Staats v. Colvin

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT the 9 Proposed Findings and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, DENYING the plaintiff's 7 motion for judgment on the pleadings, GRANTING the defendant's 8 motion for judgment on the pleadings, AFFIRMING the final decision of the Commissioner, and DISMISSING this action from the court's docket. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 3/30/2018. (cc: Magistrate Judge Tinsley; counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (kp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
MELISSA JEAN STAATS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-cv-10553

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Introduction
This action was referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United States

Magistrate Judge, for submission to this court of proposed findings of fact and
recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate
Judge has submitted findings of fact and recommended that the court grant the
plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings to the extent the plaintiff seeks
remand, deny the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, reverse the final
decision of the Commissioner, and remand this case for further proceedings, and
dismiss this matter from the court’s docket. Prop. Fin. & Rec. 1 [ECF No. 9]. The
defendant filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings and
Recommendation [ECF No. 10].

The Court has reviewed de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s
findings and recommendation to which the defendant objects and finds that the
objections are meritorious. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DECLINES TO
ADOPT the findings and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 9],
DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [ECF No. 7], GRANTS
the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [ECF No. 8], AFFIRMS the
final decision of the Commissioner, and DISMISSES this action from the Court’s
docket.
II.

Factual and Procedural History
On April 26, 2013, the claimant, Melisa J. Staats, filed a Title II application

for disability insurance benefits alleging disability beginning October 15, 2008. Prop.
Fin. & Rec. 1. The claim was denied initially as well as on further reconsideration.

Id. On November 4, 2016, Staats filed a complaint before this court. Compl. [ECF No.
1].
On February 3, 2017, Staats filed a Brief in Support of Judgment on the
Pleadings [ECF No. 7]. In it, Staats argues that reversal is necessary because “the
ALJ failed to properly assess Staats’s fibromyalgia.” Id. at 1. On February 28, 2017,
the defendant, Nancy A. Berryhill, filed a Brief in Support of Defendant’s Decision,
arguing that the ALJ correctly handled Staat’s claim. [ECF No. 8].
On March 2, 2018, the Magistrate Judge entered Proposed Findings and
Recommendation, suggesting that the Court find that the ALJ properly addressed
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the claimant’s fibromyalgia. Prop. Fin. & Rec. 10. While Staats did not raise the issue
in this appeal, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court find that the ALJ’s
step three analysis of Staat’s coronary artery disease was deficient because “the ALJ
failed to explain how that medical evidence demonstrated that the criteria for Listing
4.04 was not met.” Id. According to the Magistrate Judge, this omission makes
remand necessary. On March 3, 2018, the defendant timely filed objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendation. Def.’s Objs. Prop. Fin. & Rec. On
March 27, 2018, the plaintiff responded. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Objs. [ECF No. 11]. These
matters are currently before the Court.
III.

Standards of Review
a. Review of the PF&R

A district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This court is not, however, required to review, under a de
novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge
as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are
addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
b. Review of the ALJ’s Findings and Decision
The Social Security Act states that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C.A.§ 405(g). The Supreme Court has defined substantial
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evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Further, “[i]t consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966).
In reviewing the case for substantial evidence, the court does not re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make determinations as to credibility, or substitute its own
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th
Cir. 1990). Rather, the court must adopt the Commissioner’s findings if there is
evidence in support of such findings “to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury.” Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1972). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the
[Commissioner’s] designate, the ALJ).” Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.
1987). Thus, even if the court would have reached a different decision, it must
nonetheless defer to the conclusions of the ALJ if such conclusions are bolstered by
substantial evidence and were reached through a correct application of relevant law.

See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
IV.

Analysis
While this finding was not objected to by Staats, the Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that the ALJ discussed whether Staat’s fibromyalgia met the
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criteria of any listing under section 1.01, and properly considered Staats’s
fibromyalgia in her step three analysis. See Prop. Fin. & Rec. 7. The court disagrees
with the Magistrate Judge that remand is necessary, because the ALJ’s lack of
discussion regarding Staat’s coronary artery disease at step three was harmless.
“Courts have routinely applied a harmless error analysis to administrative
decisions that do not fully comport with the procedural requirements of the agency’s
regulations, but for which remand ‘would be merely a waste of time and money.’ The
Fourth Circuit has applied a similar analysis in the context of Social Security
disability determinations.” Hedrick v. Colvin, No. 3:14-23775, 2015 WL 5003658, at
*9 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 21, 2015) (citations omitted). Generally, a procedurally deficient
decision does not need to be remanded “absent a showing that the [complainant] has
been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s
procedural lapses.” Id. (citations omitted); see Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057
(7th Cir. 1989) (“No principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to
remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the
remand might lead to a different result.”)
“An ALJ’s error is harmless when it does not substantively prejudice the
claimant.” Hedrick, 2015 WL 5003658, at *9 (citing Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632,
639 (4th Cir. 2015); Tanner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App’x. 95, 101 (4th Cir.
2015); Austin v. Astrue, No. 7:06cv00622, 2007 WL 3070601, *6 (W.D. Va. Oct. 18,
2007)). “In order for a reviewing court to find an error harmless, the court must be
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able to plainly see from the ALJ’s written decision that the prejudicial effect of the
ALJ’s mistake was, in some way, remedied, so that a final determination of
nondisability is indeed supported by substantial evidence.” Meadows v. Colvin, No.
1:14-15147, 2015 WL 3820609, at *15 (S.D. W. Va. June 18, 2015).
Here, at step two, the ALJ found that Staats suffers from a severe impairment
of coronary artery disease. At step three, the ALJ held that Staat’s coronary artery
disease did not meet the severity of one of the Listings. The ALJ did not identify
under which listing she considered Staat’s coronary artery disease, or the criteria for
that listing. Listings under Section 4.00 apply to cardiovascular impairments, and
Listing 4.04 applies specifically to coronary heart disease. The Magistrate Judge
recommends that the court find that the court remand this case, because “[a]lthough
the ALJ discussed the medical evidence regarding [the] [c]laimant’s severe
impairment of coronary artery disease, the ALJ failed to explain how that medical
evidence demonstrated that the criteria for Listing 4.04 was not met.” Prop. Fin. &
Rec. 10.
Listing 4.04C, which applies to coronary artery disease, states:
Coronary artery disease, demonstrated by angiography
(obtained independent of Social Security disability
evaluation) or other appropriate medically acceptable
imaging, and in the absence of a timely exercise tolerance
test or a timely normal drug-induced stress test, an MC,
preferably one experienced in the care of patients with
cardiovascular disease, has concluded that performance of
exercise tolerance testing would present a significant risk
to the individual, with both 1 and 2:
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1.

Angiographic evidence showing:
a. 50 percent or more narrowing of a nonbypassed left
main coronary artery; or
b. 70 percent or more narrowing of another
nonbypassed coronary artery; or
c. 50 percent or more narrowing involving a long
(greater than 1 cm) segment of a nonbypassed
coronary artery; or
d. 50 percent or more narrowing of at least two
nonbypassed coronary arteries; or
e. 70 percent or more narrowing of a bypass graft
vessel; and

2. Resulting in very serious limitations in the ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of
daily living.
20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
Before moving to step four, the ALJ found:
In terms of the claimant’s artery disease, the evidence of
record refers to a history of coronary artery bypass
grafting, which occurred in January of 2013. However, the
evidence of record indicates that with treatment, her
symptoms improved. In fact, treatment records dated
February 1, 2013, documented that the claimant’s coronary

artery disease was controlled with medication, and her
cardiovascular examination was normal (Exhibit 3F). In
addition, notes from the August of 2013 physical
consultative examination with Dr. Holley documented a
normal cardiovascular examination with no reports of
palpatations, angina, syncope or edema (Exhibit 5F, p. 4).
Furthermore, at the hearing, the claimant testified that

she recovered from her history of bypass grafting, and
stated that she has no significant lasting residual effects
from the impairment (Testimony). Accordingly, the

undersigned finds the claimant’s history of coronary artery
disease is less limiting than she originally alleged.
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Tr. 20 (emphasis added) [ECF No. 6-2].
This evidence makes clear that even if the ALJ did not explicitly discuss
Listing 4.04 in step three, her failure to do so was harmless because Staat’s coronary
artery disease clearly did not result in “very serious limitations in [her] ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily living,” as required to
meet the listing. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; see Berry v. Astrue, No. 3:10cv-00430, 2011 WL 2462704, at *9 (S.D. W. Va. June 17, 2011) (“The Court does
appreciate shortcomings in the ALJ’s written explanation of his 12.05 analysis, but
finds these inadequacies to be harmless inasmuch as the ALJ’s ultimate decision has
substantial evidentiary support.”). Thus, even if the ALJ did err, the error did not
substantively prejudice Staats, rendering remand unnecessary.
V.

Conclusion
The Court DECLINES TO ADOPT the findings and recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 9], DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings [ECF No. 7], GRANTS the defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings [ECF No. 8], AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner, and
DISMISSES this action from the court’s docket.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order to
Magistrate Judge Tinsley, counsel of record, and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:

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March 30, 2018