Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Mountaineer Gas Company et al

Filing 322

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting in part and denying in part third-party defendant Engel Welding, Inc.'s 273 MOTION for Summary Judgment, and as set forth more fully herein. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 9/1/2017. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-07959

MOUNTAINEER GAS COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the court is the third-party defendant Engel Welding, Inc.’s
(“Engel”) Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 273]. Mountaineer Gas Company
(“Mountaineer Gas”), the third-party plaintiff, filed a Response [ECF No. 286], and
Engel filed a Reply [ECF No. 294]. The matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the
following reasons, Engel’s Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a boiler explosion at St. Mary’s Medical Center in
Huntington, West Virginia. Although Engel was not initially named a defendant,
Mountaineer Gas later brought it in as a third-party defendant, alleging contribution,
negligent performance of services, and implied indemnity. See Third-Party Compl.
[ECF No. 80]. Engel now moves this court for summary judgment on claims against
it.

LEGAL STANDARD
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for
summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the
court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986).
Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer
some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict” in his
or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the
nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case
and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish
that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The nonmoving
party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of
evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise,
conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to
preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion. See Dash v. Mayweather, 731
F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013); Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 191 (4th
Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION
Engel seeks summary judgment on all claims against it. First, Engel asserts
that the negligence and contribution claims against it must be dismissed because
Mountaineer Gas failed to present evidence that Engel was a causal factor in the
explosion at issue in this case. Mountaineer Gas, in turn, argues that a litany of
evidence sufficiently proves causation.
After reviewing the evidence presented on the issues raised by the parties, I
FIND that contested issues of material fact remain as to Mountaineer Gas’s
negligence and contribution claims. Accordingly, I DENY Engel’s Motion as to the
negligence and contribution claims.
Engel next argues that I should dismiss Mountaineer Gas’s implied indemnity
claim because there is no special relationship between the parties giving rise to an
implied indemnity claim. Mountaineer Gas failed to address this point.
Regardless of whether any special relationship exists between the parties, the
implied indemnity claim asserted against Engel must fail as a matter of law because
Mountaineer Gas cannot prevail on its implied indemnity claim. The only sort of
indemnity claim Mountaineer Gas asserted against Engel is an implied indemnity
claim—a claim that requires a showing that Mountaineer Gas is entirely without
fault.1 Hager v. Marshall, 505 S.E.2d 640, 648 (W. Va. 1998). (“[T]he right to seek
implied indemnity belongs only to a person who is without fault.”). Were Mountaineer
Gas to prove that it was entirely without fault, then it would have no need to recover

1

Implied indemnity is most often implicated in strict liability cases.

from Engel. If, on the other hand, Mountaineer Gas were proven to be partially at
fault for the incident, then Mountaineer Gas could not recover under an implied
indemnity claim. Previously, where a party asserting an implied indemnity claim
against another was placed in this no-win situation, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia recognized that dismissal of the claim was proper. See Schoolhouse

Liab. Co. v. Creekside Owners Ass'n, No. 13-0812, 2014 WL 1847829, at *4 (W. Va.
May 8, 2014). Similarly, I FIND that it is impossible for Mountaineer Gas to prevail
on its implied indemnity claim against Engel and GRANT Engel’s Motion as to the
implied indemnity claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS that Engel’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 273] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:

September 1, 2017