Riley v. American Medical Systems, Inc.

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying 15 MOTION by American Medical Systems, Inc. to Dismiss With Prejudice for Plaintiff Starla M. Riley's Failure to Comply with Pre-Trial Order #223; the plaintiff has 30 days from the entry of this Order to submit to AMS a completed PFS with verifications and authorizations; failure to comply with this Order may result in dismissal with prejudice upon motion by AMS, as more fully set forth herein. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 3/21/2017. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (ts)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
IN RE:

AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.,
PELVIC REPAIR SYSTEM
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

MDL No. 2325
______

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:

Starla M. Riley v. American Medical Systems, Inc.
Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-21376

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the court is defendant, American Medical Systems, Inc.’s,
(“AMS”) Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. [ECF No. 15]. The plaintiff has not
responded, and the deadline for responding has expired. Thus, this matter is ripe for
my review. For the reasons stated below, AMS’s Motion is DENIED.
I.

Background
This case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel

on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat
pelvic organ prolapse and stress urinary incontinence. In the seven MDLs, there are
over 60,000 cases currently pending, over 4,000 of which are in the AMS MDL, MDL
2325. Managing multidistrict litigation requires the court to streamline certain
litigation procedures in order to improve efficiency for the parties and the court. Some
of these management techniques simplify the parties’ discovery responsibilities.
Pretrial Order Number 223 (“PTO # 223”) provides that plaintiffs in 517 cases
in this MDL, including this case, were required to submit a Plaintiff Fact Sheet

(“PFS”) to act as interrogatory answers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 and
responses to requests for production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. See
PTO # 223 at ¶ B, No. 2:12-md-2325, entered Oct. 21, 2016 [ECF No. 3216]. Here, the
plaintiff failed to submit a completed PFS and AMS now moves for sanctions against
the plaintiff for failure to comply with PTO # 223. Specifically, AMS seeks dismissal
of the plaintiff’s case with prejudice.
II.

Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) allows a court to sanction a party for

failing to comply with discovery orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (stating that a
court “may issue further just orders” when a party “fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery”). Before levying a harsh sanction under Rule 37, such as
dismissal or default, a court must first consider the following four Wilson factors
identified by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals:
(1) Whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith; (2) the amount
of prejudice his noncompliance caused his adversary, which necessarily
includes an inquiry into the materiality of the evidence he failed to
produce; (3) the need for deterrence of the particular sort of
noncompliance; and (4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions.

Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir.
1989) (citing Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503–06 (4th Cir. 1977)).
In applying these factors to this case, I must be particularly cognizant of the
realities of multidistrict litigation and the unique problems an MDL judge faces.
Specifically, when handling seven MDLs containing thousands of individual cases,
case management becomes of utmost importance. See In re Phenylpropanolamine

2

Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing the “enormous”
task of an MDL court in “figur[ing] out a way to move thousands of cases toward
resolution on the merits while at the same time respecting their individuality”). I
must define rules for discovery and then strictly adhere to those rules, with the
purpose of ensuring that pretrial litigation flows as smoothly and efficiently as
possible. See id. at 1232 (“[T]he district judge must establish schedules with firm
cutoff dates if the coordinated cases are to move in a diligent fashion toward
resolution by motion, settlement, or trial.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “should be construed, administered, and employed
by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding”). In turn, counsel must collaborate with the court “in
fashioning workable programmatic procedures” and cooperate with these procedures
thereafter. In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1231–32.
Pretrial orders—and the parties’ compliance with those orders and the
deadlines set forth therein—“are the engine that drives disposition on the merits.” Id.
at 1232. A “willingness to resort to sanctions” in the event of noncompliance can
ensure that the engine remains in tune, resulting in better administration of the
vehicle of multidistrict litigation. Id.; see also Freeman v. Wyeth, 764 F.3d 806, 810
(8th Cir. 2014) (“The MDL judge must be given ‘greater discretion’ to create and
enforce deadlines in order to administrate the litigation effectively. This necessarily
includes the power to dismiss cases where litigants do not follow the court’s orders.”).

3

III.

Discussion
Pursuant to PTO # 223, the plaintiff was required to submit a completed PFS

by November 21, 2016. The purpose of the PFS, as was the case in In re

Phenylpropanolamine, is “to give each defendant the specific information necessary
to defend the case against it . . . [because] without this device, a defendant [is] unable
to mount its defense because it [has] no information about the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s injuries outside the allegations of the complaint.” 460 F.3d at 1234. To this
end, PTO # 223 provided that “[a]ny plaintiff who fails to comply with this PTO may
be subject to a substantial sanction, including dismissal with prejudice.”
PTO # 223 at ¶ E. As of the date of this Order, the plaintiff has not submitted a PFS,
making it 120 days late.
AMS asks the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. The plaintiff
did not respond to AMS’s motion to dismiss. Applying the Wilson factors to these
facts, and bearing in mind the unique context of multidistrict litigation, I conclude
that although recourse under Rule 37 is justified, the plaintiff should be afforded one
more chance to comply with discovery before further sanctions are imposed.
The first factor, bad faith, is difficult to ascertain, given that the plaintiff did
not respond. The plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, failed to comply with
PTO # 223 by timely submitting a PFS, failed to respond to AMS’s motion to dismiss,
and as of today have provided no indication that she intends to submit a PFS. The
fact that these failures were blatant and in full knowledge of the court’s orders and
discovery deadlines leads me to weigh the first factor against the plaintiff. See In re

4

Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863, 867 (8th
Cir. 2007) (“While not contumacious, perhaps, this is a blatant disregard for the
deadlines and procedure imposed by the court, [and t]herefore, we conclude that the
[plaintiffs] did not act in good faith.”).
The second factor—prejudice caused by noncompliance—also leans toward the
order of sanctions. Without a PFS, AMS is “unable to mount its defense because it
[has] no information about the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s injuries outside the
allegations of the complaint.” In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1234.
Furthermore, because AMS has had to divert its attention away from timely plaintiffs
and onto this case the delay has unfairly affected the progress of the remaining
plaintiffs in MDL 2325.
The adverse effect on the management of the MDL as a whole segues to the
third factor, the need to deter this sort of noncompliance. When parties fail to comply
with deadlines provided in pretrial orders, a domino effect develops, resulting in the
disruption of other MDL cases. In addition, the court expects to have to evaluate and
dispose of a significant number of motions similar to the one at bar, thereby directing
its time and resources to noncompliant plaintiffs at the expense of other plaintiffs in
this MDL. This cumbersome pattern goes against the purpose of MDL procedure, and
I must deter any behavior that would allow it to continue. See H.R. Rep. No. 90-1130,
at 1 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1901 (stating that the purpose of
establishing MDLs is to “assure the uniform and expeditious treatment” of the
included cases).

5

Application of the first three factors demonstrates that this court is justified in
sanctioning the plaintiff. However, application of the fourth factor—the effectiveness
of less drastic sanctions—counsels against the relief sought by AMS. Rather than
imposing harsh sanctions at this time, the court opts for a lesser sanction and allows
the plaintiff one more chance to comply with PTO # 223 subject to dismissal with
prejudice, upon motion, if she fails to do so. This course of action is consistent with
PTO # 223, which warned the plaintiff of the possibility of dismissal with prejudice
upon failure to timely submit a PFS.
Alternative lesser sanctions, such as the ones outlined in Rule 37(b)(2)(i–iv),
are impracticable, and therefore ineffective, in the context of an MDL containing over
4,000 cases. The court cannot spare its already limited resources enforcing and
monitoring sanctions that are qualified by the individual circumstances of each case,
nor would it be fair for the court to place this responsibility on AMS. Therefore,
considering the administrative and economic realities of multidistrict litigation, I
conclude that affording the plaintiff a final chance to comply with discovery, subject
to dismissal with prejudice if they fail to do so, is a “just order” under Rule 37 and in
line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating
that the Rules “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and
the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding”).

6

IV.

Conclusion
It is ORDERED that AMS’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice [ECF No. 15] is

DENIED. It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff has 30 days from the entry of this
Order to submit to AMS a completed PFS with verifications and authorizations. The
plaintiff is reminded that the PFS and other forms relevant to participating in this
MDL

are

available

at

http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/MDL/amsinc/forms.html.

Information on where to submit the PFS is also available on the court’s website.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in dismissal with prejudice upon motion
by AMS.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented party
ENTER:

7

March 21, 2017