdivision of the State of West Virginia,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is the motion by the plaintiff Arvil Runyon
for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, filed July
9, 2013.

I.

This dispute arose out of a confrontation between Mr.
Runyon and members of the Mingo County Sheriff’s Department.
Those departmental members are former Sheriff Lonnie Hannah
(“Hannah”), Sergeant Joe Smith (“Smith”), and Deputy Michael

Miller (“Miller”).

On February 21, 2012, Mr. Runyon was

arrested for battery of an officer and arraigned the same day.
The magistrate court in which he was arraigned is located on the
third floor of the Memorial Building in Mingo County.
Mr. Runyon, who walks with the assistance of a cane,
alleged that he was denied a reasonable accommodation for his
disability and instead forced to walk up three flights of stairs
for the arraignment.

He claimed that the individual defendants’

alleged failure to provide him a reasonable accommodation
violated portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(c).
On June 18, 2013, a jury trial commenced.

On June 20,

2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
The panel answered “NO” to interrogatories asking whether Mr.
Runyon had proven his Section 1983 claims against Sergeant Smith
and Deputy Miller.

That same answer came in response to whether

Sergeant Smith and Deputy Miller denied Mr. Runyon a reasonable
accommodation.

The jury also found that Mr. Runyon failed to

prove his negligent training claim.

On June 21, 2013, the court

entered the Judgment in favor of the defendants.
In moving for judgment as a matter of law and for a
new trial, Mr. Runyon asserts that the verdict is contrary to

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the weight of the evidence.

He contends that an extended

conversation in which the individual defendants offered Mr.
Runyon a reasonable accommodation, which he refused, could not
have taken place as described at trial inasmuch as a
surveillance video shows that the exchange lasted only fifteen
seconds.

II.
A.

Governing Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) provides as
follows:
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment
as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is
considered to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to the court's later deciding the legal
questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days
after the entry of judgment -- or if the motion
addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no
later than 28 days after the jury was discharged -the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law . . . . In ruling on the renewed
motion, the court may:
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury
returned a verdict;
(2) order a new trial; or
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of
law.
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)).

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The applicable federal standard governing a Rule 50(b)
motion is summarized as follows:
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), the question is whether
a jury, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to [the nonmovant], “could have properly
reached the conclusion reached by this jury.” If
reasonable minds could differ about the result in this
case, we must affirm the jury's verdict. . . .
Bryant v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543
(4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); International Ground
Transp. v. Mayor And City Council Of Ocean City, 475 F.3d 214,
218-19 (4th Cir. 2007)(“When a jury verdict has been returned,
judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if, viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (and
in support of the jury's verdict) and drawing every legitimate
inference in that party's favor, the only conclusion a
reasonable jury could have reached is one in favor of the moving
party.”); Tools USA and Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame
Straightening Eqpt. Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 656-57 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted) (“Champ argues that the district judge erred
in denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law with
respect to both liability and damages.

A court may only grant a

motion for judgment as a matter of law (formerly j.n.o.v.) if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing every legitimate inference in that
party's favor, the court “determine[s] that the only conclusion
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a reasonable trier of fact could draw from the evidence is in
favor of the moving party.”); Hetzel v. County of Prince
William, 89 F.3d 169, 171 (4th Cir.

1996).

Respecting the new trial component, Rule 59(a)
provides that “[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on
all or some of the issues . . . for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal
court[.]”

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(a).

For example, a trial judge

may grant a new trial if he is of the opinion that the verdict
is against the clear weight of the evidence or is based upon
evidence which is false or will result in a miscarriage of
justice.

Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz

Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1043 (4th Cir. 1987); Wyatt
v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 892 (4th Cir.
1980); Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 392 (4th Cir. 1959).

B.

Analysis

Reduced to its essence, Mr. Runyon’s challenge to the
jury verdict is premised on his belief that the panel erred in
weighing the evidence.
verdict.

That is not a basis for upsetting the

The question of whether a reasonable accommodation was

offered was committed to the fact finder.

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The evidence on the

point was disputed.

In reviewing the jury’s Seventh Amendment-

based resolution of that conflict, the court is unable to
conclude, with the evidence taken in the light most favorable to
the defendants and drawing every legitimate inference in their
favor, that the panel reached a result contrary to what a
reasonable trier of fact would have found.

Neither is the court

of the opinion that the verdict was against the clear weight of
the evidence or otherwise susceptible to a set-aside under Rule
59(a).
It is, accordingly, ORDERED that Mr. Runyon’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial be, and
hereby is, denied.

The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this
written opinion and order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.
DATED:

November 25, 2013

John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge

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