Murray v. Rubenstein et al
Filing
156
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying plaintiff's 141 MOTION for Emergency Relief. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 12/5/2016. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
GARLAND MURRAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-cv-15798
JIM RUBENSTEIN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the court is the plaintiff’s Motion for Emergency Relief [ECF
No. 141]. Following the court’s November 8, 2016, Order [ECF No. 145] construing
that Motion as a motion for injunctive relief, defendants David Ballard and James
Rubenstein filed a substantive Response [ECF No. 147] (“Ballard Response”), and
defendants Paul Donelson and Sandra filed Responses [ECF Nos. 151–152] indicating
that they were unable to provide the requested injunctive relief. The plaintiff then
filed a Reply [ECF No. 154]. The matter is now ripe for decision. For the following
reasons, the court DENIES the plaintiff’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2016, the plaintiff filed the instant Motion asking the court to
order the defendants to protect him from attackers in prison and disclose the precise
measures taken to protect him.
The plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges, among other claims, that the
deliberate indifference of supervisory prison staff led to him being stabbed by other
prisoners at the Mount Olive Correctional Center (“MOCC”) on April 1, 2013. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 56–64, 113 [ECF No. 112]. Neither party disputes that the plaintiff was
attacked and stabbed. Mot. Emergency Relief ¶ 2. Kristopher Creel, one of the
plaintiff’s attackers, was subsequently transferred to another prison facility. Ballard
Resp. 3. Stephen Houghton, another of the plaintiff’s attackers, is in the general
population at MOCC. See Mot. Emergency Relief ¶ 4.
Following that attack, the plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement for his
protection. Id. at ¶ 3. On October 12, 2016, Matthew Clemons, the plaintiff’s case
manager, asked the plaintiff if he feared for his life and offered the plaintiff a chance
to apply for a special form of protective custody. Ballard Resp. Ex A, at ¶ 5 [ECF No.
147-1] (“Clemons Aff.”). The plaintiff declined. Id. On November 7, 2016, the plaintiff
was returned to the general population of the prison. Ballard Resp. Ex. B, at ¶ 5 [ECF
No. 147-2] (“Cole Aff.”). Three days later, the plaintiff was again asked if he feared
for his life and wanted to apply for special management; the plaintiff again refused.
Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
The United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit have provided district courts with a precise analytical framework
for determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See Winter v. Nat. Res.
2
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC,
575 F.3d 342, 345–47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010).
First, plaintiffs must make a clear showing that they will likely succeed on the merits.
The Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 346. Second, plaintiffs must make a
clear showing that they are likely to be irreparably harmed absent preliminary relief.
Id. Third, plaintiffs must show that the balance of equities tips in their favor. Id.
Finally, the plaintiffs must show that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. All
four requirements must be satisfied for a preliminary injunction to be appropriate.
Id.
DISCUSSION
In his Motion, the plaintiff argues—without relying on any legal authority—
that he is scared for his life, and I should therefore enter an order directing the
defendants to protect him and provide information regarding the steps being taken
to protect him. See Mot. Emergency Relief. I construed that Motion as a motion for
injunctive relief and directed the defendants to respond. See Order, November 8,
2016. In the Ballard Response, the defendants David Ballard and James Rubenstein
argued against an injunction; however, they too eschewed legal authority. See Ballard
Response. Given another chance to advocate for the entry of an injunction in his
Reply, the plaintiff did not supply me with sufficient evidence to satisfy the four
preliminary injunction requirements; indeed, neither party mentioned the standard
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for granting a preliminary injunction—even after I construed the Motion as a motion
for injunctive relief. See Reply.
Regardless, the plaintiff’s Motion must be denied because the plaintiff has
failed to satisfy at least two of the requirements for a preliminary injunction. First,
the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that he is likely to prevail on the merits of
the case. Additionally, the plaintiff presented no evidence that he would be
irreparably harmed if the injunction was not entered. Although the plaintiff states
generally that he is afraid of Stephen Houghton, he points to no specific indicators
that Stephen Houghton will harm him in the future. General fear of what someone
might do is insufficient to satisfy the irreparable-harm prong—especially where that
fear is based on an incident that occurred over three years in the past. See Curtis v.
Ramsey, No. 2:12-7885, 2014 WL 4296683, at *3–4 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 28, 2014) (“A
mere possibility of harm will not suffice to support the granting of a preliminary
injunction.”) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 21). Indeed, given the plaintiff’s willingness
to return to the general population and his assertion that he is not afraid for his life,
it is unclear that he believes irreparable harm is imminent absent the issuance of an
injunction. Accordingly, because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to satisfy
the first or second prong of the preliminary injunction test, I FIND that neither of
those prongs are satisfied.
Moreover, it appears to me that some of the relief sought by the plaintiff—
specifically, information regarding the steps being taken to protect him—could be
4
easily obtained through the discovery process. It is unclear why, exactly, the plaintiff
would seek discovery material through informal e-mail requests and motions instead
of using one of the plethora of discovery tools enumerated in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Mot. Emergency Relief Ex. B. It is also unclear why counsel for
David Ballard and James Rubenstein would send a callow e-mail responding to the
plaintiff’s counsel’s request for information instead of directing her to the discovery
process. See Mot. Emergency Relief Ex. C. What is clear, however, is that I will not
micromanage discovery. The parties are free to utilize the discovery tools provided by
the Rules, and if unresolvable disagreements arise, the parties are free to motion the
court to resolve those disagreements. I trust that the parties will act more civilly in
the future.
Therefore, because the plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy
the four-prong preliminary injunction test and some of the relief sought is more
appropriately handled through discovery, I DENY the plaintiff’s Motion.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence to show that a preliminary
injunction is warranted. Moreover, some of the relief sought appears more
appropriately resolved through discovery. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s Motion for
Emergency Relief [ECF No. 141] is DENIED.
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The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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December 5, 2016
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