Hatcher v. Rubenstein et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing that the plaintiff's 38 objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommendation are overruled; adopting and incorporating in full the 38 Proposed Findings and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge; granting the 19 Motion to dismiss; and that this civil action be dismissed and stricken from the docket of the court. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 9/27/2018. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (taq)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
FREDERICO HATCHER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-02054
JIM RUBENSTEIN, Commissioner;
C.J. RIDER, Religious Services
Director; and DAVID BALLARD,
Warden, Mount Olive Correctional
Complex,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is the defendants’ motion to dismiss filed on
December 15, 2017.
In his complaint, the plaintiff, an inmate
at the Mount Olive Correctional Complex, asserts that the
actions of the defendants violated the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et
seq. (ECF No. 2 at 17).
This action was previously referred to the Honorable
Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission
to the court of his Proposed Findings and Recommendations
(“PF&R”) for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
On August 8, 2018, the magistrate judge entered his PF&R
recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted and that this
matter be dismissed from the docket of the court.
filed objections to the PF&R on September 6, 2018.
The plaintiff
Defendants
David Ballard, C.J. Rider and Jim Rubenstein filed a response to
the plaintiff’s objections on September 24, 2018.
Upon an objection, the court reviews a PF&R de novo.
Specifically, “[t]he Federal Magistrates Act requires a district
court to ‘make a de novo determination of those portions of the
[magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.’”
Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.
2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)).
The plaintiff’s first objection to the PF&R is that
the magistrate judge improperly applied RLUIPA. ECF No. 41, at
3.
Specifically, the plaintiff contends that it was improper
for the magistrate judge “to focus on what other Muslim’s [sic]
believe or what other courts have decided against other
Muslims.”
Id.
The plaintiff states that it is his “sincerely
held religious belief that he eat meat other than pork as part
of his regular diet.”
Id. at 2.
While “[t]he protection of
RLUIPA . . . is ‘not limited to beliefs which are shared by all
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of the members of a religious sect[,]’”
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.
Ct. 853, 862–63 (2015), a “prisoner's request for an
accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief and
not some other motivation[.]”
Id. at 862, citing Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n. 28 (2014).
The magistrate judge adequately addressed this claim, providing
several instances of caselaw in which a court found that the
failure to provide Muslim inmates with a Halal non-pork meat
diet does not impose a substantial burden on the exercise of
religion.
The plaintiff’s mere conclusory statements regarding
his faith fail to demonstrate that his case demands a different
outcome than the litany of federal cases cited by the magistrate
judge at pages nine to eleven of the PF&R.
The plaintiff’s second objection is that the
magistrate judge incorrectly interpreted the facts related to
the Inmate Grievance Procedure when disposing of his Kufi claim.
In this objection, the plaintiff does not present any new facts
or arguments not considered by the magistrate judge.
The
magistrate judge, at pages fourteen to nineteen of the PF&R,
evaluated in-depth whether the actions taken by the plaintiff
constituted a proper exhaustion of his available administrative
remedies, as required under both the federal and the West
Virginia Prison Litigation Reform Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and
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W.Va. Code § 25-1A-2a(i)).
The court agrees with the magistrate
judge’s analysis in finding that the plaintiff failed to
properly exhaust his administrative remedies for his Kufi claim
insofar as his grievances did not go through every step of the
grievance process.
The plaintiff’s third objection appears to be general
disagreement with the magistrate judge’s decision regarding the
claims under the establishment and equal protection clauses.
The court finds that the magistrate judge correctly decided
these issues.
Specifically, the court agrees with the notion
that since the Religious Special Diet does not “promot[e] the
strict dietary requirements of the Hare Krishna[,]” as argued by
the plaintiff (ECF # 41 at 8), but merely adopts the Brahman
diet by its nature of being the most restrictive religious diet,
there is no Establishment Clause issue.
Insofar as the Equal
Protection Clause claims are concerned, the plaintiff now
attempts to introduce new facts, of which he faults the
defendants for “not inform[ing] the court[.]”
Id. at 9.
These
facts were not introduced in the complaint and therefore do not
affect the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to rule
12(b)(6).
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
4
that is plausible on its face.’”).
The plaintiff’s final
objection is therefore without merit.
Accordingly, the court finds that the magistrate
judge’s PF&R adequately addressed and correctly resolved all
issues presented in the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Therefore, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. That the plaintiff’s objections to the PF&R be, and hereby
are, overruled.
2. That the magistrate judge’s Proposed Findings and
Recommendation be, and they hereby are, adopted and
incorporated in full.
3. That the pending motion to dismiss be, and it hereby is,
granted.
4. That this civil action be dismissed and stricken from the
docket of the court.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this
memorandum opinion and order to all counsel of record and to any
unrepresented parties.
Enter: September 27, 2018
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
United States District Judge
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