Pearson v. Thompson et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The 36 Motion for Summary Judgment on all Plaintiff's claims asserted against Sergeant Cabell is GRANTED IN PART; Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all remaining claims asserted against Defendants Thompson and Hicks is DENIED IN PART; Defendant Cabell is DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. Signed by Judge Thomas E. Johnston on 8/21/2020. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented party) (kew)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
MARIO PEARSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-cv-00321
CAPTAIN THOMPSON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants Ronnie Thompson, William Cabell, and Timothy
Hicks’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 36.) For the
reasons more fully explained below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
I.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of an alleged use of excessive force by correctional officers at the
South Central Regional Jail (the “Jail”) on October 28, 2017. Plaintiff Mario Pearson (“Plaintiff”)
was a recently-booked inmate at the Jail and was to be incarcerated until February 24, 2018. (ECF
No. 37 at 2.) Defendants Captain Ronnie Thompson (“Captain Thompson”), Sergeant William
Cabell (“Sergeant Cabell”) , and Corporal Timothy Hicks (“Corporal Hicks”) are all correctional
officers employed by the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority and were
assigned to the Jail. (Id. at 1.)
During the booking process, Plaintiff was examined by a nurse who conducted a suicide
screening. (ECF No. 36–2, Ex. B.) For the protection of private health and medical information,
Plaintiff’s assessment was not disclosed to Jail personnel. (ECF No. 37 at 2.) However, based
on Plaintiff’s assessment, the nurse recommended to the booking officer that Plaintiff be placed
on suicide watch. (Id.) A mistake was made, though, and Plaintiff was initially housed in
general population. (Id. at 3.)
Upon discovering the mistake, Plaintiff was brought to an
interview room where Sergeant Cabell informed Plaintiff he was to be moved to suicide watch and
needed to change into a suicide smock.
(Id.)
According to Defendants, Plaintiff became
argumentative at this time, denied being suicidal, yelled at the officers, and attempted to flip the
table in the interview room. (Id.) De-escalation attempts by the officers failed, and Corporal
Hicks then sprayed Plaintiff in the face with two one-half second bursts of Oleoresin Capsicum
(“OC”). (Id.) Plaintiff, however, denies that he was “combative,” but concedes that he was
verbally arguing with Corporal Hicks over Plaintiff’s placement on suicide watch. (ECF No. 39
at 2.) Plaintiff contends that Corporal Hicks used the OC spray on Plaintiff “for simply arguing
over their intention to place plaintiff on suicide watch.” (Id.)
Following Corporal Hicks’s use of OC spray, Captain Thompson ordered the officers to
close the door to the interview room to allow the OC to take effect. (Id.) Once Plaintiff was
subdued by the spray, the officers removed Plaintiff without further use of force and took him to
decontamination. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he was left in the cell for approximately two hours
before being moved to decontamination. (ECF No. 39 at 2.) Plaintiff was taken to the suicide
watch section following decontamination.1 (ECF No. 37 at 3.)
Specifically, Plaintiff was taken to pod section A-7-3. (ECF No. 37 at 3.) Section A of the suicide watch is used
for inmates who are monitored more closely. (Id.)
1
2
Shortly after being moved to the suicide watch section, Plaintiff removed the sprinkler head
in his cell, which resulted in the flooding of the area. 2 (Id.) Plaintiff was removed from his cell
and placed in booking so that the sprinkler could be replaced. (Id. at 3–4.) While in booking,
Plaintiff took a shower and was given fresh clothing. (Id. at 4.) However, Plaintiff refused to
change into a fresh suicide smock and “became belligerent and continued to act erratically.” (Id.)
Plaintiff repeatedly refused to be placed on suicide watch and stated that the officers would need
to fight him. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, asserts that he was calm, requested medical, but was
ignored. (ECF No. 39 at 3.)
After approximately 20 to 25 minutes, Captain Thompson was called to assist the officers
handling Plaintiff. (ECF No. 37 at 3.) Plaintiff continued to refuse the officers’ orders. (Id.)
Plaintiff also continued to request medical assistance. (ECF No. 39 at 3.) Captain Thompson
then ordered that a restrain chair be brought in, and he told Plaintiff that Plaintiff could either
comply with his placement on suicide watch or would be placed in the restraint chair. (ECF No.
37 at 3.) Plaintiff continued to refuse compliance. (Id.) When Plaintiff did not move towards
the chair, Captain Thompson sprayed Plaintiff with the OC in a single half-second burst. (Id.)
Plaintiff immediately sat down in the restraint chair. (Id.) Officers then applied the restraints to
Plaintiff.
(Id.)
Captain Thompson ordered another officer that once Plaintiff had become
compliant, he was to move Plaintiff to decontamination and again place him on suicide watch.
(Id.) Once Plaintiff was in the chair, Captain Thompson and Corporal Hicks left the area. (Id.
at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that he did not threaten or act aggressively towards Captain Thompson
during this period of time in booking, (ECF No. 39 at 3), but Captain Thompson stated in the
Plaintiff states that he “popped the sprinkler head” after “unsuccessfully attempting to get officers to decontaminate
him.” (ECF No. 39 at 2.)
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incident report that he feared for the safety of a nurse who was in the vicinity, despite the presence
of other correctional officers. (ECF No. 39–6, Ex. F.)
Plaintiff was held in this chair for several hours. (ECF No. 36–6, Ex. F at 23.) While
restrained in the chair, Plaintiff requested that he be decontaminated. (ECF No. 37 at 4; ECF No.
39 at 4.) Various officers, including Sergeant Cabell, misted Plaintiff with water in the face and
neck area. (ECF No. 37 at 4–5.) During this time, both Jail personnel and the nursing staff began
logging the active monitoring of Plaintiff in the chair. (Id. at 5.) This monitoring included
checking his pulse, respiration, and blood pressure, as well as the tightness of his restraints and
overall general health. (Id.) After Plaintiff was released from the restraint chair, he was placed
on suicide watch for the next day. (Id.) The day after that, he was removed from suicide watch
by a mental health professional. (Id. at 5–6.)
Plaintiff filed this action on January 30, 2019, in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County,
West Virginia. (ECF No. 1–1.) Defendants removed this action to this Court on April 25, 2019,
on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff asserted the following causes
of action in the original complaint: assault and battery (Count I); intentional infliction of emotional
distress/outrageous conduct (Count II); and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV). 3 On
August 29, 2019, this Court issued an order dismissing the claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against all defendants. (See ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff’s remaining claims,
asserted against all Defendants, are for assault and battery and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3
“Count IV” is apparently a typographical error, as no “Count III” was listed in the original complaint.
4
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on April 20, 2020. (ECF No. 36.)
Plaintiff timely responded on May 4, 2020. (ECF No. 39.) Defendants filed their reply on May
11, 2020. (ECF No. 42.) As such, Defendants’ motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment. It states, in
pertinent part, that a court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.” “Facts are ‘material’ when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a
‘genuine issue’ exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” News & Observer Publ. Co. v. Raleigh–Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570,
576 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment should not be granted if there are factual issues that
reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986). “Thus, at the summary judgment phase, the pertinent inquiry is whether there
are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
The nonmoving party bears the burden of showing there is a “genuine issue of material fact
for trial . . . by offering ‘sufficient proof in the form of admissible evidence[.]’” Guessous v.
Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016). When ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing
party.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
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III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s remaining
claims. First, Defendants argue that Sergeant Cabell is subject to dismissal because there has
been no evidence produced that he used any force, let alone excessive, against the Plaintiff. (ECF
No. 37 at 8.) Next, Defendants argue that Captain Thompson and Officer Hicks are entitled to
summary judgment in their favor because the force used by them in subduing Plaintiff was applied
in a good-faith effort. (Id.) Finally, Defendants assert that they are all entitled to qualified
immunity as to both the state and federal causes of action. 4 (Id. at 15–18.)
A. Sergeant Cabell
Defendants argue for the dismissal of Sergeant Cabell from this action because no evidence
has been produced that he used any force against Plaintiff. (Id. at 8.) While Sergeant Cabell was
present when Corporal Hicks first used the OC spray against Plaintiff, he did not actually disperse
the spray. (Id.) Further, Sergeant Cabell was not present when Captain Thompson used the OC
spray or during the time leading up to Plaintiff’s placement into the restraint chair.
(Id.)
Therefore, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff cannot prove a “prima facie” case against him, thus
requiring his dismissal. (Id.)
Plaintiff responds by arguing that Sergeant Cabell is liable “because he was present to hear
the pleas of plaintiff that the O.C. was burning him.” (ECF No. 39 at 13.) Instead of properly
decontaminating him, Sergeant Cabell “misted plaintiff’s face with a spray bottle,” which only
Defendants have also included an argument addressing a § 1983 claim under a theory of supervisory liability. (ECF
No. 37 at 18–20.) This appears to be in error, as no cause of action was advanced by Plaintiff under supervisory
liability. Therefore, the Court does not take up this argument.
4
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exacerbated the burning. (Id.) Therefore, Plaintiff maintains that Sergeant Cabell should not be
granted summary judgment in his favor.
Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Sergeant Cabell committed an assault and
battery against him. In West Virginia, a person commits an act of battery if “(a) he acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an
imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other
directly or indirectly results.” Tolliver v. The Kroger Co., 498 S.E.2d 702, 711 (W. Va. 1997)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965)). Sergeant Cabell did not use any force
against Plaintiff when Corporal Hicks deployed OC spray, and he was not even present when
Captain Thompson used OC spray against the Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of assault and
battery against Sergeant Cabell is DISMISSED.
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence showing a genuine issue that
Sergeant Cabell violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to properly decontaminate Plaintiff.
In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the
“deprivation suffered or injury inflicted . . . was sufficiently serious,” and (2) the “prison official
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th
Cir.1996). The latter requirement of this test is a subjective one. Mann v. Failey, 578 Fed. App’x
267, 272 (4th Cir. 2014). The subjective component requires a showing that the force was applied
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” instead of “a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). While Plaintiff
is correct that the deprivation of decontamination may establish a constitutional claim, the
evidence against Sergeant Cabell fails in that regard. Instead, the evidence shows that Sergeant
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Cabell even attempted to help Plaintiff while he was restrained by spraying him with water. (See
ECF No. 37 at 4–5.) This is a far cry from the “malicious and sadistic” standard articulated by
the Supreme Court in Hudson. Simply, Plaintiff has failed to show any genuine issue of material
fact as to Sergeant Cabell. As such, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force
against Sergeant Cabell must be DISMISSED.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Sergeant
Cabell. Sergeant Cabell is hereby DISMISSED from this action, with prejudice.
B. Captain Thompson and Corporal Hicks
As to the remaining Defendants, Defendants argue that Captain Thompson and Corporal
Hicks are entitled to qualified immunity as to both the state and federal claims and that Plaintiff
has failed to produce evidence that their actions were not in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline. Plaintiff counters, however, that numerous genuine issues of material fact
prevent this Court from granting summary judgment in favor of the remaining Defendants. (ECF
No. 39 at 5–12.) The Court begins by analyzing the issue of qualified immunity.
1. Qualified Immunity
The purpose of qualified immunity is to ensure that government officials performing
discretionary functions can perform their duties “free from the specter of endless and debilitating
lawsuits.”
Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). When performing discretionary functions, government
officials are “entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages to the extent that ‘their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
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Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Thus, qualified immunity protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986).
In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must consider
“whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that
the police officer's actions violated a constitutional right,” and “whether the right at issue was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the officer's conduct.” See Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d
723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of
the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
West Virginia’s qualified immunity standard is modeled on the federal standard described
above. See State v. Chase Secs., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591, 595 (W. Va. 1992). The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has explained the standard as follows:
A public executive official who is acting within the scope of his authority and is
not covered by the provisions of W. Va. Code 29–12A–1 et seq. [the West Virginia
Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act], is entitled to qualified
immunity from personal liability for official acts if the involved conduct did not
violate clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have known.
There is no immunity for an executive official whose acts are fraudulent, malicious,
or otherwise oppressive.
Syl. Pt. 5, West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority v. A.B., 766 S.E.2d 751,
755 (W. Va. 2014) (alteration in original).
In the matter at hand, the Court need not advance beyond the first prong of this analysis
because there are genuine issues of material fact. To begin, there is a significant disagreement
between the parties as to whether the use of force was necessary. For example, Defendants
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contend that, from the start, Plaintiff was argumentative, yelling at the officers, and attempted to
flip a table. (ECF Nos. 36–3 at 18–22; 36–4 at 21–26; 36–5 at 26–27.) Plaintiff, meanwhile,
disputes this characterization. (See ECF No. 39–1 at 71:2.) Furthermore, there appears to be
conflicting accounts between certain testimony and documentary evidence.
For instance,
Sergeant Cabell testified that the officers were outside of the interview room when Corporal Hicks
first used OC Spray against Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 39–8 at 22:5–6.)
Meanwhile, Captain
Thompson’s incident report indicates that both he and Corporal Hicks were still in the interview
room when Corporal Hicks deployed the OC spray. (ECF No. 39–6 at 2.) Similarly, in the
second incident, Corporal Hicks stated that Plaintiff was not a threat while in booking and did not
act out violently. (ECF No. 39–8 at 44:10; 46:23.) While Defendants claim to have “exhausted
every possible avenue to gain compliance,” (ECF No. 37 at 4), Plaintiff claims that Defendants
escalated the use of force beyond “using empty hand control, . . . [and] used intermediate control
tactics in response to a situation where there was no physical threat or active resistance.” (ECF
No. 39 at 8.)
Based on the foregoing, genuine issues of material fact exist such that the Court cannot
grant summary judgment on the issue of state and federal qualified immunity.
As such,
Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to the Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.
2. Good-Faith Effort Restore Order
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishments.
U.S. Const., amend. VIII.
In the prison context, the Eighth
Amendment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Iko v.
Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams, 77 F.3d at 761). As already
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explained by the Court, in order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) the “deprivation suffered or injury inflicted . . . was sufficiently serious,” and
(2) the “prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761.
This analysis encompasses both an objective and a subjective element. Id.
To establish the objective component of this test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the
alleged wrongdoing is objectively ‘harmful enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 2. The question, as applied here, is whether the officer’s conduct was
“objectively unreasonable” under the circumstances. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 396–97
(2015). Therefore, the conduct must be assessed from the perspective of a “reasonable” officer
with the knowledge they actually possessed at the time, while recognizing the need of jails “to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id.
A plaintiff must show that an officer “acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’”
that is “wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (4th Cir. 2008).
This subjective component requires a showing that the force was applied “maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” instead of “a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. Whether the force was applied “maliciously and
sadistically” or in a good-faith effort requires a court to weigh the following factors:
[1] the need for application of force, [2] the relationship between that need and the
amount of force used, [3] the threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials,” and [4] “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34 (2010).
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However, and as explained above, there exist genuine issues of material fact in this matter
that prevent the Court from deciding this issue. To begin, the parties dispute the events such that
it is impossible for the Court to determine if there was a need for the application of force. On one
hand, the Plaintiff testified and points to evidence indicating that he was merely argumentative
with the officers about being placed on suicide watch, (ECF No. 39–1 at 71:2), while on the other,
Defendants assert that Plaintiff was cursing and flipped a table. (ECF Nos. 36–3 at 18–22; 36–4
at 21–26; 36–5 at 26–27.) Furthermore, as to the second factor, while the officers maintained that
they “exhausted every possible avenue to gain compliance,” Plaintiff testified that the Defendants
inappropriately escalated the amount of force beyond what was needed. (ECF No. 39 at 8.)
Naturally, the dispute of fact revolving on the level of force used affects the Court’s analysis on
the third Whitley factor as well. Simply, genuine issues of material fact prevent the Court from
engaging in this analysis, and those issues must be decided by the fact-finder.
Based on the foregoing, genuine issues of material fact exist such that the Court cannot
grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force. As such,
Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment on all Plaintiff’s claims asserted against Sergeant Cabell. The Court further
DENIES IN PART the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on all remaining claims
asserted against Defendants Thompson and Hicks. The Court ORDERS that Defendant Cabell
be DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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August 21, 2020
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