Lewis v. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting defendant's 7 MOTION to Dismiss; directing plaintiff's counsel to file a memorandum with this court within 30 days to show cause why sanctions under Rule 11(b) are not warranted; the court ORDERS that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant and that this case be dismissed and stricken from the docket. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 10/21/2013. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (taq)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

QUINCY GRAY MCMICHAEL LEWIS
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-cv-13110

WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket 7]. The plaintiff has
responded, and the motion is ripe. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
Further, the plaintiff’s counsel is ORDERED to show cause why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(b) has not been violated.
I. Background
This case arises out of a decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in
State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight, 223 S.E.2d 617 (W. Va. 2009). That case upheld a court-ordered
gynecological exam of the alleged victim in a criminal sexual assault case. The plaintiff, who was
not a party to that case, brings the instant action against the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in its official capacity to enjoin enforcement of State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight. (See Compl.
[Docket 1] at 3, 13). The plaintiff further asks this court for a declaratory judgment holding State
ex rel. J.W. v. Knight unconstitutional. (Id. at 13). Before I address the merits of the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, I will describe the Supreme Court of Appeals decision at issue.

A.

State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight

In State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight, two brothers were charged with various acts of sexual abuse
against their sister, J.W., a fifteen year-old minor. 223 S.E.2d 617, 618 (W. Va. 2009). One of the
brothers, Jason Wilson, moved the trial court for a physical examination of J.W. to determine
whether any physical penetration or intercourse had occurred. Id. at 619. In deciding Jason
Wilson’s motion, the trial court applied a six-part test set out in State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903
(W. Va. 1992). That test enumerated the factors a trial court must consider before ordering a
physical or psychological examination against a victim in a criminal case:
[T]he judge should consider (1) the nature of the examination requested and the
intrusiveness inherent in that examination; (2) the victim’s age; (3) the resulting
physical and/or emotional effects of the examination on the victim; (4) the
probative value of the examination to the issue before the court; (5) the remoteness
in time of the examination to the alleged criminal act; and (6) the evidence already
available for the defendant's use.
State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903, 907 (W. Va. 1992). The trial court ultimately granted Jason
Wilson’s motion after applying the Delaney test. State ex rel. J.W., 223 S.E.2d at 619. The trial
court found that the gynecological examination sought was not overly intrusive given J.W.’s age
and the fact that the examination was less extensive than those administered to women in the
general population for health purposes. Id. at 619, 621. The trial court also found that the evidence
sought by Jason Wilson was not otherwise available and that the examination was not too remote
in time from the alleged abuse. Id. at 621.
After the trial court ordered J.W. to undergo the physical examination, the state prosecutor
sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Appeals to prevent the examination from
going forward. Id. at 618. The only issue the Supreme Court of Appeals considered was whether
the trial court had mistakenly applied the Delaney test. Id. at 618. On that issue, the Supreme Court

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of Appeals held that the trial court had properly applied the Delaney test “under the facts of this
particular case.” Id. at 622. The court did not consider any federal constitutional issues.
Following the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, J.W. personally sought a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, presenting the following two issues:
I. Whether it violates the Supremacy Clause for a state court to order a minor rape
victim to submit to a penetrating pelvic examination, where the court lacks
constitutional authority to issue such an order and the minor victim has a federal
constitutional right to refuse to submit?
II. Whether it violates the Due Process Clause for a state court to order a child rape
victim to submit to a penetrating pelvic examination at the behest of a criminal
defendant?
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, J.W. v. Knight, 2009 WL 2491812 (No. 09-131). The appeal was
denied without explanation on October 20, 2009. See J.W. v. Knight, 558 U.S. 970 (2009).
In November 2009, J.W. apparently filed a new federal suit to enjoin enforcement of the
original trial court order. (Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Docket 14], at 2). 1
That suit was dismissed as moot after the criminal defendant, Jason Wilson, pleaded guilty. (Id. at
3). On appeal, the defendant withdrew his guilty plea and the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded. (Id.). On remand, the district court again dismissed the suit as moot after it was revealed
that J.W. had voluntarily undergone the disputed physical examination without the knowledge of
her counsel. (Id.).
B.

The Instant Case

The plaintiff in this case is Quincy Gray McMichael Lewis, a twenty-seven-year-old
female resident of West Virginia. (Compl. [Docket 1] ¶ 21). She brings this action “for herself and
on behalf of a class of . . . [a]ll natural persons residing in West Virginia that are at risk for sexual

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The plaintiff discusses this case in her Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, but
she fails to provide citations to either the district court or the Fourth Circuit’s orders.

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victimization[.]” (Id.). The plaintiff brings five causes of action. First, the plaintiff alleges that the
“ongoing vitality of J.W. threatens [her] Fourth Amendment rights.” (Id. ¶ 33). Second, she alleges
State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight threatens her right to privacy. (Id. ¶ 36). Third, she alleges the
defendant issued State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight in violation of her procedural due process rights
because the state prosecutor “lacks capacity to represent Plaintiff’s personal and constitutional
rights in criminal matters.” (Id. ¶ 39). Fourth, the plaintiff alleges State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight
threatens her substantive due process rights. (Id. ¶ 46). Finally, the plaintiff alleges State ex rel.
J.W. v. Knight interferes with her First Amendment speech and petitioning rights. (Id. ¶ 49).
The defendant brings this motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). The defendant argues that that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s suit for the following reasons: (1) the defendant is immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines, and (3) the plaintiff lacks standing under
Article III of the United States Constitution. (See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
[Docket 8], at 1).
II. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
raises the fundamental question of whether a court is competent to hear and adjudicate the claims
brought before it. It is axiomatic that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a
controversy before it can render any decision on the merits. Challenges to jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) that are based on the sufficiency of the complaint are facial challenges. If a facial
challenge is made, as it is here, “the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the motion

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must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.”
Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
III. Analysis
At the outset, I note that the plaintiff incorrectly argues that the Supreme Court of Appeals’
decision in State ex rel. J.W. v. Knight stands for the proposition that criminal defendants in sexual
assault cases may generally obtain discovery from a court-ordered physical examination of a
victim. The court decided only that “under the facts of this particular case,” the trial court properly
considered the defendant’s motion under the Delaney factors. State ex rel. J.W., 223 S.E.2d at 622.
Further, the decision is a per curiam opinion; its precedential value is limited to its particular facts.
See Walker v. Doe, 558 S.E.2d 290, 291 (W. Va. 2001) (“The value of a per curiam opinion arises
in part from the guidance such decisions can provide to the lower courts regarding the proper
application of the syllabus points of law relied upon to reach decisions in those cases.”). I now turn
to the defendant’s arguments.
A.

The Plaintiff’s Suit is Barred by the Eleventh Amendment

The defendant argues that this suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution. That Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI. Although the text of the Amendment may suggest otherwise, the Supreme
Court has understood it generally to bar suits against unconsenting states brought in federal court.
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v.
Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990) (“This Court has drawn upon principles of sovereign immunity
to construe the Amendment to establish that an unconsenting [s]tate is immune from suits brought
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in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment also prohibits suits against state entities. See P.R. Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). State supreme courts are
considered state entities for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Landers Seed Co.,
Inc. v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 731-32 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 811 (suit
to enjoin Illinois Supreme Court from violating Due Process Clause barred by 11th Amendment);
Robinson v. Court of Common Pleas of Phila. Cnty., 827 F. Supp. 1210, 1211 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(“There is no doubt that a state’s highest court is an Eleventh Amendment state entity.”); Louis v.
Supreme Court of Nev., 490 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (D. Nev. 1980) (“The Supreme Court of Nevada
is an agency of the State of Nevada and immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.”). I accordingly FIND that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is
immune from this suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
B.

Rule 11 Sanctions

Because the Eleventh Amendment clearly bars the plaintiff’s suit, the plaintiff’s counsel is
ORDERED to show cause why sanctions under Rule 11(b) are not warranted. Specifically, the
plaintiff’s counsel is ORDERED to file a memorandum within 30 days with this court explaining
why the plaintiff’s “claims . . . and other contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). The memorandum should address the plaintiff’s arguments
regarding applicability of the Eleventh Amendment made in the Complaint [Docket 1] and the
plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket 14].

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IV. Conclusion
Because I find that the Eleventh Amendment requires dismissal of this suit, I do not decide
whether the plaintiff has Article III standing or whether I should abstain pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine or Younger v. Harris. The plaintiff’s counsel is ORDERED to file a
memorandum with this court within 30 days to show cause why sanctions under Rule 11(b) are not
warranted. For the reasons stated above, the defendant’s motion is GRANTED. The court
ORDERS that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant and that this case be dismissed and
stricken from the docket. The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of
record and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:

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October 21, 2013