Pauley v. Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital Association
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying defendant's 33 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 9/19/2014. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (taq)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
BRITTANY N. PAULEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-25299
HERBERT J. THOMAS MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION d/b/a THOMAS
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is defendant’s motion for partial summary
judgment filed on August 18, 2014.
I. Background
Plaintiff Brittany N. Pauley (“Ms. Pauley”) was employed by
the defendant, Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital Association
(“Thomas”), as a nursing assistant and unit clerk.
She alleges
that Thomas engaged in discriminatory employment practices,
including retaliatory termination, proscribed by both the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., and
the West Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”), W. Va. Code §§ 511-1, et seq.
Ms. Pauley asserts that the defendant interfered
with the exercise of her FMLA rights, retaliated against her
because of her attempt to exercise those rights, and terminated
her, in whole or in part, because of Thomas’s perception that
she was disabled.
This motion for summary judgment concerns
only the perceived disability claim under the WVHRA.
II. Facts
Ms. Pauley worked for Thomas from January 2011 until the
beginning of May 2012.
Pl. Compl. ¶ 8.
On April 20, 2012, Ms.
Pauley obtained an “FMLA packet” from Thomas’s human resources
Pauley Dep. 42:1-24. 1
department.
At some time between April
27, 2012 and May 3, 2012, she submitted an FMLA leave request to
Thomas. 2
J. at *5.
See Pl. Resp. in Opp’n to Def. Mot. For Partial Summ.
Ms. Pauley was terminated on May 1, 2012, after
having failed to report to work on each of the preceding three
days.
Pl. Compl. ¶ 24.
Ms. Pauley began suffering the effects of mental or
emotional illness as early as the summer of 2011.
46:13-24.
Pauley Dep.
It was during this time period when Ms. Pauley was
first treated by a psychiatrist.
Id.
In September 2011 Ms.
“Pauley Dep.” refers to the video deposition of Brittany N.
Pauley, taken on August 11, 2014. Excerpts from the transcript
of this deposition are included as attachments to both
defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff’s
response in opposition. See Exhibit A attached to Def. Mot. for
Partial Summ. J. (ECF 33-1); Exhibit A attached to Pl. Resp. in
Opp’n (ECF 35-1).
1
There is a factual dispute as to when Ms. Pauley’s FMLA leave
request was submitted and processed. However, this timing
dispute has no direct bearing on Ms. Pauley’s claim under the
WVHRA and is not a material fact for the purposes of this motion
for partial summary judgment.
2
2
Pauley’s father murdered her stepmother.
Id., 65:8-11.
in February 2012, Ms. Pauley had a miscarriage.
Then,
Id., 18:7-8.
In April 2012, she believed she had been suffering from chronic
depression for “four or five months.”
Id., 46:4-9.
The
depression was severe and sufficiently manifested in Ms.
Pauley’s demeanor that she believed it had become readily
apparent to other people, including her co-workers.
15.
Id., 65:6-
Around this time, Ms. Pauley was diagnosed with major
affective disorder, a form of postpartum depression that was
connected to the traumatic events she had recently experienced.
Id. 64:2-9, 78:3-18.
Thomas was aware of the problems that Ms. Pauley was
experiencing.
Ms. Pauley discussed her stepmother’s murder with
her supervisor, Sandra Young, who suggested that Ms. Pauley
might benefit from an employee counseling program offered by
Thomas.
Young Dep. 21:1-24, 22:1-23. 3
Ms. Pauley informed Ms.
Young that she was already treating with a psychiatrist.
Id.
The hospital’s human resource director, Marybeth Smith, was also
aware that Ms. Pauley was treating with a psychiatrist.
Smith
“Young Dep.” refers to the deposition of Sandra Young, taken on
August 12, 2014. Excerpts from the transcript of deposition are
included as attachments to plaintiff’s response in opposition to
defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. See Exhibit C
attached to Pl. Resp. in Opp’n (ECF 35-3).
3
3
Dep. 36:13-20. 4
Ms. Smith later learned about Ms. Pauley’s
miscarriage, and was aware that she had submitted an FMLA leave
request at the time of that incident.
19.
Smith Dep. 20:24, 21:1-
She also knew that Ms. Pauley had picked up and submitted
FMLA paperwork requesting leave in April 2012.
Id. 34:1-24,
36:4-12.
Ms. Pauley was terminated after she did not show up for
work on April 28, 29 and 30, 2012.
Supra.
Ms. Pauley believed
her leave request had been approved as of April 27.
87:5-9.
Pauley Dep.
She attempted to speak with Ms. Young by telephone to
confirm that approval, but Ms. Young never answered or returned
her calls.
Id. 87:24, 88:1-7.
After she learned of her
termination, Ms. Pauley continued attempting to contact her
superiors at Thomas to discuss her absences of the 28th, 29th, and
30th.
See Exhibit E attached to Pl. Resp. in Opp’n (ECF 35-
5)(Email chain between Ms. Young and Ms. Smith on May 7, 2012,
explaining that Ms. Pauley had called and left a message for Ms.
Young.).
No Thomas employee returned Ms. Pauley’s phone calls.
Id.
“Smith Dep.” refers to the deposition of Marybeth Smith, taken
on August 8, 2014. Excerpts from the transcript of deposition
are included as attachments to plaintiff’s response in
opposition to defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.
See Exhibit D attached to Pl. Resp. in Opp’n (ECF 35-4).
4
4
III. Discussion
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings,
the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Material facts are
those necessary to establish the elements of a party’s cause of
action.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
A genuine issue of material fact exists if, in viewing the
record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable fact-finder
could return a verdict for the non-movant.
Id.
The moving
party has the burden of showing — “that is, pointing out to the
district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case.”
317, 325 (1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
If the movant satisfies this burden, then the
non-movant must set forth specific facts as would be admissible
in evidence that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
fact for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); id. at 322-23.
A party
is entitled to summary judgment if the record as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmovant.
Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991).
5
Conversely, summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is
sufficient for a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in
favor of the non-moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
A court must neither resolve disputed facts nor weigh the
evidence, Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th
Cir. 1995), nor make determinations of credibility.
Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986).
Sosebee v.
Rather, the party
opposing the motion is entitled to have his or her version of
the facts accepted as true and, moreover, to have all internal
conflicts resolved in his or her favor.
Charbonnages de France
v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979).
Inferences that
are “drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
There is no special standard for summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases, but the Fourth Circuit has
stated that when the outcome of a case rises and falls on a
determination of a party’s mental state, that determination
should usually be left in the hands of a jury.
Charbonnages de
France, 597 F.2d at 414 ("[S]ummary judgment is seldom
appropriate in cases wherein particular states of mind are
decisive as elements of [a] claim or defense"), Ballinger v.
North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, 815 F.2d 1001,
6
1005(4th Cir. 1987)(“[C]ourts must take special care [at the
summary judgment stage] . . . because motive often is the
critical issue in employment discrimination cases.”), see also
Thacker v. Peak, 800 F. Supp. 372, 376(S.D. W. Va. 1992)(“Where
state of mind is a decisive element of a claim or defense,
summary judgment is seldom appropriate inasmuch as state of mind
generally is dependent on the resolution of conflicting
inferences drawn from circumstantial or self-serving evidence,
or on the credibility of witnesses.”)(internal citations
omitted).
Ms. Pauley’s WVHRA claim alleges that the Thomas employees
responsible for her termination perceived her to be disabled,
and that they acted on that perception when they made the
decision to terminate her.
Thus, the state of mind of these
supervisory employees is at issue.
The WVHRA defines “disability” as “[a] mental or physical
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities . . .
having such an impairment.”
[or] being regarded as
W. Va. Code § 5-11-3(m).
Working
is specifically included in the statutory definition of “major
life activities”, id., and a state regulation includes
“emotional illness” as a “disease or condition” that falls
within the definition of a “physical or mental impairment,” W.
7
Va. Code St. R. § 77-1.2.4.
An “emotional illness” is “any
mental disorder.” 2 J.E. Schmidt, M.D., Attorney’s Dictionary of
Medicine, E-68 (1997), see also J.C. Segen, The Concise
Dictionary of Modern Medicine (2nd ed. 2006)(defining emotional
illness as a “nonspecific term for any psychiatric disorder or
mental illness.”); In re William John R., 200 W. Va. 627, 632,
490 S.E.2d 714, 719 (1997)(referring to “emotional illness,
mental illness or mental deficiency” in tandem, as equivalent
descriptors of this sort of medical condition.)
Ms. Pauley has presented and developed evidence showing
that she was afflicted with an emotional illness.
Pauley Dep.
See generally
She has provided evidence tending to show that the
effects of this illness were apparent to her co-workers.
78:3-18.
Id.,
She has proffered evidence that Thomas had an
awareness of the causes and severity of that illness.
Young
Dep. 21:1-24, 22:1-23; Smith Dep. 20:24, 21:1-19, 36:13-20.
The
evidence she has proffered indicates that Ms. Pauley’s
supervisor, Ms. Young, was, after discussing one of the
predicate causes of the illness, sufficiently concerned about
Ms. Pauley that she suggested that Ms. Pauley utilize an
employee counseling service.
Young Dep. 21:23-24.
The evidence
also indicates that Thomas’s human resources director, Ms.
Smith, knew about her applications for FMLA leave, in both
8
February and April 2012.
Smith Dep. 31:17-19, 36:4-10.
Both
women also knew that Ms. Pauley was being treated by a
psychiatrist.
Young Dep. 22:1-3, Smith Dep. 36:13-15, 19-20.
Ms. Smith, even admits that she signed the April FMLA documents
that were submitted by Ms. Pauley.
Smith Dep. 36:4-12.
Accepting all this evidence as true, taking it in the light
most favorable to the non-movant, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in Ms. Pauley’s favor, the court concludes that a
reasonable jury could determine that Ms. Young and Ms. Smith
regarded Ms. Pauley’s mental state, stemming from her emotional
illness, as a disability that was affecting her ability to work.
It would not be unreasonable for a jury to then reach the
conclusion that this perception of disability contributed to Ms.
Pauley’s eventual termination; it would be consistent with a
determination that Ms. Smith and Ms. Young failed to return Ms.
Pauley’s phone calls because they believed she was unable to
adequately do her job and wanted her to be terminated.
Because
there is sufficient evidence that would permit a rationale factfinder to return a verdict in favor of the non-movant, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
9
IV. Conclusion and Order
Defendant has not satisfied the burden required for summary
judgment.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment be, and it hereby is,
denied.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this order
to all counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
DATED: September 19, 2014
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?