Horton v. Marriott International, Inc.

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendant's 5 MOTION to Dismiss Counts III and IV. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 1/30/2013. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (tmh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

BRETT HORTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-cv-01579

MARIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV [Docket 5].
The plaintiff has filed a response, and the defendant has filed a reply. The motion is ripe for
review. As discussed below, this motion is GRANTED. Counts III and IV of the Complaint are
DISMISSED.
I.

Background
The plaintiff, Brett Horton (“Horton”), began working for the defendant, Marriott

International, Inc. (“Marriott”), on May 24, 1989.1 (Compl. ¶ 5). In September 2010, Marriott,
acting through its agent and Horton’s supervisor Christa Wilson (“Wilson”), terminated Horton’s
employment.
On May 1, 2012, Horton filed the instant Complaint against Marriott in the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County, alleging four counts. Count I alleges that Marriott breached an employment
contract with Horton by terminating him in violation of the provisions of an employee handbook.

1

The Complaint alleges that the defendant operates a hotel in Charleston, West Virginia.
(Compl. ¶ 4). Although not specifically alleged, it appears that the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant at this particular hotel.

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Count II alleges that Marriott violated the West Virginia Human Rights Act by terminating
Horton because of his age. Count III alleges that Marriott, acting through its agent Wilson,
intentionally inflicted emotional distress by terminating Horton in retaliation for informing
Wilson’s fiancé that Wilson was having an affair.2 Count IV alleges that Wilson unlawfully
retaliated against Horton when she terminated his employment, and that Marriott is liable for the
acts of Wilson as its agent.
On May 18, 2012, Marriott removed the case to this court pursuant to diversity
jurisdiction. On May 25, 2012, Marriott filed the instant motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss
Counts III and IV of the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
II.

Motion to Dismiss Standard
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or

pleading. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, that standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations’ but ‘it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] plaintiff’s
2

The Complaint is unclear as to the reason that Horton alleges he was terminated. In Count II,
Horton suggests that he was terminated because of his age. (Compl. ¶ 15). In Count III, Horton suggests
that he was terminated because he informed Wilson’s fiancé that Wilson was having an affair. (Compl. ¶
22-24).
Additionally, the Complaint is unclear as to what factual basis Horton relies on for his claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Count II, Horton alleges that he “suffered severe emotional
distress” as a result of being terminated due to age discrimination. (Compl. ¶ 10-17). In Count III, Horton
alleges that his termination by Wilson was “designed to retaliate against” him, and was “outrageous and
purposefully implemented to inflict emotional distress” upon him. (Compl. ¶ 21-24). In his response to
Marriott’s motion to dismiss, Horton suggests yet another basis—“[Wilson] . . . arbitrarily terminat[ed]
[Horton] without adhering to the contractual rights of [Horton] established by the employee handbook,
thus purposefully inflicting emotional distress upon [Horton].” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
Counts III and IV [Docket 7], at 2) (emphasis added).

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obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) for the
proposition that “on a motion to dismiss, courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’”). A court cannot accept as true legal conclusions in
a complaint that merely recite the elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory
statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To achieve facial plausibility, the plaintiff must
plead facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, and
those facts must be more than merely consistent with the defendant’s liability to raise the claim
from merely possible to probable. Id.
In determining whether a plausible claim exists, the court must undertake a contextspecific inquiry, “[b]ut where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). A complaint must
contain enough facts to “nudge[] [a] claim across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Iqbal court suggested a two-pronged inquiry to determine if the complaint survives a
motion to dismiss, which I will follow here. First, I will identify any pleadings that are not
entitled to the assumption of truth because they are conclusory and unsupported by factual
allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. Where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, I will
assume the veracity of those facts and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to a valid

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claim for relief. See id.
III.

Discussion
Under Count III, Marriott argues that Horton failed to plead any element of an intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim, because the plaintiff’s claim arises out of the reason he was
terminated, and not because of the way he was terminated. Under Count IV, Marriott argues that
Horton failed to plead the first element of a retaliation claim—that he engaged in protected
activity. Horton’s response first argues asserts that Horton pleads sufficient facts to allege the
elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, Horton argues
that the Complaint indicates that “[Wilson] inflicted as much pain upon [Horton] as possible.
[Wilson] achieved her goal by arbitrarily terminating [Horton] without adhering to the
contractual rights of [Horton] established by the employee handbook, thus purposefully inflcting
emotional distress upon [Horton].” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts III and IV
[Docket 7] at 1-2). Horton’s response does not address Marriott’s motion to dismiss the
retaliation claim, Count IV. As discussed below, I FIND that Horton’s Complaint with respect to
Counts III and IV are conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations.
A.

Count III: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

For a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
plaintiff must establish four elements:
(1) that the defendant’s conduct was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and
outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with
the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or
substantially certain emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3) that the
actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and; (4)
that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

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Travis v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 202 W. Va. 369, 375 (1998). The Complaint fails to allege any facts
pertaining to any of these four elements. Paragraphs 17 and 18 in Count II state, in conclusory
fashion, several elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim:
17.

Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation, and loss of
enjoyment of life due to the discriminatory acts of Defendant.

18.

Defendant’s actions were so egregious and were performed with such
conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights under the West Virginia Human
Rights Act that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of full back-pay, front-pay,
interest, plus punitive damages.

(Compl. ¶¶ 17-18). Count III, which incorporates the above allegations, states the factual basis
for Horton’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim:
21.

Plaintiff became aware that Christa Wilson [his supervisor] was engaged
to be married.

22.

Plaintiff informed Ms. Wilson’s fiancé that Ms. Wilson was having an
affair with someone other than the fiancé during the engagement.

23.

Ms. Wilson, acting as an agent of Defendant and as a supervisor of
Plaintiff, terminated Plaintiff from employment.

24.

Ms. Wilson’s actions, as an agent of Defendant, and designed to retaliate
against Plaintiff, were outrageous and purposefully implemented to inflict
emotional distress upon Plaintiff.

(Compl. ¶¶ 21-24). These paragraphs make it plain that Horton has not pled sufficient factual
allegations to support his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Horton’s claim is
based off of his allegations regarding (1) breach of contract; (2) age discrimination; and (3)
retaliation from Wilson because he told Wilson’s fiancé that Wilson was having an affair.3
Horton alleges no facts indicating that the way he was terminated was atrocious, intolerable,
extreme, or outrageous. Horton alleges no facts indicating that Wilson acted ‘with the intent to
3

As discussed supra, note 2, the Complaint is unclear as to what factual basis Horton relies upon
for his claim of intentional inflction of emotional distress. Even taking all of his arguments together,
however, Horton has failed to allege any facts supporting his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

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inflict emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain
emotional distress would result from [her] conduct.” Travis, 202 W. Va. at 375. Horton alleges
no facts supporting his conclusory statement that he suffered any emotional distress. Finally,
Horton alleges no facts supporting his conclusory statement that the emotional distress he
suffered was severe. Accordingly, I FIND that Horton has failed to state a plausible claim in
Count III for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that Count III must be
DISMISSED.
B.

Count IV: Unlawful Retaliation

For a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for unlawful retaliation, the plaintiff must establish
four elements:
(1) that the complainant engaged in protected activity; (2) that complainant’s
employer was aware of the protected activities, (3) that complainant was
subsequently discharged and (absent other evidence tending to establish a
retaliatory motivation), (4) that complainant’s discharge followed his or her
protected activities within such period of time that the court can infer retaliatory
motivation.
Conrad v. ARA Szabo, 198 W. Va. 362 (1996). As Marriott asserts, and Horton does not argue
otherwise, there is nothing in the Complaint that suggests that Horton engaged in any protected
activity. I agree. The reason Horton gives for the alleged retaliation was that he told Wilson’s
fiancé that Wilson was having an affair. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-24, 26). Informing a supervisor’s fiancé
of an affair is simply not a protected activity, and Horton does not allege any other acts he
engaged in that could be considered protected. Accordingly, I FIND that Horton has failed to
state a plausible claim in Count IV for unlawful retaliation, and that Count IV must be
DISMISSED.
IV.

Conclusion

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Horton has failed to state a plausible claim in Count III for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and in Count IV for unlawful retaliation. The two claims are unsupported by
any factual allegations, and accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV is
GRANTED. Counts III and IV of the Complaint are DISMISSED.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:

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January 30, 2013