Rauch v. Welch et al
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting the West Virginia Division of Corrections' 55 MOTION to Dismiss; granting conditionally Commissioner James Rubenstein and Warden David Ballard's 61 MOTION to Dismiss respecting the Fourteenth Am endment failure to train and supervise claims and otherwise denied; granting conditionally the designation defendants' 59 MOTION to Dismiss respecting the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and otherwise denied; granting plaintiff Jord an Lawrence Rauch leave to 8/15/2014 to attempt to amend the operative pleading to allege further facts that would state plausible Fourteenth Amendment claims against the defendants named in numbered paragraphs 2 and 3; in the absence of such an amendment, the motions to dismiss will be formally granted. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 7/25/2014. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (taq)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
JORDAN LAWRENCE RAUCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:13-0468
WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS and
JAMES RUBENSTEIN, Commissioner,
West Virginia Division of Corrections, and
DAVID BALLARD, Warden, Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
BRIAN WELCH, C.O. II, Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
JUSTIN COTTRELL, C.O. II, Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
RITA ALBURY, Inmate Movement Coordinator,
Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
CHERYL CHANDLER, Executive Assistant to the Warden,
Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
SHERRILL LYNN SNYDER, Mental Health Director,
Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
REGINA STEPHENSON, Director of Classification,
Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
JUSTIN COOK, C.O II, Mount Olive Correctional Complex, and
C.O. BENNITT, C.O. II, Mount Olive Correctional Complex,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are separate motions to dismiss filed by
defendants (1) the West Virginia Division of Corrections
(“WVDOC”), (2) Correctional Officer (“CO”) Bennitt, CO Justin
Cook, CO Justin Cottrell, and CO Brian Welch (collectively the
“correctional officer defendants”), (3) Rita Albury, Cheryl
Chandler, Sherrill Lynn Snyder, and Regina Stephenson
(collectively “designation defendants”), and (4) Commissioner of
the West Virginia Division of Corrections James Rubenstein and
Mount Olive Correctional Complex (“Mount Olive”) Warden David
Ballard, each of which were filed on February 6, 2014.
I.
The following allegations are taken from the first
amended complaint inasmuch as this case is at the motion to
dismiss stage.
Plaintiff Jordan Lawrence Rauch is in the custody of
the WVDOC.
He is incarcerated at Mount Olive.
In approximately
May 2009, Mr. Rauch claimed that his safety was in danger from
fellow inmates.
He sought protective housing and associated
classifications to avoid physical harm.
These requests were
insufficiently addressed to provide Mr. Rauch protection.
On November 7, 2010, an inmate poisoned and attempted
to kill Mr. Rauch.
On November 7, 2011, and again on February
6, 2013, Mr. Rauch was stabbed on the recreation yard by two
different inmates.
The inmates who stabbed Mr. Rauch were
believed to have carried the weapons from their cell to the
recreation yard.
In keeping with WVDOC policy, both inmates
were allegedly strip searched prior to entering the yard.
2
The
search conducted prior to the November 7, 2011, attack was
performed by defendants CO Welch, CO Cottrell, and CO Cook.
The
search conducted prior to the February 6, 2013, attack was
performed by CO Bennitt.
During both stabbings, the correctional officer
defendants are alleged to have failed to intervene in a timely
manner to prevent further injuries to Mr. Rauch.
As a result of
these attacks, and the correctional officer defendants’ delayed
response, Mr. Rauch suffered permanent and severe physical and
psychological injuries.
Mr. Rauch unsuccessfully sought additional protection
from inmates through administrative procedures on numerous
occasions.
These administrative procedures included the Special
Management Review Committee at Mount Olive, which was comprised
of the designation defendants.
Defendants Commissioner
Rubenstein and Warden Ballard also knew of Mr. Rauch’s continued
attempts to seek protection and failed to adequately respond.
On January 10, 2013, Mr. Rauch instituted this action.
His first amended complaint, filed January 24, 2014, which the
court is obliged to treat as true, alleges four counts pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count One alleges that all of the
defendants deprived Mr. Rauch of his Eighth Amendment rights by
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failing to take reasonable steps to protect him from physical
harm by other inmates, despite their knowledge that Mr. Rauch’s
safety was at risk.
Count One also alleges that the policies of
the WVDOC demonstrated a callous disregard for Mr. Rauch’s right
to be incarcerated in a reasonably safe environment.
Count Two asserts that the correctional officer
defendants deprived Mr. Rauch of his Eighth Amendment rights by
failing to intervene in a reasonable time to stop the stabbings
despite fair warning to do so.
In failing to respond to the
attacks in an adequate and timely manner, Mr. Rauch alleges
these defendants were following policies established by the
WVDOC.
Count Three asserts that Mr. Rauch was denied his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection
based upon the inadequate responses of the designation
defendants and Commissioner Rubenstein and Warden Ballard to his
requests for protection from other inmates.
This, too, is
alleged to have resulted from policies established by the WVDOC.
Count Four alleges that the WVDOC, Commissioner
Rubenstein, and Warden Ballard breached their duties of care to
properly supervise and train the correctional officers at Mount
Olive, resulting in inadequately supervised and trained
4
personnel who failed to properly protect Mr. Rauch’s
constitutional guarantees.
The court construes these
allegations as giving rise to Fourteenth Amendment claims for
failure to train and supervise.
The defendants named in Count
Four are alleged to have, again, acted pursuant to the policies
established by the WVDOC.1
II.
A.
Governing Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that
a pleader provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing . . . entitle[ment] to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2); Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007).
Rule
12(b)(6) correspondingly permits a defendant to challenge a
1
Certain language found in the first amended complaint
suggests that Mr. Rauch may also seek relief other than under
the federal Constitution. (See, e.g., First Am. Compl. at 1
(“The claims asserted herein are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for the Defendants’ violations of the Constitutions,
statutes and common law of the State of West Virginia and the
United States of America.”)). Some of the defendants have
asserted that unspecified references to federal and state law
sources are insufficiently pled. (See, e.g., Desig. Defs.’
Memo. in Supp. at 4).
The court need not address these challenges or speculate
upon the bases for these unspecified claims. In his response
briefing, Mr. Rauch clarifies that “The First Amended Complaint
makes it clear that all of the Plaintiff’s claims are based on
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Resp. Br. at 4).
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complaint when it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The required “short and plain statement” must provide
“‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
545 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957),
overruled on other grounds, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563).
In order
to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570);
see also Monroe v. Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir.
2009).
Application of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires
that the court “‘accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint . . . .’”
Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at
2200 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965); see also South
Carolina Dept. Of Health And Environmental Control v. Commerce
and Industry Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 245, 255 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002)).
The court must also “draw[] all reasonable . . . inferences from
th[e] facts in the plaintiff's favor . . . .”
Edwards v. City
of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
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B.
Law and Analysis
Several of the grounds alleged in the various motions
to dismiss are meritorious.
First, the WVDOC moves to dismiss,
inter alia, on the ground that it does not qualify as a “person”
under section 1983.
Inasmuch as controlling precedent supports
the position, it is ORDERED that the WVDOC’s motion be, and it
hereby is, granted.
See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under §
1983.”).
Second, Commissioner Rubenstein and Warden Ballard
move to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claims arising out of
their alleged failures to train and supervise the designation
defendants and the correctional officer defendants.
They assert
that Mr. Rauch has inadequately pled the claim inasmuch as he
has not alleged they “were responsible for training and
supervision . . . .”
(Memo. in Supp. at 13).
The first amended
complaint alleges the following respecting Commissioner
Rubenstein and Warden Ballard:
37. Defendants WVDOC, Commissioner Rubenstein, and
Warden Ballard owed the Plaintiff a duty to use due
care in the supervision and training of correctional
officers at MOCC, in order to assure that the
Plaintiff’s legal rights were not violated in the
manner described herein.
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38. These Defendants breached this duty, and the
resulting deprivation of the clearly-established
constitutional and other legal rights of the Plaintiff
was directly and/or proximately caused by the
implementation and existence of customs, policies and
acts of Defendants WVDOC, Commissioner Rubenstein, and
Warden Ballard.
39. Accordingly, such official customs, policies and
acts of these Defendants resulted in correctional
officers at MOCC being inadequately supervised and
trained with regard to the legal rights of the
Plaintiff that were specifically violated and that
directly and/or proximately caused the significant
damages he suffered.
(First. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-39).
The claim must be assessed in light of the wellsettled standards for Fourteenth Amendment failures to train and
supervise, which appear, respectively, below:
FAILURE TO TRAIN:
[A] failure to train can constitute a “policy or
custom” actionable under section 1983 only where the
“municipality's failure to train its employees in a
relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’
to the rights of its inhabitants.” And only if, “in
light of the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees, the need for more or different training is
so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in
the violation of constitutional rights,” can a
municipality reasonably “be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to that need.” Mere
negligence is insufficient to impose section 1983
liability on a municipality for alleged failure to
train.
Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
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FAILURE TO SUPERVISE:
In order to succeed on a § 1983 claim for supervisory
liability, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that h[er] subordinate was engaged in
conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk”
of constitutional injury to citizens like the
plaintiff;
(2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge
was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference
to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices,”; and
(3) that there was an “affirmative causal link”
between the supervisor's inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
As to the first element, “[e]stablishing a ‘pervasive’
and ‘unreasonable’ risk of harm requires evidence that
the conduct is widespread, or at least has been used
on several different occasions and that the conduct
engaged in by the subordinate poses an unreasonable
risk of harm of constitutional injury.” As to the
second element, a plaintiff “may establish deliberate
indifference by demonstrating a supervisor's continued
inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses.”
Finally, as to the third element, “proof of causation
may be direct ... where the policy commands the injury
of which the plaintiff complains ... or may be
supplied by the tort principle that holds a person
liable for the natural consequences of his actions.”.
Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226-27 (4th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted).
Mr. Rauch’s allegations fall well short of
the marks established in Jackson and Wilkins.
The designation defendants assert an additional
pleading defect, namely, that the Fourteenth Amendment due
process claims against them do not satisfy the rigors of Twombly
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and Iqbal.
Mr. Rauch narrows the claim in his responsive
briefing, asserting that he has pled only the “failure to
afford” him “due process in accessing administrative
procedures.”
(Resp. at 12).
He no longer appears to press,
inter alia, an equal protection claim, nor does he pursue a due
process claim for any purpose other than in accessing
administrative procedures.
Nevertheless, the specific allegations supporting the
narrowed due process claim are, like the Fourteenth Amendment
failure to train and supervise claim, inadequately pled.
For
example, one must speculate respecting the nature of the
“woefully inadequate and unreasonable responses to [Mr. Rauch’s]
. . . attempts to obtain relief by way of” the WVDOC and Mount Olive
administrative procedures.
(Resp. at 12 (quoting First. Am.
Compl. ¶ 33).
The court, accordingly, ORDERS that Commissioner
Rubenstein’s and Warden Ballard’s motion to dismiss be, and
hereby is, granted conditionally respecting the Fourteenth
Amendment failure to train and supervise claims and otherwise
denied.
The court further ORDERS that the designation
defendants’ motion to dismiss be, and hereby is, granted
conditionally respecting the Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim and otherwise denied.
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Mr. Rauch is given leave, no later than August 15,
2014, to attempt to amend the operative pleading to allege
further facts that would state plausible Fourteenth Amendment
claims against the defendants named in the preceding paragraph.
In the absence of such an amendment, the motions to dismiss will
be formally granted.
The defendants’ remaining contentions are not
meritorious.
First, Commissioner Rubenstein, Warden Ballard,
the designation defendants, and the correctional officer
defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that Mr. Rauch has
alleged only official capacity claims against them and, as state
officers, they do not qualify as “persons” subject to suit in
that capacity.
The court notes that “a plaintiff need not plead
expressly the capacity in which he is suing a defendant in order
to state a cause of action under § 1983.”
F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
Biggs v. Meadows, 66
When capacity is not pled
specifically, the court is obliged to “examine the nature of the
plaintiff's claims, the relief sought, and the course of
proceedings to determine whether a state official is being sued
in a personal capacity.”
Id. at 61.
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Having analyzed the operative pleading, the court
concludes that Mr. Rauch has pled individual capacity claims.
Foremost, the request for compensatory damages, and for punitive
damages against the “individual defendants,” suggests a judgment
is sought against those defendants personally.
Compare First.
Am. Compl. at 8, with Suarez Corp. Industries v. McGraw, 125
F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e take SCI's request for
compensatory and punitive damages as an indication that these
state actors are being sued in their personal capacities here,
since such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits.”)
(citing Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61).
There is no basis for dismissal
on this ground.
Second, Commissioner Rubenstein, Warden Ballard, the
designation defendants, and the correctional officer defendants
assert that any claim by Mr. Rauch for damages arising out of
the November 7, 2010, incident is barred by the applicable
limitations period.
Mr. Rauch clarifies in his response
briefing that he seeks no recompense for the incident, adding it
only to provide context.
Third, this same group of defendants asserts that “the
massive passage of time between the alleged incidents”
eviscerates as a matter of law any attempted showing of
causation.
(See, e.g., Desig. Defs.’ Memo. of Law at 9).
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The
assertion is dismissed inasmuch as the timeline, and its
substantive content and impact, plainly warrants further
development during discovery.
III.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it is ORDERED as
follows:
1.
That the WVDOC’s motion to dismiss be, and hereby is,
granted;
2.
That Commissioner Rubenstein’s and Warden Ballard’s
motion to dismiss be, and hereby is, granted
conditionally respecting the Fourteenth Amendment
failure to train and supervise claims and otherwise
denied;
3.
That designation defendants’ motion to dismiss be, and
hereby is, granted conditionally respecting the
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and otherwise
denied;
4.
That Mr. Rauch be, and hereby is, granted leave no
later than August 15, 2014, to attempt to amend the
operative pleading to allege further facts that would
state plausible Fourteenth Amendment claims against
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the defendants named in numbered paragraphs 2 and 3.
In the absence of such an amendment, the motions to
dismiss will be formally granted.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this
written opinion and order to all counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.
ENTER:
July 25, 2014
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
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