Bainbridge v. Colvin
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER the Court OVERRULES the 22 Objections; adopting the 21 Proposed Findings and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge; denying Plaintiff's 16 request for judgment on the pleadings; granting the Commissioner's 19 request for judgment on the pleadings; affirming the decision of the Commissioner; and dismissing this action. Signed by Judge Thomas E. Johnston on 7/10/2017. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
KEVIN ALLEN BAINBRIDGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-00226
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Kevin Allen Bainbridge’s Complaint seeking review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (ECF No. 2.) By
standing order filed in this case on January 14, 2016, this action was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Omar J. Aboulhosn for submission of proposed findings and recommendations
for disposition (the “PF&R”). (ECF No. 4.) On February 17, 2017, the Magistrate Judge entered
his PF&R, which recommends that this Court deny Plaintiff’s request for judgment on the
pleadings, grant the Commissioner’s request for judgment on the pleadings, affirm the
Commissioner’s decision, and dismiss this case. Plaintiff filed timely objections to the PF&R on
March 6, 2017 (the “Objections”).
For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES the Objections, (ECF No. 22),
ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 21), DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judgment on the pleadings,
(ECF No. 16), GRANTS the Commissioner’s request for judgment on the pleadings, (ECF No.
19), AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner, and DISMISSES this action.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts concerning this matter are fully set forth in the PF&R and need not be repeated
here at length. In short, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental security
income on September 7, 2012, alleging disability as of July 31, 2007,1 (ECF No. 14-7 at 9), due
to post-traumatic stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), back pain,
and bipolar disorder, (ECF No. 14-8 at 29). The application was denied initially on January 22,
2013, (ECF No. 14-5 at 7), and upon reconsideration on April 19, 2013, (id. at 17).
Administrative Law Judge John T. Molleur (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on August 26, 2014.
On September 11, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (ECF No. 14-3.) The ALJ
found at step one of the “sequential evaluation” process that Plaintiff “has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since September 7, 2012, the application date.” (Id. at 12.) At step
two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has several severe impairments, specifically: sciatica,
osteoarthritis of the right hand, cognitive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder/post-traumatic
stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and alcohol dependence in remission. (Id. at 12.) At step three
of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 13.) The ALJ next found that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c), reduced
by certain limitations. (Id. at 14–18.) Finally, the ALJ found at step four that while Plaintiff is
The Magistrate Judge’s PF&R accounts for the lapse of time between Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset
date and the filing of the application for benefits. (ECF No. 21 at 2 n. 2.) Despite Plaintiff’s alleged onset
date—apparently related to an application denied prior to the initiation of this action—the pending matter
is restricted to Plaintiff’s disability status from September 7, 2012.
1
2
incapable of performing past relevant work, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (Id. at 18.)
The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision on November 30, 2015. (ECF
No. 14-2 at 2–5.) Thereafter, on January 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this Court.
II.
A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of the PF&R
The Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendations
to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this
Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party “makes general and conclusory objections
that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
B.
Review of the ALJ’s Findings and Decision
Judicial review of a final decision regarding disability benefits is limited to determining
whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was
applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.
1987) (“A factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper
standard or misapplication of the law.”). Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance, of the evidence. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001).
“It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
3
“In reviewing for
substantial evidence, [the court should] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make
credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary.” Craig v. Chater,
76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). If “conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to
whether a claimant is disabled,” the Court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Id. (citing
Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving to the Commissioner that he is disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080,
1082 (4th Cir. 1993). “The term ‘disability’ means . . . inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Commissioner uses a five-step “sequential evaluation” process to evaluate a disability
claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) & 416.920(a)(4). In Hall v. Harris, the Fourth Circuit
provided the following description of the “sequential evaluation” analysis:
Under the process the ALJ must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether he has a severe
impairment; (3) if so, whether that impairment meets or equals the medical criteria
of Appendix 1 which warrants a finding of disability without considering vocational
factors; and (4) if not, whether the impairment prevents him from performing his
past relevant work. By satisfying either step 3 or 4, the claimant establishes a prima
facie case of disability. The burden then shifts to the Secretary and leads to the fifth
and final inquiry in the sequence: whether the claimant is able to perform other
work considering both his remaining physical and mental capacities (defined as
residual functional capacity) and his vocational capabilities (age, education, and
past work experience) to adjust to a new job.
658 F.2d 260, 264–65 (4th Cir. 1981); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920 (providing the
“sequential evaluation” analysis). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through
4
four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
146 n.5 (1987); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). If a decision regarding
disability can be made at any step of the process, however, the inquiry ceases. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Objections to the PF&R rehash the two arguments initially raised in the
Complaint. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinion of Dr. Elizabeth
McClellan, his treating psychiatrist.
Second, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for concluding that
Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease was not a severe impairment. The Magistrate Judge rejected
Plaintiff’s contentions on both fronts and Plaintiff seeks review.
A.
Weight Assigned to Treating Psychiatrist’s Opinion
The testimony of a treating physician is given controlling weight if it “is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. “By negative implication,
if a physician’s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other
substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 590; see
Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ holds the discretion to give less
weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence.”
(citation omitted)).
In determining whether contrary evidence justifies disregard for the opinions held by a
treating physician, the ALJ is obligated to consider “1) whether the physician has examined the
applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the
5
supportability of the physician’s opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and
(5) whether the physician is a specialist.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 563 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citing Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir.2005)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c).
The ALJ’s decision must contain “specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source’s
medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to
make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s
medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (July 2,
1996).
Dr. McClellan began treating Plaintiff for mental health concerns in 2011. She diagnosed
bipolar disorder, alcohol-related disorder, alcohol dependence early partial remission, and
combined-type post-traumatic stress disorder and ADHD.
(ECF No. 14-11 at 8.)
An
independent consultative examination conducted in October 2012 confirmed many of Dr.
McClellan’s diagnostic findings—the examiner diagnosed bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, provisional cognitive disorder, alcohol dependence in full remission, and personality
disorder. (ECF No. 14-3 at 55–62.) To that extent, the ALJ noted the consensus between Dr.
McClellan and the consultative examiner and relied on their opinions in finding that Plaintiff
suffers from a number of severe mental impairments. (ECF No. 14-3 at 16.) The ALJ declined,
however, to give controlling weight to Dr. McClellan’s assessment of the impact of Plaintiff’s
psychological symptoms on his job performance. The weight afforded that assessment is at issue
in Plaintiff’s Objections.
In 2014, Dr. McClellan performed a functional capacity evaluation on Plaintiff’s behalf.
In rating his ability to adjust to a job along a graded scale, Dr. McClellan indicated that Plaintiff
6
has “extreme” limitations in his ability to relate with coworkers, interact with supervisors, and deal
with work stresses.2 Dr. McClellan supported the ranking with a brief handwritten notation that
Plaintiff “has difficulty getting along w[ith] others, mood swings, violent episodes.” (ECF No.
14-2 at 55.) The evaluation form then prompted Dr. McClellan to rank Plaintiff’s ability to make
personal social adjustments. Again, Dr. McClellan ranked Plaintiff as “extremely limited” in his
ability to behave in an emotionally stable manner, relate predictably in social situations, and
complete a normal workday or work week without interruption from psychologically based
symptoms. (Id. at 56.) Dr. McClellan referenced Plaintiff’s “extreme mood swings w[ith]
violent outbursts” in explaining her selection. (Id.)
The ALJ gave Dr. McClellan’s opinion “little weight” in assessing the severity of
Plaintiff’s impairments and determining RFC. He considered the controlling factors in doing so.
Hines, 453 F.3d at 563.
The ALJ accurately summarized Plaintiff’s extended history of mental
health treatment with Dr. McClellan but amply explained the reasons for discrediting her social
functioning assessment.
He wrote that Dr. McClellan’s opinion “is inconsistent with her
treatment notes that fail to show any significant deficits in functioning, behavior, or interacting
with others[.]” (ECF No. 14-3 at 17.) Dr. McClellan “failed to point to any objective findings,
incidents of uncontrollable behaviors or inappropriate social interactions, or mental status
evaluations that support such severe deficits in functioning.” (Id.) In reviewing Plaintiff’s
mental health records elsewhere in his decision, the ALJ observed that the records predating the
application date “do not show any significant behavioral or functioning deficits despite situational
stressors.” (Id. at 16.) Moreover, despite frequent mental health evaluations between 2011 and
To define the term “extreme” the form stated, “There is major limitation in this area. There is no useful
ability to function in this area.” (ECF No. 14-2 at 54.)
2
7
2014, Dr. McClellan’s notes reveal only intermittent periods of irritability that generally improved
with use of prescribed psychotropic medication. (See ECF No. 14-12 at 28, 36, 40.) As the ALJ
noted, Dr. McClellan’s notes are devoid of any observation or narrative to support the significant
deficits she would later ascribe to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 14-3 at 17.)
Other evidence of record eroded confidence in the limitations assessed by Dr. McClellan.
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s consultative examination revealed only moderate impairments in
social functioning and his activities of daily living—including use of public transportation and outof-state travel to care for a relative—did not support extreme limitations in functioning. Coupled
with the inadequacy of her own treatment notes on that score, this contradictory evidence made
Dr. McClellan’s opinion “unpersuasive.” (Id.) Even so, the ALJ incorporated moderate social
limitations in the RFC assessment. He found that Plaintiff is capable of performing work that
“requires no interaction with the public” and “requires no work with close coordination with others
in a team type approach.” (Id. at 14.)
It is apparent from the record that the ALJ did not err in declining to give controlling weight
to Dr. McClellan’s opinion. Dr. McClellan’s assessment of Plaintiff’s functioning is inconsistent
with other mental health evidence of record and appears to go beyond her own clinical observations
without clear basis. In such circumstances, the ALJ maintained the discretion to assign little
weight to that opinion. Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178. The Court FINDS that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit the results of Dr. McClellan’s social functioning
assessment.
8
B.
Severity of Plaintiff’s Lumbar Spine Impairment
At step two of the “sequential evaluation” process, the administrative law judge determines
“the medical severity” of a claimant’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) &
416.920(a)(4)(ii). Severe impairments are impairments which, singly or in combination,
“significantly limit[ ] [a claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 404.920(c). “Basic work activities” include (1) physical functions such
as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2)
capacities for seeing, hearing and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering
simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers,
and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Id. §
404.1521(b). “An impairment can be considered ‘not severe’ only if it is a slight abnormality
which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with
the individual’s ability to work.”
Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 1984)
(emphasis omitted).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mild degenerative disc disease was not
“independently severe,” nor did it “cause persistent functional limitations affecting [Plaintiff’s]
ability to perform basic work activities.” (ECF No. 14-3 at 12.) Stated differently, the ALJ did
not find evidence in the record to support a loss of function relating to Plaintiff’s back problems.
The ALJ buttressed this finding with the observation that despite claiming years of back pain,
Plaintiff had never participated in physical therapy, used a pain clinic, seen a neurosurgeon, or
required the use of an assistive device to ambulate.
(ECF No. 14-3 at 15.)
Consultative
examinations performed in 2012 and 2013 revealed no functional limitations related to back pain
9
either—though Plaintiff experienced some tenderness of the spine, he had only mildly reduced
range of motion. (Id.) The findings noted an inability to squat in 2012 but no difficulty in
squatting in 2013. (Id.) Reviewing the ALJ’s decision and the evidence of record, the Magistrate
Judge found the ALJ did not err in concluding that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease was not a
severe impairment.
In the Objections, Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ for making only “cursory references” to the
examination of Dr. Kip Beard when reviewing Plaintiff’s back condition. Plaintiff alleges that
the ALJ failed to assign weight to Dr. Beard’s findings and reconcile these findings with Plaintiff’s
functional abilities. Dr. Beard performed a consultative examination of Plaintiff on January 8,
2013. His findings relating to Plaintiff’s back pain did not differ in any meaningful way from
those of the state agency medical consultants who concluded that Plaintiff did not have a severe
lumbar spine impairment. (See ECF No. 14-10 at 65–70.) The ALJ noted the harmony between
these various opinions in his decision. (ECF No. 14-3 at 16.)
Plaintiff also claims the ALJ erred in not discussing the results of a lower back x-ray
completed at Dr. Beard’s request. The ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in
the record, see Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005), and the Court cannot find
that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the results of this procedure undermines his decision as to the
severity of Plaintiff’s lower back impairment. The x-ray of Plaintiff’s spine revealed “marked
disc narrowing with endplate sclerosis and mild anterior spurring” at L5-S1. The radiologist’s
sole diagnostic impression was “degenerative disc disease.” (ECF No. 14-10 at 71.) A diagnosis
does not equal a disability, nor does it suffice to prove an impairment’s severity under the
regulations. “There must be a showing of related functional loss.” Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d
10
1163, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The lack of evidence linking Plaintiff’s back
condition to limited functional ability led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s back impairment was
not severe. The Court FINDS that substantial evidence supports that decision. Thus, in all
respects, the Objections are OVERRULED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES the Objections, (ECF No. 22),
ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 21), DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judgment on the pleadings,
(ECF No. 16), GRANTS the Commissioner’s request for judgment on the pleadings, (ECF No.
19), AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner, and DISMISSES this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:
11
July 10, 2017
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?