Chinn v. Martin et al
Filing
73
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting the defendant West Virginia Department of Corrections' 43 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies; and granting the defendant David Martin's 48 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint; and the plaintiff's case is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 12/21/2016. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
ELIZABETH CHINN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-00080
C.O. DAVID MARTIN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the court is the defendant West Virginia Division of
Corrections’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies [ECF No. 43] and the defendant David Martin’s Motion to Dismiss
Complaint [ECF No. 48] (collectively, the “defendants’ Motions”).1 The plaintiff filed
her Response [ECF No. 45] (“Resp.”) on October 31, 2016. The defendant West
Virginia Division of Corrections then filed its Reply [ECF No. 50] on November 4,
2016, and defendant David Martin did not file Reply. On November 21, 2016, the
court entered an Order [ECF No. 58] giving the defendants until December 9, 2016,
to show cause why the plaintiff should be required to exhaust administrative
remedies where those remedies are not available. On December 2, 2016, the West
David Martin’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint and corresponding memorandum merely incorporated
the arguments set for the West Virginia Division of Corrections’s Motion. Therefore, the plaintiff only
filed one Response.
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Virginia Division of Corrections filed a memorandum showing cause [ECF No. 60],
which was later joined by David Martin [ECF No. 65]. The plaintiff then filed a
Response Memorandum [ECF No. 68]. The matter is now ripe for adjudication. For
the following reasons, the court GRANTS the defendants’ Motions.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff brought the present suit alleging that she was sexually exploited
in prison because the defendants failed to afford her sufficient protections and
contributed to sexual harassment she suffered in prison. See Notice Removal Ex. A,
at 4–7 [ECF No. 1] (“Compl.”). Specifically, the plaintiff asserts several state common
law claims and a federal claim that is, in essence, a § 1983 claim. Compl. 7–10. The
plaintiff was incarcerated at the Lakin Correctional Center (LCC) when she filed the
case on September 23, 2015. Compl. 4; Resp. 2. The LCC is a correctional center
operated by the West Virginia Division of Corrections (“WVDOC”). Compl. 5. Further,
the WVDOC has policies and procedures for prisoner grievances governed by WVDOC
Policy Directive 335. Neither party disputes that the plaintiff did not utilize the
grievance procedures established by the WVDOC before bringing this case. See Resp.
1. The plaintiff has since been released from prison. Resp. 2.
LEGAL STANDARD
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but ‘it demands more than an unadorned, the2
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a
motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). A facially plausible claim is one accompanied by facts allowing the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, facts moving the claim
beyond the realm of mere possibility. Id. Mere “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic
recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555.
DISCUSSION
The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s case should be dismissed because she
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to her prior to bringing this
lawsuit. Mem. Supp. WVDOC Mot. Dismiss 3–5 [ECF No. 44]. The plaintiff argues
that she was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies because (1) she is
no longer incarcerated, (2) she filed a pre-suit notification, and (3) she did not know
about the administrative remedies available to her. See Resp.
Both the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and West Virginia Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“WVPLRA”) require inmates to exhaust their administrative
remedies before they bring a lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); W. Va. Code § 25-1A-2a(i).
Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
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prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted
the PLRA broadly, stating that the “PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). If a plaintiff fails to exhaust
administrative remedies, the case must be dismissed. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Miller, No.
5:10-CV-01293, 2014 WL 131067, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 10, 2014).
The WVPLRA functions similarly. Indeed, this court recognized that “West
Virginia law requires inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies before
instituting any civil action.” Baker v. Hammons, No. 2:15-CV-13849, 2016 WL
538481, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 9, 2016) (citing W. Va. Code § 25-1A-2(c)). Although
the exhaustion requirements are altered in cases involving sexual assault, “section
25-1A-2a of the West Virginia Code [still] requires an inmate to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies even in cases involving violence, sexual assault, or sexual
abuse—albeit under special grievance procedures.” Id. at *3. As with the PLRA,
claims where the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies must be
dismissed under the WVPLRA. Id. at *3.
Here, neither party disputes the fact that the plaintiff did not exhaust the
administrative remedies available to her. However, the plaintiff argues that she
should be excused from exhausting those remedies for several reasons. First, she
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argues that she is no longer an “inmate” and therefore should not have to exhaust
administrative remedies. Resp. 2. However, the plaintiff’s status for purposes of
determining whether remedies must be exhausted is determined at the time of filing.
See, e.g., Cofield v. Bowser, 247 F. App'x 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is the plaintiff's
status at the time he filed the lawsuit that is determinative as to whether the §
1997e(a) exhaustion requirement applies.”); Norton v. The City of Marietta, OK, 432
F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In light of the PLRA's plain language, the other
circuits to have addressed the issue have unanimously held that it is the plaintiff's
status at the time he files suit that determines whether § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion
provision applies.”); Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[P]laintiff's
status as a ‘prisoner’ is to be determined as of the time he brought the lawsuit.”).
Therefore, because the plaintiff’s status for PLRA and WVPLRA purposes is
determined at the time of filing and she was incarcerated when filed the lawsuit, her
later release does not exempt her from the exhaustion requirement.
Next, the plaintiff argues that filing a mandatory pre-suit notification with the
WVDOC served the same purpose as a grievance, and accordingly, she is exempt from
the exhaustion requirement. However, both the PLRA and WVPLRA explicitly
require the exhaustion of administrative remedies—not the filing of a mandatory presuit notification. Where there is a statutory mandate, “courts have a role in creating
exceptions only if Congress wants them to. So mandatory exhaustion statutes like
the PLRA establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.”
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Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1853 (2016). Therefore, because both statutes mandate
the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the plaintiff may not exempt herself from
the exhaustion requirement by utilizing an entirely different procedure than that
contemplated by the statutes.
Finally, the plaintiff argues she should be exempted from the exhaustion
requirement because she was unaware of administrative remedies available to her.
In support of her argument, she cites Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), focusing
on Justice Breyer’s concurrence. In that concurrence, Justice Breyer noted,
“petitioners [may] overcome procedural defaults if they can show the procedural rule
is not firmly established and regularly followed.” Plaintiff has shown neither.
Although she might have been unaware of the rule, there are no facts before the court
that lead it to conclude that the WVDOC’s grievance procedure is not firmly
established and regularly followed.
The plaintiff has not shown that she is exempt from the exhaustion
requirements of the PLRA and WVPLRA. Consequently, the court must dismiss this
case because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the court ORDERS that the defendant West Virginia Department
of Corrections’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies [ECF No. 43] and the defendant David Martin’s Motion to Dismiss
Complaint [ECF No. 48] are GRANTED and the plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
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The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record
and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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December 21, 2016
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