Blevins v. Nationwide General Insurance Company
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The 5 MOTION to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; the Court DISMISSES Count I of the 1 Complaint; DISMISSES IN PART Count II of the 1 Complaint insofar as it alleges claims of bad faith and breach of good faith and fair dealing relating to Nationwide's failure to pay Ms. Blevins' insurance claim; and DISMISSES IN PART Count III of the 1 Complaint insofar as it alleges that Nationwide denied and failed to remit payment on Ms. Blevins' claim; Nationwide's 16 motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of its motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Thomas E. Johnston on 12/28/2017. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (kp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
LINDA BLEVINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-03692
NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Nationwide General Insurance Company’s
(“Nationwide”) Motion to Dismiss.1
(ECF No. 5.)
For the following reasons, this Court
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion.
Further, the Court DISMISSES
Count I of the Complaint; DISMISSES IN PART Count II of the Complaint insofar as it alleges
claims of bad faith and breach of good faith and fair dealing relating to Nationwide’s failure to
pay Ms. Blevins’ insurance claim; and DISMISSES IN PART Count III of the Complaint
insofar as it alleges that Nationwide denied and failed to remit payment on Ms. Blevins’ claim.
I.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a fire that occurred on March 14, 2017 that damaged Plaintiff
Linda Blevins’ (“Ms. Blevins”) property at 48 Godby Street in Logan, West Virginia, which was
Also pending before the Court is Defendant Nationwide’s motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of its
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 16.) As this order decides Nationwide’s motion to dismiss, the Court DENIES AS
MOOT Nationwide’s motion to stay. (ECF No. 16.)
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insured by Nationwide.
(ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 5–6.)
This property was occupied by Ms. Blevins’
son and daughter-in-law, a fact that Ms. Blevins alleges she disclosed to Nationwide when she
applied for the policy on August 17, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
Ms. Blevins asserts that she notified Nationwide of her loss soon after the fire. (Id. at ¶
16.)
Ms. Blevins further alleges that she also attempted to give Nationwide her sworn
statement in proof of loss form but was told to hold on to it. (Id. at ¶ 27.)
Subsequent to
receiving notification of Ms. Blevins’ loss, Nationwide issued a reservation of rights letter to Ms.
Blevins stating that her insurance policy may not cover the claim because the property had not
been occupied by the owner for eight years. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
claim number to Ms. Blevins’ claim.
However, Nationwide still assigned a
(Id. at ¶ 17.)
Nationwide states that it subsequently investigated the claim and requested an
examination under oath (“EUO”) of Ms. Blevins to be held on May 2, 2017. (ECF No. 6 at 2.)
Ms. Blevins, through counsel, made several requests to postpone the EUO, to which Nationwide
obliged. (Id.) On May 31, 2017, Ms. Blevins sent Nationwide her verified statement of loss
and again requested the EUO be postponed until June 15, 2017.
and conducted Ms. Blevins’ EUO on that date.
(Id. at 2.) Nationwide agreed
(Id. at 2–3.)
On June 19, 2017, Ms. Blevins filed this action in the Circuit Court of Logan County
alleging the following:
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the covenants of good faith and fair
dealing, and (3) violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”). (See
ECF No. 1-1.) Nationwide subsequently removed this action to this Court. (See ECF No. 1.)
On August 11, 2017, Nationwide accepted Ms. Blevins’ claim and remitted payment of
$92,017.50 for her claim.
(See ECF No. at 5-1 at 49.)
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Nationwide then filed this Motion to
Dismiss on August 28, 2017. (See ECF No. 5.)
Ms. Blevins filed her response to the motion
on September 11, 2017, (ECF No. 7), and Nationwide timely replied on September 18, 2017,
(ECF No. 8). The matter is now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
simple, concise, and direct” and “[n]o technical form is required.”
Allegations “must be
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
A
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
civil complaint.
See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
“[I]t
does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed. 1990)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A court
decides whether this standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual
allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether
those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer that “the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Id.
A motion to dismiss will be granted if, “after accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.”
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Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244.
III.
DISCUSSION
In the present motion, Nationwide argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because Ms. Blevins’ claims are not ripe since Nationwide never denied the insurance claim at
issue. (See ECF No. 6 at 3–7.) Ms. Blevins argues that her claims are ripe because, even if
Nationwide has satisfied her claim, Nationwide still fraudulently asserted a defense to the
insurance coverage. (ECF No. 7 at 6.) Ms. Blevins further argues that her common law bad
faith and UTPA claims are separate and distinct from her contract claim.
(Id.)
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear any case that is not ripe for
adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A case is ripe when “the issues are purely legal and
when the action in controversy is final and not dependent on future uncertainties.”
Brown, 42 F.2d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2006).
See Miller v.
Thus, a claim “should be dismissed as unripe if the
plaintiff has not yet suffered injury and any future impact remains wholly speculative.
Va. Dep’t of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 758 (4th Cir. 2013).
Doe v.
To determine if a case is ripe, a
court must “balance ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision with the hardship of the parties
of withholding the court’s consideration.’” Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 194 (4th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)).
The Court will
address the ripeness of each of Ms. Blevins’ claims separately.
A. Breach of Contract
In her Complaint, Ms. Blevins alleges that Nationwide breached its insurance contract by
asserting an “owner occupied” defense in their reservation of rights letter knowing that the
defense was baseless. (See ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 13.)
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Nationwide argues that Ms. Blevins’ breach of contract claim is premature because
Nationwide did not deny her claim as a reservation of rights letter does not constitute a denial of
coverage.
(See ECF No. 6 at 3–4; ECF No. 8 at 2–4.)
Nationwide further argues that
Nationwide’s continued investigation of Ms. Blevins’ claim before she filed this action shows
that the claims were never denied, thus making the breach of contract claim not ripe. (See ECF
No. 6 at 4–5.)
To state a breach of contract claim under West Virginia law, a plaintiff must allege facts
that show “the existence of a valid contract; that plaintiff has performed under that contract; that
the defendant has breached or violated its duties or obligations under the contract; and that the
plaintiff has been injured as a result.”
Exec. Risk Indem., Inc. v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 694, 714 (S.D. W. Va. 2009).
“[A] plaintiff must allege in his complaint
‘the breach on which the plaintiffs found their action . . . and the facts and circumstances which
entitle them to damages.”
Id. (quoting White v. Roman, 3 S.E. 14, 16 (W. Va. 1887)).
Here, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege facts that show that Nationwide breached
or violated its duties under the insurance contract.
The only fact that Ms. Blevins’ alleges to
show that Nationwide breached the contract is the fact that Nationwide sent her a reservation of
rights letter stating that Nationwide may not provide coverage for the fire because the property
was not occupied by the owner. (See ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 7, 13.) However, a reservation of
rights letter asserting a possible defense to providing coverage is not the equivalent of a denial of
coverage.
See Mosadegh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 330 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“On appeal, the Mosadeghs argue that State Farm sent them letters denying coverage before the
scheduled examinations under oath, justifying their absence.
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But, as the district found, the
letters unequivocally state that State Farm was ‘reserv[ing] its rights under the policy, including
the right to deny coverage in its entirety’ should the concealment of fraud become known. . . . On
their face, the letters did not deny coverage . . . .”).
Beyond the reservation of rights letter, Ms. Blevins does not allege any other facts that
suggest that Nationwide wrongfully denied her claim or violated its obligations by not providing
coverage.
Thus, this Court agrees with Nationwide that the breach of contract claim is not ripe.
See Yacht Club on the Intracoastal Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 509 F. App’x 919,
922–23 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the breach of contract claims were not ripe at the time the
lawsuit was filed because the insurance company had not denied the claims but finding they were
ripe at the time the district court ruled on the case because the insurance company had since
denied coverage); see also Syron v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 506 F. App’x 500, 505 (6th Cir.
2012); (finding that a breach of contract claim became ripe once the insurance company
determined that the term policy was void and it owed the plaintiff nothing); Collins v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-0093, 2017 WL 1901630, at * 1 (S.D. Ala. May 9, 2017) (“A
claim of breach of contract . . . presupposes that the insurer has already violated a contractual
duty to pay . . . .”).
Furthermore, even if this Court were to find that Ms. Blevins’ breach of contract claim
was ripe at the time the Complaint was filed, that claim is now moot as Nationwide has since
accepted and paid the claim.
See Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754,
763 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a case can become moot by a change in factual circumstances
that renders the issues in the case no longer live) (“Generally speaking, one such [factual]
circumstance mooting a claim arises when the claimant receives the relief he or she sought to
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obtain through the claim.”).
(See also ECF No. 5-1 at 47.) Therefore, this Court also lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to hear Ms. Blevins’ breach of contract claim under the mootness
doctrine. See Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that it is well settled
that “[f]ederal courts have no power to hear moot cases, and . . . a case can become moot at any
time) (citing Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 550 U.S.
934 (2007); see also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1982).
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Count I of the Complaint.
B. Bad Faith and Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Count II of Ms. Blevins’ Complaint appears to allege a claim of bad faith and a claim of
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Nationwide.
(See ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶
14–23.) Specifically, Ms. Blevins alleges that Nationwide acted in bad faith by failing to timely
remit appropriate payment for all of her claim and “thus denying her claim.” (Id. at ¶ 23.)
Ms. Blevins further states that Nationwide “acted maliciously” and “pre-determined to devalue
and delay” her claim, ignoring their duty under the policy to promptly remit a claim award. (Id.
at ¶ 20.)
Nationwide argues that this claim also is not ripe because the Complaint was filed only
four days after Nationwide’s examination of Ms. Blevins and before Nationwide rendered its
decision on her claim.
the claim.
(Id.)
(ECF No. 6 at 6.) Nationwide further reasserts that it ultimately paid
Lastly, Nationwide argues that Ms. Blevins cannot pursue her common law
bad faith claim absent a proper breach of contract claim.
(Id. at 7.)
Although the parties appear to use the terms interchangeably, claims for bad faith and
claims for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing have two, distinct standards,
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at least in this context. Because Ms. Blevins appears to allege both in Count II, this Court will
address these claims separately.
i.
Bad Faith Claim
Under West Virginia law, before a plaintiff can assert a first-party bad faith claim against
an insurer, the underlying claim must ultimately be resolved.
See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1996). “Once a demand is unmet by an insurance
carrier, a policyholder need only prove he or she has substantially prevailed.”
Miller v.
Fluharty, 500 S.E.2d 310, 320–21 (W. Va. 1997).
[W]hen examining whether a policyholder has substantially prevailed against an
insurance carrier, a court should look at the negotiations as a whole from the time
of the insured event to the final payment of the insurance proceeds. If the
policyholder makes a reasonable demand during the course of the negotiations,
within policy limits, the insurance carrier must either meet that demand, or
promptly respond to the policyholder with a statement why such a demand is not
supported by the available information. The insurance carrier’s failure to
promptly respond is a factor for courts to consider in deciding whether the
policyholder has substantially prevailed in enforcing the insurance contract, and
therefore, whether the insurance carrier is liable for the policyholder’s
consequential damages under Hayseeds [ ] and its progeny.
Id. at 321.
Here, Ms. Blevins filed this lawsuit demanding Nationwide remit payment on her fire
loss insurance claim.
(See ECF No. 1-1.) Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, Nationwide
paid Ms. Blevins’ insurance claim.
(See ECF No. 5-1 at 47.)
This Court has stated before that
it is not entirely clear whether the filing of a lawsuit such as the instant matter constitutes a
“demand” under Miller or that payment of the insurance policy proceeds, even if it was in full,
constitutes a finding that Ms. Blevins substantially prevailed.
See Brooks v. Chase Home Fin.,
Inc., No. 5:06-cv-00694, 2008 WL 2704603, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. July 3, 2008). However, this
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Court is not aware of, nor has Nationwide cited, an authority that states that Ms. Blevins’ cannot
be said to meet the demand and substantially prevailed factors of a common law bad faith claim.
To the extent Nationwide argues that Ms. Blevins cannot assert a claim for bad faith because
Nationwide never denied Ms. Blevins’ claim, this Court has held that a formal denial of coverage
is not required because common law bad faith damages are premised on the delay in settlement.
See Bailey v. Bradford, 12 F. Supp. 3d 826, 841 (S.D. W. Va. 2014) (quoting Miller, 500 S.E.2d
at 321 n.6 (Additionally to the extent that Nationwide suggests a formal “denial of coverage” is
required for Plaintiff to substantially prevail, again, the applicable authority appears to be to the
contrary.
Indeed, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals observed in Miller that “[u]nder
Hayseeds, the policyholder’s consequential damages are based upon the insurance carrier's delay
in settlement . . . .”).
Therefore, to the extent Ms. Blevins alleges a bad faith claim against
Nationwide for delaying the payment of her insurance proceeds the claim survives this stage of
the proceedings.
However, to the extent that Ms. Blevins alleges bad faith based on
Nationwide’s failure to remit payment, the Court finds that allegation moot as Nationwide has
paid Ms. Blevins’ claim.
(ECF No. 5-1 at 47.) Thus, this Court DISMISSES IN PART
Count II of the Complaint. The bad faith claim under this Count will proceed insofar as it
relates to allegations that Nationwide delayed paying Ms. Blevins’ claim.
ii.
Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
This Court has recognized that West Virginia law “implies a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in every contract for purposes of evaluating a party’s performance of that contract.”
See Hanshaw v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:14-cv-28042, 2015 WL 5345439, at *17 (S.D.
W. Va. Sept. 11, 2015) (quoting Stand Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 373
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F. Supp. 2d 631, 644 (S.D. W. Va. 2005)).
independent claim.
However, this covenant does not provide for an
See id. (citing Corder v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-0738,
2011 WL 4263506, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 26, 2011)).
A claim for breach of the common law
duty of good faith must be brought with an express breach of contract claim; thus, “this claim
will live or die by the [express breach of contract] claim in [the same complaint].”
Clendenin v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:09–cv–00557, 2009 WL 4263506, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 24,
2009) (holding that the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be
dismissed because the breach of contract claim was dismissed).
Accordingly, to the extent Ms. Blevins is asserting a claim for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing under Count II of her Complaint, she cannot assert such a claim
without asserting a proper breach of contract claim.
Therefore, the breach of good faith and fair
dealing claims that stem from the above, dismissed breach of contract claim must also be
dismissed. Furthermore, as discussed more fully above, Ms. Blevins’ allegations under this
count that Nationwide denied her claim are moot as Nationwide has since paid her claim.
(See
ECF No. at 5-1 at 49.)
However, Ms. Blevins’ allegations that Nationwide failed to promptly remit payment of
the claim in violation of the policy language can constitute an express breach of the insurance
policy.
See Nowlan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:11-cv-00404, 2012 WL 1029315, at
* 4 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 26, 2012) (finding that although plaintiff did not assert a breach of
contract claim, plaintiff’s allegations that defendant failed to properly apply plaintiff’s loan
payments may constitute an express breach of the deed of trust); see also Miller v. Fluharty, 500
S.E.2d 310, 320 (W. Va. 1997) (“Other jurisdictions have . . . also concluded that the failure by
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an insurance carrier to investigate a claim adequately, or to investigate a claim properly within a
reasonable time, constitutes a breach of the insurance contract.”).
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES IN PART Count II of the Complaint insofar as it
relates to allegations that Nationwide failed to remit payment.
Thus, Count II will proceed
insofar as it relates to allegations that Nationwide failed to remit payment in a timely manner.
C. Violations of UTPA
Lastly, the third count of the Complaint alleges that Nationwide violated several
provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
(See ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 24–34.) Ms. Blevins
first alleges the following general violations under this statute: that Nationwide failed to pay
appropriate policy benefits and wrongly instructed her to hold on to her sworn statement of proof
of loss form.
(Id. at ¶¶ 25–37.) Ms. Blevins then alleges the following specific statutory
violations: (1) Nationwide failed to give a reasonable explanation as to why it was denying the
policy claim in violation of § 33-11-4(9)(n); (2) Nationwide refused to pay the policy claim
without conducting a reasonable investigation in violation of § (9)(d); (3) Nationwide failed to
act promptly upon communications about Ms. Blevins’ claim in violation of § 9(b); and (4) that
Nationwide has not attempted in good faith to reach a settlement with Ms. Blevins on her claim
in violation of § (9)(f).
(Id. at ¶¶ 28–32.)
Nationwide asserts that Ms. Blevins’ UTPA claims are premature because Ms. Blevins
filed this action before Nationwide decided the claim following the completion of its
investigation.
Blevins’ claim.
(See ECF No. 6 at 6.)
Nationwide also highlights that it ultimately paid Ms.
(See ECF No. 5-1 at 47.)
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West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9) states that “no person shall commit or perform with
such frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following” and then lists
business practices that violate the statute.
See § 33-11-4(9)(a)–(o).
To maintain an action
under the UTPA, a plaintiff must first resolve the underlying claim in her favor and then
establish some violation(s) under § 33-11-4(9).
See Allen v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., No.
5:11-cv-00036, 2011 WL 5357632, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 3, 2011) (citing McCormick v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 507, 519 (W.Va. 1996)).
“Further, a plaintiff must establish more
than a single ‘isolated’ violation of the UTPA to show that the insurance company’s violations
were of such frequency as to indicate a ‘general business practice.’” Id. (citing McCormick,
475 S.E.2d at 519). A plaintiff can demonstrate that the violations are part of a “general
business practice” by alleging multiple violations of § 33-11-4(9).
Id.; see also Rich v. Life Ins.
Co. N. Am., No. 2:13-cv-92, 2013 WL 13145690, at *7 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2013) (finding
plaintiff sufficiently alleged separate discrete acts by alleging seven different violations of §§
33-11-4(2) and 33-11-4(9) pertaining to settling a single claim); United Bankshares, Inc. v. St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co., No. 6:10-cv-00188, 2010 WL 4630212, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 4, 2010)
(citing Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 491 S.E.2d 1, 12–13 (W. Va. 1996)) (finding that
plaintiffs sufficiently pled a claim under the UTPA by alleging separate, discrete acts that
constitute violations of the sub-paragraphs of § 33-11-4(9)).
First, unlike the underlying claim in State ex rel. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.
v. Wilson on which Nationwide relies, the insurance claim here was ultimately paid.
S.E.2d 216, 223 (W. Va. 2017).
See 801
(ECF No. 6 at 3.) Therefore, the underlying claim in this
action has been resolved in Ms. Blevins’ favor, satisfying the first requirement of a UTPA claim.
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Second, similar to the above cited cases, the Complaint alleges several violations of §
33-11-4(9).
(See ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 24–34.)
Thus, Ms. Blevins has alleged facts that, if true,
may demonstrate that Nationwide engaged in a general business practice that violates the UTPA.
See McCormick, 475 S.E.2d at 519.
Lastly, Ms. Blevins’ claims are ripe as they involve
Nationwide’s behavior prior to settling the claim.
Furthermore, to the extent Nationwide argues
that Ms. Blevins’ claims are not ripe because she filed suit before Nationwide rendered its
decision on her claim, Ms. Blevins’ claims did not have to be ripe at the time of filing, but at the
time of review.
See Wilson, 801 S.E.2d at 223 n.15 (quoting Gopher Oil Co. v. Bunker, 84 F.2d
1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1996)) (“A live dispute must exist between the parties at the time of the
court’s hearing.”).
However, to the extent that Ms. Blevins alleges that Nationwide denied and failed to
remit payment for her claim, those allegations are moot as Nationwide never denied her claim
and ultimately paid it.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES IN PART Count III of the
Complaint insofar as it relates to allegations that Nationwide denied and failed to remit payment
on Ms. Blevins’ claim. Thus, Count III will proceed insofar as it relates to allegations that
Nationwide failed to promptly communicate or investigate Ms. Blevins’ claims.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Nationwide’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 5.)
This Court DISMISSES Count I of the
Complaint; DISMISSES IN PART Count II of the Complaint insofar as it alleges claims of bad
faith and breach of good faith and fair dealing relating to Nationwide’s failure to pay Ms.
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Blevins’ insurance claim; and DISMISSES IN PART Count III of the Complaint insofar as it
alleges that Nationwide denied and failed to remit payment on Ms. Blevins’ claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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December 28, 2017
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