United States of America v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting the United States of America's 6 MOTION to Substitute Proposed Consent Decree; directing that the United States file on or before 5/26/2015 a revised memorandum in support that explains the strength of it s case, the nature of the proposed decree, and those considerations relevant to determining whether it is fair, adequate and reasonable, including the method by which the civil penalty was calculated and the efforts undertaken, and materials consider ed, in arriving at the proposed settlement; further directing as more fully set forth herein; directing counsel for the defendant to notice an appearance herein by 5/15/2015; counsel for the United States is directed to serve a copy of this memorandu m opinion and order upon counsel for DuPont forthwith by 5/1/2015; once counsel for the defendant has noticed an appearance, he or she must forthwith file a certificate of authority disclosing that the defendants signatory on the proposed consent decree is duly authorized to bind the corporation on those matters set forth in the accord. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 4/24/2015. (cc: counsel or record; unrepresented parties) (tmh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:14-25143

E.I. Du PONT de NEMOURS
AND COMPANY
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are the United States= unopposed motions (1) to
enter the proposed consent decree, filed October 17, 2014, and
(2) to substitute the proposed consent decree, filed November
12, 2014.
In seeking to substitute the proposed consent decree
with a revised copy submitted November 12, 2014, the United
States seeks merely to correct a single typographical error.

In

paragraph 64 on page 26, there is an incorrect reference to an
“SLM Unit”; “SLM” should instead be “SAR” Unit.

The error was

noticed by DuPont’s counsel, who has not appeared herein, but
who “contacted the United States’ counsel and identified . . .
[the] typographical error . . . .”

(Mot. at 1).

It is ORDERED

that the motion to substitute the proposed consent decree be,
and hereby is, granted.

I.

A.

The Underlying Conduct

E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (“DuPont”) operates
a chemical production facility in Belle, West Virginia (“Belle
Facility”).

The Belle Facility is located on a plot of

approximately 700 acres of land along the Kanahwa River.
roughly eight miles east of Charleston.

It is

Approximately 50

individuals live within 0.2 miles of the Belle Facility, which
is located in an area that consists of industrial, commercial,
and residential land use.

The Belle Facility produces,

processes, handles, stores, and disposes of “hazardous
substances and extremely hazardous substances” within the
meaning of Section 112(r)(1) and (3) of the Clean Air Act
(“Act”).

(Compl. ¶ 42).
During all relevant times, the Belle Facility had

eight regulated processes under title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, which deals with environmental protection.

For

these processes, DuPont was required to submit a risk management
plan (“RMP”) to certain federal regulators.

Two of the

regulated processes at the Belle Facility were the Sulfuric Acid

2

Recovery unit (“SAR Unit”) and the Phosgene operations
(“Phosgenation Process”) at the Small Lots Manufacturing unit
(“SLM Unit”).

The SAR Unit and the Phosgenation Process at the

SLM Unit ceased operations in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
This action centers primarily on three releases of
toxic substances.

First, on January 17, 2010, a production unit

at the Belle Facility was restarted after extended maintenance.
Methyl chloride was one substance produced in a reaction vessel
in the unit.

The substance was accidentally released when it

flowed through a blown ruptured disc.

It also escaped from the

weep hole in a vent line which allowed toxic gases to accumulate
into an unsafe location in the building where the process was
housed.

The release triggered an alarm designed to notify Belle

Facility operators of an over pressurization.

The alarm was

activated in the Belle Facility’s control room.

The methyl

chloride release and alarm, however, continued for five days
from and after January 17, 2010, before the defendant adequately
responded to it.

The defendant was aware of the release by 5:00

a.m. on January 22, 2010.

It did not notify the West Virginia

Department of Environmental Protection Spill Hotline until 2:15
p.m.

Approximately 2,045 pounds of methyl chloride escaped.

The unit continues to operate.

3

Second, in the early morning hours on January 23,
2010, a release of oleum, a concentrated form of sulfuric acid
produced by the SAR unit, occurred.

According to the United

States’ complaint, “Oleum is an extremely corrosive substance
that causes severe eye and skin burns and is deadly if inhaled.
It is reactive with metals and may react to form explosive
hydrogen gas.”

(Compl. ¶ 64).

Over the passage of time, the

oleum corroded piping in the SAR Unit and created a hole.
substance then escaped through the hole.

The

Workers discovered the

resulting vapor cloud shortly after 7:00 a.m. on January 23,
2010.

Approximately 22 pounds of oleum was released into the

environment.

The SAR unit process is said not to have been

restarted after this event.
An oleum leak had previously occurred at the Belle
Facility on January 27, 2009.

That incident resulted in a

company recommendation to conduct regular maintenance piping
inspections.

The recommendation was not carried out for the

line that leaked.

DuPont has no records of performing visual

external inspections or thickness testing of that piping.
Third, on January 23, 2010, phosgene was released.
Phosgene is one of the raw materials used in the SLM
Unit to produce five isocyanate intermediate products for

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pesticides.
cylinders.

The phosgene was received and stored in 2000 pound
The United States’ complaint alleges as follows:

Phosgene is an industrial toxin once used as a
chemical weapon in World War I. Phosgene is a severe
pulmonary irritant and exposure [that] causes a
buildup of fluid in the lungs that may not materialize
until hours after exposure. Phosgene is highly toxic
because it contains a lethal concentration equal to or
less than 200 parts per million (“ppm”) in air when
administered via inhalation for one hour. A lethal
concentration of phosgene is five ppm for one hour of
exposure. Exposure to 20 ppm for five minutes may be
fatal.
(Compl. ¶ 75).
The subject release involved at least two pounds of
phosgene.

The cause of the release was the failure of a braided

stainless steel transfer hose in the SLM Unit.

The transfer

hose was connected to a one-ton cylinder of phosgene.

The

phosgene cylinders were stored in a single story, partially
walled structure called the phosgene shed, which was open to the
atmosphere.

Inside each hose was a liner made of Teflon.

During use, the Phosgene cylinders were connected to
other equipment with the transfer hoses.

As one cylinder

empties, an alarm sounds and the operator closes the valves to
the empty cylinder and opens the valves to a second full
cylinder.

The transfer hoses connected to the empty cylinder

are then purged of the Phosgene with nitrogen.

5

On the day prior to the phosgene release, operators
were experiencing flow problems with one of the cylinders.

They

began switching between the cylinders to avoid disruption to the
chemical process.

During the course of switching cylinders, the

valves were closed on a partially full cylinder.
the transfer hose was not purged.

Unfortunately,

This allowed pressure to

build as the liquid phosgene was undergoing thermal expansion
due to ambient air temperature increase.
Consequently, sometime between 1:45 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.
on January 23, 2010, a worker was inspecting one of the
cylinders when the pressurized transfer hose suddenly burst. The
worker was sprayed across the chest and face with a lethal dose
of phosgene.

Another worker was exposed to the phosgene gas and

a third was potentially exposed.

The worker receiving the fatal

dose was transported to a local hospital.

His condition

progressively deteriorated and he perished the next day.
The phosgene release occurred approximately 6 hours
after the oleum release.

It happened approximately 21 hours

after DuPont contends that it learned of the methyl chloride
release.

DuPont’s standard operating procedure (“SOP”) required

replacement of phosgene hoses every two months.

The failed

transfer hose had not been replaced for over 7 months.

6

A recommendation from experts employed by DuPont,
dating to 1987, urged the use of Monel, a strong metal alloy
lined hose, for phosgene service.
to have been ignored.

That recommendation appears

DuPont had other opportunities to prevent

an accidental phosgene release.

For example, in 2004, it

developed a plan to fully enclose the phosgene shed and equip it
with a scrubber by 2005.

This plan also was apparently ignored.

In 2011, DuPont shut down the phosgene operation at the Belle
Facility.
Between January 25, 2010, and September 2011, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), the
United States Chemical Safety Board (“CSB”) and the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) investigated the
circumstances that led to the methyl chloride, oleum and
phosgene releases.

The CSB found that the releases were

preventable incidents caused by deficiencies in plant safety
management systems relating to maintenance and inspections,
alarm recognition and management, accident investigation,
emergency response and communications, and hazard recognition.
DuPont paid a $43,000 administrative penalty to resolve the OSHA
citations it received.

EPA also directed DuPont to address

certain violations, which it accomplished in December 2011.

7

In addition to the aforementioned incidents, the
complaint alleges other misconduct by DuPont at the Belle
Facility.

At 3:20 a.m., on May 4, 2006, a disc ruptured in the

ethyl carbamoyl phosphate process in building 114 at the Belle
Facility.

Over a period of two to three days, approximately

8,100 pounds of ethyl chloride (“ECl”), a listed hazardous
substance with a 100 pound reportable quantity, were vented to
the atmosphere.

The release migrated off-site.

DuPont did not

discover the release until over two days later, on May 6, 2006,
at 8:00 a.m.

Despite that knowledge, it failed to notify the

National Response Center (“NRC”) of the release until 12:21 p.m.
on May 6, 2006.
Second, on December 9, 2006, there were three releases
of trimethylamine at 4:30 p.m., 5:45 p.m. and 7:20 p.m., from
the methylamine unit at the Belle Facility.

Trimethylamine is a

listed hazardous substance with a reportable quantity of 100
pounds.

Citizens in Charleston complained of odors between 6:00

p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on December 9, 2009.

DuPont, however, failed

to notify the NRC of the release until December 10, 2006 at 1:56
p.m.

The releases totaled 604 pounds.
Third, at an unknown hour on December 22, 2008, the

phosphoric acid bulk storage tank located at the water treatment

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plant at the Belle Facility was being loaded from a transport
trailer with a delivery of 4,249 gallons of 35% phosphoric acid.
Phosphoric acid is a listed hazardous substance with a
reportable quantity of 5,000 pounds.

At 1:46 p.m., a DuPont

employee noticed that a phosphoric acid release was occurring
and the employee notified Belle Facility personnel.

The leak

was contained by 2:15 p.m. but not before it migrated offsite.
DuPont did not notify the NRC until 5:05 p.m.

The release

resulted in 5,412 pounds of phosphoric acid escaping.
Fourth, from September 3 through September 17, 2010,
there were approximately 10 alarms triggered in the total
organic compound (“TOC”) analyzer at the Belle Facility.

Those

alarms indicate organic compounds in the water stream
discharging from the Belle Facility into the Kanawha River.

At

approximately 2:30 p.m. on September 21, 2010, DuPont took
samples at the outfall to the Kanawha River.

The results showed

the total organic compounds level to be 55 ppm.

Samples taken

at 4:30 p.m. detected the presence of methanol.

Methanol is a

listed hazardous substance with a reportable quantity of 5,000
pounds.

DuPont failed to notify the NRC until 10:35 p.m.

release totaled 160,000 pounds.

9

The

It is additionally alleged that DuPont was required to
maintain copies of any material safety data sheets (“MSDSs”)
regarding hazardous chemicals to which the Belle Facility’s
employees were exposed.

During 2007, DuPont had present at the

Belle Facility at least 52,800 pounds of 2,2-azodi
(asobutyronitrile), 1,001,350 pounds of 2,4-dimethyl-6-tertbutyl-phenol, 675,000 pounds of amide and imide polymers,
2,273,000 pounds of ammonium bisulfate, 15,000 pounds of
chloroform, 15,000 pounds of cyclohexanecarbonitrile, 1, 1azobis, 20,033 pounds of diethylcarbomethoxyphosphate, 1,189,000
pounds of methylacrylate polymers, and 15,000 pounds of
pentanenitrile, 2,4-dimethyl, 2,2-azobis.
DuPont was required to submit to various agencies, and
the local fire department, by March 1, 2008, an Emergency and
Hazardous Chemical Inventory Form identifying and discussing
these substances.

DuPont failed, however, to even reflect the

aforementioned hazardous substances on the applicable form.
B.

The Complaint
On August 27, 2014, the United States instituted this

action against DuPont seeking the assessment of civil penalties
and injunctive relief pursuant to section 113(b) of the Clean
Air Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), Section 325 of the
10

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”), 42
U.S.C. § 11045, and Section 109(c) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(c).
The United States alleges violations of sections
112(r)(1) and 112(r)(7) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) and
(r)(7), violations of the emergency release notification
requirements of section 103 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603, and
section 304 of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11004, and violations of
certain requirements of section 312 of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11022.
The United States’ complaint contains eleven counts arising out
of the aforementioned misconduct:
COUNT 1: Failure to Ensure That Equipment Complies
With Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
Engineering Practices in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §
7412(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2);
COUNT 2: Failure to Update and Revalidate Process
Hazard Analysis in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)
and 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(f);
COUNT 3: Failure to Develop and Implement Operating
Procedures in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7) and
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) and (c);
COUNT 4: Failure to Comply with Inspection and
Testing for Mechanical Integrity in Violation of 42
U.S.C. § 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d);
COUNT 5: Failure to Comply with Equipment
Deficiencies for Mechanical Integrity in Violation of
42 U.S.C. § 112(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e);

11

COUNT 6: Failure to Develop and Implement an Adequate
Emergency Response Program in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §
7412(r)(7) and 40 C.F.R. § 68.95;
COUNT 7: Methyl Chloride Release: Failure to Identify
Hazards Which May Result from Such Releases Using
Appropriate Hazard Assessment Techniques, To Design
and Maintain a Safe Facility Taking Such Steps as are
Necessary to Prevent Releases, and to Minimize the
Consequences of Accidental Releases Which do Occur in
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 112(r)(1);
COUNT 8: Failure to Identify Hazards Which May Result
from Such Releases Using Appropriate Hazard Assessment
Techniques, To Design and Maintain a Safe Facility
Taking Such Steps as are Necessary to Prevent
Releases, and to Minimize the Consequences of
Accidental Releases Which do Occur in Violation of 42
U.S.C. § 112(r)(1);
COUNT 9: Failure to comply with CERCLA Section 103(a);
COUNT 10: Failure to comply with EPCRA Sections 304(a)
and 304(c); and
COUNT 11: Failure to comply with EPCRA Section 312;
The remedy sought by the United States for these
multiple violations is stated only generally, in essence, as
injunctive relief coupled with the assessment of a civil penalty
of up to $32,500 per day for each violation occurring between
March 15, 2004, and January 12, 2009, and up to $37,500 per day
for each violation occurring thereafter.

12

C.

The Proposed Consent Decree

On August 27, 2014, the United States filed a proposed
consent decree covering the claims in this action.

It requested

that no action be taken pending conclusion of the public comment
period on October 3, 2014.

On October 17, 2014, the United

States moved for entry of the proposed consent decree.

As

noted, on November 12, 2014, it moved to substitute the proposed
consent decree, which the court has allowed.

In sum, the

proposed consent decree requires DuPont (1) to pay a $1,275,000
civil penalty to resolve the United States’ claims, and (2) as
observed by the United States, “to perform injunctive relief
including enhanced training, formal reviews of its safety
procedures, and annual reporting to resolve the Plaintiffs’
civil claims described in the complaint.”

(Memo. in Supp. at

2).
The memorandum in support of the proposed consent
decree is brief, spanning only five and one quarter pages in
length.

It is composed almost entirely of prefatory language

and boilerplate.

For example, respecting the all-important

consideration of fairness and the absence of collusion, the
United States conclusorily asserts as follows:
Through months of arm’s length negotiations, the
13

parties had the opportunity to explore each other’s
positions regarding Defendant’s Clean Air Act, CERCLA
and EPCRA compliance issues at Defendant’s facility.
Negotiations were based on information presented in
Region III EPA’s numerous inspection reports for the
facility, Defendant’s responses to EPA information
requests, and further information obtained by the
Environmental Protection Agency and shared with the
defendant during the settlement negotiations.
(Id. at 4).
DuPont has consented to entry of the proposed consent
decree without further notice.

Indeed, counsel has failed to

even notice an appearance on DuPont’s behalf.

II.

Our court of appeals has observed that Aa consent
decree >has elements of both judgment and contract,= and is
subject to >judicial approval and oversight= generally not present
in other private settlements.@ Szaller v. American Nat. Red
Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Smyth v.
Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Local
No. 93, Int'l Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 519 (1986); United States v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237 n.10 (1975) (citation omitted); Alexander
v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 1996).

14

It has expanded upon this principle in Smyth,
observing that a court is expected, when presented with a
proposed consent decree, to scrutinize the accord and make
certain findings prior to entry:
Because it is entered as an order of the court, the
terms of a consent decree must also be examined by the
court. As Judge Rubin noted in United States v.
Miami,
Because the consent decree does not merely
validate a compromise but, by virtue of its
injunctive provisions, reaches into the
future and has continuing effect, its terms
require more careful scrutiny. Even when it
affects only the parties, the court should.
. . examine it carefully to ascertain not
only that it is a fair settlement but also
that it does not put the court's sanction on
and power behind a decree that violates
Constitution, statute, or jurisprudence.
664 F.2d at 441 (Rubin, J., concurring). In other
words, a court entering a consent decree must examine
its terms to ensure they are fair and not unlawful.
Smyth, 282 F.3d at 280.
The standards governing consideration of a proposed
consent decree are described further by United States v. North
Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 581 (4th Cir. 1999):
In considering whether to enter a proposed consent
decree, a district court should [1] be guided by the
general principle that settlements are encouraged.
Nevertheless, a district court should not blindly
accept the terms of a proposed settlement. See Flinn
v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir.1975).
15

Rather, before entering a consent decree the court
must satisfy itself that [2] the agreement Ais fair,
adequate, and reasonable@ and [3] Ais not illegal, a
product of collusion, or against the public interest.@
United States v. Colorado, 937 F.2d 505, 509 (10th
Cir. 1991). In considering the fairness and adequacy
of a proposed settlement, the court must assess the
strength of the plaintiff's case. See Flinn, 528 F.2d
at 1172-73. While this assessment does not require the
court to conduct Aa trial or a rehearsal of the trial,@
the court must take the necessary steps to ensure that
it is able to reach Aan informed, just and reasoned
decision.@ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
particular, the Acourt should consider the extent of
discovery that has taken place, the stage of the
proceedings, the want of collusion in the settlement
and the experience of plaintiffs' counsel who
negotiated the settlement.@ Carson v. American Brands,
Inc., 606 F.2d 420, 430 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(Winter, Circuit Judge, dissenting), adopted by Carson
v. American Brands, Inc., 654 F.2d 300, 301 (4th Cir.
1981) (en banc)(per curiam).
Id. at 581 (emphasis supplied).

III.

The allegations in this action are quite serious.

For

example, the United States points to a number of preventable
releases of hazardous substances, multiple failures to report
the same, and the death of at least one worker due to safety and
maintenance lapses.

In the face of these allegations, the

brevity of the United States’ written offering in support of the
proposed consent decree is perplexing.
16

Aside from that

observation, the minimal offering precludes the court from
conducting the analysis required by controlling precedent.

For

instance, the court is unaware of the regulator’s basis for
arriving at the chosen civil penalty.

The court is also unable

to ascertain the strength of the United States’ case against
DuPont and the efforts undertaken, and the information
considered, by both sides in arriving at the proposed accord.
In comparison, the court notes that the last consent
decree it entered, in the case of United States v. Alpha Natural
Resources, Inc., No 2:14-11609 (S.D. W. Va.), was accompanied by
a 29-page memorandum in support.

Attached to the motion to

enter the proposed consent decree were three declarations,
including one by the Lead Environmental Scientist in Region III
of the EPA.

That declaration alone, without considering

reference to its handling of public comments, covered
approximately thirty pages.

Several pages were devoted to

discussing calculation of the civil penalty in that case.
The court declines at this point to reject the
proposed consent decree.
modifying it.

It is also precluded by law from

In an effort to properly develop the matter,

however, such that the court may appropriately discharge its
duty to pass on the proposal, it is ORDERED that the United
States be, and hereby is, directed to file on or before May 26,
17

2015, a revised memorandum in support that explains the strength
of its case, the nature of the proposed consent decree, and
those considerations relevant to determining whether it is fair,
adequate and reasonable, including the method by which the civil
penalty was calculated and the efforts undertaken, and materials
considered, in arriving at the proposed settlement.

It is

further ORDERED as follows:
1.

That the United States be, and hereby is, directed to
provide an inventory of the number and nature of the
various per diem violations applicable to the claims
alleged in the complaint; and

2.

That the United States be, and hereby is, directed to
disclose whether the remediation steps to be taken
under the proposed consent decree, or any of them, are
already, absent the proposed consent decree, an
obligation imposed by statute or regulation.
The revised memorandum in support must also address

the following matters:
Citation
Page 3, ¶ 4

Matter Raised
This provision should also require any
successor, assignee, parent, subsidiary, or
like transferee, subsequently exercising
authority and control over the Belle Facility,
to expressly assume in writing all of the
obligations imposed by the proposed consent
decree, with such written agreement to be
delivered to the EPA at least 30 days prior to
any such transfer.
18

Page 6, ¶ 11

Passim

Page 10, ¶ 15

Page 12, ¶ 22

Page 15, ¶ 31

The first sentence of this paragraph states:
“As of June 2011, Defendant has and will
continue to permanently cease operations of the
SAR Unit and the Phosgenation Process at the
Facility.” (Prop. Consent Dec. at 6 (emphasis
added)). The second sentence of this paragraph
states that DuPont “has no plan to resume
operations of the SAR Unit or the Phosgenation
Process at the Facility.” (Id. (emphasis
added)). It is thus unclear if DuPont will
permanently discontinue these two production
components. Additionally, the parties should
advise what procedures will be necessary if
either the SAR Unit or the Phosgenation Process
is proposed for reignition in the future.
At various points in the proposed accord,
certain reporting obligations continue only for
the first and second anniversaries of the
effective date of the proposed consent decree.
The parties should discuss the basis for
choosing to limit temporally the reporting
obligations and explain why the reporting
obligations were not imposed on an annual basis
up to the time the proposed consent decree is
terminated.
The second sentence of this paragraph provides
that certain “certification reports [at
paragraphs 12.a, 13.a, and 14.e] . . . are not
subject to review and approval . . . .” The
parties should explain why those reports are
excepted.
The final sentence of this paragraph mentions
that a certain “certification requirement does
not apply to emergency or similar notifications
where compliance would be impractical.” (Prop.
Consent Dec. at 12). In its present form, the
court is unable to ascertain the precise scope
of this carve out. The parties are directed to
further elaborate upon their intentions
respecting this provision.
It is stated in this paragraph that “The United
States may, in the unreviewable exercise of its
discretion, reduce or waive stipulated
penalties otherwise due it under this Consent
Decree.” (Prop. Consent Dec. at 15). The
parties should provide to the court the name or
position of the individual, or individuals, who
19

are vested with the necessary discretion to
accomplish the reduction or waiver.
Additionally, inasmuch as the court may have need to
schedule a hearing in this matter depending upon the materials
furnished in compliance with this order, it is further ORDERED
that counsel for the defendant be, and hereby is, directed to
notice an appearance herein on or before May 15, 2015.

Counsel

for the United States is thus directed to serve a copy of this
memorandum opinion and order upon counsel for DuPont forthwith
and no later than May 1, 2015.

The court contemplates setting a

hearing on this matter following receipt of the aforementioned
materials.
Once counsel for defendant has noticed an appearance,
he or she must forthwith file a certificate of authority
disclosing that the defendant’s signatory on the proposed
consent decree is duly authorized to bind the corporation on
those matters set forth in the accord.
The Clerk is requested to transmit this written
opinion and order to all counsel of record and to any
unrepresented parties.
DATED: April 24, 2015
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
20