Rauch v. Rubenstein et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing that the referral of this matter to the Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN; granting the defendants' 14 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint; granting the plaintiff's 18 LETTER-FORM MOTION to Dismiss Case; denying as moot the plaintiff's 18 LETTER-FORM MOTION to withdraw case; directing that this civil action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; the filing fee is waived and plaintiff shall not be required to pay any installments thereon; this ruling has no effect on any other litigation previously or subsequently instituted by the plaintiff in this or any other federal court. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 10/21/2016. (cc: plaintiff, pro se; counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
JORDAN LAWRENCE RAUCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:15-cv-15637
JAMES RUBENSTEIN, WVDOC,
CO II MARTIN, DAVID BALLARD,
CAPTAIN BRIAN PENIC and
JONATHAN FRAME, MOCC,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court are the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint
[ECF No. 14] and the plaintiff’s Letter-Form Request to Withdraw or Dismiss Case
[ECF No. 18]. By Standing Order, this matter is referred to the Honorable Dwane
L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings and
a recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For reasons
appearing to the Court, it is hereby ORDERED that the referral of this matter to the
Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN and that the matter is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I.
The Plaintiff’s Allegations
On November 30, 2015, the plaintiff filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that on November 8, 2014, defendant Martin opened all pod doors of a
maximum security housing unit at the Mount Olive Correctional Complex and
allowed another inmate, Larry Cantrell, to assault the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s
allegations against the remaining defendants appear to address their alleged failure
to properly supervise and train prison staff. The plaintiff seeks monetary damages
and injunctive relief.
II. Standard of Review
In Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), the Supreme Court
observed that a case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as
true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint does not contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” While the
complaint need not assert “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain “more than
labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Id. at 555.
The Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), a civil rights case. The Court wrote:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,
the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the
factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal
quotation marks omitted). Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.
2
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. * * *
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.
Twombley, 556 U.S. at 678–79. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct.” Id. at 678. The defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
will be reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Twombly/Iqbal standard.
II.
Discussion
Both the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw
or Dismiss Case agree that the matters addressed in the plaintiff’s Complaint are
subject to a prior “Release of All Claims” executed by the plaintiff on April 1, 2016, as
part of the settlement of a claim filed in the West Virginia Court of Claims arising
out of the same factual circumstances. 1
Thus, the defendants’ Motion seeks
dismissal of the instant Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure based upon accord and satisfaction.
1 The defendants’ Memorandum of Law indicates that the “Release of All Claims” addressed an
incident that occurred on November 30, 2014, rather than November 8, 2014. However, the parties
appear to agree that this was the same incident and that the allegations in the Complaint are subject
to the Release.
3
As noted in the defendants’ Memorandum of Law in support of their Motion to
Dismiss, West Virginia law recognizes the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction by which “a debt is satisfied and the debtor released from liability when
a creditor accepts partial or substituted performance of a disputed claim in the place
of the original debt.” Mem. Law Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 4–5 (citing Delbert v.
Gorby, 2011 WL 4527351, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112101, at *11 (N.D. W. Va. Sept.
28, 2011) (citation omitted); Richard v. Kees, 572 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 2002); Painter
v. Peavy, 451 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1994); Charleston Urban Renewal Auth. v. Stanley,
346 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. 1985)). Their Memorandum of Law further states:
An accord and satisfaction is a method of discharging a claim whereby
the parties agree to give and accept something in settlement of the claim
and then perform the agreement, and it must have all of the elements of
a valid contract. The elements of a contract are an offer and acceptance
supported by consideration. The offer is made in an accord and
satisfaction when one party offers to settle an unliquidated debt. The
acceptance must be made by the other party intelligently, realizing the
consequences of his act and with full knowledge of the relevant facts in
order for the accord to be enforceable. Where payment is made by
check, unless there is a specific agreement that the check itself shall
constitute payment, then the acceptance shall not be complete until the
check is negotiated or held for an unreasonable period of time.
Id. at 6 (citing McCormick v. Hamilton Bus. Sys., 332 S.E.2d 234, 236 n.1 (W. Va.
1985)). The defendants further emphasize that the language of the release signed by
the plaintiff makes clear (1) what the payment of the $176.00 was for, (2) what
liability, claims, and damages were being released, and (3) that such payment and
release applied to release any and all claims against the defendants arising out of the
November 2014 assault of the plaintiff by inmate Cantrell. Id. at 5-6.
4
On August 29, 2016, the plaintiff filed his Letter-Form Motion, indicating his
agreement to dismiss this matter with prejudice as a result of the prior settlement.
The plaintiff further requests that he not be required to pay the applicable filing fee.
I FIND that the instant Complaint is barred by the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction in light of the prior settlement of the plaintiff’s claim before the West
Virginia Court of Claims. Additionally, although the court previously granted the
plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs and ordered
that the applicable filing fee be paid in installments, it appears that, presently, no
installment payments have been received.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Complaint [ECF No. 14] and the plaintiff’s Letter-Form Motion to
Dismiss Case [ECF No. 18] are GRANTED, and the plaintiff’s Letter-Form Motion to
Withdraw Case is DENIED AS MOOT. It is further ORDERED that this civil action
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that the filing fee
herein is waived and plaintiff shall not be required to pay any installments thereon.
This ruling has no effect on any other litigation previously or subsequently instituted
by the plaintiff in this or any other federal court.
5
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:
6
October 21, 2016
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