Brumfield v. McCann et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting defendants Charles McCann, Thomas Ramey Jr., Judy Johnson, and the County Commission of Lincoln County, West Virginia's 12 MOTION to Dismiss; directing that the claims against defendants McCann, Ramey, and Johnson in their official capacities and the claims against the County Commission of Lincoln County, West Virginia are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 9/4/2012. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (taq)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

CHARLES BRUMFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-cv-01481

CHARLES MCCANN, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is defendants Charles McCann, Thomas Ramey Jr., Judy Johnson,
and the County Commission of Lincoln County, West Virginia’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket 12].
For the reasons discussed below, this motion is GRANTED.
I.

Background
This case arises from allegations by the plaintiff, Charles Brumfield, that the defendants

conspired and engaged in misconduct relating to the 2010 primary and election for Circuit Clerk of
the Office of the Lincoln County Clerk.

The complaint names the following defendants:

Charles McCann, individually and in his capacity as Lincoln County Commissioner; Thomas
Ramey Jr., individually and in his capacity as Lincoln County Commissioner; Judy Johnson,
individually and in her capacity as Secretary to the Lincoln County Commission; Donald Whitten,
individually and in his capacity as Sherriff of Lincoln County; Jerry Bowman, individually and as
Sheriff of Lincoln County, West Virginia; Rocky Adkins; The County Commission of Lincoln
County (“County Commission”); and the West Virginia Counties Group Self Insurance Risk Pool.

According to the complaint, Brumfield and Jerry Bowman were both candidates in the
2010 primary for the Democratic nomination for the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of
Lincoln County West Virginia. (Compl. ¶ 6). The complaint asserts that when the polls closed
on the day of the primary, May 11, 2010, Brumfield had won the nomination based on in-person
votes. (Id. ¶ 8). Following the primary, however, a recount of the absentee ballots took place.
(Id. ¶ 9). On May 27, 2010, the County Commission certified the results of the election and
declared Jerry Bowman the winner of the nomination. (Id.) Brumfield then initiated an election
contest and was ultimately declared the winner of the nomination. (Id. ¶ 10).
Brumfield asserts that the manner in which the absentee ballots for the May 11, 2010
primary were collected was “illegal and unlawful and the result of a conspiracy between the
above-named defendant office holders in the Lincoln County Courthouse affiliated with a political
action committee named ‘Lincoln County Democratic Committee.’” (Id. ¶ 11). Brumfield
asserts that the Lincoln County Democratic Committee (“LCDC”) “was a factional political group
that existed in Lincoln County, West Virginia, separate and apart from the Lincoln County
Democratic Executive Committee.” (Id. ¶ 12). The complaint alleges that in March 2010,
defendants Bowman, Whitten, Ramey, and Adkins “visited in the homes of a select group of
Lincoln County residents . . . for the purpose of obtaining from those individuals voting
applications for absentee ballots despite the fact that [the defendants] had actual knowledge that
the reasons given for the voting of absentee ballots by mail set forth in those applications were
false.” (Id. ¶ 16). Brumfield asserts that the defendants’ conduct “so contaminated” the May
2010 primary that it “corrupted the entire process of absentee voting,” and thereby deprived
Brumfield of his due process and equal protection rights. (Id.)

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Defendants McCann, Ramey, Johnson, and the County Commission filed the instant
motion, seeking to dismiss the claims against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The plaintiff has responded, and the defendants have filed a reply. This motion is
now ripe for review.
II.

Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or

pleading. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain a Ashort and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, that standard "does not require >detailed factual allegations= but >it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.=@ 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

A[A] plaintiff=s obligation

to provide the >grounds= of his >entitle[ment] to relief= requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.@ Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) for the proposition that Aon a motion to
dismiss, courts >are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation=@). A court cannot accept as true legal conclusions in a complaint that merely recite the
elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.
ATo survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). To achieve facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead facts that allow the court to draw

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, and those facts must be more than merely
consistent with the defendant=s liability to raise the claim from merely possible to probable. Id.
In determining whether a plausible claim exists, the court must undertake a
context-specific inquiry, A[b]ut where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has allegedCbut it has not >show[n]=C>that
the pleader is entitled to relief.=@ Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). A complaint must
contain enough facts to Anudge[] [a] claim cross the line from conceivable to plausible.@
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Iqbal court suggested a two-pronged inquiry to determine if the complaint survives a
motion to dismiss as set forth by Iqbal, which I will follow here. First, I will identify any
pleadings that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are conclusory and
unsupported by factual allegations.

See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.

Where there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, I will assume the veracity of those facts and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to a valid claim for relief. See id.
III.

Discussion
The defendants argue that the claims against McCann, Ramey, and Johnson in their official

capacities must be dismissed because the real party in interest is the County Commission, and
claims against the County Commission are barred by the West Virginia Tort Claims Insurance
Reform Act. The plaintiff argues that his claims should not be dismissed, but does not provide
any legal explanation for his position.
A lawsuit against a government official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the
governmental entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (explaining
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that “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity”). Accordingly, claims against the individual officials in their official capacities are claims
against the County Commission.
The West Virginia Tort Claims Insurance Reform Act (“Tort Claims Act”) limits the
circumstances under which a political subdivision is liable in a civil action for “injury, death, or
loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or an
employee of the political subdivision.” W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-4(b)(1). Specifically, the Tort
Claims Act provides that a political subdivision cannot be held liable unless the “loss to persons or
property [is] caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees while acting within
the scope of employment.” W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-4(b)(1), (c)(2). The complaint does not
allege that McCann, Ramey, or Johnson acted negligently within the scope of his or her
employment. Rather, the complaint alleges that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy, and
acted “with malicious purpose, in bad faith and in a wanton and reckless manner.” (Compl. ¶ 66).
Accordingly, the claims against McCann, Ramey, and Johnson in their official capacities are
barred by the West Virginia Tort Claims Act and are hereby DISMISSED. See, e.g., Mallamo v.
Town of Rivesville, 197 W. Va. 616 (1996) (holding that a town was immune from liability for
conspiracy and intentional misconduct by its employees).
All of the factual allegations in the complaint relate to the conduct of individual
defendants. As explained above, the County Commission is not liable under West Virginia law
for intentional acts of its employees. Additionally, there is no respondeat superior liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the complaint does not allege a policy, custom, or other action attributable

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to the County Commission. Accordingly, the claims against the County Commission are hereby
DISMISSED.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the court GRANTS the defendants’ motion and

ORDERS that the claims against defendants McCann, Ramey, and Johnson in their official
capacities and the claims against the County Commission of Lincoln County, West Virginia are
hereby DISMISSED.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:

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September 4, 2012