Bush v. Saul
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER adopting and incorporating the 15 Proposed Findings and Recommendations by Magistrate Judge; plaintiff's 10 Brief in support of judgment on the pleadings is denied; defendant's 11 Brief in support of d efendant's decision is granted; the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed; this action is dismissed and removed from the docket of the court. Signed by Senior District Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. on 4/10/2020. (cc: plaintiff, counsel of record, Magistrate Judge) (lca)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
FLINT TIMOTHY BUSH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00310
ANDREW SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are the objections to the Proposed Findings
and Recommendation (“PF&R”) of United States Magistrate Judge
Omar J. Aboulhosn, filed by the plaintiff, Flint Timothy Bush,
on October 28, 2019,
I.
Procedural History
The plaintiff filed an application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on
February 4, 2016.
The claim was denied on April 8, 2016.
The
plaintiff requested reconsideration of the initial denial, and
the claim was again denied on May 26, 2016.
The plaintiff then
requested an administrative hearing on June 17, 2016, and such
hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on
May 2, 2018.
The ALJ denied the claim in a decision on May 23,
2018.
The plaintiff requested an Appeals Council review of the
ALJ decision, but this request was denied on February 28, 2019.
On April 23, 2019, the plaintiff instituted this civil
action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review
of the administrative decision of defendant Andrew Saul (“the
Commissioner”) to deny the plaintiff’s application for
disability insurance benefits.
This action was referred to
United States Magistrate Judge Omar J. Aboulhosn for
consideration in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
the standing order in this district.
The plaintiff and the
Commissioner filed cross motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn filed a PF&R on October 15,
2019, recommending that the court deny the plaintiff’s judgment
on the pleadings, grant the defendant’s judgment on the
pleadings, and affirm the defendant’s administrative decision to
deny the plaintiff’s application for disability insurance
benefits.
The plaintiff timely filed a written objection on
October 28, 2109, to which the defendant filed a response on
November 5, 2019.
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II.
Standard of Review
The court reviews de novo those portions of a
magistrate judge’s PF&R to which objections are timely filed.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
The standard for
review of the Commissioner’s decision is rather deferential to
the Commissioner under the Social Security Act because “a
reviewing court is required to uphold the determination when an
ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence.”
Bird v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); see also
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (explaining judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decisions); Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d
396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating that the court must
“scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the
conclusions reached are rational” and “supported by substantial
evidence”).
Substantial evidence is that which “a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal
citation omitted).
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III. Analysis
In his memorandum in support of judgment on the
pleadings, the plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s decision was not
based on substantial evidence for two reasons.
First, the
plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide an adequate
explanation for the determination of the plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work because the
ALJ did not properly consider the plaintiff’s chronic fatigue. 1
ECF No. 10 (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 5-10.
Second, the plaintiff
alleges that the ALJ gave less weight to the expert medical
opinion of Dr. Jose Gonzalez-Mendez, who opined that the
plaintiff would be limited to light work.
See id. at 10-12.
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s evaluation and partial
rejection of Dr. Gonzalez-Mendez’s opinion is not supported by
substantial evidence. 2
Id.
1
The RFC assessment is a determination of the most work that an
individual can perform despite his/her limitations or
restrictions. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 3744184, at *1. The RFC
determination is an issue for the Commissioner to resolve. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
2
Several medical experts provided medical opinions: Dr.
Christian Nasr, Dr. Atiya Lateef, Dr. Fulvio Franyutti, and Dr.
Jose Gonzalez-Mendez. See ECF No. 15 (“PF&R”) at 11. Only Dr.
Gonzalez-Mendez opined that the plaintiff would be limited to
light work. See id. at 11, 14-19. The other medical experts
opined that the plaintiff could perform at least medium work.
See id. at 11.
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The magistrate judge reviewed the record and each of
these arguments.
For the first argument, the magistrate judge
concluded that the ALJ provided a logical narrative for the
conclusion that the plaintiff could perform medium work.
No. 15 (“PF&R”) at 21-23.
ECF
This was based, in part, on a review
of the collective record, including the plaintiff’s own
statements about his fatigue and corroborating and conflicting
evidence in the record. 3
Id.
For the second argument, the
magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ’s evaluation of the
expert medical opinion of Dr. Gonzalez-Mendez, who opined that
the plaintiff was limited to light work, is supported by
substantial evidence inasmuch as the ALJ found that Dr.
Gonzalez-Mendez’s medical opinion was not supported by medical
treatment records, by the plaintiff’s daily activities, or by
the plaintiff’s own statements about his ability to lift weight.
Id. at 17-19.
The magistrate judge noted that the ALJ provided
an appropriate narrative for the evaluation of Dr. Gonzalez-
3
The ALJ is responsible for making findings of fact and
resolving conflicts in the evidence, but the court determines if
the final decision is supported by substantial evidence and is
based on the correct application of the law. Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Craig v. Chater,
76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In reviewing for substantial
evidence, we do not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence,
make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for
that of the [Commissioner].”).
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Mendez’s medical opinion and the reason that opinion was only
entitled to “some weight.”
Id.
The plaintiff objects to the PF&R by arguing that the
magistrate judge failed to apply Fourth Circuit case law, which
resulted in the magistrate judge failing to recognize that the
ALJ did not provide a logical explanation for the conclusion
that the plaintiff could perform medium work despite his chronic
fatigue. 4
See ECF No. 16 (“Pl.’s Obj.”) at 2-3.
The plaintiff
specifically argues that the magistrate judge failed to apply
the binding precedent of Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307 (4th
Cir. 2019), wherein “meaningful review is frustrated when an ALJ
goes straight from listing evidence to stating a conclusion.”
See id. at 1, 3.
The plaintiff asserts that the magistrate
judge did not review “whether the ALJ even considered whether
[the plaintiff’s] ability to maintain attention, concentration,
and persistence was affected by his episodes of fatigue and need
for naps throughout the day.”
Id. at 3.
The plaintiff
maintains that his argument throughout the appeal process has
been that the ALJ’s determination is “legally deficient” because
the ALJ failed to provide “a logical explanation for how the
evidence cited informed and supported the ALJ’s conclusion that
4
The plaintiff does not object to the magistrate judge’s
determination in the PF&R regarding the weight afforded to the
medical opinion of Dr. Gonzalez-Mendez.
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[the plaintiff’s] chronic fatigue from sarcoidosis would have no
effect on his RFC.”
See id.
In reviewing a denial of a claim for disability
insurance benefits, an ALJ must provide an “accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.”
Monroe v. Colvin,
826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel,
227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)).
For an RFC assessment, the
ALJ must consider all the plaintiff’s “physical and mental
impairments, severe and otherwise, and determine, on a functionby-function basis, how they affect [the plaintiff’s] ability to
work.”
Id. at 188.
However, “there is no rigid requirement
that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in
his decision.”
Reid v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865
(4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).
In Thomas v. Berryhill, the Fourth Circuit vacated an
ALJ’s denial of an application for supplemental security income
because the court found that the ALJ did not sufficiently
explain her conclusions regarding the appellant’s mental
impairments and did not identify or resolve an apparent conflict
in testimonies.
916 F.3d at 311.
The court held that “a proper
RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical
explanation, and (3) conclusion.”
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Id.
“[M]eaningful review is
frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence to
stating a conclusion.”
Id. (citing Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d
686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018)).
Upon review of the record, the court agrees with the
magistrate judge and finds that the ALJ provided adequate
logical explanation for why the substantial evidence in the
record supports the conclusion that the plaintiff has the RFC to
perform medium work.
The ALJ properly reviewed evidence and
resolved conflicts between apparently conflicting evidence to
determine that the plaintiff’s “allegations and alleged
limitations are inconsistent with the objective evidence and
other evidence in the record.”
Tr. at 42-43.
“[T]he evidence
of the [plaintiff’s] daily activities along with the objective
medical evidence . . . establishes that [the plaintiff] has
greater sustained capacity than alleged.”
See Tr. at 46.
In
particular, the ALJ considered the plaintiff’s report of fatigue
but found that the plaintiff’s daily activities and the medical
examinations, which were normal, supported the RFC assessment,
even in light of the alleged fatigue.
See Tr. at 44.
The ALJ’s
analysis of the evidence in the record creates a “logical
bridge” from the evidence to the conclusion of the plaintiff’s
ability to perform medium work.
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The plaintiff also asserts that the magistrate judge
neither mentioned the Thomas ruling in the PF&R nor applied the
holding of Thomas in reviewing the ALJ’s determination, despite
the fact that the plaintiff cited to this case in his memorandum
in support of judgment on the pleadings and in his reply to the
defendant’s response.
without merit.
See Pl.’s Obj. at 2.
This argument is
The absence of a citation to Thomas in the PF&R
does not indicate that the magistrate judge failed to consider
the law articulated in the case.
The magistrate judge properly
addressed the three components of Thomas by reviewing the
evidence in the record, considering the ALJ’s conclusion, and
finding a logical explanation for how the ALJ reached the
conclusion based on the evidence.
The magistrate judge cited to
and applied the same law from other Fourth Circuit cases to
which Thomas itself cites.
See PF&R at 22-23 (citing Monroe,
826 F.3d; Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015)).
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, having received the PF&R and the
plaintiff’s objections, and having reviewed the record de novo,
it is ORDERED that:
1. The plaintiff’s objection to the PF&R be, and it
hereby is, overruled;
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2. The findings and recommendation made in the PF&R
be, and they hereby are, adopted by the court and incorporated
herein;
3. The plaintiff’s request for judgment on the
pleadings and remand be, and it hereby is, denied;
4. The Commissioner’s request for judgment on the
pleadings to affirm the decision below of the ALJ be, and it
hereby is, granted;
5. The decision of the Commissioner be, and it hereby
is, affirmed; and
6. The plaintiff’s action be, and it hereby is,
dismissed and removed from the docket of the court.
The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this
memorandum opinion and order to the plaintiff, all counsel of
record, and the United States Magistrate Judge.
ENTER: April 10, 2020
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