Lewis et al v. Best Buy Stores, L.P. et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying the defendants' 3 MOTION to Dismiss; denying without prejudice, as moot, the plaintiffs' 12 CROSS-MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 5/22/2015. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (taq)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
CHRISTOPHER LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:15-00394 (Lead Action)

BEST BUY STORES, L.P., and
WILLIAM HOLMAN,
Defendants
TERA ROSS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:15-00395 (Consolidated)

BEST BUY STORES, L.P., and
WILLIAM HOLMAN,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is the defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed
January 15, 2015.

The plaintiffs filed a response in opposition

on February 9, 2015, which contains a cross-motion for summary
judgment.

The plaintiffs’ response notes that the defendants

attached an affidavit in support of their motion to dismiss and
asserts that if the affidavit is taken into consideration, the
defendants’ motion must be converted into a motion for summary
judgment.

The plaintiffs argue that the court should not take

the attachment into consideration.

As discussed more thoroughly

below, the court agrees that taking the affidavit into account
would require conversion of the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment. 1

As discovery is still ongoing, summary

judgment would be premature.

Accordingly, the information

contained in the affidavit is not taken into consideration by
the court in deciding the motion to dismiss.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the
defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

The plaintiffs’ cross-

motion for summary judgment is also denied without prejudice as
moot.
Background
Plaintiffs Christopher Lewis (“Lewis”) and Tera Ross
(“Ross”) are West Virginia citizens who live in Kanawha County,
West Virginia.

Pl. Compl. ¶ 1. 2

Defendant Best Buy Stores, L.P.

(“Best Buy”) is a limited partnership with its principal place
The plaintiffs attached an affidavit to their cross-motion for
summary judgment which was inadvertently filed without a
signature block. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a
supplemental motion seeking to replace the unsigned affidavit
with a signed copy. As this order denies the plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment as moot, the supplemental motion is also
denied for mootness.
1

Before consolidation, the plaintiffs each filed a separate
complaint. Those complaints are virtually identical. With the
exception of the identifying details pertaining to each
plaintiff, they allege the same facts, assert the same claims,
and contain the same organization and paragraph numbering.

2

2

of business in Richfield, Minnesota.

Id. ¶ 2.

Defendant

William Holman (“Holman”) is alleged to be an Ohio citizen who,
at the time of the incident giving rise to this suit, was a West
Virginia citizen employed in a management position at a Best Buy
retail location in South Charleston, West Virginia.
Lewis is an African-American male.

Id. ¶ 6.

“[c]aucasian and Native American” female.

Id. ¶ 3.

Ross is a

Id. ¶ 7.

Holman’s

race is not identified.
On February 7, 2014, Lewis and Ross visited the South
Charleston Best Buy intending to purchase a gaming system.
¶ 8, ¶ 10.

Id.

evening.

Holman was on duty as a manager at the store that
Id. ¶ 9.

According to the complaint, Holman refused

to allow Lewis and Ross to purchase the gaming system, “even
though other customers were permitted to complete their
transactions.”

Id. ¶ 12.

It is also alleged that Holman forced

Lewis and Ross to leave the store, followed them outside, and
directed “racially discriminatory and insulting words directly
at Mr. Lewis that amounted to vituperative epithets or racial
slurs.”

Id. ¶¶ 13-14.

Specifically, it is alleged that Holman

referred to Lewis as a “nobody” who he “didn’t have to serve” as
well as saying that Lewis should “go back to the hood where he
belonged.”

Id. ¶ 15.
The plaintiffs’ complaint contains two causes of
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action: 1) discrimination in violation of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code § 5-11-9, and 2) a violation of
West Virginia’s insulting words statute, W. Va. Code § 55-7-2.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss addresses only the first
claim.

Relying on Holman’s affidavit, the defendants assert

that Holman did not engage in any discriminatory conduct and,
therefore, that the plaintiffs’ discrimination claim fails as a
matter of law.
This case was initially filed in the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County, West Virginia on August 18, 2014.

The

defendants received service through the West Virginia Secretary
of State on December 11, 2014.

On January 8, 2015, the

defendants invoked the jurisdiction of this court by filing a
timely notice of removal pursuant to U.S.C. § 1332.

Although

Holman was a citizen of West Virginia at the time the incident
took place, the court can properly exercise diversity
jurisdiction because at the time the action was filed Holman is
alleged to be a citizen of Ohio.
exists between the parties.

Thus, complete diversity

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global

Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004).

4

The Motion to Dismiss Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a
plaintiff’s complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing . . . entitle[ment] to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).

Rule

12(b)(6) correspondingly permits a defendant to challenge a
complaint when it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted . . . .”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The required “short and plain statement” must provide
“‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

545 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957),
overruled on other grounds, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563); see also
Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007).
The complaint need not, however, "make a case" against a
defendant or even "forecast evidence sufficient to prove an
element" of the claim.

Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d

342, 349 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Iodice v. United States, 289
F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).

Stated succinctly, the

complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face."

Twombly, 550 at 569;

Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302.

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When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a district court
is required to “‘accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint . . . .’”

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-556); see also South Carolina
Dept. Of Health And Environmental Control v. Commerce and
Industry Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 245, 255 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002)).

Factual

allegations are to be distinguished from legal conclusions,
which the court need not accept as true.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions”).

The court must also “draw[] all reasonable . . .

inferences from th[e] facts in the plaintiff’s favor . . . .”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
Discussion
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’
discrimination claim fails as a matter of law because Holman,
when he asked the plaintiffs to leave the Best Buy store without
their being able to purchase the gaming system, did so for
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.”
Mot. to Dismiss at * 4.

See Def. Mem. in Supp.

The defendants’ argument relies on

Holman’s account of the incident set forth in an affidavit

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“Holman Affidavit.” 3

attached to the motion to dismiss.

According to Holman’s affidavit, Lewis attempted to pay for the
gaming system with a credit card that lacked sufficient funds to
complete the transaction.

Id.

Lewis then tried to purchase

different items, and his card was again declined for having
insufficient funds.

Id.

Before trying to complete a

transaction for the third time, Lewis was asked to present his
driver’s license.

Id.

After the request for identification,

Holman claims that Lewis became aggressive and belligerent,
prompting Holman to ask both Lewis and Ross, who was
accompanying him, to leave the store.

Id.

As noted above, when evaluating a motion to dismiss,
a plaintiff is entitled to have all of the well-pleaded facts in
his complaint accepted as true and all reasonable inferences
arising from those facts drawn in his favor to the extent those
inferences support his position.

Additionally, a district court

considering a motion to dismiss is governed by the “Four Corners
Rule” which generally limits the court to an examination of the
complaint and any documents that are attached to it.

See CACI

Int'l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150,
154 (4th Cir. 2009).

That rule is an evaluative canon that

prevents a district court from running afoul of Federal Rule of
3

Attached as “Exhibit A” to Def. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF 3-1).
7

Civil Procedure 12(d) which states:
If, on a motion [to dismiss] under Rule 12(b)(6) or
12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
There are a few limited exceptions by which a court
can consider material outside the complaint itself without
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.

As our Court of Appeals explained in Philips v. Pitt

County Memorial Hospital, it is permissible for a court
reviewing a motion to dismiss to “take judicial notice of
matters of public record” or to “consider documents attached to
the complaint . . . as well as those attached to the motion to
dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and
authentic,” without transforming a motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment.

Philips v. Pitt County Mem'l

Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
The Holman affidavit is attached to the defendants’
motion to dismiss.

However, it is not a document relied on in

the complaint and it is not otherwise integral to the
plaintiffs’ claim.

Consequently, it cannot be examined under

the mentioned exceptions.

See e.g., Blankenship v. Manchin, 471

F.3d 523, 526 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2006)(newspaper article relied upon
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in, but not attached to, plaintiff’s complaint was a basis of
plaintiff’s claim and could be considered by the district court
after being attached to motion to dismiss by the defendant).
Indeed, the affidavit’s recitation of events contradicts or
casts doubt on the veracity of the allegations set forth in the
complaint and seeks to rebut the inferences that can be drawn
from the complaint in favor of the plaintiffs.

Thus, the Holman

affidavit cannot be classified as integral and does not fit
within the exception articulated in Philips.
Taking the Holman affidavit into account would require
the court to transform the defendant’s motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment.

This the court declines to do.

Rule 12 states that when a court considers material outside the
four corners of the complaint which would require the conversion
of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,
“[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present
all the material that is pertinent to the [summary judgment]
motion.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

The account set forth in

Holman’s affidavit may or may not be an accurate version of the
events that occurred at Best Buy, but the plaintiffs are
entitled to a reasonable amount of time to develop the facts
before offering their rebuttal.

Discovery is ongoing and is not

scheduled to close until August 28, 2015.
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Our Court of Appeals

has expressly stated that “summary judgment is appropriate only
after adequate time for discovery.”

Greater Baltimore Ctr. for

Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
721 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation marks
omitted).

Accordingly, the court concludes that it would be

premature to consider the affidavit at this stage.
Conclusion and Order
The lynchpin of the defendant’s motion to dismiss is
the contention that Holman acted in a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory manner when he asked the plaintiffs to leave
the South Charleston Best Buy.

The only support the defendants

have for that contention comes from the Holman affidavit.

The

defendants offer no other arguments in favor of dismissal.

The

court has concluded that taking the affidavit into consideration
at this time would be both improper and premature.

Accordingly,

the court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment,
sought in the event the court converted the defendant’s motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, is, as earlier
noted, denied without prejudice as moot.

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The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this order
to counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER: May 22, 2015
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge

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