Hatfield et al v. Coloplast Corp.
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER The 11 MOTION by Coloplast Corp. to Dismiss on the Pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts IIVII and is otherwise DENIED at this time. Counts IIVII are DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 11/18/2016. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (mek)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
IN RE: COLOPLAST CORP.
PELVIC SUPPORT SYSTEMS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
MDL NO. 2387
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
Karen Hatfield and Joe Hatfield v. Coloplast Corp.
Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-17578
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the court is Coloplast Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss on the
Pleadings [ECF No. 11]. The plaintiffs responded [ECF No. 15] and Coloplast Corp.
replied [ECF No. 16] making the Motion ripe for adjudication. For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.
Background
This case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat
pelvic organ prolapse (“POP”) and stress urinary incontinence (“SUI”). In the seven
MDLs, there are more than 58,000 cases currently pending, approximately 500 of
which are in the Coloplast Corp. (“Coloplast”) MDL, MDL 2387.
On February 10, 2009, Ms. Hatfield was surgically implanted with Coloplast’s
Suspend-Tutoplast Processed Fascia Lata (“Fascia Lata”), a device manufactured by
Coloplast to treat SUI and to reconstruct the pelvic floor. Short Form Compl. ¶¶ 9–
10 [ECF No. 2]. Ms. Hatfield’s surgery occurred at Mercy Medical Center in Canton,
Ohio. Id. ¶ 11. Ms. Allen claims that as a result of implantation of the Fascia Lata,
she has experienced multiple complications. She adopts the following counts as
alleged in the First Amended Master Long Form Complaint and Jury Demand
(“Master Complaint”): I – negligence, II – strict liability design defect, III – strict
liability manufacturing defect, IV – strict liability failure to warn, V – strict liability
defective product, VI – breach of express warranty, VII – breach of implied warranty,
VIII –fraudulent concealment, IX – constructive fraud, X – discovery rule and tolling,
XI –negligent misrepresentation, XII – negligent infliction of emotional distress, XIII
– violation of consumer protection laws, XIV – gross negligence, XV – unjust
enrichment, XVI – loss of consortium, and XVII – punitive damages. Id. ¶ 13.
According
to
the
Master
Complaint,
Coloplast
“designed,
patented,
manufactured, packaged, labeled, marketed, sold, and distributed a line of pelvic
mesh products,” one of which was an allograft, the Fascia Lata. Master Compl. at ¶
22–23. Coloplast admits in its Master Answer that it “generally packaged, labeled,
marketed, sold[,] and distributed” such pelvic mesh devices. Master Answer at ¶ 22.
The Fascia Lata device is “dehydrated, . . . processed fascia lata from donated human
tissue.” See Def.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Ex. B [ECF No. 11-2] (“Package Insert”). The
Fascia Lata is preserved such that it “retains the three-dimensional collagen
structure responsible for the unidirectional, mechanical properties of the original
fascia lata tissue.” Id.
2
II.
Legal Standard
“[T]he Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings procedure primarily is addressed
to . . . dispos[e] of cases on the basis of the underlying substantive merits of the
parties’ claims and defenses as they are revealed in the formal pleadings.” 5C Charles
Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1367 (3d ed.
2004). A motion under 12(c) is useful when only questions of law remain. Id.
[A] Rule 12(c) motion is designed to provide a means of disposing of cases
when the material facts are not in dispute . . . and a judgment on the
merits can be achieved by focusing on the content of the competing
pleadings, exhibits thereto, matters incorporated by reference in the
pleadings, [and] whatever is central or integral to the claim for relief or
defense . . . .
Id. Rule 12(h)(2) provides that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted may be raised in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(2). If this is asserted in a Rule 12(c) motion, the district court will apply the
same standards for granting the appropriate relief or denying the motion as it would
have employed had the motion been brought prior to the defendant’s answer under
12(b)(6). Wright & Miller, supra, § 1367; see Exec. Risk Indem., Inc. v. Charleston
Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 n.17 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (“[T]he
standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for a motion for judgment on
the pleadings are identical to those applicable to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint or pleading. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
3
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). To achieve facial plausibility, the plaintiffs must plead facts allowing the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, moving the claim
beyond the realm of mere possibility. Id. Mere “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic
recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555.
III.
Discussion
The plaintiffs assert that Coloplast’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is truly a Rule 56 Summary Judgment Motion because Coloplast has
attached exhibits for the court’s consideration. However, when deciding a 12(c)
motion, the court may consider “the content of the competing pleadings, exhibits
thereto, matters incorporated by reference in the pleadings, [and] whatever is central
or integral to the claim for relief or defense.” Wright & Miller, supra, § 1367. Of
Coloplast’s attached documents and the plaintiffs’ referenced evidence in their
Response, the court will only consider the package insert marked as Exhibit B to
Coloplast’s Motion because it is integral to the claim for relief and defense. See
Package Insert. The package insert offers a product description and a warranty
4
statement which are pertinent to the claims at hand—specifically the breach of
warranty claims. See id. at 1; Short Form Compl. ¶ 13. The evidence the plaintiffs
put forward in their Response, the content from Coloplast’s website, is not part of the
content of the pleadings, an exhibit thereto, incorporated by reference in the
pleadings, or central or integral to the claims. Therefore, it will not be considered.
Further, Coloplast attached the Short Form Complaint as Exhibit A to its Motion.
See Def.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Ex. A [ECF No. 11-1]. This is a pleading and must be
considered by the court, and accordingly has no transformative power. Thus,
Coloplast’s Motion is not a Rule 56 Summary Judgment Motion.
Next, this court applies the substantive tort law of the state where the
plaintiff’s implantation occurred—in this case, Ohio. In re: Coloplast, Inc. Pelvic
Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-cv-760, 2016 WL 3067752, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
May 31, 2016); Short Form Compl. ¶ 11. The claims are addressed below.
a. Strict Liability and Breach of Warranty (Counts II–VII)
Coloplast argues that it is immune from the plaintiffs’ strict liability and
warranty claims alleged in Counts II-VII by virtue of Ohio’s blood and human tissue
shield statute which states:
[T]he procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing, or using
of human whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, and
products, corneas, bones, organs, or other human tissue except hair, for
the purpose of injecting, transfusing, or transplanting the fluid or body
part in another human body, is considered for all purposes as the
rendition of a service by every person participating in the act and not a
sale of any such fluid or body part. No warranties of any kind or
description are applicable to the act.
5
Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 2108.30. Where a statute such as this one clearly defines the
“procuring, furnishing or distribution” of blood and human tissues as “not to be a sale
[as] a matter of law,” there can be no sale of a product subject to products liability
actions.1 Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 427 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
Additionally, case law applying § 2108.11 mandates the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
Zaccone v. Am. Red Cross, 872 F. Supp. 457, 460 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (“In Ohio, the
procuring, processing, distributing, or using of human blood or blood products . . . is
a service.”); Slaughter v. Life Connection of Ohio, 907 F. Supp. 929, 931 (M.D.N.C.
1995) (Explaining that, in Ohio, “the procurement of organs is expressly considered
for all purposes as the rendition of a service by every participating person or
institution.”).
It follows that the plaintiffs’ warranty claims also fail for this reason. As the
Fifth Circuit has explained:
It is axiomatic, of course, that breach of express warranty is not
available as a cause of action without a sale, because the essence of
warranty is a consensual agreement— express or implied— arising from
contract. Without a sale under contract, there is no consensual nexus
between the parties and thus no warranties may attach.
Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841, 846 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting a
statute defining tissue as a medical service and expressly exempting contracts for the
sale of human tissue from breach of warranty claims); see also Condos v.
Musculoskeletal Transplant Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 (D. Utah 2002)
1
The term “products liability” is used in reference to both strict liability and breach of warranty claims.
See 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 625 (2010) (“An action for products liability may be brought
under several theories, including . . . strict liability, and warranty.”).
6
(recognizing that the analysis for breach of warranties claims is the same as strict
liability.).
The Restatement of Torts gives even more credence to the idea that human
tissue is not a “product” and thus not subject to products liability claims. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts elaborates on products liability law in the context of
human tissue and states: “Human blood and human tissue, even when provided
commercially, are not subject to the rules of this Restatement.” Restatement (Third)
of Torts, § 19(c) (Am. Law Inst. 1998). This update clarifies that human tissue, such
as the allograft in this case, is not a “product” and is consistent with the nationwide
policy against applying strict liability to the distribution of human tissue. See id. at
§ 19(a)–(c), cmt. c.
Where the statutory language varies modestly between jurisdictions, the
public policy behind blood and human tissue shield statutes remains the same. On
this matter, the California Court of Appeals stated:
[L]egislatures have determined that the production and use of human
blood and its derivatives for therapeutic purposes should be encouraged;
and for this purpose those who provide these products, and who are
themselves free from fault, should not be required to bear the economic
loss which might otherwise be imposed under the rules of strict liability
which are applicable to sellers of commercial products generally.
Cryolife, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Cruz Cty., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 405 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hyland Therapeutics, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
220 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)). Moreover, there is “a nationwide
antipathy over applying products-liability or strict-liability concepts to body parts
such as blood and tissue.” Palermo v. Lifelink Found., Inc., 152 So. 3d 1177, 1181
7
(Miss. Ct. App. 2014). Indeed, “no court has ever applied strict liability to the
distribution of human tissue.” Condos, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1229; see Palermo, 152 So.
3d at 1181.
According
to
the
Master
Complaint,
Coloplast
“designed,
patented,
manufactured, packaged, labeled, marketed, sold, and distributed a line of pelvic
mesh products,” one of which was an allograft, the Fascia Lata. Master Compl. at ¶
22. Coloplast admits in its Master Answer that it “generally packaged, labeled,
marketed, sold[,] and distributed” such pelvic mesh devices. Master Answer at ¶ 22.
Thus, it is not in dispute that Coloplast distributed the Fascia Lata allograft. Per its
labeling, the allograft is “dehydrated, Tutoplast processed Fascia [L]ata from donated
human tissue.” Package Insert at 1. The plaintiffs do not dispute this fact either.
Because there is no dispute as to whether Coloplast distributed processed human
tissue, the Fascia Lata, no discovery is needed to determine whether the statute
applies, as the plaintiffs suggest.2 Coloplast’s actions are plainly covered by the
statute and must be considered a “service.” Public policy, precedent, and the plain
language of the statute all dictate that the plaintiffs’ strict liability and breach of
warranty claims must fail.
The plaintiffs further argue that discovery is needed to identify other conduct
that may allow a claim for strict liability to go forward. It is well-settled law, however,
The court acknowledges that Coloplast’s status as a commercial distributor does not change the
applicability of the statute. Human tissue and blood shield statutes have been interpreted to apply to
for-profit entities. See, e.g., Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1987) (interpreting
Connecticut’s human tissue and blood shield statute’s use of “blood bank” to include commercial
manufacturers and distributors).
2
8
that the scope of discovery may not exceed the boundaries of the complaint. See
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 557 U.S. 519, 531 (2009) (“Judges are trusted
to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’ or an undirected rummaging through . . . records for
evidence of some unknown wrongdoing.”).
Therefore, Counts II–VII of the plaintiffs’ Amended Short Form Complaint,
which correspond with Counts II–VII in the Master Complaint, are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
b. Remaining Claims (Counts I, VIII–XVII)
Given the plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s impending motion to amend the Master
Complaint contemplated in the plaintiffs’ Response, the nature of a short form
complaint, and for reasons appearing to the court, the Motion is DENIED at this time
as to all other claims (Counts I, VIII–XVII).
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Coloplast’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 11] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts II–VII and is otherwise DENIED at
this time. Counts II–VII are DISMISSED with prejudice.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented party.
ENTER: November 18, 2016
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?