Stewart et al v. Logan County Department of Health and Human Resources et al

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER the Court ABSTAINS from adjudicating the issues in this case; denying the pending 12 , 14 , 16 , 20 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 53 and 54 MOTIONS for lack of jurisdiction; dismissing plaintiffs' 2 complaint; and directing this case removed from the Court's docket. Signed by Judge Thomas E. Johnston on 7/22/2013. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (taq)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

BRANDY STEWART, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-cv-06644

LOGAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are motions to dismiss filed by four of the thirteen Defendants in this case. [ECF
12, 14, 16, 20.] Also pending are Plaintiffs’ several “motions” to amend the Complaint.1 [ECF
23–27.]

Finally, also pending is Defendant West Virginia Department of Health and Human

Resources’ (“WVDHHR”) motions to file certain juvenile records under seal [ECF 53, 54].2
For the reasons that follow, the Court ABSTAINS from this case based on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
486–87 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

1   
Plaintiffs did not file separate motions to amend their Complaint. Rather, their “motions” to amend are
tucked into Plaintiffs’ various responses to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Such practice violates the Local
Rules of Civil Procedure for the Southern District of West Virginia. Further compounding their improper procedural
practice, Plaintiffs attach a proposed amended complaint as an exhibit to their various responses to the motions to
dismiss.
2
The Complaint incorrectly names the “Logan County Department of Health and Human Services”, the
“Boone County Department of Health and Human Services”, and the “Wayne County Department of Health and
Human Services” as individual Defendants. As noted by Defendant WVDHHR, the WVDHHR is a single state
agency within the West Virginia’s executive branch and is the correctly-designated Defendant in this case. (See
Defendant WVHHR’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, ECF 21 at 5.)

I.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from the removal of Plaintiff Brandy Stewart’s minor children from her
custody by Defendant WVDHHR and the subsequent placement of the children in a foster family.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint invokes this Court’s federal question jurisdiction. 3

The following

allegations are drawn from Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which the Court, as it must, accepts as true.
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Brandy Stewart was the victim of domestic violence
perpetrated by her former husband, Charles Mullins, the father of her first three children.

At

some point, Ms. Stewart fled the marital home taking her children with her. She then applied for
homeless benefits at Defendant WVDHHR’s Logan County, West Virginia office. In early June
2010, Defendant WVDHHR removed Ms. Stewart’s three children from her custody and placed
them in foster care. The removal of the children from Ms. Stewart’s custody was allegedly
precipitated by partly false reports by the staff at WVDHHR’s Logan County office that Ms.
Stewart’s children had head lice and were shoeless, unkempt and unruly. An abuse and neglect
action was filed in Boone County Circuit Court against Ms. Stewart. In the course of this
proceeding, Ms. Stewart became pregnant with her fourth child. When the baby was born,
Defendant WVDHHR removed the child from Ms. Stewart’s custody. Like his siblings, the
newborn was placed in foster care. Plaintiff Johnny Stewart is the father of this fourth child.
The Complaint alleges that the foster family caring for Ms. Stewart’s four children also
cares for a child who is a “known sexual offender.” (ECF 2 at 7.)

Additionally, the Complaint

contains numerous allegations challenging procedural aspects of the Boone County Circuit Court
abuse and neglect proceeding, including claims that Defendant WVDHHR falsely accused
3 In the section of the Complaint titled “Jurisdiction”, Plaintiffs state that all the parties are West Virginians,
averments that establish only that Court’s diversity jurisdiction is unavailable. It is plain from other sections of the
Complaint, however, that Plaintiffs assert violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal constitutional claims.

2

Plaintiff Johnny Stewart of being a sex offender and unfit parent.
The Complaint asserts civil rights claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal
constitutional provisions, as well as a variety of pendent state claims. Each of the nine counts
allege claims against all Defendants collectively: Count I—Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Count
II—Unlawful Government Taking; Count III—Unlawful Seizure and False Arrest; Count
IV—False Imprisonment; Count V—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count
VI—Unlawful Seizure; Count VII—Malicious Prosecution; Count VIII—Negligent Training and
Supervision; and Count IX—Fraud.

Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages of an

unspecified amount.
As noted, several Defendants filed motions to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The motions are now fully briefed and ripe for

disposition.
II.

DISCUSSION

In their motions to dismiss, none of the Defendants raises the substantial question of
whether this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the
Court raises the issue sua sponte. See Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th
Cir. 2003); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 197 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that
federal courts may raise the question of abstention sua sponte).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the U.S.
Constitution (Counts I, II, and III) offend the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923). Under Rooker-Feldman, a district court may neither directly review a state court

3

decision nor entertain a claim that is “inextricably intertwined” with one such that “the district
court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at
483–84 n.16. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine “preserves a fundamental tenet in our system of
federalism that, with the exception of habeas cases, appellate review of state court decisions occurs
first within the state appellate system and then in the United States Supreme Court.” Am. Reliable
Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Consequently, a plaintiff may not “seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by recasting his
complaint in the form of a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Fariello v. Campbell,
860 F. Supp. 54, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Moreover, this is a highly sensitive case about the alleged abuse and neglect of children
and the termination of parental rights. Without question, such delicate matters are first and
foremost the concerns of state courts. For this reason, federal courts traditionally decline to
intervene in state domestic relations cases. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court held that
“[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–
594; see also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989) (“[D]omestic relations are
preeminently matters of state law”); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations
are a traditional area of state concern”). Thus, divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees–and
cases involving “elements of the domestic relationship”–are traditionally within the province of
state courts. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705-706 (1992).
As represented by the parties in their filings, the Boone County Circuit Court abuse and
neglect proceeding is still pending, a fact that does not preclude application of the

4

Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the Fourth Circuit. See Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d at
317-18 (applying Rooker-Feldman even though at the time the federal lawsuit was filed, the state
court had not rendered its decision on the issues challenged in the federal lawsuit; and stating “the
order in which the federal action was filed and the state decision issued is a relevant, but not
controlling, consideration in answering the key question of ‘whether a party seeks the federal
district court to review a state court decision and thus pass upon the merits of that state court
decision.’”).
Here, Plaintiffs directly challenge the validity of one or more of the Boone County Circuit
Court’s interlocutory orders.

For example, Plaintiffs claim that WVDHHR “knowingly,

willfully, and wantonly removed Plaintiff Brandy Stewart[’]s three children from her by way of an
unlawful, improper, and unwarranted civil action filed by the Boone County Prosecutor’s Office.
This Emergency Protective Order recklessly removed Plaintiff Brandy Stewart’s three (3) children
from her custody for no lawful reason.” (ECF 2 at 2.)

Plaintiffs make a similar attack on a

subsequent Circuit Court order removing Ms. Stewart’s infant son from her custody. (Id.)
Plaintiffs further allege
Since the beginning of the initial civil abuse and neglect action, Plaintiffs have been
continually deprived of their fundamental rights as family, as well as citizens of this
[S]tate and nation. Finally, without continued false allegations, misrepresentation
and State sponsored thuggery facilitated by state actors in conjunction with the lack
of due diligence on behalf of state agencies and private corporations, Plaintiffs’
individual and fundamental rights as people, citizens, and members of a family
would not continue to be decimated through the State’s ongoing and malicious
prosecution.
Id. at 2–3.4
These allegations invite the Court to second-guess the Boone County Circuit Court’s
4 In their responses to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs concede that their malicious prosecution claim
is not ripe.

5

judge’s sensitive and weighty decisions to re
s
d
emove Ms. S
Stewart’s chi
ildren from h custody a
her
and
place them in foster care. See Te
c
exaco v. Penn
nzoil, 481 U 1, 25 (19
U.S.
987) (Marsha J., concur
all,
rring)
ef
d
viction that th state cour was wrong it is
the
rt
g,
(“Where federal relie can only be predicated upon a conv
t
al
bstance, anyt
thing other th a prohib
han
bited
difficult to conceive of the federa proceedings as, in sub
appeal of the state co [decision
f
ourt
n].”). The Court declin Plaintiffs invitation t commit su
C
nes
s’
to
uch
jurisdicti
ional error. Additionally, the Court declines to exercise sup
pplemental ju
urisdiction o
over
Plaintiffs pendent state law claim See United Mine Workers v. Gibb 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
s’
ms.
bs,
.
III.

CONCLU
USION

For the forego
oing reasons the Court ABSTAINS from adjudi
s,
A
S
icating the is
ssues in this case,
DENIES the pendin motions for lack of ju
S
ng
f
urisdiction [E
ECF 12, 14, 16, 20, 23–
,
–27, 53, and 54],
d
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Compla (ECF 2), and DIRE CTS the Clerk to remov this case from
aint
ve
t’s
the Court Docket.
IT IS SO OR
T
RDERED.
The Court DI
T
IRECTS the Clerk to se a copy o this Order to counsel o record and any
e
end
of
of
d
unreprese
ented party.
ENTER:

6

July 22, 2013