Lacy v. Delong et al
Filing
7
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER sustaining in part plaintiff's 6 Opposition/Objections, adopting the 5 Proposed Findings and Recommendations by Magistrate Judge, and re-referring this case to Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley for further proce edings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order; dismissing without prejudice Mr. Wilson and all other unnamed Prime Care Medical, Inc. officials from the current action; directing Magistrate Judge Tinsley to order service upon Defendants Jo e DeLong, Steven Crooks, and Officer Hunter, and allow Plaintiffs failure to protect claim to proceed against the unnamed SCRJ officials mentioned in the complaint, to the extent Plaintiff is able to identify such officials through further proceedings. Signed by Judge Thomas E. Johnston on 6/27/2016. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (tmh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
ALBERT WILLIAM LACY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-cv-14813
JOE DELONG, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. (ECF No.
2.) On June 19, 2013, this action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Dwane L.
Tinsley for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation for disposition (“PF&R”).
(ECF No. 3.)
Magistrate Judge Tinsley filed his PF&R, (ECF No. 5), on May 20, 2014,
recommending that this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff filed timely objections to
the PF&R (the “Objections”) on May 28, 2014. (ECF No. 6.)
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART the Objections, (id.),
ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 5), only to the extent it is consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion and Order, and RE-REFERS this case to Magistrate Judge Tinsley for further
proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
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I.
Background
Plaintiff filed the instant § 1983 complaint (the “Complaint”) on June 19, 2013, alleging
that various known and unknown officials at South Central Regional Jail (“SCRJ”) and Prime Care
Medical, Inc. (“Prime Care”), the independent medical provider at SCRJ, were deliberately
indifferent both to Plaintiff’s safety and his serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleges that he was a
pre-trial detainee at SCRJ from October 21, 2012 until March 8, 2013. (ECF No. 2 at 11.) It
does not appear that Plaintiff was subsequently incarcerated, however, and at the time he filed his
complaint, he listed a residential address in Charleston, West Virginia as his place of residence.1
(Id. at 3; see also ECF No. 5 (the PF&R) at 3 (noting that Plaintiff “is not presently incarcerated”).).
Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that an SCRJ Correctional Officer, Officer Hunter,
“instigated an assault on the plaintiff by telling two white inmate[s] in the POD that Plaintiff Lacy
was a Child molester.” (ECF No. 2 at 9.) At Officer Hunter’s provocation, Plaintiff “was
force[d] to fight one (1) white inmate for twenty-five minutes . . . and then . . . was forced to fight
another white inmate for about seven (7) minutes before correctional officers came in and
The Complaint admits that Plaintiff did not present the claims in his Complaint to SCRJ pursuant to the institution’s
prisoner grievance procedure. Generally, this failure to utilize available prison grievance procedures would run afoul
of the exhaustion requirement imposed by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.”). However, this broad-ranging exhaustion requirement has only been interpreted to apply
to plaintiffs who are incarcerated at the time they file their federal lawsuit. See Lesesne v. Doe, 712 F.3d 584, 587–
88 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (collecting cases for the proposition that “[b]y its plain terms, exhaustion is not required of a
plaintiff who is not . . . confined . . . indicating that that the relevant time of confinement is when the complaint is
filed”); Cofield v. Bowser, 247 F. App’x 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Because Coefield was not a prisoner when he filed
his complaint, the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not applicable to his § 1983 action.”); Cantley v. W. Va. Reg’l Jail
and Corr. Facility Auth., 728 F. Supp. 2d 803, 820 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (same).
Moreover, failure to exhaust has been determined to be an affirmative defense, rather than a pleading
requirement, and a court is only entitled to sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s complaint on that basis “in the rare case
when failure to exhaust is apparent from the face of the complaint.” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407
F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that he was not a prisoner at the
time of filing, the face of the complaint does not indicate that he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under
the PLRA and sua sponte dismissal on that basis is improper.
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remove[d] the plaintiff from the POD.” (Id. at 12.) For the duration of this assault, Plaintiff
alleges that “[s]everal” unknown correctional officers watched, but did not intervene. (Id. at 10.)
In particular, he avers that “an unknown female Correction Officer . . . was in the POD tower” and
watched the assault take place but did not signal for aid or otherwise take steps to break up the
assault for over twenty-five minutes. (Id. at 12.) The above allegations implicate a failure to
protect on the part of SCRJ officials; as alleged, they either instigated or were aware of a physical
assault on the plaintiff but did nothing to intervene in that assault for a prolonged period of time.
Plaintiff also makes allegations, albeit in much less coherent fashion, that he received
inadequate medical care from Prime Care staff while at SCRJ. Some of these allegations directly
relate to the above-described assault. For example, he alleges that the assault caused injury to his
hip and head and that he was not immediately seen by anyone at Prime Care despite the fact that
he “could barely walk and was having dizzy spells.” (ECF No. 2 at 12; see also id. at 13 (“The
plaintiff’s hip was hurt and he had head injury. However, when he complain[ed] he was told to
sign-up for sick call which he was not seen until he got an officer to deliver a note to the Jail
administrator.”).) Plaintiff does not allege that any particular Prime Care employee denied him
service or seek to identify any unnamed Prime Care official responsible for that failure; rather, it
appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold “Mr. Wilson,” alleged to be the entity’s medical administrator,
liable based on the Prime Care’s generalized failure to provide medical care in the wake of the
assault.
The majority of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding medical treatment, however, are
generalized grievances that are unrelated to the injuries suffered during the inmate assault. In
particular, he alleges that “unknown medical staff” placed him an unclean cell that had previously
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been inhabited by an inmate with staph infection; that “Female Medical Staff member Terry” did
not take Plaintiff’s medical information during intake, resulting in a three-week denial of
Plaintiff’s prescription medication; that “Female Medical Staff member Eva” treated him several
times for high blood pressure but failed to record any information on the subject; and finally that
unknown medical staff “threaten[ed]” Plaintiff shortly before the alleged assault. (ECF No. 2 at
9.)
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to impose supervisory liability on two former West Virginia
Regional Jail and Facility Authority administrators: Joe DeLong, its former executive director, and
Steven Crooks, the former local administrator at SCRJ. Plaintiff alleges that these officials were
responsible for operating SCRJ in an overcrowded capacity, without regard for inmate safety,
resulting in “an unsafe and inhumane condition[ ]” defined by several documented instances of
inmate-on-inmate violence, sexual assault, and excessive force by officers against inmates. (Id.
at 10–11.) More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the correctional officers at South Central (and
elsewhere in West Virginia) “were untrained in controlling inmate violence,” that instances of
assaults on inmates by other inmates were commonplace and often instigated by the correctional
officers, and that DeLong and Crooks generally “failed to train Correctional Officers and Shift
Leaders how to create a safe environment and defuse conflicts in the POD.”
(Id. at 11.)
According to Plaintiff, these failures directly led to his assault and violated his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks five million dollars each from DeLong, Crooks, and Hunter, one
million dollars from Wilson, ten thousand dollars from each unnamed defendant, punitive
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damages, and “injunctive relief and an investigation of all regional jails in the State of West
Virginia.” (Id. at 13.)
Magistrate Judge Tinsley examined Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to the provisions set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the federal in forma pauperis statute, which requires a district
court to review prisoner complaints that seek to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs and
dismiss such complaints where they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Before ordering service of process on any of the named defendants, the Magistrate Judge issued
his PF&R, which, as relevant here,2 determined that Plaintiff’s complaint lacked sufficient factual
allegations to state any plausible claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (ECF No. 5 at 8.) Accordingly, it recommends that the Complaint be dismissed in
its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff objects to this
recommendation, emphasizing the fact that he is proceeding pro se and highlighting the specific
nature of the allegations supporting each of his claims. (ECF No. 6.)
II.
A.
Legal Standard
Review of the PF&R
The Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §
The PF&R also made three other proposed findings, none of which are challenged in Plaintiff’s Objections. First,
it found that Plaintiff lacks standing to raise claims that do not directly involve him. (ECF No. 5 at 5.) Second, the
PF&R determined that, because Plaintiff is no longer detained, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are
mooted. (Id. at 6.) Finally, it recommends a finding that, to the extent the defendants are sued in their official
capacity, they are immune from suit. The Court adopts these findings, but determines that Plaintiff has stated a claim
for monetary damages, based on personal harm suffered, against several of the defendants named in the Complaint in
their personal capacities. Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint will be allowed to proceed on such claims and only such claims;
all claims for declaratory or injunctive relief, official capacity claims, or claims stated on behalf of other individuals
(to the extent they are asserted) are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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636(b)(1). However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard,
the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or
recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
In addition, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party “makes general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
B.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) Initial Screening
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act “imposes on the district courts a duty to screen initial
filings” and “requires a district court to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis ‘at any time if
the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . [or] fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.’”3 Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656 (4th
Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii)). In determining
whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court is to employ the same
standard that is used when reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The standards
for reviewing a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the same as those for reviewing a dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”); Richards v. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d 630, 633 (D.
Del. 2014) (“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
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Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from officers and employees of governmental entities, an additional
screening provision of the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, is also applicable to his complaint. As relevant here, that
statute requires a court to review, before docketing if feasible, every prisoner complaint that seeks redress from
governmental entities or the officers or employees of such entities. Section 1915A uses language identical to §
1915(e), and, “[b]ecause of their obvious similarity, courts may have the option in a particular case of dismissing [in
forma pauperis] prisoner litigation for failure to state a claim under more than one of these provisions.” McLean v.
United States, 566 F.3d 391, 404 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, because the present case is such a case where § 1915A
and § 1915(e) both apply, and because the two statutes set forth the same standard, the Court does not find it necessary
to independently address the application of § 1915A.
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions.” (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999))).
Accordingly, “[d]ismissal is proper only if the plaintiff has failed to ‘present factual allegations
that state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176
(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014)).
Further, the Court is mindful that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. As such his pleadings will
be accorded liberal construction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe v. Armistead,
582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978).
Liberal construction of pleadings is “particularly
appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Jehovah, 798
F.3d at 176 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009)).
III.
Discussion
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Importantly, § 1983 is not itself the source of any substantive rights. Rather,
it provides a “method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the
United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979). “A federal civil rights claim based upon § 1983 has two essential elements:
‘[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
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of state law.’” Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in
original) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint can be divided into two distinct challenges to the
conditions of his pretrial detention: (1) that various prison officials failed to protect him from
obvious safety risks (the “failure to protect claim”); and (2) that various medical professionals
denied him adequate medical care (the “inadequate medical care claim”). Both types of claims
are well-recognized when asserted by prison inmates under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (recognizing that prison officials have a constitutional duty to
protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976) (recognizing the state’s duty to attend to an inmate’s serious medical needs). With respect
to both such claims, the standard of culpability applicable to prison officials “is one of ‘deliberate
indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 302–03 (1991)); see also Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 989 (4th Cir. 1987) (“The
eighth amendment protects a convicted inmate from physical harm at the hands of fellow inmates
resulting from the deliberate or callous indifference of prison officials to specific known risks of
such harm, just as it protects against harm resulting from deliberate indifference of prison officials
to serious medical needs.” (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff, however, was a pretrial detainee at the time his claims arose, and although he
invokes the Eighth Amendment, it is well-established that “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is
appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally
associated with criminal prosecutions.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977).
The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment,” but because they have not yet
8
received any formal adjudication, “pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be
punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct.
2466, 2475 (2015) (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671–72 n.40). As a result, conditions of
confinement claims by pretrial detainees sound in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause rather than in the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36 and n.16
(1979); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Because Martin was a pretrial
detainee and not a convicted prisoner at the time of the alleged denial [of medical care], this claim
is governed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than the eighth
amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”); Parrish ex rel. Lee v.
Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (assessing a pretrial detainee’s claims that the
government denied him medical care and failed to protect him from a substantial risk of physical
harm under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Nonetheless, because “[p]retrial detainees are entitled to at least the same protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment as are convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment,” Young v.
City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001), courts generally apply the standards
developed in Eighth Amendment claims to due process claims brought by pretrial detainees. See,
e.g., Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that no determination as to
whether the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner was necessary because “the
standard in either case is the same—that is, whether a government official has been ‘deliberately
indifferent to any [of his] serious medical needs’” (alteration in original) (quoting Belcher v.
Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990))); Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302 and n.11 (noting that the
standard applicable to a pretrial detainee’s claims of denial of medical care and failure to protect
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“is the same as that which applies in cases arising under the Eighth Amendment,” and accordingly
finding cases applying Eighth Amendment standards “relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment
claim here”).
Thus, whether assessing a failure to protect claim or a claim based on inadequate medical
care, a showing of deliberate indifference will sustain a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment:
In cases where the government is accused of failing to attend to a detainee’s serious
medical needs, and in cases where the government is accused of failing to protect a
detainee from a substantial risk of physical harm, ‘conduct that amounts to
deliberate indifference . . . is viewed as sufficiently shocking to the conscience that
it can support a Fourteenth Amendment claim.’
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302 (quoting Young, 238 F.3d at 575); see also Marshall v. Abbasi, 109 F.
App’x 609, 610 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “with respect to claims of deliberate indifference
to medical needs, a pretrial detainee’s due process rights are coextensive with a convicted
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights”); King-Fields v. Leggett, Civil Action No. ELH–11–1491,
2014 WL 694969, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 19, 2014) (“A failure-to-protect claim brought by a pretrial detainee constitutes a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the same
standards apply as for an Eighth Amendment claim brought by a convicted prisoner.”).
Accordingly, the Court will assess each of Plaintiff’s claims under the deliberate
indifference standard and with reference to case law developed in response to Eighth Amendment
claims. Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard, “lying somewhere between the poles of
negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. A
prison official exhibits deliberate indifference where he “knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Id at 837.
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Nevertheless, although it “remains open to . . . officials to prove that they were unaware
even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety,” id. at 844, the subjective standard does not
allow a prison official to “hide behind an excuse that he was unaware of a risk, no matter how
obvious.” Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995). Whether a given
prison official exhibits deliberate indifference is “a question of fact subject to demonstration in the
usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; see also
White by White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that a claim of deliberate
indifference “implies at a minimum that defendants were plainly placed on notice of a danger and
chose to ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice”); Brice, 58 F.3d at 105 (“[A]n injury might
be so obvious that the factfinder could conclude that the [prison official] did know of it because
he could not have failed to know of it.”). Where the evidence demonstrates that an official
“merely refused to verify ‘underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true,’ which, if verified,
would have compelled him to realize that the claimant needed immediate medical attention, or that
he ‘declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exit,’” id. (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 843 n.8), that official can be held liable notwithstanding his actual ignorance of the
threat to inmate health or safety at issue.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a failure to protect
claim against both the named and unnamed SCRJ officials described in the complaint, but has
failed to state a claim based on inadequate medical care against any Prime Care official, named or
unnamed. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s Objections as they relate to his failure
to protect claim, and allows his claims to proceed against Officer Hunter, Joe DeLong, Steven
Crooks, and, to the extent they can be identified, the unnamed SCRJ officials who participated in
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Plaintiffs assault by failing to take reasonable measures to intervene. The Court OVERRULES
Plaintiff’s Objections as they relate to his inadequate medical care claim and ORDERS that all
Prime Care Medical officials, named and unnamed, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
from the current action.
A.
Failure to Protect
In Farmer, the Supreme Court recognized that “prison officials have a duty . . . to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” 511 U.S. at 833 (quoting CortesQuinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988)).
Such violence is not appropriately characterized as punishment and “[b]eing violently assaulted in
prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also Odom v.
S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[G]ratuitously allowing the beating . . .
of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objective, any more than it squares
with evolving standards of decency.” (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833)).
To establish a failure to protect claim, a prisoner must make two showings: first, that he
suffered significant injury or was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm;” and second, that the prison official at issue had a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Under the first prong—i.e., the objective inquiry, “a prisoner must allege a serious or significant
physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,” De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634
(quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)), “or demonstrate a substantial
risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner’s exposure to the challenged conditions,” id.
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(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33–35 (1993)). The second showing is subjective and,
as noted above, requires proof of deliberate indifference. See Toomer v. Baltimore City Det. Ctr.,
Civil Action No. DKC 12–0083, 2014 WL 4678712, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2014) (“In order to
prevail on a claim of failure to protect from violence, [a plaintiff] must establish that [the
defendants] exhibited deliberate or callous indifference to a specific known risk of harm.” (citing
Pressly, 816 F.2d at 979)). Ultimately, “the test is whether the [prison officials] know the plaintiff
inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they fail to
do so.” Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Case v. Ahitow,
301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by two other inmates for over twenty-five
minutes, and that the resulting injuries to his head and hip left him with dizzy spells and unable to
walk. At this stage in the litigation, the Court has little trouble finding that such allegations satisfy
the objective prong of a failure to protect claim. The Court will address in turn the culpability of
the individual defendants, named and unnamed, alleged to be responsible for that injury.
i.
Officer Hunter
As alleged in the Complaint, Officer Hunter directly instigated a violent attack on the
plaintiff by branding him among other inmates with the derogatory label of child molester. In a
prison environment, there can be little doubt that such a label exposes an inmate to an increased
threat of physical attack from other inmates. See Anderson v. Chapman, 604 F. App’x 810, 811
(11th Cir. 2015) (“[I]nmates charged with crimes against children are frequent targets of assault at
the hands of other inmates.”); Norman v. Schuetzle, 585 F.3d 1097, 1112 (8th Cir. 2009) (Bye, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “child molesters are viewed with disdain”
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within the prison population); Davis v. Muscarella, 615 F. Supp. 2d 296, 302 (D. Del. 2009) (“It
is well known that ‘convicted child molesters may be in danger in a general prison population.’”
(quoting Brigden v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Corrs., 129 F.3d 130, at *6 (10th Cir. 1997))).
Indeed, courts have found that negatively labeling an inmate can evince deliberate indifference to
that inmate’s safety whether or not the label ever actually results in any physical attack. See
Jordan v. Hooks, Civil Action No. 6:13-cv-2247-BHH, 2015 WL 5785504, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 29,
2015) (noting that “[n]umerous courts have allowed plaintiffs to survive summary judgment where
the plaintiff alleges only an increased risk of attack,” absent any actual physical injury, as the
result of being labeled a snitch).
Here, Plaintiff alleges not only that Officer Hunter told other inmates that Plaintiff was a
child molester, but further that such disclosure led directly to a violent and prolonged physical
assault that actually caused serious physical injuries. Given the highly unfavorable status of child
molesters in prison populations, such allegations sufficiently allege Officer Hunter’s deliberate
indifference by creating an inference that Officer Hunter made the disclosure with the intent to
cause Plaintiff harm. See Brown v. Narvais, 265 F. App’x 734, 735–36 (10th Cir. 2008) (taking
note of well-established case law indicating that labeling an inmate a snitch can support an Eighth
Amendment claim, determining that “the same principles apply” to the “incendiary badge of prison
infamy” associated with being a child molester, and concluding that “allegations of a prison
officer’s deliberate disclosure of dangerous information about an inmate’s status are sufficient to
state a claim under the Eighth Amendment”); Moore v. Wetzel, Civil Action No. 14–1709, 2015
WL 7163114, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2015) (“[I]t is well-established that labeling an inmate a
snitch or a child molester ‘may give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation if the prison official
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acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.’” (quoting
Tabb v. Hannah, Civil No. 1:10–CV–1122, 2012 WL 3113856, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2012))).
Not only did Officer Hunter fail to protect Plaintiff from violence at the hands of other
inmates, but he directly incited that violence. Allegations of such conduct, taken as true, state a
claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety.
ii.
Unnamed SCRJ Officials
Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims of total inaction on the part of various SCRJ officials during
the assault are sufficient to survive initial screening and allow Plaintiff the opportunity to discover
the identity of the culpable prison officials.
A correctional officer does not have a “constitutional duty to intervene in the armed assault
of one inmate upon another when intervention would place the guards in danger of physical harm.”
Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 533
(4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the defendant correctional officers “violated no clearly established
right of [plaintiff’s] because they were not required to risk serious bodily harm by entering,
unarmed, into a fray with an armed and violent assailant during the short period before assistance
arrived”). At the same time, however, officers do retain an obligation to take reasonable action
to prevent an inmate from suffering harm at the hands of other inmates, and a correctional officer
acts in a deliberately indifferent manner if he “stands by as a passive observer and takes no action
whatsoever to intervene during an assault.” Odom, 349 F.3d at 773 (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978)); see also Brown, 612 F.3d at 723 (finding that prisoner’s
allegation that an officer was present at the time of an assault by another inmate stated a failure to
protect claim because, from that allegation, “[a] reasonable person could infer . . . that [the
15
defendant officer] was aware of the attack, and that his failure to intervene represented deliberate
indifference to a serious risk of harm”); Kartman v. Markle, 582 F. App’x 151, 154 (4th Cir. 2014)
(finding summary judgment inappropriate where the plaintiff’s verified complaint “provide[d]
undisputed evidence that [the defendant officer] watched [the plaintiff] being assaulted and
unreasonably delayed breaking up the fight”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that one “unknown female” sat in the POD tower and watched an
entire twenty-five minute assault without doing anything to prevent it or protect the plaintiff.
(ECF No. 2 at 12.) Further, he alleges that several unknown guards similarly sat idly by and
watched the assault for several minutes without taking any action. (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege
that his assailants were armed or that intervention would have been physically dangerous for the
numerous correctional officers who failed to intervene. Taken as true and liberally construed,
such allegations state a claim for failure to protect, and Plaintiff should have the opportunity,
through further court proceedings, to identify the officers involved. See Cole v. RHU Officers
John Doe, No. Civ. 1:CV-04-1218, 2005 WL 2648342 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2005) (“Generally,
courts will allow claims based upon John Doe defendants to go forward at the initial stages of an
action, often surviving initial screening by the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or a motion to
dismiss, because they may be found and named later through the discovery process.” (citing K.J.
ex rel. Lowry v. Div. of Youth and Family Servs., 363 F. Supp. 2d 728, 740 (D.N.J. 2005))).
iii.
Supervisors: DeLong and Crooks
It is well-established that a government official cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely
on the basis of respondeat superior. See, e.g. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Nonetheless, “[t]he principle is firmly entrenched that supervisory officials may be held liable in
16
certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.” Shaw v.
Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). In such circumstances, liability is based not on
respondeat superior, but upon “a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization
of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on
those committed to their care.” Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing
Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir. 1980)). In general, “a supervisory power
cannot be liable, under Section 1983, for the actions of its subordinates unless it is on fair notice
that subordinates are engaged in constitutional or statutory deprivations” and “consciously chose[
] a particular course of action in response.” Brown v. Mitchell, 308 F. Supp. 2d 682, 703 (E.D.
Va. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). Thus, in order to avoid
having supervisory liability collapse into respondeat superior, a supervisory official will not be
liable under § 1983 unless that official’s “‘edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy,’ and if [he] ha[s] promulgated a custom or policy that caused a constitutional violation.”
Newbrough v. Piedmont Reg’l Jail Auth., 822 F. Supp. 2d 558, 582 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
In order to establish a supervisor’s § 1983 liability, a plaintiff “must show actual or
constructive knowledge of a risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to that risk, and
‘an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional
injury suffered by the plaintiff.’” Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).4 One way in which a supervisor furthers a policy of deliberate indifference
4
In Shaw, the Fourth Circuit stated that a plaintiff seeking to establish supervisory liability must make the following
three- part showing:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in
17
in this context is by failing to train his subordinate employees. “The imposition of supervisory
liability on a failure to train theory is merely a more specific formulation of the Monell ‘official
policy or custom’ inquiry wherein the official ‘policy or custom’ is the training program (or lack
thereof).” Brown, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 702–03; see also Newbrough, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (noting
that, under both Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, failure to train claims are treated as
a subset of policy or custom supervisory liability claims); Layman v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 2d
784, 794 (W.D.N.C. 2003) “[A] supervisor’s failure to train his employees can subject him to
liability where the failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of citizens.”
(citations omitted)).
When a plaintiff’s claim of supervisory liability is based on a failure to train, he must prove
the following three elements:
(1) the subordinates actually violated the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory
rights; (2) the supervisor failed to train properly the subordinates thus illustrating a
‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of the persons with whom subordinates come
into contact; and (3) this failure to train actually caused the subordinates to violate
the plaintiff’s rights.
Brown, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 701. “A plaintiff can allege the deliberate indifference element in two
ways.” Moody v. City of Newport News, 93 F. Supp. 3d 516, 538 (E.D. Va. 2015). First, “where
it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional
violations.” Gallimore v. Henrico Cty. Sch. Bd., 38 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting
conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the
plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show
deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices [ ]; and (3) that
there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
13 F.3d at 799 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
18
Harris, 489 U.S. at 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). “Second, ‘a
failure to train claim also can be based on a supervisory power’s failure to train its employees
concerning an obvious constitutional duty that the particular employees are certain to face.’”
Moody, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 538 (quoting Gallimore, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 726).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that SCRJ subordinate employees
violated his constitutional rights by inciting an assault against the plaintiff by fellow inmates and
then standing idly by for an unreasonable period of time as that assault took place. The question,
then, becomes whether the administrators’ failures with respect to training these subordinates
evince deliberate indifference to the right of detainees to be from violence at the hands of other
detainees.
At this stage in the litigation, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged such deliberate
indifference.
Plaintiff’s overarching contention is that the correctional officers at West Virginia regional
jails were poorly trained, and that this lack of training led to violence, officer corruption, and
generally unsafe conditions for the inmates. In support, Plaintiff cites examples of inmate-oninmate assaults, excessive force complaints against individual officers, and instances of officers
instigating inmate violence against other inmates that tend to show a pattern of constitutional
violations similar to the one Plaintiff currently alleges, both at SCRJ specifically (Crooks’s
domain) and within the West Virginia regional jails more broadly (the province of DeLong).
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that DeLong and Crooks failed to train their officers in the specific area
of controlling inmate violence, and that this failure manifested itself in Plaintiff being assaulted by
another inmate, at the instigation of an officer, while other correctional officers stood idly by and
19
allowed the violence to continue. In other words, the constitutional injury Plaintiff alleges is the
precise kind that the administrators allegedly failed to train their subordinates to prevent.
Given a correctional officer’s constitutional duty to make reasonable efforts to protect
inmates from violence at the hands of other inmates, allegations that the supervisory officials failed
to train their officers with respect to controlling inmate violence and “defus[ing] conflict in the
POD,” (ECF No. 2 at 11), are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of SCRJ inmates. See DeHaven v. W. Va. Div. of Corrs., No. 2:14–CV–
16156, 2014 WL 2765612, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. June 18, 2014) (emphasizing that “[t]he need for
training to avoid and halt violence by fellow inmates is clearly obvious for correctional officers in
a prison environment,” and finding allegations that supervisory officials “failed to adequately train
their correctional officers to protect the known and substantial risk of harm by other inmates”
sufficient to state a supervisory liability claim for failure to train under § 1983).
Given such deliberate indifference, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint has
adequately alleged an “affirmative causal link,” between the injury suffered—at the hands of
another inmate, at the instigation of a correctional officer—and DeLong’s and Crooks’s failure to
train their subordinates to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence. Accordingly, at this early stage of
the litigation, Plaintiff’s claims will be allowed to proceed against DeLong and Crooks.
For the reasons discussed, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s Objections, insofar as they
relate to his failure to protect claim against SCRJ officials.
B.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
While Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts several facts supporting his allegations that several
SCRJ officials were deliberately indifferent to the injuries he suffered as the result of an assault,
20
its allegations with respect to medical care are much less clear. Plaintiff makes several allegations
quibbling with the level of care provided by Prime Care prior to the assault, but his allegations
regarding a lack of care after the assault boil down to the unadorned assertion that “Defendant
Wilson’s medical staff from Prime Care Medical . . . . offered the plaintiff no medical care after
the assault.” (ECF No. 2 at 12.) Even construing Plaintiff’s Complaint as it must at this stage in
the litigation, the Court cannot determine that such allegations state a plausible claim for relief.
The Supreme Court has recognized that state governments have an obligation to provide
medical care for the inmates they incarcerate, and accordingly that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). A claim based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs must
satisfy a similar two-prong test to that applicable to failure to protect claims. As with a failure to
protect claim, the first prong is objective and focuses on the severity of the plaintiff’s harm, while
the second is subjective and focuses on the defendant’s deliberate indifference. See Brice, 58
F.3d at 104 (“To establish . . . a constitutional violation, a claimant must prove that, objectively
assessed, he had a ‘sufficiently serious’ medical need to require medical treatment, and that a
[prison official], subjectively aware of the need and of its seriousness, nevertheless acted with
‘deliberate indifference’ to it by declining to secure available medical attention.” (citations
omitted)).
“Objectively, the inmate’s medical condition must be ‘serious’—‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178 (quoting
21
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)); see also Scott v. Clarke, 64 F. Supp. 3d 813, 822
(W.D. Va. 2014) (collecting cases for the proposition that “a threshold element of an Eighth
Amendment claim premised upon allegations of deficient medical care is the claimant’s showing
that the health problem of which she complains involves a ‘serious medical need’”). As for the
subjective component, deliberate indifference is a “higher standard for culpability than mere
negligence or even civil recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that would
constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Jackson, 775
F.3d at 178. “Disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate’s proper medical
care do not state a § 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged.” Wright v. Collins,
766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970));
see also Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178.
Under this standard, Plaintiff’s claim must fail. His allegations regarding inadequate
treatment prior to the assault, to the extent they even describe serious medical needs, represent
nothing more than disagreements between inmate and physician over proper medical care. (See
ECF No. 2 at 9 (alleging medical staff member “Eva” failed to record Plaintiff’s blood pressure
information); id. at 12 (alleging medical staff member “Terry” did not properly record his medical
information during intake, causing Plaintiff to be without unspecified medication for an
unspecified medical condition for three weeks); id. at 9, 12 (alleging that unidentified medical staff
“threaten[ed]” Plaintiff in some unspecified way shortly before the assault); id. at 9 (alleging that
unidentified medical staff members did not properly clean an area of the hospital before placing
Plaintiff in it).)
22
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations of a denial of medical care following the assault lack
specificity. Other than the blanket statement that he was denied medical care in the immediate
aftermath of his assault, the Complaint mentions only that, despite Plaintiff’s injuries, “when he
complain[ed] he was told to sign-up for sick call” and “was not seen until he got an officer to
deliver a note to the Jail administrator.” (Id. at 13.) This allegation suggests that Plaintiff did in
fact receive some medical attention following the assault, and that his primary objection to that
treatment is to its timing.
As this Court has previously noted, such complaints about the
“frequency, duration, and provider” of medical treatment generally do not rise to the level of
constitutional concern. Basham v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., Civil Action No. 5:06-cv-00604, 2007
WL 1468775, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. May 18, 2007) (noting that “the prohibition against the infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only those
deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to
form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation” (quoting Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166
(4th Cir. 1995))).
Plaintiff does not even attempt to identify any specific individual responsible for the
alleged denial of care, and even if he did his allegations would be insufficient to state a claim for
supervisory liability against Prime Care’s medical director. Plaintiff does not allege that Mr.
Wilson directly took any action to deny him medical treatment and, as noted above, a supervisory
official cannot be held responsible under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. There
is simply nothing in the Complaint suggesting that Mr. Wilson was aware of a serious risk that
detainees such as Plaintiff would be denied medical treatment and failed to respond to that risk in
a way that would demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Barnes v. Wilson, 110 F. Supp. 3d 624,
23
631–32 (D. Md. 2015) (noting that supervisory liability in the context of a serious medical needs
case requires a showing that “(1) the supervisory defendants failed promptly to provide an inmate
with needed medical care, (2) that the supervisory defendants deliberately interfered with the
prison doctors’ performance, or (3) that the supervisory defendants tacitly authorized or were
indifferent to the prison physicians’ constitutional violations” (quoting Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d
848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990))).
Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and OVERRULES Plaintiff’s
Objections as they relate to that claim and all Prime Care officials.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART Plaintiff’s Objections, (ECF
No. 6), ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 5), only to the extent it is consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion and Order, and RE-REFERS this case to Magistrate Judge Tinsley for further
proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Consistent with the recommendation in the PF&R, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Mr. Wilson and all other unnamed Prime Care Medical, Inc. officials from the
current action. The Court DIRECTS Magistrate Judge Tinsley to order service upon Defendants
Joe DeLong, Steven Crooks, and Officer Hunter, and allow Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim to
proceed against the unnamed SCRJ officials mentioned in the complaint, to the extent Plaintiff is
able to identify such officials through further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
24
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:
25
June 27, 2016
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