Patton v. Federal Bureau of Investigation et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 1 MOTION to Dismiss on the grounds explicitly addressed herein; the action against the government is dismissed without prejudice; and the action against the Sheriff is remanded to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 7/11/2014. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (taq)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
LARRY RODNEY PATTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:14-13347
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
and KANAWHA COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(“FBI”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, filed March 28, 2014, the Kanawha County Sheriff’s
office (“Sheriff”) motions for a more definite statement filed
May 6, 2014, and to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, filed the same day, and Mr.
Patton’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, or in the
alternative, to file a new amended complaint, filed May 22,
2014.
For reasons discussed more fully below, the claim
against the FBI will be treated as a claim against the
government.
See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515 (1952)
(Congress must explicitly authorize an agency to be sued in its
own name).
The text of the pro se complaint in its entirety is as
follows:
I Larry Rodney Patton am filing a claim against F.B.I.
and Kanawha Co. Sheriff Department Breeching (sic) a
Contract posting A $100,00.00 (sic) Reward for the
information I gave leading to the arrest and conviction to
the 2003 sniper case.
I gave Information 8-24-2003 on the person they
arrested in 3-2011 and he was convicted and sentenced in
2012.
The reason the F.B.I. denide (sic) me the reward was
they hadn’t charged anyone for the other two victims.
Prayer—Please grant me the reward.
Compl. 1-2.
I.
From the complaint and other filings in this case,
including those by counsel for the plaintiff whose appearance
has since been entered, the following allegations are made.
In August 2003, a sniper shot and killed three persons
in Kanawha County.
One of the victims was Jeanie Patton, the
daughter of plaintiff Larry Rodney Patton.
A $100,000 reward
was offered by the FBI and the Sheriff for information leading
to the arrest and conviction of the sniper.
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Mr. Patton alleges that on August 24, 2003, he gave
information to authorities about Shawn Lester, who he believed
to be the sniper.
Nearly eight years later, in March 2011, Mr.
Lester was arrested and charged with the three August 2003
murders.
In July 2012, as part of a plea agreement, Mr. Lester
pled guilty to one count of second-degree murder.
He was
sentenced to forty years in prison.
Mr. Patton alleges that the FBI refused to give him
the reward because they did not charge anyone for the murders of
the other two victims.
On March 27, 2014, Mr. Patton instituted
this action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
His
complaint alleges that the FBI and the Sheriff breached a
contract with him by refusing to pay the $100,000 reward,
despite his providing information leading to the arrest and
conviction of the sniper.
On March 27, 2014, the government
removed pursuant to 28 U.S. § 1442(a)(1).
As indicated, the government’s motion alleges the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
The Sheriff seeks a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e) and moves to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule
12(b)(6).
Mr. Patton has moved for leave to amend the complaint
or, in the alternative, to file a new amended complaint.
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II.
A.
The Governing Standards
1.
Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss for the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction may be presented in two ways:
First, it may be contended that a complaint simply fails to
allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be
based. In that event, all the facts alleged in the
complaint are assumed to be true and the plaintiff, in
effect, is afforded the same procedural protection as he
would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration. Second,
it may be contended that the jurisdictional allegations of
the complaint were not true. A trial court may then go
beyond the allegations of the complaint and in an
evidentiary hearing determine if there are facts to support
the jurisdictional allegations.
Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnote
omitted).
The first option is the most analogous for present
purposes.
In such a situation, the facts alleged by the
plaintiff are assumed to be true, giving him the same procedural
protection as he would be accorded by Rule 12(b)(6).
2.
Id.
Removal Under § 1442(a)(1)
As noted, the government removed under § 1442(a)(1).
Section 1442(a)(1) permits the government to remove a civil case
that is filed against an agency of the United States in state
court.
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
When a case is removed under §
1442, the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction applies.
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Palmer
v. City Nat’l Bank of W.Va., 498 F.3d 236, 236 (4th Cir. 2007).
Derivative jurisdiction requires the federal court’s
jurisdiction to mirror the jurisdiction of the state court prior
to removal.
Id.
When the state court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the federal court does not acquire it upon
removal, “even though in a like suit originally brought in
federal court, the court would have had jurisdiction.”
Smith v.
Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1998).
B.
Analysis
The government contends that Mr. Patton’s action
should be dismissed for the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction because the government has not waived its sovereign
immunity for suits brought in state court.
The government
further contends that, due to the doctrine of derivative
jurisdiction, the district court did not acquire jurisdiction
upon removal.
Mr. Patton has brought this action against the FBI and
the Sheriff.
Congress, however, has not authorized suits
against the FBI in its own name.
See Anderson v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp, 918 F.2d 1139, 1141 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing
Blackmar, 342 U.S. at 515 (1952) (Congress must authorize an
agency to be sued in its own name)); see also Jones v. FBI, 139
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F. Supp. 38, 41 (D. Md. 1956) (plaintiff’s claim against the FBI
must be considered as a claim against the government because
Congress has not authorized the FBI to be sued).
Therefore, as
noted at the outset, the action against the FBI must be treated
as one against the government.
The government enjoys sovereign immunity and may not
be sued unless authorized by Congress.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
United States v.
The Tucker Act authorizes
suit against the government for express and implied contract
claims.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a).
It vests exclusive jurisdiction
for these claims with the Court of Federal Claims when the
amount in controversy is greater than $10,000.
1346(a)(2), 1491(a).
See 28 U.S.C. §§
Inasmuch as Mr. Patton is suing to recover
more than $10,000, the Tucker Act requires litigation of his
claim against the FBI in the Court of Federal Claims.
See id.
In sum, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County lacked jurisdiction
to adjudicate the claim against the FBI.
As noted, this court’s jurisdiction is derivative of
the state court’s jurisdiction upon removal under § 1442(a)(1).
See Palmer, 498 F.3d at 246.
Inasmuch as the West Virginia
state court lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the
government, this court also lacks jurisdiction and acquired none
upon removal. See id.
The government is thus entitled to
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dismissal.
It is, accordingly ORDERED that the government’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) be, and hereby is,
granted.
When an action is removed under § 1442(a), the
district court may remand claims against non-federal
governmental parties to state court if it subsequently discovers
the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) (a district court may only remand a case removed under §
1442(a) when it discovers a defect in removal or lack of subject
matter jurisdiction); see also Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222,
239 (4th Cir. 1994); Bradshaw v. Town of Ceredo, No. 2:05-CV00644, 2005 WL 2487827 (S.D.W.V. Oct. 7, 2005) (remanding a
remaining claim against a non-federal governmental party when
the court lacked jurisdiction due to application of the
derivative jurisdiction doctrine).
Inasmuch as this action was
removed under § 1442(a)(1), and inasmuch further as the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim against the
government, it is ORDERED that the claim against the Sheriff be,
and hereby is, remanded to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
III.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it is ORDERED as
follows:
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1.
That the government’s motion to dismiss be, and
hereby is granted on the grounds explicitly addressed herein;
2.
That the action against the government be, and
hereby is, dismissed without prejudice; and
3.
That the action against the Sheriff be, and
hereby is, remanded to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
The Clerk is requested to transmit this written
opinion and order to all counsel of record and to any
unrepresented parties.
DATED: July 11, 2014
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
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