Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Mountaineer Gas Company et al

Filing 321

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting in part and denying in part MIRC Construction Services, LLC's 219 MOTION for Summary Judgment, and as set forth more fully herein. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 8/31/2017. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-07959

MOUNTAINEER GAS COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the court is MIRC Construction Services, LLC’s (“MIRC”)
Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 219]. Mountaineer Gas Company
(“Mountaineer Gas”), the third-party plaintiff, filed a Response [ECF No. 285], and
MIRC filed a Reply [ECF No. 295]. The matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the
following reasons, MIRC’s Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a boiler explosion at St. Mary’s Medical Center in
Huntington, West Virginia. Although MIRC was not initially named a defendant,
Mountaineer Gas later brought it in as a third-party defendant, alleging contribution,
negligent supervision, and implied indemnity. See Third-Party Compl. [ECF No. 80].
On January 11, 2017, this court entered an order dismissing the contribution claim
against MIRC because it settled with the original plaintiff in this lawsuit. Order, Jan.

11, 2017 [ECF No. 232]. MIRC now moves this court for summary judgment on the
negligent supervision and implied indemnity claims remaining against it.
LEGAL STANDARD
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for
summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the
court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986).
Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer
some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict” in his
or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the
nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case
and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish
that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The nonmoving
party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of
evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise,
conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to
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preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion. See Dash v. Mayweather, 731
F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013); Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 191 (4th
Cir. 1997).
DISCUSSION
MIRC seeks summary judgment on the remaining negligent supervision and
implied indemnity claims. First, MIRC asserts that the negligent supervision claim
against it must be dismissed because Mountaineer Gas failed to present evidence of
proximate causation. Mountaineer Gas, in turn, argues that a litany of evidence
sufficiently proves proximate causation.
After reviewing the evidence presented on the issues raised by the parties, I
FIND that contested issues of material fact remain as to Mountaineer Gas’s
negligence claim. Accordingly, I DENY MIRC’s Motion as to the negligence claim.
MIRC next argues that I should dismiss Mountaineer Gas’s implied indemnity
claim because there is no special relationship between the parties giving rise to an
implied indemnity claim. Mountaineer Gas failed to respond to this point.
Regardless of whether any special relationship exists between the parties, the
implied indemnity claim asserted against MIRC must fail as a matter of law because
Mountaineer Gas cannot prevail on its implied indemnity claim. Because MIRC
settled with Traveler’s Property Casualty Company of America, the only way
Mountaineer Gas may prevail on an implied indemnity claim is by proving that it is
entirely without fault. Syl. pt. 7, Hager v. Marshall, 505 S.E.2d 640, 643–44 (W. Va.
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1998). (“[G]ood faith settlement between a plaintiff and a defendant will extinguish
the right of a non-settling defendant to seek implied indemnity unless such nonsettling defendant is without fault.”). Were Mountaineer Gas to prove that it was
entirely without fault, then it would have no need to recover from MIRC. If, on the
other hand, Mountaineer Gas were proven to be partially at fault for the incident,
then Mountaineer Gas could not recover under an implied indemnity claim.
Previously, where a party asserting an implied indemnity claim against another was
placed in this no-win situation, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
recognized that dismissal of the claim was proper. See Schoolhouse Liab. Co. v.

Creekside Owners Ass'n, No. 13-0812, 2014 WL 1847829, at *4 (W. Va. May 8, 2014).
Similarly, I FIND that it is impossible for Mountaineer Gas to prevail on its implied
indemnity claim against MIRC and GRANT MIRC’s Motion as to the implied
indemnity claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS that MIRC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 219] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:

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August 31, 2017