Patterson v. City of South Charleston, West Virginia et al

Filing 160

ORDER adopting the 159 PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge, denying Plaintiff's 146 RULE 60(b) MOTION for Relief from Summary Judgment Order and Memorandum Of Law In Support re: 40 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 3/27/2015. (cc: counsel of record; Magistrate Judge Tinsley; plaintiff, via certified mail, at 205 Saratoga Road, Normal, Illinois, 61761) (tmh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

WAYNE PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No: 2:12-1964

LIEUTENANT R.T. YEAGER,
individually and in his official
capacity, South Charleston Police,
JOHN DOE 1-7,
individually and in their official
capacities,
Defendants.

ORDER
Pending is the plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion for
Relief from Summary Judgment Order, filed March 4, 2014.

The

motion was referred to Dwane L. Tinsley, United States
Magistrate Judge, who submitted his Proposed Findings and
Recommendation (“PF&R”) on March 4, 2015.

Neither the named

defendant nor the plaintiff, Wayne Patterson, has objected to
the PF&R, which recommends that Patterson’s motion be denied.
As the court has previously explained, the dispute in
this case arises out of a family feud over a house located in
South Charleston that is owned in common by Patterson and his
siblings, including Patterson’s sister, Gail Reid.

In the

summer of 2011, Patterson, along with his son and brother,
George, (the “Patterson group”), attempted to evict those living
in the house, including Reid’s daughter, Danaya Reid-Steiner,
Steiner’s husband, their child, and Jamie Adkins (the “Reid
group”).

At various points throughout the day on June 29, 2011,

the Patterson group feuded with members of the Reid group.

On

July 1, 2011, officers from the South Charleston Police
Department (“SCPD”) directed the Patterson group to vacate the
premises, which they did.
On July 2, 2011, Adkins made a statement to Officer
Bailes of the SCPD, alleging that Patterson pushed her (while
she was holding an infant child) during the tumult of June 29,
2011.

Officer Bailes prepared a criminal complaint charging

Patterson with battery, Kanawha County Magistrate Pete Lopez
found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant, and Patterson
was arrested on July 2, 2011.

On July 4, 2011, Reid gave a

statement to Officer Lindell of the SCPD also alleging battery
against Patterson.

Lindell prepared a complaint, Magistrate

Traci C. Strickland found probable cause, and later issued a
warrant for Patterson’s arrest on August 10, 2011.

Patterson

was arrested on that charge on September 7, 2011.
On June 11, 2012, Patterson initiated this action
asserting several common law causes of action and claims under
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42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

The essence of his complaint was

that his arrests were unlawful and unconstitutional inasmuch as
the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and instead
conspired to arrest him anyway because he is African American.
The defendants, which at that time included the City of South
Charleston and Officers Bailes and Lindell, moved to dismiss.
The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Mary E. Stanley, who
converted the motion into one for summary judgment.

Magistrate

Judge Stanley ultimately recommended that Patterson’s claims -variously styled as false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and conspiracy -- all failed
because the uncontroverted evidence in the record demonstrated
that there was probable cause to charge and arrest Patterson,
and because no evidence suggested that the officers were
motivated by Patterson’s race.

Patterson objected, but the

court adopted Judge Stanley’s recommendation, granting judgment
in favor of the City, and Officers Bailes and Lindell.
Patterson has now moved for Rule 60 relief from that
judgment.

The basis for his motion is a letter, written by

Jamie Adkins, that was included in a supplemental response to
discovery requests provided by one of the remaining defendants,
Lieutenant Yeager.

The letter, which is undated and addressed

“To whom it may concern”, contains Adkins’ account of the events

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of June 29, 2011 and the subsequent days, culminating with her
decision to make a statement against Patterson.

To summarize

briefly, the letter states, inter alia, that:
•

Adkins arrived at the property on June 29, 2011, saw
vehicles she did not recognize as well as an SCPD cruiser,
left to pick up Reid, returned, and encountered the
Patterson group;

•

Patterson shoved her while she was holding a nine-and-onehalf-month-old child and also shoved Reid, who fell over a
chaise lounge;

•

Adkins called the police and three SCPD officers, including
Lindell, arrived;

•

The officers spoke with the Patterson group and then told
Adkins that she could not enter the house because she was
not “family,” but agreed to accompany her inside so that
she could collect her belongings;

•

After leaving the premises Adkins went to the SCPD to file
charges, but Officer Lindell actively discouraged her from
doing so and in fact threatened that Adkins herself could
be charged with drug possession because papers containing
what the police believed to be marijuana were observed in
an ashtray at the property;

•

Adkins declined to press charges at that time after Lindell
suggested that she “drop it” because she “wasn’t ‘really
hurt’” and “could potentially lose her [teaching] job for a
drug charge”;

•

On July 1, 2011 Adkins received a call from Danaya ReidSteiner informing her that the SCPD would allow them back
onto the property, and asking Adkins to come to the SCPD
station at 3:00 p.m.;

•

Adkins returned to the property and observed that many of
her possessions were missing, damaged, or destroyed;

•

Adkins immediately returned to the SCPD station, intending
to press charges, and observed what she believed to be
Patterson’s van in the parking lot;
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•

Lt. Yeager stopped the van and he and Officer Bailes asked
for consent to search the van, which Patterson provided;

•

The search revealed a suitcase which Adkins was able to
identify by its markings and which Patterson incorrectly
identified;

•

Lt. Yeager directed the Patterson group to return the
suitcase to Adkins;

•

Adkins again sought to press charges over the theft, but
was told by the duty officer (who is not identified) that
her claim was “chicken sh-t”;

•

On July 2, 2011, Adkins returned to the station and again
spoke with Lt. Yeager and Officer Bailes about the events
beginning on June 29, 2011;

•

The officers “agreed that things were mishandled” and
“agreed that they had to do something”;

•

More specifically, Lt. Yeager said that he had discussed
the situation with his sister, Kanawha County Magistrate
Julie Yeager, who revealed that she had previously informed
Patterson of the proper legal mechanism for evicting the
Reid group, but Patterson “evidently did not like that
answer” and instead told the SCPD that the Reid group was
squatting at the property, which led to Adkins (among
others) being excluded from the property on June 29, 2011;

•

Bailes “decided he would have [Adkins] write a separate
statement about being pushed at against the wall with the
baby”;

•

Lt. Yeager stated that Officer Lindell could be charged for
pressuring Adkins not to press charges on June 29, 2011 and
characterized the SCPD’s performance as a “cluster-f--k of
a job”.

Patterson alleges that Adkins has a financial
motivation (namely, remaining at the property) to lie about him,
but he states that he “believes the statements contained in the

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Adkins letter to be true and correct.”

He asserts that the

letter “supports [his] specific § 1983 and constitutional
claims,” and that he is entitled to relief under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and (b)(3)
(fraud). 1
The magistrate judge persuasively recommends that the
motion be denied.

First, under Rule 60(b)(3), the party moving

for relief from judgment must (1) have a meritorious defense;
(2) prove misconduct on the part of the adverse party by clear
and convincing evidence; and (3) show that the misconduct
prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting its
case.

Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir. 1994).

In

his PF&R, Judge Tinsley observed that Judge Stanley stayed
discovery in this case on September 27, 2012, and reiterated the
stay in a second order on October 24, 2012, pending the
resolution of the motion to dismiss (which she had converted to
a motion for summary judgment).

The stay was not lifted until

April 23, 2013, after this court, adopting Judge Stanley’s PF&R,
granted judgment in favor of the City and Officers Bailes and
Lindell.

As a result, Judge Tinsley observed that those

defendants were under no obligation to disclose the Adkins
letter and had not engaged in misconduct by withholding it.
1

Patterson’s motion also briefly mentions Rule 60(b)(6), but no
argument for the application of that provision is developed.
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Second, under Rule 60(b)(2), the moving party must
show (1) evidence newly discovered since the judgment was
entered; (2) that due diligence on the part of the movant has
been exercised; (3) that the evidence is not merely cumulative
or impeaching; (4) that the evidence is material; and (5) that
the evidence is such that is likely to produce a new outcome if
the case were retried, or is such that would require the
judgment to be amended.
771 (4th Cir. 1989).

Boryan v. United States, 884 F.2d 767,

Judge Tinsley concluded that the Adkins

letter would not require the judgment to be amended or produce a
new outcome, and for good reason:

As he explained, “the

plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, denial of equal protection, deprivation of rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conspiracy to interfere with
civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 were all dismissed
based upon the . . . findings . . . that there was probable
cause for the plaintiff’s arrests, and that the plaintiff had
not sufficiently demonstrated that the defendants’ conduct was
racially motivated,” and “nothing in the Adkins Letter [] would
change those findings.”
Quite so.

PF&R at 15-16.

The contents of the letter do not create

any genuine dispute of material fact that would in any way
undercut Judge Stanley’s previous finding that the warrants for

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Patterson’s arrests were supported by probable cause, nor does
the letter in any way suggest that Officers Bailes and Lindell
were motivated by any racial animus towards Patterson.

Indeed,

Adkins’ description of Patterson’s conduct on June 29, 2011
precisely echoes the allegations that led two separate Kanawha
County Magistrates to conclude that probable cause existed to
arrest Patterson for battery, and her account at no point
mentions Patterson’s race.
Patterson argues that the letter somehow constitutes
evidence that “Bailes went before a magistrate judge, [and]
swore to what he [knew] was a false claim, [and] got a warrant
based on the false statement he had asked Adkins to write[.]”
But the letter simply would not allow any reasonable juror to
draw that inference.

Nothing in the letter suggests that

Adkins’ account of the events of June 29, 2011 was false or
coerced by Officer Bailes.

That Lt. Yeager and Officer Bailes

agreed to “do something” and took Adkins’ statement -- rather
than coercing her into declining to press charges as Officer
Lindell allegedly did -- does not begin to suggest that Adkins’
statement was concocted at their behest.

On the contrary, the

letter makes clear that Adkins returned to the SCPD station on
July 2, 2011 of her own volition, intent on filing charges after
being previously rebuffed by Officer Lindell.

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Accordingly, having received the Proposed Findings and
Recommendation submitted on March 4, 2015 by United States
Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley; and there being no objections
to the PF&R filed by either the defendants or the plaintiff; it
is ORDERED: (1) that the PF&R of the magistrate judge be, and
hereby is, adopted by the court and incorporated herein; and (2)
that the plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Summary
Judgment Order (ECF No. 146) be, and hereby is, denied.
The Clerk is requested to transmit a copy of this
order to all counsel of record, to Magistrate Judge Tinsley, and
to the plaintiff, by certified mail, at 205 Saratoga Road,
Normal, Illinois, 61761.
ENTER: March 27, 2015
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge

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