James v. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING the 6 Proposed Findings and Recommendations, and DISMISSING the 1 Complaint under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the Clerk is directed to remove this action from the docket of the Court. Signed by Judge Thomas E. Johnston on 9/26/2018. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (kp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

JOHN MERRITT JAMES,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-03926

WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Letter-Form Complaint (“Complaint”). (ECF No. 1.) By
Standing Order filed in this case on April 26, 2016, this action was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation
for disposition (“PF&R”). (ECF No. 2.) Magistrate Judge Tinsley entered his PF&R on July 2,
2018, recommending that the Court find that Plaintiff is challenging a decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“WVSCA”), which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
(ECF No. 6 at 3–4). Based on these proposed findings, the PF&R further recommends that the
Court dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 4.)
The Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation
to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Failure to file
timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo review and a party’s right to appeal this Court’s
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Order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). In addition, this Court need not conduct
a de novo review when a party “makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court
to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson,
687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff filed timely objections to the PF&R on July 13, 2018.

(ECF No. 7.)
The crux of Plaintiff’s objections is that Magistrate Judge Tinsley erroneously construed
his Complaint as one against the WVSCA and that he is “only requesting judgement [sic] against
the West Virginia Real Estate Commission and their Executive Director Richard Strader.” (Id. at
1 (emphasis removed).) Therefore, he challenges the PF&R’s proposed finding that his case is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The remainder of Plaintiff’s filing delves into the merits
of his case heard by the WVSCA and decided against him on April 15, 2016. (See id. at 2–11
(“There are many reasons why this is an erroneous decision . . . .”); see also ECF No. 1-1.) The
Court will only address Plaintiff’s objections insofar as he claims that the WVSCA is not the true
Defendant in this matter. The rest of the objections deal with the merits of a state court case not
currently before this Court or addressed by Magistrate Judge Tinsley, and, thus, they “do not direct
the Court to a specific error in the [PF&R].” Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47.
As noted by the PF&R, the style of Plaintiff’s Complaint reads as follows:
John Merritt James Plaintiff (pro se)
V
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decisions
In Civil Action C 15-0415
John Merritt James v. West Virginia Real Estate Commission and
Richard Strader Executive Director (now retired).

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(ECF No. 1 at 1.) The Complaint makes clear in the first two sentences the relief Plaintiff is
seeking: “I received the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals [decision] dated April 15,
2015[1] on April 19, 2016. The Supreme Court made several erroneous decisions in this matter
and I am praying that this court determines such facts and reverse[s] their decision and see that
final justice is finally accomplished in this state.” (Id.) Again, at the end of Plaintiff’s lengthy
objections, which mostly discuss the merits of his state court case, he reiterates that “[t]he West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals violated [his] constitutional [r]ights under the [C]onstitution
of the United States of America.” (ECF No. 7 at 11 (“I am respectfully request[ing] that this court
will finally review my charges in this document and let justice prevail.”).) Thus, it is clear that
Plaintiff requests relief from the decision handed down by the WVSCA by having this Court
reverse it. Now that the Court has determined that Plaintiff brought this case against the WVSCA
and not the West Virginia Real Estate Commission and its former executive director as Plaintiff
states in his objections, it will discuss whether such a challenge can survive.
“A district court must dismiss a claim if, at any time, it appears that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.” Johnson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No.
2:15-cv-16010, 2015 WL 9008848, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 15, 2015) (citations omitted). A
court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction generally may be raised at any time, and courts should
raise the question sua sponte when appropriate. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). Finally, while
courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally, King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir.

The Court notes that the WVSCA’s decision in James v. Strader was issued on April 15, 2016. (See ECF No. 1-1
at 1, 5.)
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2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation omitted)), the burden
of proving subject matter-jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff as the party asserting proper
jurisdiction, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), cited in
Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999).
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), “lower federal courts are precluded from
exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Thana v. Bd. of License
Comm’rs for Charles Cty., 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.
459, 463 (2006) (per curiam)). The doctrine prohibits district courts from adjudicating “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Id. (quoting Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) [hereinafter Exxon])). While district courts have
some authority to “oversee” state court judgments, such as in habeas petitions, Congress has not
allocated such jurisdiction “so generally to confer on district courts appellate jurisdiction over
state court judgments.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292 n.8).
As noted above, Plaintiff clearly brings this case because he is unhappy with a final state
court judgment. He asks this Court in his objections to overturn the WVSCA’s decision because
they “should be held accountable for their erroneous decision . . . .” (ECF No. 7 at 11.) This is
exactly the type of appellate review of a state court case the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was
designed to prevent. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414–15. There is no evidence that Plaintiff
attempted to obtain review of the state court decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, but “Congress

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ha[s] vested jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal only in” that Court. Thana, 827 F.3d at 319.
While Plaintiff expounds in his objections upon the merits of his case originally filed in state court
against the West Virginia Real Estate Commission and its executive director, the Court cannot
construe his pleading in this Court to be “a concurrent, independent action” to that original state
court case. See id. at 321. Even affording his Complaint liberal construction, it is clear that he
seeks appellate review of an unfavorable WVSCA action, and the Court does not have jurisdiction
to hear such a matter. Therefore, the Court agrees with the PF&R that Plaintiff’s Complaint is
barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and it must be dismissed.
For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the PF&R, (ECF No. 6), and DISMISSES the
Complaint under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, (ECF No. 1). The Court further DIRECTS the Clerk to remove this action from the
docket of the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:

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September 26, 2018