Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company v. Nichols et al
Filing
64
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 37 MOTION by Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company for Summary Judgment, except insofar as it seeks relief against defendant William Jackson Stuck; and denying the 35 MOTION by Allison Elaine McGinnis, Sandra Kay Nichols, Ashlee Nicole Nichols Rosas for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 12/6/2018. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
ERIE INSURANCE PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-03126
THE ESTATE OF SANDRA KAY NICHOLS,
ALLISON ELAINE MCGINNIS,
ASHLEE NICOLE NICHOLS ROSAS, and
WILLIAM JACKSON STUCK,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are cross-motions for summary judgment, one
filed by the plaintiff, Erie Insurance Property and Casualty
Company (“Erie”), and one jointly by the three defendants other
than William Jackson Stuck who has not entered an appearance.
Both motions were filed September 17, 2018.
I.
Background
On October 6, 2016, William Jackson Stuck shot and
killed his daughter, Sandra Kay Nichols, who for some time had
been one of his primary caretakers, and who is the mother of
defendants Allison McGinnis and Ashlee Rosas.
Soon after the
shooting, Mr. Stuck called 911 at 7:00 a.m., informing the 911
operator quite clearly, at the outset of a recorded call, of his
address, that he had shot his daughter, “Sandra Kay Nichols,”
and that she was a “traitor” who was involved in stealing his
money.
ECF No. 49, at 0:17 and 1:20.
In the course of the
rambling diatribe that followed, he described, disjointedly,
bizarre plots that had been made against himself and others.
Id. at 1:20 to 5:05.
Beginning near the end of the call, Mr.
Stuck succinctly stated that his daughter’s body was lying on
the kitchen floor, that he was going downstairs to shoot
himself, and that the police should come in the back door which
would be unlocked.
Id. at 5:20.
He then hung up.
Prior to the
police’s arrival at his home, Mr. Stuck shot himself, resulting
in a non-fatal wound.
As noted in Detective Hunter’s affidavit of October
11, 2016, attached to the state criminal complaint against Mr.
Stuck, which has been filed herein by Erie, Mr. Stuck reported
to the officers who arrived on the scene that “he had waited on
his daughter all night and he shot to kill her when she
arrived.”
Criminal Compl., ECF No. 37-1, at 40-41.
Mr. Stuck had previously purchased a homeowner’s
insurance policy from Erie, which provides:
We will pay all sums up to the amount shown on the
Declarations which anyone we protect becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury
or property damages caused by an occurrence during the
2
policy period. We will pay for only bodily injury or
property damage covered by this policy.1
Insurance Policy, ECF No. 3, at 15.
This policy excludes
coverage for intentional acts committed by the insured:
We do not cover under Bodily Injury Liability
Coverage, Property Damage Liability Coverage, Personal
Injury Liability Coverage and Medical Payments To
Others Coverage:
1. Bodily injury, property damage or personal injury
expected or intended by anyone we protect even if:
a. the degree, kind or quality of the injury or damage
is different than what was expected or intended; or
b. a different person, entity, real or personal property
sustained the injury or damage than was expected or
intended.
Id. at 16.
The Estate of Sandra Kay Nichols and her daughters,
Ms. McGinnis and Ms. Rosas, (“defendants”),2 initiated a civil
action in state court against Mr. Stuck seeking damages for the
murder of his daughter, based on his conduct which was alleged
by the defendants (who are the plaintiffs in the civil action)
to have been “reckless, intentional with malice aforethought.”
See State Court Compl., ECF No. 4, ¶¶ 4, 6.
These same parties
also alleged in their state court complaint that Mr. Stuck
The insurance policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general
harmful conditions.” Insurance Policy, ECF No. 3, at 6.
2 These parties will be referred to hereinafter as “defendants,”
and that reference will not include Mr. Stuck, who has not
appeared in this case.
1
3
reported to local police that “he had waited on his daughter all
night and he shot to kill her when she arrived.”
Id. ¶ 5.
In November 2016, Dr. Timothy Saar conducted an
independent medical examination to evaluate Mr. Stuck’s mental
competency to stand trial.
Dr. Saar’s report, which has been
filed by the defendants, acknowledges that Mr. Stuck informed
the police that “he had waited for his daughter all night, and
he shot to kill her when she arrived.”
1, at 2.
Saar Report, ECF No. 41-
Noted in the report is Dr. Saar’s belief that Mr.
Stuck likely has some form of dementia.
Id.
Dr. Saar found
that Mr. Stuck was unable to complete any standardized tests due
to his cognitive impairment and delusions, id. at 4, and that
“Mr. Stuck, due to his level of confusion, was unable to fully
complete the responses [to] style questions,” id. at 5.
Dr.
Saar also reported that Mr. Stuck’s daughter, Sharon Lee,
“stated that her father had a long history of erratic behaviors,
and had been [in] mental health facilities twice back in the
1970’s.”
Id. at 4.
Dr. Saar ultimately concluded that Mr.
Stuck was not competent to stand trial and that “it is
questionable if he will ever regain competency.”
Saar declined to opine on the question of criminal
responsibility.
Id. at 6.
4
Id. 5-6.
Dr.
Erie initiated the present action in this court on
June 1, 2017, seeking declaratory relief under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, W. Va. Code § 55-13-1, et seq., and
judgment as to whether Erie is required to provide coverage
under Mr. Stuck’s policy and whether Erie must defend or
indemnify Mr. Stuck for the defendants’ state tort claims.
The
court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
II.
Legal Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Material facts are
those necessary to establish the elements of a party’s cause of
action.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
A genuine issue of material fact exists if, in viewing
the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-movant.
Id.
The
moving party has the burden of showing -- “that is, pointing out
5
to the district court -- that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case.”
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
If the movant satisfies this burden,
then the non-movant must set forth specific facts as would be
admissible in evidence that demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of fact for trial.
322-23.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); id. at
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the record
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find in
favor of the non-movant.
Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823
(4th Cir. 1991).
Conversely, summary judgment is inappropriate if the
evidence is sufficient for a reasonable fact-finder to return a
verdict in favor of the non-moving party.
248.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
Even if there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts,
summary judgment is also not appropriate where the ultimate
factual conclusions to be drawn are in dispute.
Overstreet v.
Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir. 1991).
III. Discussion
In cases grounded in diversity jurisdiction, “federal
courts are to apply the substantive law the State in which they
are sitting would apply if the case had originated in a State
6
court.”
Stonehocker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 154
(4th Cir. 1978).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held
that a policyholder may be denied coverage under an intentional
act exclusion clause if the policyholder “(1) committed an
intentional act and (2) expected or intended the specific
resulting damage.”
Syllabus Pt. 7, Farmers & Mechanics Mut.
Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 210 W. Va. 394, 557 S.E.2d 801
(2001) (emphasis in original).
“When an intentional acts
exclusion uses language to the effect that insurance coverage is
voided when the loss was ‘expected or intended by the insured,’
courts must generally use a subjective rather than objective
standard for determining the policyholder’s intent.”
Syllabus Pt. 8.
Id. at
The policyholder must intend “‘a result that is
wrongful in the eye of the law of torts,’” to trigger the
intentional acts exclusion of an insurance policy.
Id. at 402,
557 S.E.2d at 809.
Further, when a policyholder suffers from a mental
illness
[c]overage under an intentional injury exclusion
clause in a homeowners' insurance policy may be denied
when one who commits a criminal act has a minimal
awareness of the nature of his act. The test for
criminal insanity in West Virginia is appropriate only
in a criminal trial and has no applicability to the
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interpretation of plain language in an insurance
contract.
Syllabus, Mun. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Mangus, 191 W. Va.
113, 443 S.E.2d 455 (1994) (emphasis added).
Consequently, in
deciding whether to deny coverage under such a policy, the law
in West Virginia does not consider the test for criminal
insanity as required in a criminal case; that is, whether one is
aware of the wrongfulness of his act or is able to conform his
act to the requirements of the law is neither controlling nor in
issue.
Rather, the mentally ill insured need only have a
“minimal degree of understanding of the nature of his act,” in
order for the intentional injury exclusion to apply.
Id. at
117, 443 S.E.2d at 459 (emphasis added).
The defendants urge the court to consider, in seeking
summary judgment, the dissent in Mangus which argues that
intentional act exclusion clauses should not apply when the
insured commits an insane act.
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.,
ECF No. 36, at 3-5 (citing cases from other states that use the
standard proposed in the dissent).
Though the defendants in
their civil suit in state court allege that Mr. Stuck’s conduct
was “intentional with malice aforethought,” the defendants in
their briefing here claim that Mr. Stuck was mentally
incompetent when he shot his daughter.
Id. at 2.
This
argument, based as it is on the dissent, fails inasmuch as the
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court is obliged to use the substantive law that West Virginia
would apply, and the applicable test here is whether Mr. Stuck
was minimally aware of the nature of his act.
The facts of Mangus are instructive.
There, Mr.
Mangus, the insured, shot his neighbor who then sued him for the
resulting injuries.
The insurer, Municipal Mutual, subsequently
filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare
that it had no duty under the insurance policy’s intentional
acts exclusion clause.
456.
Mangus, 191 W. Va. at 114, 443 S.E.2d at
Mr. Mangus believed at the time of the shooting that: “(1)
his neighbors were conspiring to drive him off his land because
his wife, a former schoolteacher, knew the family secrets of the
neighbors; (2) his phone was tapped; and (3) the traffic along
his driveway in common with others was caused by the neighbors'
involvement in drug dealing.”
Id. at 115, 443 S.E.2d at 457.
Psychiatric testimony suggested that these beliefs resulted from
Mr. Mangus’s “clinical depression with psychotic features.”
Id.
In considering whether Mr. Mangus had a minimal
awareness of his actions, the court imagined the following
hypothetical scenario:
“[I]f a person is so delusional that he
shoots another human believing him to be a charging elephant, or
shoves a knife in another's throat thinking that he is handing
him an ice cream cone, then for insurance contract purposes the
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act is not ‘intentional.’”
Id. at 116, 443 S.E.2d at 458.
The
psychiatric testimony given during the trial of the Mangus case
revealed that, despite being “insane” at the time of the
shooting, Mr. Mangus knew that he was going to shoot a man, that
it was wrong and that he intended to shoot the man.
16, 443 S.E.2d at 457-58.3
Id. at 115-
The court relied primarily on this
testimony in determining that Mr. Mangus was minimally aware of
the nature of his act.
Id.
However, the court also noted the
details of the underlying incident in which Mr. Mangus and the
victim were feuding and Mr. Mangus shouted at the victim, “You
get out of here or I’m going to shoot you.”
Id. at 113-14, 443
S.E.2d at 455-56.
Here, Mr. Stuck revealed in the 911 call made soon
after the shooting, that he shot his daughter, that he knew he
shot his daughter, and that he believed her to be a “traitor.”
Even if the shooting was the product of delusional thinking
(which Dr. Saar reported Mr. Stuck was suffering at the time of
3
Although the state circuit court utilized a jury to answer
three special interrogatories, the supreme court affirmed
judgment in favor of the insurer by applying the facts to the
law without requiring a jury determination of whether the
intentional act exclusion applied. See generally Mangus, 191 W.
Va. 113, 443 S.E.2d 455. In answering one of those questions,
the jury found that Mr. Mangus shot the victim “as a result of a
mental disease or defect” and lacked “substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to conform
his act to the requirements of the law.” Id. at 114-15, 443
S.E.2d at 456-57.
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his examination) or other mental infirmity, and despite the
rambling nature of the 911 call except for the beginning and
ending parts of it, his call clearly indicates he understood
that, at the time of the act, he was shooting his daughter and
intended to do so.
Also supporting this conclusion is the fact
that Mr. Stuck was able to give the 911 operator his address,
telling the operator where the shooting occurred and where the
body would be found.
He asked the operator to notify the police
and tell them to come in the back door which would be unlocked.
He also told the operator he would be downstairs and that he was
going to shoot himself, which he proceeded to do.
Finally, it
is conceded that Mr. Stuck, though wounded, reported to the
police when they arrived that “he had waited on his daughter all
night and he shot to kill her when she arrived.”
Criminal
Compl., ECF No. 37-1, at 40-41; State Court Compl., ECF No. 4, ¶
5; Saar Report, ECF No. 41-1, at 2.
It is noted that Erie makes the further argument that
the defendants, in their response in this case to requests for
admission, admitted that Mr. Stuck’s conduct was expected or
intended by him to result in bodily injury.
That initial
admission, which is neither needed by Erie nor persuasive here,
does not influence the court’s decision.
Indeed, in the same
series of requests for admission, the defendants further stated:
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(1) Mr. Stuck “was insane and not capable of committing an
intentional act”; and (2) Mr. Stuck “was insane and not capable
of committing a deliberal [sic] act.”
Req. Admis., ECF No. 37-1, at 6.
Defs.’ Answers to Pl.’s
Furthermore, the defendants
denied that Mr. Stuck had a “minimal awareness of the nature of
the acts at issue.”
Id.
The foregoing answers to Erie’s
requests for admission leave the admissions confused at best,
and the court does not rely on the initial admission in reaching
a finding as to whether Mr. Stuck was minimally aware of the
nature of his act.
Although, as noted, the defendants in their civil case
complaint against Mr. Stuck claim that his conduct was
“intentional with malice aforethought,” they now argue that
there remains an issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Stuck
was minimally aware of the nature of his act.
No. 41, at 1-2.
Defs.’ Resp., ECF
The defendants first observe that Johnson v.
Insurance Company of North America, a Virginia case with similar
facts as, and relied upon by, Mangus, states that language in
insurance policies that excludes coverage is construed against
the insurer, which of course it is.
S.E.2d 616, 619 (1986).
232 Va. 340, 345, 350
Next, the defendants state that in
Johnson, “[t]he insurer carried the burden to establish that
Davis [the insured] was aware of what he was doing and that he
intended injury to Johnson [the victim].
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Therefore, the
exclusion applies.”
Defs.’ Resp., ECF No. 41, at 2-3 (quoting
Johnson, 232 Va. at 348, 350 S.E.2d at 621).
Defendants contend
that because psychiatric evaluations in each Mangus and Johnson
acknowledge both the insureds’ mental infirmities and that each
of the insured individuals knew he was shooting a person, those
cases are distinguishable from the one here.
Id.
The only
relevant evidence as to Mr. Stuck’s awareness, according to the
defendants, is Dr. Saar’s evaluation, which states that Mr.
Stuck is mentally incompetent to stand trial.
Id. at 3.
While the defendants are correct in that there is no
testimony from mental health professionals that supports the
notion that Mr. Stuck knew he was shooting his daughter, the
absence of that testimony is not controlling.
In Mangus, in
addition to the psychiatrist’s acknowledgment that Mr. Mangus
knew he was shooting his neighbor, the facts of the underlying
incident laid out by the court, in which Mr. Mangus threatened
to, and ultimately did, shoot his neighbor over a property
dispute, indicate that Mr. Mangus intended to shoot him.
Va. at 113-14, 443 S.E.2d at 455-56.
191 W.
In Johnson, two
psychiatrists who evaluated the mentally ill insured stated that
he intended to shoot the victim, noting that the insured also
told the police, when he was arrested 15 hours after the
shooting, that he shot the victim, just as Mr. Stuck did here
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immediately after the shooting.
at 617-18.
232 Va. at 341-43, 350 S.E.2d
Further, none of the psychiatrists testifying in
Mangus and Johnson were applying the “minimal awareness” test
set forth by the West Virginia supreme court.4
The absence of psychiatric evaluations as to Mr.
Stuck’s sanity at the time of the act is not dispositive here.
West Virginia established in Mangus that it follows the
“standard denying coverage under a homeowners policy when a
mentally ill insured has a minimal degree of understanding of
the nature of his act.”
191 W. Va. at 117, 443 S.E.2d at 459.
West Virginia does not apply its criminal standard in this
setting.
Id.
Dr. Saar’s report simply states that Mr. Stuck likely
suffers from dementia, that his cognitive impairment and
delusions rendered him unable to complete certain standardized
tests, that he is not competent to stand trial and that he is
unlikely to regain competence.
4, 5, 6.
Saar Report, ECF No. 41-1, at 2,
The conclusions of this report, even taken in the
light most favorable to the defendants, do not shed light as to
4
In both cases the courts were deciding what standard to use
when evaluating whether an intentional act exclusion clause
would apply to an insured person with a mental illness. See
Mangus, 191 W. Va. at 115, 443 S.E.2d at 457; Johnson, 232 Va.
at 345-47, 350 S.E.2d at 619-20.
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what Mr. Stuck was or was not aware at the time of the shooting.
Rather, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that
Mr. Stuck had at least minimal awareness of the nature of his
act, namely: (1) the 911 call in which Mr. Stuck informed the
911 operator, soon after the shooting, that he had just shot his
daughter, Sandra Kay Nichols, at his home, that she was a
“traitor” who stole from him, that she was lying on the kitchen
floor, that he was going downstairs to shoot himself which he
did, and that the police could gain entry through an unlocked
door; and (2) when the police arrived he informed them that “he
had waited on his daughter all night and he shot to kill her
when she arrived.”
Indeed, the act is shown to have been
“intentional with malice aforethought,” just as the defendants
alleged in their civil lawsuit.
The court concludes that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Mr. Stuck was minimally aware of his
actions when he shot and killed Sandra Kay Nichols.
Inasmuch as
the only pertinent evidence before the court is that which
supports the finding that he was mentally aware of the nature of
his act when he shot his daughter, the plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment and declaratory relief.
Plaintiff’s motion alternatively seeks default
judgment against Mr. Stuck.
The plaintiff has not satisfied the
15
court that service of the summons and complaint has been made on
him.
It appears that the plaintiff has attempted service by
serving a guardian ad litem for Mr. Stuck, who purported to
waive service on his behalf in this matter and who may have been
appointed in the state civil case referred to in the opinion and
order herein, yet was not appointed for any purpose in this case
by this court.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be, and it hereby is,
granted, except insofar as it seeks relief against defendant
Stuck.
It is further ORDERED that the motion of the other three
defendants for summary judgment be, and it hereby is, denied.
The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this
memorandum opinion and order to all counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.
Enter: December 6, 2018
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