Farrar et al v. Cessna Aircarft Company et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 19 MOTION for jurisdictional discovery; and HOLDS IN ABEYANCE 6 MOTION by Textron Aviation Inc. to Dismiss and MOTION by McFarlane Aviation, Inc. to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction for a 60- day period of jurisdictional discovery ending 1/7/2019; plaintiffs to then file supplemental responses to Textron's and McFarlane's motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by 1/21/2019; and Textron and McFarlane to file replies by 1/28/2019. Signed by Judge Thomas E. Johnston on 11/9/2018. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (taq)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
ARRIN FARRAR, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-cv-00461

THE CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
(ECF No. 19.) Also pending before the Court is Defendant Textron Aviation, Inc.’s (“Textron”) and
Defendant McFarlane Aviation, Inc.’s (“McFarlane”) motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 6, 9.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’
motion for jurisdictional discovery, (ECF No. 19), and HOLDS IN ABEYANCE Textron’s and
McFarlane’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 6, 9.)
I.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the March 16, 2016 crash of a Cessna 172 aircraft at Yeager Airport in
Charleston, West Virginia, in which Plaintiff Arrin Farrar, a student pilot, was severely injured. (See
ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 99–102.) The aircraft was manufactured by Cessna Aircraft Company (“Cessna”),
which later merged with Textron. (ECF No. 20 at 1–2.) McFarlane manufactured the aircraft’s seat
rails. (Id.)

Defendant Andrew Swepston (“Swepston”) performed repetitive maintenance and

inspections on the aircraft. (See id. ¶¶ 144–63.)

1

The crash occurred when the right-side seat, in which Arrin Farrar’s flight instructor was
sitting, slipped from its intended position. (See id. at 2.) As a result, the flight instructor slid
backwards, pulling the yoke with her. (See id. at 1.) This caused the aircraft to pitch up, stall, and
subsequently crash. (See id.) Arrin Farrar suffered from numerous fractures throughout his face
and extremities as a result of the crash. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 100–101.) He and his spouse, Plaintiff
Erin Farrar, further claim loss wages and loss of consortium due to Arrin Farrar’s severe injuries.
(See id. at ¶ 102.)
On March 20, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the present action in this Court invoking the Court’s
diversity jurisdiction as Plaintiffs are residents of Maine, (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4–5), Textron and
McFarlane are Kansas corporations with their principal places of business in Kansas, (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9),
and Swepston is a resident of Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege the following five counts against
Textron 1 and McFarlane: strict liability (Count I); negligence (Count II); breach of warranties
(Count III); fraud (Count IV); reckless, outrageous, and willful and wanton conduct (Count V). (See
id. ¶¶ 1–43.) Plaintiffs further allege claims for negligence (Count VI) and breach of express and
implied warranties (Count VII) against Swepston. (See id. ¶¶ 144–63.)
Textron and McFarlane subsequently filed the present motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, (ECF Nos. 6, 9), to which Plaintiffs timely responded, (ECF Nos. 23, 25), and Textron
and McFarlane timely replied. (ECF Nos. 30, 32.) On August 6, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the present
motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

(ECF No. 19.)

1

Textron and McFarlane timely

Plaintiffs also name Cessna as a defendant in their Complaint. (See ECF No. 1.) However, as stated above, Cessna
merged with Textron on January 1, 2017, and thus no longer exists as a separate corporate entity. (ECF No. 7 at 1 n.1.)
Therefore, the Court will only refer to Textron.

2

responded to the motion. (ECF Nos. 29, 31.) Plaintiffs did not file a reply. As such, both motions
are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a court may dismiss claims against a
defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).

“When a non-resident

defendant files a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenging
the court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction, ‘the jurisdictional question thus raised is one for
the judge, with the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove the existence of a ground for jurisdiction
by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Felman Prod. v. Bannai, 517 F. Supp. 2d 824, 827–28 (S.D.
W. Va. 2007) (quoting Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir.1989)). However, “[w]here, as
here, the district court addresses the question of personal jurisdiction on the basis of motion papers,
supporting legal memoranda, and the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff bears the burden of
making a prima facie showing of a sufficient jurisdictional basis to survive the jurisdictional
challenge.” Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 2009). “In
considering whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the district court must construe all relevant
pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most
favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction.” Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773
F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“A federal district court uncertain about its personal jurisdiction over a defendant may, in its
discretion, grant discovery for the limited purpose of determining whether exercising personal
jurisdiction is proper.” Estate of Alford v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd, No. 3:15-cv-16449, 2016 WL
756489, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 25, 2018) (citing Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy
Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003)); see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d
3

446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If a plaintiff presents factual allegations that suggest with reasonable
particularity the possible existence of the requisite contacts between the party and the forum state, the
plaintiff’s right to conduct jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). “[T]he decision of whether or not to permit jurisdictional discovery is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court” and “where . . . the plaintiff simply wants to
conduct a fishing expedition in the hopes of discovering some basis of jurisdiction,” the district court
is well within its discretion to deny jurisdictional discovery. See Base Metal Trading v. Ojsc
Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002). Thus, “[w]hen a plaintiff
offers only speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum state, a court is within
its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery.” Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 402.
III.

DISCUSSION

Textron argues that the Court does not have general personal jurisdiction over Textron
because Textron is not at home in West Virginia as it is not incorporate in West Virginia, its principal
place of business is not in West Virginia, and it does not have systematic contacts with West Virginia.
(See ECF No. 7 at 4–8.) Textron further argues the Court does not have specific personal jurisdiction
over Textron because Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise or relate to Textron’s minimum, purposeful
contacts with West Virginia. (See id. at 8–12.)
McFarlane similarly argues that the Court does not have general or specific personal
jurisdiction over McFarlane because McFarlane is not at home in West Virginia as it is a Kansas
corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas. (See ECF No. 10 at 3.) McFarlane
further asserts that it does not have a physical presence in West Virginia, nor does it directly advertise
or send products directly to West Virginia residents. (See id. at 3–4.)

4

In response to Textron’s and McFarlane’s motions, and in a separate motion, Plaintiffs request
permission to conduct jurisdictional discovery. (See ECF No. 20 at 2.) Textron and McFarlane
oppose Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, arguing that the request is nothing more than a
fishing expedition. (See ECF No. 29 at 10, ECF No. 31 at 2.) Specifically, Textron and McFarlane
argue that Plaintiffs have not shown that jurisdictional discovery is warranted because they have failed
to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction and have failed to provide a proffer on what
they expect to discover. (See ECF No. 29 at 5–10; ECF No. 31 at 2–7.)
A federal court sitting in diversity, “has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if
(1) an applicable state long-arm statute confers jurisdiction and (2) the assertion of that jurisdiction is
consistent with constitutional due process.” Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A., 814 F.3d 185, 188 (4th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir.1993)). Here,
because the West Virginia long-arm statute “‘is coextensive with the full reach of due process,’ the
Court need not conduct ‘the normal two-step formula.’” Knisely v. Nat’l Better Living Ass’n, No.
3:14–CV–15, 2015 WL 1868819, at *8 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 23, 2015) (quoting In re Celotex Corp.,
124 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir. 1997)).

Thus, the Court’s statutory inquiry merges with the

constitutional inquiry and the Court need only consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
would be consistent with the Due Process Clause. See id. “A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant comports with due process if the defendant has ‘minimum contacts’ with the
forum, such that to require the defendant to defend its interests in that state ‘does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Carefirst of Md., Inc., Inc., 334 F.3d at 397 (quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction—general and specific. A court may exercise
general personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, corporate defendant if the defendant’s contacts with
5

the forum state are “continuous and systemic” as to render the defendant “at home” in the forum state.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014). Generally, a corporation is at home only
where it has its place of incorporation and its principal place of business. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at
137. However, the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that a corporation could be at
home in a state where it is not incorporated or has its principal place of business. Id. at 139 n.20.
A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant if the
defendant has “‘purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum State’ such ‘that [it] should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” Perdue Foods, 814 F.3d at 189 (quoting Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)). The Fourth Circuit has directed courts to look
at the following to determine whether specific personal jurisdiction exists:
(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum state; (2) whether the plaintiff’s claims arose out of
those activities; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally
reasonable.
Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2014).
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Textron has the following contacts with West
Virginia: Textron makes millions of dollars in revenue in West Virginia; Textron is registered with
the State of West Virginia for the purpose of conducting business 2; there are 220 Cessna model 172
aircraft registered in West Virginia; Textron is required to continually provide airworthiness
information to the owners and operators of aircraft in West Virginia; and Textron advertises in and
solicits business from West Virginia. (ECF No. 26 at 12; see also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 13–14.) Further,

2

The Court notes that Textron has provided evidence that Plaintiffs are mistaken in their belief that Textron is registered
to do business in West Virginia. (See ECF No. 31 at 5.) Textron states that the Office of the Secretary of State in West
Virginia issued Textron an Exemption Certificate, which is not the equivalent of a certificate to conduct business in West
Virginia. (See id.) However, even taking this as true, it does not affect the Court’s decision to allow jurisdictional
discovery.

6

Plaintiffs allege that McFarlane has the following contacts with West Virginia:

McFarlane

advertises its products through national publications that reach West Virginia; McFarlane was
obligated to ensure continuing airworthiness of the aircraft components it manufacturers and sells,
including to the owner of the accident aircraft who is a West Virginia resident; and McFarlane sold
products to West Virginia. (ECF No. 24; see also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 13–14.)
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims amount to more than “conclusory assertions” of
the possibility that Textron and McFarlane have sufficient purposeful contacts with West Virginia.
See Eclipse IP, LLC v. Cornerstone Brands, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-144, 2013 WL 12136596, at *2–3
(N.D. W. Va. Jan. 23, 2013) (granting jurisdictional discovery and finding that, although plaintiff’s
allegations that the defendant “regularly transacts business in the jurisdiction” and “purposefully
directed its activities at residents in the forum” teetered on the verge of being bare allegations, the
allegations were sufficient to show that jurisdictional discovery would not be a fishing expedition).
Plaintiffs have done more than simply state that Textron and McFarlane have contacts with West
Virginia, but instead have offered concrete examples of Textron’s and McFarlane’s contacts with the
forum state. Compare the present case with Brighter Sky Prods., LLC v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No.
5:17-cv-03254, 2018 WL 2248601, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. May 16, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff’s
claims regarding personal jurisdiction were merely conclusory where the plaintiff offered no concrete,
meaningful contacts with the forum outside of the defendant’s website).
Although, especially in light of Textron’s and McFarlane’s specific refutations, Plaintiffs’
allegations are not currently sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Textron and
McFarlane, they are enough to cause the Court hesitation in dismissing Textron and McFarlane at this
juncture. Accordingly, the Court, in its broad discretion, will allow Plaintiffs to conduct limited
jurisdictional discovery for a period of 60 days to fully develop the record of Textron’s and
7

McFarlane’s contacts with West Virginia. See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 64 (4th
Cir. 1993); see also Eclipse IP, LLC, 2013 WL 12136596, at *2 (“[J]urisdictional discovery may be
appropriate where a plaintiff provides more than bare allegations to dispute a defendant’s denial of
personal jurisdiction.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed more fully above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for
jurisdictional discovery, (ECF No. 19), and HOLDS IN ABYEANCE Textron’s and McFarlane’s
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction for a 60-day period of jurisdictional discovery
ending January 7, 2019. (ECF Nos. 6, 9.) It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs, bearing the
burden of proof, shall then file supplemental responses to Textron’s and McFarlane’s motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on or before January 21, 2019, and Textron and McFarlane
shall file replies on or before January 28, 2019.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:

8

November 9, 2018