Richards v. Berryhill
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER the court OVERRULES the plaintiff's 12 objections; adopting and incorporating the 11 Proposed Findings and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge; denying the Plaintiff's 7 Motion for Judgment on the Ple adings; granting the Defendant's 10 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner, and DISMISSES this matter from the docket. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 9/20/2018. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party; Magistrate Judge) (taq)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
RONALD LYNN RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-03524
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Introduction
This action was referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United States
Magistrate Judge, for submission to this court of proposed findings of fact and
recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate
Judge has submitted findings of fact and recommended that the court deny the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 7], grant the Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 10], affirm the final decision of the
Commissioner, and dismiss this matter from the court’s docket. Proposed Findings &
Rec. (“PF&R”) [ECF No. 11].
On September 11, 2018, the plaintiff timely filed objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s PF&R. Pl.’s Objs. PF&R [ECF No. 12]. The defendant filed a response on
September 19, 2018. Def.’s Resp. [ECF No. 14]. The court has reviewed de novo the
portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendation to which the
plaintiff objects and finds the plaintiff’s objections lack merit. For the reasons stated
herein, the court OVERRULES the plaintiff’s objections and ADOPTS and
INCORPORATES the findings and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The
court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 7],
GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 10],
AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner, and DISMISSES this matter from
the docket.
II.
Statement of Facts
The court ADOPTS the statement of relevant facts and procedural history set
forth in Judge Tinsley’s PF&R. PF&R 1–2.
III.
Standard of Review
A district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This court is not, however, required to review, under a de
novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge
as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are
addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this court need not
conduct a de novo review when a party “makes general and conclusory objections that
do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
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The Social Security Act states that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence
as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Further, “[substantial evidence] consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966).
In reviewing the case for substantial evidence, the court does not re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make determinations as to credibility, or substitute its own
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990). Rather, the court must adopt the Commissioner’s findings if there is
evidence in support of such findings “to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury.” Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1972). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the
[Commissioner’s] designate, the [Administrative Law Judge]).” Walker v. Bowen,
834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, even if the court would have reached a
different decision, it must nonetheless defer to the conclusions of the ALJ if such
conclusions are bolstered by substantial evidence and were reached through a correct
application of relevant law. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
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IV.
Analysis
The plaintiff raises several objections to the Magistrate Judge’s PF&R, which
I will address in turn. The plaintiff’s primary objection is that the Magistrate Judge
erred in finding that the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis was supported by
substantial evidence. Pl.’s Obj. PF&R 1. Specifically, the plaintiff avers that the
Magistrate Judge failed to conduct an “independent judicial review” of the issues and
the record in finding the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis supported by substantial
evidence. Id. at 2.
a. Magistrate Judge’s Independent Review
According to the plaintiff, the Magistrate Judge ignored the basis for the
plaintiff’s appeal and “unilaterally adopt[ed]” the Commissioner’s position without
independently reviewing the record. Id. at 3. To be sure, a reviewing court “must not
abdicate [its] traditional functions [in reviewing a case for substantial evidence]; [the
court] cannot escape [its] duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
whether the conclusions reached are rational.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396,
397 (4th Cir. 1974). Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, however, Magistrate Judge
Tinsley carefully reviewed the record in finding the ALJ’s subjective symptom
analysis supported by substantial evidence.
The Magistrate Judge first reviewed the plaintiff’s background. PF&R 7. Then,
the Magistrate Judge set forth a thorough analysis of the plaintiff’s medical record,
detailing the plaintiff’s Function Report, in which the plaintiff stated he could
prepare his own meals, drive a car, walk half a mile, attend church, and go shopping.
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Id. at 7–8. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge examined the plaintiff’s testimony at
length. In a review spanning several pages, the Magistrate Judge detailed the
plaintiff’s statements at his administrative hearing regarding his abdominal pain,
chest pain, back pain, shortness of breath, dizziness, anxiety, treatments for such
conditions, and functional limitations. Id. at 8–10. Following this careful review of
the record, the Magistrate Judge noted that the ALJ also considered the plaintiff’s
testimony and self-reports in finding the plaintiff only partially credible. Id. at 12.
After reviewing the ALJ’s eight reasons for finding the plaintiff’s testimony
inconsistent, the Magistrate Judge concluded that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff’s alleged severity of symptoms was not credible. Id. at
13–14. Thus, the plaintiff’s argument that the Magistrate Judge “unilaterally
adopt[ed]” the Commissioner’s position without conducting an independent judicial
review is without merit.
It follows that the plaintiff’s assertion that the Magistrate Judge ignored and
failed to consider the basis of his appeal—to the extent this contention states a
specific objection—is likewise erroneous. On appeal, the plaintiff argued only that the
ALJ erred in evaluating the plaintiff’s credibility. Pl.’s. Br. 8 [ECF No. 7]. The
Magistrate Judge explicitly considered this argument but determined that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of the plaintiff’s credibility after
thoroughly reviewing the record. PF&R 10–14. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge
explained that the ALJ properly applied the two-step analysis for evaluating
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subjective complaints. Id. at 12–13. The Magistrate Judge in no way ignored or failed
to consider the basis for the plaintiff’s appeal.
b. Deference to Credibility Determinations
The plaintiff further contends that the Magistrate Judge failed to conduct an
independent judicial review of the record by applying the wrong standard in deferring
to the ALJ’s credibility determination. Pl.’s Objs. PF&R 3–4. Specifically, the plaintiff
objects to the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that the ALJ has the “exclusive
responsibility” in making credibility determinations. Id. at 4. This argument also
lacks merit.
Notably, the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s credibility is the plaintiff’s
sole argument on appeal and therefore the only argument considered by the
Magistrate Judge in the PF&R. “In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court]
do[es]
not
undertake
to
re-weigh
conflicting
evidence,
make
credibility
determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary.” Craig v.
Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). When an ALJ’s factual finding rests on a
credibility determination, it “should be accepted by the reviewing court absent
exceptional circumstances,” where, for instance, “a credibility determination is
unreasonable, contradicts other findings of fact, or is based on an inadequate reason
or no reason at all.” NLRB v. CWI of Md., Inc., 127 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Deltek, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev.
Bd., 649 Fed.Appx. 320, 329–30 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasizing that credibility
determinations are entitled to great deference); see also Darvishian v. Geren, 404
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Fed.Appx. 822, 831 (4th Cir. 2010) (ALJ’s credibility determinations are “virtually
unreviewable” by the court on appeal).
Here, the ALJ enumerated no fewer than eight reasons for finding the
plaintiff’s subjective symptom analysis only partially credible. The ALJ found the
plaintiff’s allegations inconsistent because:
(1) Plaintiff’s impairments including hernias, back pain,
myocardial infarction, and anxiety, improved with
treatment including medications, injections, and stent
placement (Tr. at 25-28);
(2) Physical examinations regularly revealed a normal
gait, full motor strength, normal posture, and normal
reflexes (Tr. at 27);
(3) Plaintiff refused various treatment recommendations
for his back pain (Id.);
(4) Mental status examinations were largely normal and
revealed that the plaintiff was alert and fully oriented;
calm and pleasant; made good eye contact; had normal
speech; linear and goal directed stream of thought;
normal thought processes and content; fair insight and
judgment; normal memory; and normal attention and
concentration (Tr. at 28);
(5) Mark Choueiri, M.D., the plaintiff’s hernia repair
surgeon, noted that the plaintiff could return to work
with no restrictions (Tr. at 29, 431, 442);
(6) State agency physicians Porfirio Pascasio, M.D., and
Rogelio Lim, M.D., reviewed the record and opined that
the plaintiff could perform light work with postural and
environmental limitations (Tr. at 28-29);
(7) State agency psychologist Paula Bickham, Ph.D.,
reviewed the record and opined that the plaintiff
retained the ability to learn and perform work-like
activity in an environment without strict production
criteria (Tr. at 30, 101); and
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(8) Plaintiff engaged in numerous activities that were
inconsistent with his allegations of disabling
impairments, including driving for up to 45 minutes at
a time; caring for his own personal needs; performing
household chores such as washing dishes and clothes
and sweeping; mowing the grass; preparing simple
meals; attending his daughter’s sporting events;
attending church; and, even, hunting occasionally (Tr.
at 21-23, 31).
While the court agrees with the plaintiff that the ALJ does not necessarily have
“exclusive responsibility” for making credibility determinations, the Magistrate
Judge nonetheless appropriately deferred to the ALJ’s finding. The plaintiff cannot
show the kind of “exceptional circumstances” that would permit the court to set aside
the ALJ’s credibility determination. The ALJ fully explained her finding, pointing
directly to evidence in the record. Moreover, the determination is not unreasonable,
given the inconsistencies between the plaintiff’s testimony and self-reports.
Therefore, under a substantial evidence review, not only was the Magistrate Judge
permitted to defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, the Magistrate Judge was
required to do so, given the lack of exceptional circumstances. The court cannot, as
the plaintiff suggests, reweigh the evidence on appeal.
V.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the court OVERRULES the plaintiff’s objections. The court
ADOPTS and INCORPORATES the findings and recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge. The court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF
No. 7], GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No.
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10], AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner, and DISMISSES this matter
from the docket.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order to counsel of record, any unrepresented party, and the Magistrate Judge.
ENTER:
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September 20, 2018
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