Patterson v. City of South Charleston, West Virginia et al
Filing
137
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER adopting the 106 Proposed Findings and Recommendation; denying defendants' 66 Motion to dismiss or, in the alternative motion for summary judgment; denying the plaintiff's 90 Motion for summary judgment; and denying the defendants' 87 Motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 1/22/2014. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (taq)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
WAYNE PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO: 2:12-01964
LIEUTENANT R.T. YEAGER,
individually and in his official
capacity, South Charleston Police,
JOHN DOE 1-7,
individually and in their official
capacities,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are the defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, motion for summary judgment, filed on June 17,
2013, the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute, filed on August 28, 2013, and the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment, filed on September 9, 2013.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This action was previously referred to the Honorable
Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission
to the court of his Proposed Findings and Recommendation
(“PF&R”) for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
A.
The factual and procedural histories of this case have
been thoroughly recited in a previous PF&R and opinion, and are
only briefly summarized here.
The pro se plaintiff, Wayne
Patterson (“Patterson”), initiated this action on June 11, 2012.
(See generally Pl.’s Compl.)
His initial complaint arose out of
a dispute over property, located at 825 Barrett Street, South
Charleston, West Virginia, that is jointly owned by the
plaintiff and his siblings (the “Property”) who acquired title
by inheritance upon their mother’s death in March 2011.
Patterson v. City of South Charleston (“Patterson PF&R I”), No.
12-1964, 2012 WL 7829040, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 30, 2012),
adopted by, Patterson v. City of South Charleston (“Patterson
I”), No. 12-1964, 2013 WL 13337317 (S.D. W. Va. March 29, 2013).
Sometime in June 2011, the plaintiff’s sister, Gail
Reid, directed Danaya Reid-Steiner, Joe Steiner, the Steiner
children, and Jamie Adkins to take up residence at the Property,
2
because Gail Reid was concerned that it was not being properly
cared for.
Patterson PF&R I, 2012 WL 7829040 at *2.
On June
29, 2011, the plaintiff, along with his son, Eros, and his
brother, George, visited the Property accompanied by Officer
A.R. Lindell of the South Charleston Police Department.
Id.
The Patterson brothers evidently found the Property in disarray,
and “assumed possession” of the premises.
Id.
At various
points later that day, Danaya Reid-Steiner, Gail Reid, and Jamie
Adkins all visited the Property and quarreled with the
plaintiff.
Id. at *3.
On July 1, 2011, defendant Robert Yeager (“Yeager”)
and John Does 1 through 7, who are alleged to be unidentified
officers of the South Charleston Police Department, arrived at
the Property and directed the Pattersons to vacate the premises,
which they did.
Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 51.
On July 2, 2011,
Jamie Adkins gave a written statement to Officer T.A. Bailes of
the South Charleston Police, in which she alleged that the
plaintiff had pushed her at some point during the tumultuous
afternoon of June 29, 2011.
at *3.
Patterson PF&R I, 2012 WL 7829040
Officer Bailes charged the plaintiff with battery,
Kanawha County Magistrate Pete Lopez found the charge supported
by probable cause, and a warrant for Patterson’s arrest was
issued.
Id. at *3-4.
The plaintiff was arrested on July 2,
3
2011, and subsequently released on bond.
Id.
In the ensuing
days, Gail Reid provided the police with additional information
about the events of June 29, 2011 which caused Officer Lindell
to lodge a charge for domestic battery against the plaintiff on
July 7, 2011.
Id. at *4-5.
Kanawha County Magistrate Traci C.
Strickland thereafter issued a warrant for Patterson’s arrest on
that charge on August 10, 2011.
Id. at *5.
On September 7,
2011, when the plaintiff appeared for trial on the original
battery charge, he was arrested on the domestic battery charge.
Id.
In his initial complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
the arrests were unconstitutional and in violation of his civil
rights, and asserted a number of claims against individual
police officers and the City of South Charleston.
¶¶ 59-72.
Pl.’s Compl.
Pursuant to standing order, the pro se proceedings
were referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mary E. Stanley.
On October 30, 2012, Judge Stanley recommended that the court
dismiss Patterson’s complaint.
7829040 at *7-11.
Patterson PF&R I, 2012 WL
Shortly thereafter, on November 5, 2012, the
plaintiff moved to amend his complaint, alleging, among other
things, that entry onto the Property on July 1, 2011 by the
defendant Yeager and the John Does constituted an actionable
4
trespass.
Patterson also filed objections to Judge Stanley’s
PF&R.
In a memorandum opinion and order dated March 29,
2013, the court adopted Judge Stanley’s recommendation, and
dismissed the claims set forth in Patterson’s initial complaint
in their entirety.
Patterson I, 2013 WL 13337317 at *3, 5.
However, the court permitted Patterson to amend his complaint to
state a trespass claim against defendant Yeager and the John
Does, 1 and ordered the action to proceed on the basis of that
claim alone.
Id. at *4-5.
As noted, the matter was then
referred to Judge Tinsley.
B.
The amended complaint alleges that, “[o]n or about
July 1, 2011, [Lieutenant Yeager and the John Does], forcibly,
maliciously, unlawfully, and without legal authority trespassed
upon [Patterson’s] property in violation of the 4th and 14th
1
The court did not permit Patterson to assert the trespass claim
against the City of South Charleston. Patterson I, 2013 WL at
*4 n. 7 (“[T]he plaintiff is prohibited from asserting trespass
as a cause of action against the City of South Charleston.”).
5
Amendments of the United States Constitution, the West Virginia
Constitution, West Virginia statute and West Virginia common
law.”
See Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 167, 230, 251, 272, 293, 314,
335, 356.
In its March 29, 2013 opinion, the court found it
undisputed that Patterson shared the Property as a tenant in
common with his siblings, and therefore had “a clearly defined
right to possess the property as a whole.”
Patterson I, 2013 WL
13337317 at *4 (citing Eagle Gas Co. v. Doran & Assocs., Inc.,
387 S.E.2d 99, 103 (W. Va. 1989)).
In light of the fact that
the defendants had, to that point, suggested no legal basis for
entering the Property or ejecting Patterson, the court concluded
that the plaintiff had “established a plausible claim that the
defendant officers entered his property without lawful
authority.”
Id.
On June 17, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the
amended complaint.
Alternatively, they requested that summary
judgment be entered in their favor, arguing either that they had
consent to enter the Property, or that they are shielded from
liability for any alleged trespass by the doctrine of qualified
immunity.
On September 9, 2013, Patterson filed his own motion
for summary judgment, arguing that the defendants have admitted
6
that they entered onto the Property without Patterson’s consent.
In the interval between the cross-motions for summary judgment,
on August 28, 2013, the defendants once again moved to dismiss
the amended complaint, this time on the basis of the plaintiff’s
alleged failure to prosecute.
They argue that the plaintiff’s
failure to attend his scheduled, court-ordered, deposition is
grounds for dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b).
On October 11, 2013, the magistrate judge filed his
PF&R recommending that all of the pending motions be denied.
Proposed Finding and Recommendations (“PF&R) at 14-17.
Specifically, Judge Tinsley recommended that the defendants’
motion to dismiss the complaint as a matter of law be denied
because this court had already concluded that Patterson’s
amended complaint stated a claim for trespass that was plausible
on its face.
PF&R at 14.
He further recommended that the cross
motions for summary judgment be denied without prejudice as
premature because discovery was ongoing, and because a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the defendants had
actual or implied authority to enter the property on July 1,
2011 remained unresolved. 2
PF&R at 2, 14-15.
2
Finally, Judge
In recommending that the cross-motions be denied as premature,
the magistrate judge expressed no opinion on the defendants’
7
Tinsley recommended that the motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute should be denied because Patterson had shown good
cause for his failure to attend his deposition.
PF&R at 15-17.
The plaintiff filed objections to the PF&R on October
30, 2013. 3
The defendants have not objected.
II. Analysis
When objections are raised to findings and
recommendations proposed by a magistrate judge, the supervising
district court must conduct a de novo review.
§ 636(b)(1).
28 U.S.C.
Review, however, may be limited to “those portions
of the report or specified proposed findings . . . to which
objection is made.”
Id.; United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d
qualified immunity argument, opting instead to allow the parties
to engage in additional discovery. PF&R at 2, 15. Given that
Judge Tinsley did not specifically address the question of
qualified immunity, and in light of the fact that the defendants
have not objected to the PF&R, the court does not consider the
issue at this time.
3
Recognizing that the objections had not been timely filed, the
plaintiff moved for an extension of the objections period on
November 4, 2013. In an order dated November 12, 2013, the
court granted the motion and deemed plaintiff’s objections
timely.
8
616, 621 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Section 636(b)(1) does not
countenance a form of generalized objection to cover all issues
addressed by the magistrate judge; it contemplates that a
party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s report be specific and
particularized[.]”).
Patterson’s objections are somewhat difficult to
comprehend.
One section of his filing, labeled “Objections to
Recommended Decision,” contains four numbered paragraphs that do
not appear to object to any particular legal determination made
by the magistrate judge, but rather dispute the manner in which
Patterson’s claims and factual pleadings are characterized in
the PF&R.
Pl.’s Objections to the Findings and Recommendations
of Magistrate Judge Tinsley (“Pl.’s Objections”) at 3-4.
For
example, the first objection states that the PF&R failed to
recount Patterson’s allegations that defendant Yeager
“threatened[,] intimidated[,] and warned Patterson” not to
return to the Property, and further “threatened to pepper spray”
Patterson.
Id. at 3.
Second, Patterson objects, along similar
lines, that the PF&R did not describe the defendants as “acting
under color of state law” when they entered the property on July
1, 2011.
Id.
The third “objection” is not an objection at all,
9
but simply a statement that “Patterson . . . had a good faith
reason to believe defendants were in fact police officers
representing the City of South Charleston[.]”
Id. at 4.
Fourth, Patterson complains that the PF&R “omits that the record
shows . . . that at all times relevant[,] including July 1,
2011, the City’s failure to adequately train and supervise its
officers . . . was a moving force behind Patterson’s
dispossession.”
Id.
In a subsequent section, labeled “Argument,” Patterson
goes on to state that the defendants’ conduct was “negligent and
indicative of personnel not properly trained,” and that “police
action against Patterson could not have taken place without the
direct participation and support of the city of South
Charleston.”
Id. at 4-5.
He then argues that the City of South
Charleston is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “for willful,
malicious, ill motivated, unlawful, negligent and damaging acts
against Patterson while acting under color of state law.”
See
id. at 6-7.
Reading the “Objections” and “Argument” together, and
mindful that a “document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), it appears to the court
10
that Patterson principally objects to Judge Tinsley’s
determination that the City of South Charleston is not a party
to the amended complaint, and that “[t]he only remaining claim
is the civil trespass claim against defendants Yeager and John
Does 1-7[.]”
PF&R at 7 n.1; see also Pl.’s Objections at 7
(arguing that the record in this case “shows unresolved factual
issues regarding the City of South Charleston’s libelous
involvement” that “the Recommended Decision omits . . . or
presumes . . . were resolved by Judge Copenhaver’s March 29,
2013 Order.”).
The magistrate judge concluded that the City of South
Charleston was not a party to the amended complaint for good
reason: this court’s March 29, 2013 opinion dismissed all claims
against the City that were contained in the initial complaint,
Patterson I, 2013 WL 13337317 at *5, and specifically declined
to permit Patterson to amend his complaint to state a trespass
claim against the City, id. at *4 n.7 (“[T]he plaintiff is
prohibited from asserting trespass as a cause of action against
the City of South Charleston.”).
objection is without merit.
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Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
III. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it is,
accordingly, ORDERED as follows:
1. That the magistrate judge’s PF&R be, and it hereby is,
adopted;
2. That defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 66), be, and it hereby
is, denied;
3. That the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
90) be, and it hereby is, denied; and
4. That the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute (ECF No. 87) be, and it hereby is, denied.
The Clerk is directed to transmit a copy of this
written opinion and order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.
DATED: January 22, 2014
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
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