Lucas v. Collins et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER the court OVERRULES the plaintiff's 8 objections; ADOPTS the 7 Proposed Findings and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge; and DISMISSES the plaintiff's 1 Complaint with prejudice. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 10/12/2018. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

JAMES LUCAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-04146

JASON COLLINS, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley
for submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On August 30, 2018, Judge Tinsley submitted
his Proposed Findings and Recommendations [ECF No. 7] (“PF&R”). The PF&R
recommends the court DISMISS this matter for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. On September 10, 2018, the
plaintiff timely submitted his objections to the PF&R [ECF No. 8]. For the reasons
that follow, the court OVERRULES the plaintiff’s objections and ADOPTS the PF&R
in full.
I.

Facts
Because the plaintiff makes no objections to the PF&R’s factual background,

the court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings in full.

II.

Legal Standard
A district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This court is not, however, required to review, under a de
novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge
as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are
addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this court need not
conduct a de novo review when a party “makes general and conclusory objections that
do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). When
reviewing portions of the report de novo, this court will consider the fact that the
plaintiff is acting pro se, and his pleadings will be accorded liberal construction.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295
(4th Cir. 1978).
III.

Discussion

The plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge failed to mention “the
government’s failure to post prison rules and regulations” so that the plaintiff may
become IRPP compliant1 so that he may have band room privileges. For support, the
plaintiff cites the following passage from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia:

“IRPP” stands for “Individual Reentry Program Plan.” See Longwell v. Ballard, No. 11-0912, 2012
WL 5232243, at *1 (W. Va. Oct. 19, 2012).
1

2

[T]he first requirement imposed on a government agency
responsible for prisoners, by the federal constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment and our state due process clause
in W. Va. Const. art. II, § 10 is publication of rules and
regulations to apprise them of the conduct required for
them to earn good time credits.

State ex rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick, 265 S.E.2d 537, 542 (W. Va. 1980). The plaintiff
also faults the Magistrate Judge for “rambl[ing] on for several pages on . . . ‘liberty
interests’ and the courts exercising restraint in supervising the minutiae of prison
life.”
The Magistrate Judge went on at length on liberty interests because without
a liberty interest, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not apply.

See U.S. CONST.

AMEND.

XIV, § 1 (The Fourteenth Amendment bars states from

“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). To
be sure, prisoners, including the plaintiff, have liberty interests in good time credits,
which is why prison officials are required to publish “rules and regulations to apprise
[prisoners] of the conduct required for them to earn good time credits.” Gillespie,
265 S.E.2d at 542.
As explained by the Magistrate Judge, however, inmates have no liberty
interest in band room privileges. Unlike good time credits, there is no statutory
entitlement to band room privileges. Moreover, band room privileges do not implicate
freedom from restraint that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995).
3

Being that there is no liberty interest in band room privileges, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not apply. Prison officials are therefore not
required by the Fourteenth Amendment to post rules on how to become IRRP
Compliant so that inmates may enjoy band room privileges. And because the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not apply, the plaintiff has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I digress to remark that the serious business of judging sometimes requires me
to sound just plain silly in treating with all seriousness a constitutional claim for
band room privileges.
IV.

Conclusion
Therefore, the court OVERRULES the plaintiff’s objections [ECF No. 8],

ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s PF&R [ECF No. 7], and DISMISSES the plaintiff’s
Complaint [ECF No. 1] with prejudice.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:

4

October 12, 2018