Patterson v. City of South Charleston, West Virginia et al

Filing 317

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying the plaintiff's 281 MOTION to alter or amend judgment. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 3/11/2016. (cc: plaintiff; counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (taq)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON

WAYNE PATTERSON
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 12-01964

LIEUTENANT R.T. YEAGER,
SERGEANT L.S. THOMAS, and
OFFICER R.P. MCFARLAND,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is the “motion to alter or amend judgment,”
filed by plaintiff Wayne Patterson on February 19, 2016.
I.
A.
In his motion to amend the judgment, plaintiff asks
the court to reconsider its order of February 11, 2016.
Specifically, plaintiff asserts that “[t]he [c]ourt’s finding
that Gail Reid had personal knowledge [with respect to the
alleged ‘fake’ power of attorney discussed in the court’s order]
is predicated upon a mistaken understanding of the facts.”
According to plaintiff, “all evidence shows Gail Reid was not

present when [p]laintiff took possession” of the Barrett Street
house, and therefore “could not have seen [p]laintiff show
police a ‘fake’ power of attorney in order to gain possession of
the house.”

Plaintiff accordingly asks the court to amend its

order “under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure[.]”

Plaintiff further requests that the court

reconsider the portions of its order granting defendant
Magistrate Julie Yeager’s motion for summary judgment and
denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
The police defendants responded to the motion on March
2, 2016.

Magistrate Yeager responded on March 4, 2016.

They

contend, on largely the same grounds, that plaintiff has failed
to set forth sufficient grounds for reconsideration.
B.
To begin, Rule 54, not Rule 59, is the relevant rule
in this context.

Rule 54 states, in relevant part, as follows:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief
. . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,
but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay. Otherwise, any order . . . that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to
any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any
time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

As the court’s February 11 order did not

direct entry of a final judgment as to any party or expressly
determine that there is no just reason for delay, it is open to
reconsideration, if at all, under Rule 54(b).

Moses H. Cone

Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)
(observing that “every order short of a final decree is subject
to reopening at the discretion of the district judge”); see also
Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514-15 (4th
Cir. 2003) (same).

Rule 59, on the other hand, applies after

the entry of final judgment, not to interlocutory orders.

See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; cf. Shrewsbury v. Cyprus, 183 F.R.D. 492,
493 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (Haden, C.J.) (order is interlocutory if
“less than all claims as to all parties were adjudicated. . .
.”).
Reconsideration under Rule 54 is strong medicine, and
should be used sparingly.

It is not appropriately used to

question every order by the court.

Sejman v. Warner-Lambert

Co., Inc., 845 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that earlier
decisions of a court become law of the case and must be followed
unless “(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different
evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary
decision of law applicable to the issue, or (3) the prior
decision is clearly erroneous and would work manifest

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injustice”); see also Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
of Cooler Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147,
167 (2d Cir. 2003) (reconsideration generally inappropriate
unless there is “an intervening change of controlling law, . . .
new evidence, or [a] need to correct a clear error or prevent a
manifest injustice”); DeGeorge v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 2d
35, 39 (D.D.C. 2007) (considerations for the court “include
whether the court ‘patently’ misunderstood the parties, made a
decision beyond the adversarial issues presented, made an error
in failing to consider controlling decisions or data, or whether
a controlling or significant change in the law has occurred”).
Here, plaintiff asserts that the court erred in
concluding that Gail Reid had personal knowledge that plaintiff
used a “‘fake’ power of attorney” to convince the police that
his claim to the Barrett Street house was superior to hers. In
support of that assertion, plaintiff claims that Gail was not
present on June 29 when plaintiff first took control of Barrett
Street house.

Plaintiff’s objection misses the point, however,

and fails to satisfy the standard for reconsideration under Rule
54.
Although it appears to be true that Gail Reid was not
present during the initial entry into the Barrett Street house,
see, e.g., Reid Statement 13:13-21, the record is equally clear
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that Gail Reid was present during the second visit by the police
later in the day on June 29, see, e.g. Patt. Aff. ¶¶ 30-31.

It

was during that visit that plaintiff and Gail each “argued to
convince the officers that our positions over the occupancy of
our house were our rights as owners.”

Patt. Aff. ¶ 31.

It was

also during that visit that the police determined that the
Patterson group was entitled to possession, and that the Reid
group was living there unlawfully.
As the court noted in its February 11 order, it has
been plausibly suggested that plaintiff deceived the police into
believing that his rights over the Barrett Street house were
superior to Gail’s.

This is an important, disputed question and

it must be resolved by the jury at trial.

If plaintiff believes

that Gail Reid’s assertions were false, he has the opportunity
to prove it to the jury.

However, plaintiff has offered no

basis for the court to conclude at this stage that its “prior
decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest
injustice.”

Sejman, 845 F.2d at 69.

Consequently,

reconsideration of this issue is not appropriate.
Plaintiff provides no support whatsoever for his
request for reconsideration of the portions of the court’s order
granting Magistrate Yeager’s motion for summary judgment or
denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
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Accordingly,

the court concludes that reconsideration of those issues is
inappropriate as well.
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that
plaintiff’s motion to reconsider be, and it hereby is, denied.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this order
to all counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER: March 11, 2016

John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge

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