Miller v. Colvin

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER the 14 Proposed Findings and Recommendation are adopted and incorporated herein; the plaintiff's 11 motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied; the Commissioner's 12 motion for judgment on the pleading s is granted; the Commissioner's final decision is affirmed; judgment is granted in favor of the Commissioner; and this civil action is dismissed and stricken from the docket. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 3/31/2016. (cc: counsel of record; U.S. Magistrate judge) (skh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
ZACHARY RYAN MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 14-29568

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are the objections filed on February 24, 2016,
by plaintiff Zachary Ryan Miller to the magistrate judge’s
proposed findings and recommendation.
I.
On December 11, 2014, plaintiff instituted this action
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
By standing order this action was referred to the
Honorable Omar J. Aboulhosn, United States Magistrate Judge.

On

February 12, 2016, the magistrate judge filed his Proposed
Findings and Recommendation ("PF&R").

In the PF&R, the

magistrate judge recommends that the Commissioner's final
decision be affirmed and this matter dismissed from the docket.

On February 24, 2016, plaintiff timely filed his
objections to the PF&R.

Plaintiff objects to the magistrate

judge’s conclusion that the ALJ adequately considered and
weighed the opinion of one of plaintiff’s treating physicians,
Dr. Kathryn Worthington, and contends that the reasons given by
the ALJ for discounting Dr. Worthington’s assessment were
insufficient.
II.
Every medical opinion reviewed by the ALJ must be
considered in accordance with the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).

Further, under the treating

physician rule, an ALJ must generally give relatively more
weight to the medical opinions of a claimant’s treating
physician when determining whether a claimant is disabled.

See

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c); Russell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 F.
App’x 163, 164 (4th Cir. 2011).

Indeed, a treating physician’s

opinions concerning the “nature and severity” of a claimant’s
impairments are to be given “controlling weight” if they are
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and . . . not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case record[.]”
C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).

2

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Even if a treating physician’s opinion is ultimately
adjudged not to be entitled to controlling weight, our court of
appeals has explained that “the value of the opinion must be
weighed and the ALJ must consider: (1) the physician's length of
treatment of the claimant, (2) the . . . frequency of
examination, (3) the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, (4) the support of the physician's opinion
afforded by the medical evidence of record; (5) the consistency
of the opinion with the record as a whole[,] and (6) the
specialization of the treating physician.”

Burch v. Apfel, 9 F.

App'x 255, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).
III.
A.
The sole issue before the court is whether the
decision denying plaintiff’s claim for benefits is supported by
substantial evidence.

See 45 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial

evidence is evidence “which a reasoning mind would accept as
sufficient to support a particular conclusion.”
Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1972).

Blalock v.
“It consists of

more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance.”

Id. (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368

F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996)).

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In this case, Dr. Worthington’s final mental health
assessment (the “mental assessment”), filled out on July 29,
2013, received less than controlling weight from the ALJ.
Transcript at 20-21.

See

The ALJ concluded that more detailed

treatment reports in the record showed that plaintiff’s
psychological health had improved markedly during treatment,
whereas Dr. Worthington opined in her July 29 assessment, with
little explanation for the change, that plaintiff was suffering
from marked and severe psychological difficulties.

See

Transcript at 21 (citing Transcript at 433-35).
B.
Dr. Worthington began treating plaintiff in 2010 for
depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder, and panic
attacks.

See Transcript at 266, 269, 311, 313, 392-412.

The

record indicates that Dr. Worthington examined plaintiff every
few months.

See Transcript at 349, 350, 378, 392-93.

As the ALJ observed, Dr. Worthington’s examinations
noted improvements in plaintiff’s psychological health over the
course of treatment.
372, 374.

See Transcript at 348, 351, 360, 362, 368,

Thus, on February 20, 2012, Dr. Worthington observed

that treatment was proving “helpful and effective” for
plaintiff.

See Transcript at 349.

On March 20, 2012, Dr.

Worthington observed that plaintiff’s “mood [was] pretty good.”
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See Transcript at 350.
mood remained “stable.”

On May 5, 2012, she recorded that his
See Transcript at 354.

On September

27, 2012, she recorded that plaintiff was “doing good,” and
again observed that treatment was proving effective.
Transcript at 378.

In February of 2013, Dr. Worthington

reported that overall plaintiff felt “happy.”
399-401.

See

See Transcript at

These improvements manifested in a number of ways --

for instance, plaintiff had been engaging more frequently than
before in social activities, see Transcript 20, had started to
date, see Transcript 20-21, and was responding well to his
prescription for the anti-depression medication Zoloft, see
Transcript at 19-21, 386-91, 427.
Dr. Worthington’s observations that plaintiff was
responding well to treatment are corroborated by other medical
evidence in the record.

Dr. Leah Hopkins treated plaintiff over

the course of several years, from mid-2008 to late 2012.

Dr.

Hopkins’ assessments coincided with Dr. Worthington’s, and
indicated general improvements in plaintiff’s mental health.
Thus, as late as October 29, 2012, Dr. Hopkins considered that
plaintiff had a “fair” prognosis, see Transcript at 431, and
observed that he had “no new complaints,” see Transcript at 428.
On July 29, 2013, Dr. Worthington filled out a form
“Mental Assessment of Ability to do Work Related Activities,”
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the aforementioned “mental assessment.”
36.

See Transcript at 433-

In that document, Dr. Worthington indicated that “the

p[atient] has severe anxiety[,] social phobia[,]” and obsessive
compulsive disorder.

Transcript at 434.

She concluded that

plaintiff’s psychological ailments would cause moderate
difficulties in his ability to deal with the public, use
judgment, interact with supervisors, and complete a normal work
day and work week without interruption from psychological
symptoms.

Id.

Dr. Worthington further opined that plaintiff’s

anxiety and social phobia would “distract him when he would be
attempting to learn a job,” and that his “obsessive compulsive
disorder . . . causes him to get stuck at some points of a
task.”

Id.
C.
Plaintiff was entitled to have the opinion of Dr.

Worthington, one of his treating physicians, receive controlling
weight, as long as it was well-supported by, and not
inconsistent with, other evidence in the record.
§ 416.927(c)(2).

See 20 C.F.R.

As noted, the ALJ concluded that Dr.

Worthington’s report was inconsistent with evidence of
plaintiff’s improved condition, and therefore declined to give
the report controlling weight when assessing plaintiff’s
residual capacity to engage in work.
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See Transcript at 17.

It is the duty of the ALJ to resolve any conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence, see Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990), and to indicate on the record “the
weight given to all relevant evidence.”
724 F.2d 231, 233 (4th Cir. 1984).

Gordon v. Schweiker,

The decision to give a

treating physician’s opinion less than controlling weight must
be explained, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c); Russell, 440 F. App’x
at 164; Burch, 9 F. App'x at 259–60, and in cases where the ALJ
fails to do so, courts have remanded for further proceedings.
See, e.g., Murphy v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 1987)
(remand where ALJ accepted one doctor’s testimony over that of
another with “little or no indication

. . . [or] explanation”

why); Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 533-34 (4th
Cir. 1998) (same).

When denying an application, the ALJ’s

decision must contain specific reasons, supported by the
evidence in the case record, for the weight given to a treating
physician’s medical opinion, and must be sufficiently specific
to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight given and
the reasons why.

61 Fed. Reg. 34,490, 34,492 (July 2, 1996).

Upon review of the record, the court concludes that
the ALJ here gave “good reasons . . . for the weight [he] g[a]ve
[plaintiff’s] treating source's opinion,” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2), and his analysis was thorough, detailed, and

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supported by evidence in the record.

Because substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, the court concludes
that it should be upheld.
To begin, the ALJ explained that Dr. Worthington’s
opinion was entitled to less than controlling weight because it
was inconsistent with Dr. Worthington’s own treatment notes.
Transcript at 19-21.

As previously stated, Dr. Worthington

found plaintiff to be consistently improving, albeit with
occasional setbacks, see Transcript at 354.

Indeed, Dr.

Worthington recorded as recently as May 15, 2013, that plaintiff
was feeling “very happy,” see Transcript at 394-96, although on
that date Dr. Worthington also noted that plaintiff’s panic
attacks had increased in severity and duration.

Id.

Other of

Dr. Worthington’s reports, made prior to the mental assessment,
likewise indicate that plaintiff generally had a “pretty good”
or “good” mood, was alert and oriented, and behaved in a
socially-appropriate and pleasant, even clever, manner.

See

Transcript at 349, 351-52, 354-56, 360, 363, 372, 376-77, 394,
396, 408, 410, 413.

Likewise, Dr. Hopkins, who saw plaintiff

approximately every six months, observed in her reports that
plaintiff appeared alert, behaved appropriately, and appeared
undistressed.

See Transcript 315, 324, 332, 336, 342, 428-29.

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Worthington’s unduly

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restrictive conclusions in the mental assessment were sharply
inconsistent with other materials in the record.
19-21.

Transcript at

See Burch, 9 Fed. App’x at 260 (in light of significant

and unexplained discrepancies between treating physician’s final
opinion and his treatment notes, the ALJ properly gave
diminished weight to opinion); cf. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3)
(“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to
support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory
findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.”).
Further, the ALJ was concerned that Dr. Worthington’s
opinion was presented in a form report, upon which Dr.
Worthington merely checked boxes without providing explanations
or clinical evidence in support of her findings.

See Transcript

at 433-35; see also, e.g., McGlothlen v. Astrue, No. 11-148,
2012 WL 3647411, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2012) (“[F]orm reports
. . . are arguably entitled to little weight due to the lack of
explanation[.]”); Bishop v. Astrue, No. 10-2714, 2012 WL 951775,
at *3 n. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2012) (“‘[F]orm reports in which a
physician’s obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank
are weak evidence at best.’”) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994
F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Yet, while Dr. Worthington’s

mental assessment lacked any detail or clinical evidence in
support thereof, her earlier, more positive findings, as well as

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those of Dr. Hopkins, were presented with significantly greater
detail, explanation, and clinical evidence.

See Transcript at

392-414 (Dr. Worthington’s earlier, detailed reports), 427-432
(Dr. Hopkins’ reports, containing considerable detail as well).
The ALJ also pointed out evidence in the record
showing that plaintiff attended appointments alone, played
basketball with friends, maintained relationships with his
family, had performed work activity in the past with few
problems, and went on dates.

Transcript at 14, 17-20 (citing

Transcript at 53-54, 198-99, 266, 399).

Finally, the ALJ

observed that plaintiff behaved and responded to questions
appropriately at the administrative hearing without difficulty.
Transcript at 20.
Although Dr. Worthington, as one of plaintiff’s
treating physicians, was perhaps entitled to relatively more
weight than that of other sources of evidence, the court
concludes, in view of the foregoing, that the ALJ’s decision to
give Dr. Worthington’s opinion less than controlling weight was
supported by substantial evidence.

The court would further

observe that, although the ALJ did not give controlling weight to
Dr. Worthington’s opinions, for the reasons set forth above, the
ALJ nevertheless found that plaintiff retained a somewhat
restrictive residual functional capacity that accounted for all
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of plaintiff’s psychological limitations, based in part on Dr.
Worthington’s mental assessment and earlier treatment records.
See Transcript at 17.

Specifically, the ALJ limited plaintiff

to only simple, low stress work with very limited social
interaction, in light of his psychological problems.

Id.

Thus,

although Dr. Worthington’s opinion did not receive controlling
weight, the ALJ refrained from giving it no weight.
IV.
For the reasons stated, and having reviewed the record
de novo, the court ORDERS as follows:
1.

That

the

PF&R

be,

and

it

hereby

is,

adopted

and

incorporated herein;
2.

That plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
be, and it hereby is, denied;

3.

That

the

Commissioner’s

motion

for

judgment

on

the

pleadings be, and it hereby is, granted;
4.

That the Commissioner’s final decision be, and it hereby
is, affirmed;

5.

That judgment be, and it hereby is, granted in favor of
the Commissioner; and

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6.

That this civil action be, and it hereby is, dismissed
and stricken from the docket.
The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this

written opinion and order to all counsel of record and the
United States Magistrate Judge.
DATED:

March 31, 2016

John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge

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