Knight v. Rickard

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 7 MOTION to Dismiss; the petitioner's 1 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin on 3/15/2019. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (kp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
ANDREW WAYNE KNIGHT
Petitioner,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-cv-00356

BARBARA RICKARD,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is the respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Motion to
Dismiss”) [ECF No. 7]. On January 31, 2018, the petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) [ECF No. 1], challenging his
conviction on the grounds that “the conviction is without merit or not enough evidence
to obtain a conviction.” Pet. 2. He claims that because there was insufficient evidence,
his “federal sentence should be allowed to run concurrent[ly] with his state sentence.”

Id. On February 27, 2018, this case was referred to Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert
for proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). That same day, Magistrate Judge Eifert entered an order [ECF
No. 5] directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the Petition and to
show cause, if any, why the relief sought by the petitioner should not be granted.

[ECF No. 5]. On April 20, 2018, the respondent filed her Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
7]. On April 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Eifert notified the petitioner of his right to
respond in opposition and advised the petitioner that, ordinarily, a failure to respond
to a motion to dismiss within the allowed time can support a conclusion that the
respondent’s contentions are undisputed and may result in a recommendation of
dismissal. [ECF No. 9]. The petitioner did not respond, and the time for responding
has passed. The respondent’s Motion is now ripe for review.
For reasons appearing to the court, the referral of this civil action to the
Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to
Dismiss [ECF No. 7] is GRANTED and the Petition [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
I.

Background
On January 17, 2008, the petitioner was one of several defendants charged in

a multi-count indictment. On April 16, 2008, the petitioner entered into a plea
agreement and pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment: conspiracy to
manufacture, distribute, and possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams, or more,
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Under the plea agreement, the
petitioner stated that he was “pleading guilty [to count one of the indictment] because
[he was] in fact guilty and because it [was] in [his] best interest to do so and not
because of any threats or promises.” Pet. 14. He stipulated that “there [was] a
sufficient factual basis to support each and every material factual allegation
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contained within [the indictment],” pet. 22, and agreed “to waive any right to contest
the conviction or the sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including any
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, excepting an appeal or motion based upon
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.” Pet. 16.
On July 31, 2008, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia (“Sentencing Court”) sentenced the petitioner to 120 months in prison to run

consecutively with any other sentence that had been imposed by the state. Four years
later, while serving his state sentence, the petitioner filed a “Motion for Sentence
Modification with the Sentencing Court” requesting that his sentence be modified so
that it would run concurrently with his state sentence. That motion was denied.
Three months later, the petitioner filed a letter with the sentencing court again
requesting that his sentence be modified. That request was also denied.
In his Petition, the petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction. In support of his claim, he explains that his half-brother
searched the record of his case and could find no evidence that the petitioner
conspired to distribute methamphetamine: the petitioner’s half-brother claims that
he found no controlled drug buy sheets, no materials found on the petitioner’s person
used

to

make

or

manufacture

methamphetamine,

no

evidence

that

methamphetamine was found on the petitioner, and no evidence that the petitioner
conspired to distribute methamphetamine. Pet. 10–11. As a result of there being

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insufficient evidence, the ptitioner argues that the court should allow his federal
sentence to run concurrently to his state sentence instead of consecutively.
II.

Discussion
As a threshold matter, the petitioner waived “any right to contest the

conviction or the sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including any
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, excepting an appeal or motion based upon
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.” Pet. 16.
Being that the petitioner is contesting his conviction based on the sufficiency of
evidence in a post-conviction proceeding and alleges neither ineffective assistance of
counsel or prosecutorial misconduct, his Petition is without merit.
Nevertheless, the petitioner’s claim also fails on the merits because there was
sufficient evidence for conviction. First, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in
count one. Second, the evidence that the petitioner claims is absent is not necessary
to prove the elements of this conspiracy.1 Furthermore, the petitioner stipulated in
his plea agreement that there was “sufficient factual basis to support each and every
material factual allegation contained within [the indictment].” Pet. 22.
The petitioner also argues that his federal sentence should run concurrently
pursuant to Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1990). Barden, however, is
inapplicable. Barden answered whether the Bureau of Prisons had the authority to

“The essential elements of a [21 U.S.C.] § 846 conspiracy are (1) an agreement between two or
more persons to undertake conduct that would violate the laws of the United States relating to
controlled substances and (2) the defendant's wilful [sic.] joinder in that agreement.” United States v.
Clark, 928 F.2d 639, 641–42 (4th Cir. 1991).
1

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designate a state prison facility as a place of federal confinement nunc pro tunc so
that the prisoner could gain credit against his federal sentence when the state court
ordered the prisoner’s state sentence to run concurrently with his federal sentence.

Id. at 478. The court found that the Bureau did have such authority and that the
Bureau must at least consider the petitioner’s case in accord with the broad statutory
authority it has to make nunc pro tunc designations of a state prison as a place of
federal confinement. Id.
But unlike the federal sentencing court in Barden, the federal Sentencing
Court here specifically ordered that the petitioner’s sentence run consecutively to any
state court sentence. See pet. 106, 117 (hearing argument for concurrency with the
state court sentence but declining to grant it). Additionally, in Barden, the state
sentence was imposed after the federal sentence; here, the petitioner was already
serving a state sentence when the Sentencing Court imposed his federal sentence.

See pet. 19. Thus, Barden does not apply.
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7] is
GRANTED. As such, the petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED with prejudice.

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The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.
ENTER:

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March 15, 2019