Ratliff v. Shackelford et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part defendants' 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment; granting as to the federal § 1983 claims against the Kanawha County Sheriff's Department and the Kanawha County Commission, and denied as to all other claims; denying plaintiff's 29 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 5/21/2015. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (tmh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

STERMAN DOUGLAS RATLIFF,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-cv-32917

J.S. SHACKELFORD, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
(Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment)
Pending before the court is the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 27]
and the plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket 29]. The parties have filed
responses and replies, and the motions are ripe for review.
For the reasons explained below, the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket
27] is GRANTED in part, as to the federal § 1983 claims against the Kanawha County Sheriff’s
Department and the Kanawha County Commission, and DENIED in part, as to all other claims.
The plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket 29] is DENIED.
I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 27]
A. Introduction
The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. This is a simple case. A
blind, partially deaf United States veteran suffered a disability due to the negligence of a
Huntington Veteran Affairs Medical Center (“VA”). When he lawfully expressed his
1

dissatisfaction to the VA, the facility did not attempt a compassionate response. It dispatched a
law enforcement officer under the guise of a “well being check.” Mr. Ratliff peacefully asked the
officer to leave. The opposite occurred. The officer snuck past him into his home and then
physically assaulted and injured him. He then marched him off to jail and kept him handcuffed for
hours. The details are set forth below.
B. Background
Mr. Ratliff served in the United States Marines in Vietnam. He was blinded as a result of
fighting for his country. Although he is affected with post-traumatic stress disorder, he is a
longtime advocate for veterans’ rights. In October of 2011, he noticed severe pain in his right ear.
Congress having provided lifetime, free, quality healthcare for those who served their country, Mr.
Ratliff visited the VA. He was misdiagnosed over and over again by three doctors in the eight
months that followed. The first doctor treated him with eight different antibiotics. The second
doctor said he was fine. The third doctor informed him that he had cancer.
In desperation, he traveled to Ohio State University, where he was correctly diagnosed.
The eighth months of botched care at the VA, however, left him permanently injured. He suffered
partial deafness.
Mr. Ratliff repeatedly protested his poor care and treatment to the VA. On April 18, 2013
in particular, Mr. Ratliff placed numerous calls to the VA Medical Center that had harmed him.
He candidly admits he was rude. Instead of working with him compassionately through social
workers, the VA dispatched the police to his home. Kanawha County Deputy Sheriff J.S.
Shackelford arrived at his home at 10:00 p.m. Deputy Shackelford knew that Mr. Ratliff was blind.

2

Mr. Ratliff lives on a twenty acre parcel. Deputy Shackelford made it over the curtilage
and found Mr. Ratliff sitting in his yard. Mr. Ratliff asked the deputy if he had a warrant. Deputy
Shackelford admitted that he did not. Deputy Shackelford said he did not intend to file charges.
Mr. Ratliff told the deputy to leave.
This should have ended the encounter. Instead, Deputy Shackelford secretly proceeded to
the front door. Deputy Shackelford testified that he “didn’t care that [Mr. Ratliff] told [him] to
leave.” (Shackelford Dep. [Docket 32-2], at 164:17-19 (deputy agreeing with this statement)).
While the deputy and Ms. Ratliff were talking in the home at least five feet from the
doorway, Mr. Ratliff stood on the porch below two steps, opened the storm door, and asked
whether Deputy Shackelford was inside. The deputy was silent, until Ms. Ratliff told him to
respond. Now knowing that the deputy remained on his property, Mr. Ratliff again told Deputy
Shackelford to leave. Deputy Shackelford instead lunged toward Mr. Ratliff and forcibly
handcuffed one of his wrists. Mr. Ratliff began “flailing” because he “had no idea. [He] didn’t
even know [the deputy] was coming.” (Ratliff Dep. [Docket 32-1], at 45:20-46:2). Ms. Ratliff says
Deputy Shackelford “stormed over the five feet from the living room to the doorway, down the
steps to the front door, spun [the blind Mr. Ratliff] around, and handcuffed one of his wrists.”
(Affidavit of Linda Ratliff [Docket 32-3], at 3). A struggle ensued, with Deputy Shackelford
tackling Mr. Ratliff and fully handcuffing him. Mr. Ratliff’s mouth was cut on the porch, and he
sustained cuts to his arms and legs during the assault. The injuries were severe enough that Deputy
Shackelford called an ambulance. After the EMT arrived, however, Mr. Ratliff refused treatment.
The deputy shackled Mr. Ratliff’s feet in his police cruiser, and Mr. Ratliff was transported, not to
the hospital, but just into custody for the night. Deputy Shackelford roughly led Mr. Ratliff to his
3

cell and tripped him in route. Once inside a cell, Mr. Ratliff’s hands remained handcuffed behind
his back for no less than four hours. He was released the next day. The charges for obstructing an
officer and public intoxication were ultimately dismissed.
Mr. Ratliff instituted this action against Deputy Shackelford, the Kanawha County
Sheriff’s Department, and the Kanawha County Commission for: (1) Use of excessive force under
42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) use of excessive force and false
arrest in violation of the West Virginia State Constitution, Article III, Sections 1, 5, 6, and 10; (4)
battery; and (5) negligence. The defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.
B. Standard of Review
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249 (1986). Instead, the court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some “concrete evidence
from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on
an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a
showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
4

The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of
evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
C. Discussion
First, Deputy Shackelford seeks qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims. Second, all three
defendants seek immunity on the state constitutional claims. Third, all defendants assert that
Deputy Shackelford’s use of force was reasonable and that there is no genuine issue of material
fact on either the negligence or battery claims.
Genuine issues of material fact exist on all claims. The sole issue remaining before the
court is whether the defendants enjoy immunity under § 1983 or under West Virginia law.
i. Qualified Immunity as to Deputy Shackelford on § 1983 Claims
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
There is a two-step process “for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims.
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown . . . make out a violation
of a constitutional right.” Id. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Second,
“the court must [then] decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of
defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. (citations omitted). If the court answers both prongs in the
affirmative, then qualified immunity does not apply. Id. (“Qualified immunity is applicable unless
the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.”). In Pearson, the Supreme
Court “conclude[d] that, while the sequence . . . is often appropriate, it should no longer be
5

regarded as mandatory.” Id. at 236.
a. Excessive Force
1. First Prong
The facts that Mr. Ratliff has shown plausibly “make out a violation of a constitutional
right.” Id. at 232. The United States Supreme Court has explained:
In Graham, we held that claims of excessive force in the context of arrests or
investigatory stops should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective
reasonableness standard,” not under substantive due process principles. [Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 394 (1989)]. . . . Graham sets forth a list of factors
relevant to the merits of the constitutional excessive force claim, “requir[ing]
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865. If an officer
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for
instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was
needed.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06.
On April 18th, Deputy Shackelford ignored Mr. Ratliff’s request for him to leave the
residence. He surreptitiously invaded the home and, after being confronted by Mr. Ratliff, he
physically assaulted and injured the blind and partially deaf veteran on trumped up charges. He
took Mr. Ratliff straight to jail and left him in cuffs for longer than necessary for any legitimate
law enforcement purpose.
First, the “crime at issue” was nonexistent. See id. at 205. Mr. Ratliff was innocent of any
offense. Assuming otherwise, the severity of Mr. Ratliff’s actions of placing phone calls to the VA
is minimal. Additionally, Mr. Ratliff did not “pose[ ] an immediate threat to the safety of” Deputy
Shackelford and any belief otherwise was objectively unreasonable. See id. The deputy was totally
unjustified in lunging after Mr. Ratliff, taking him to the ground, cuffing him, treating him harshly
6

in taking him to jail, and leaving him cuffed for hours. In short, an objectively reasonable officer
in Deputy Shackelford’s position would not have behaved in this manner. See Pearson, 555 U.S.
at 232.
2. Second Prong
It is also the case that “the law [must be] clearly established that the officer’s conduct was
unlawful in the circumstances of the case.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. It is clear that an officer must
take into consideration an individual’s known personal characteristics—including an individual’s
physical or mental disabilities—in using force. As a result, any reasonable officer in Deputy
Shackelford’s circumstances would know that lunging at and forcibly handcuffing a blind man
standing over five feet away is unlawful. “Looking to the proportionality of the force used in light
of all the circumstances, and again taking [Mr. Ratliff’s] version of events as true, the objective
unreasonableness, and indeed the unlawfulness and excess, of [Deputy Shackelford’s] conduct
should have been apparent to a reasonable law enforcement official under the law existing at the
time.” McDerment v. Browning, 18 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (Haden, J.). I FIND
that the second prong is met.
Having answered both prongs of Saucier affirmatively, I FIND that Deputy Shackelford is
not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Ratliff’s § 1983 claim for use of excessive force.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (“Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated
a clearly established constitutional right.”). Thus, I DENY the defendants’ summary judgment
motion with respect to this point.
b. False Arrest
The defendants also argue that Deputy Shackelford is immune from Mr. Ratliff’s § 1983
7

false arrest claim. Mr. Ratliff was charged with obstructing an officer and public intoxication.
Although both charges were eventually dismissed, the Kanawha County Magistrate Judge found
after the incident that probable cause existed for Mr. Ratliff’s arrest. Deputy Shackelford admitted
that he mistakenly charged the plaintiff with public intoxication because Mr. Ratliff was clearly
on his private property on the night of April 18th.
In their motion and supporting memorandum, the defendants do not provide a qualified
immunity analysis for false arrest. 1 The burden is theirs alone. I am not obligated to discharge it
for them.
In any event, I FIND that any mistaken belief that Deputy Shackelford had probable cause
to arrest was objectively unreasonable. The facts presented by Mr. Ratliff fail to justify any
mistaken belief that he “ha[d] committed, [was] committing, or [was] about to commit an offense”
of obstruction when Deputy Shackelford made the arrest. Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 398-99
(4th Cir. 2003). Mr. Ratliff was standing five feet away and merely requested, once again, that
Deputy Shackelford leave his private property. Although Mr. Ratliff flailed upon being
handcuffed, as I explain above, Deputy Shackelford lacked authority to use force under these
circumstances in the first place. Although the Fourth Circuit has noted that “great deference”
should be given to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant, U.S. v.
Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990), the Magistrate Judge’s post-hoc determination that
probable cause existed here does not control my decision. Deputy Shackelford’s mistake in

1

In their memorandum in support, the defendants include an ending section that discusses whether Deputy
Shackelford had probable cause to enter Mr. Ratliff’s home. However, this section is in no way specific to whether
Deputy Shackelford is protected by qualified immunity on Mr. Ratliff’s federal false arrest claim. Also, the defendants
included this section merely in anticipation of what the plaintiff may argue.

8

assessing probable cause was not objectively reasonable in light of the situation.
Moreover, I FIND that any reasonable officer in Deputy Shackelford’s position would
know that he or she lacked probable cause to make an arrest. Mr. Ratliff asked Deputy Shackelford
to leave his property. Mr. Ratliff made no aggressive move toward the deputy. He was, in fact, no
less than five feet away in making this request. Any reasonable officer would know that it was
unlawful to arrest an individual in Mr. Ratliff’s position. Deputy Shackelford would have been
“able to walk around [Mr. Ratliff] without difficulty.” Willingham v. Crooke, 40 Fed. Appx. 850,
852 (4th Cir. July 22, 2002) (unpublished) (discussing Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.
2001)).
Therefore, I DENY the defendants’ motion with respect to this issue. Deputy Shackelford
is not protected by qualified immunity for the plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest claim.
ii. Plaintiff Concedes that the Federal § 1983 Claims Against the Kanawha County
Sheriff’s Department and Kanawha County Commission Should be Dismissed
Mr. Ratliff concedes that his federal § 1983 claims should be dismissed against the
Kanawha County Sheriff’s Department and the Kanawha County Commission. (Pl.’s Resp. to
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. [Docket 32], at 16 (“Plaintiff concedes that the Kanawha County
Sheriff’s Department and the Kanawha County Commission should be dismissed as to Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims because the facts discovered in this case have not shown a governmental custom or
policy as the moving force behind the constitutional violations of Defendant Shackelford as
required for a § 1983 claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692-93 (1978).”).
Therefore, such aspect of the defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
iii. West Virginia Immunity as to Deputy Shackelford, Kanawha County Sheriff’s
Department, and Kanawha County Commission on State Constitutional Claims
9

Next, the defendants argue that they are immune from the plaintiff’s state constitutional
claims under West Virginia law. In West Virginia, “[a] public officer is entitled to qualified
immunity from civil damages for performance of discretionary functions where: (1) a trial court
finds the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, do not
demonstrate that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; or (2) a trial court finds that
the submissions of the parties could establish the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right
but further finds that it would be clear to any reasonable officer that such conduct was lawful in
the situation confronted.” Syl. pt. 6, City of Saint Albans v. Botkins, 719 S.E.2d 863 (W. Va. 2011).
This test is noticeably similar to that in Saucier and Pearson. 2
As to their state qualified immunity argument, the defendants merely contend that,
[u]nder both the Federal and West Virginia standards for qualified immunity, the
actions of the officer are analyzed under an ‘objectively reasonable’ standard to
determine whether a reasonable, similarly situated officer believed that his
conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. This analysis need not
be repeated, and for efficiency’s sake, the Defendants hereby incorporate by
reference, as if fully set forth herein, the analysis set forth in their arguments for
qualified immunity under the federal constitutional claims.
(Defs., J.S. Shackelford’s, Kanawha County Sheriff’s Department’s & Kanawha County

2

The defendants claim that West Virginia’s standard “for police officer qualified immunity is broader” than
the federal standard. (Defs., J.S. Shackelford, Kanawha County Sheriff’s Department’s & Kanawha County
Commission’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J. [Docket 28], at 16). In support of this contention,
the defendants quote the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Botkins, saying that “the question to determine
entitlement to qualified immunity in the absence of such wrongdoing centers on ‘whether an objectively reasonable
official, similarly situated to the defendant, could have believed that his conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the defendant at the time of
the allegedly wrongful conduct[.]” Botkins, 719 S.E.2d at 868-69.
However, upon reading this sentence in context, I find that the Botkins Court was not setting forth West
Virginia’s qualified immunity standard in making this statement, but was instead referring to its prior formulation of
its qualified immunity test in Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996), a case decided before Saucier.
The Court later holds that the standard for qualified immunity is the two-part test that I note above, explaining that
Saucier “keep[s] with the guidance the Court previously provided in Hutchison.” See Botkins, 719 S.E.2d at 870. In
any event, Deputy Shackelford’s conduct is so clearly outside the bounds of constitutional jurisprudence that he is not
immune from suit.

10

Commission’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J. [Docket 28], at 16). Thus, having
already analyzed those arguments above, I DENY the defendants’ motion with respect to their
state qualified immunity claims.
Therefore, in sum, the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 27] is
GRANTED in part, as to the federal § 1983 claims against the Kanawha County Sheriff’s
Department and the Kanawha County Commission, and DENIED in part, as to all other claims.
III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket 29]
The plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket 29] is DENIED.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket
27] is GRANTED in part, as to the federal § 1983 claims against the Kanawha County Sheriff’s
Department and the Kanawha County Commission, and DENIED in part, as to all other claims.
The plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket 29] is DENIED.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:

11

May 21, 2015